Every evening in Afghanistan, small, heavily armed units of SAS soldiers are taking part in "kill or capture" missions against the Taliban. The majority of the raids -- which are guided by the latest intelligence reports provided to Nato headquarters in Kabul -- are targeted directly at senior Taliban commanders, those responsible for planting the deadly roadside bombs that have accounted for so many British casualties.
The SAS raids are part of a special forces operation on an "industrial scale", devised by General David Petraeus, the US commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, to destroy the Taliban's war-fighting capability. And the strategy is proving to be a resounding success.
But out of sight, while we concentrate on small regular units under siege.
Over a 90-day period this summer, 365 key Taliban commanders were either killed or captured in a total of 3,000 night raids carried out by British and American special forces units, operating predominantly in southern Afghanistan. Another 1,031 "rank and file" fighters were killed, and 1,355 taken into custody.
The regular units aren't supposed to do night raids, and have all sorts of absurd roles of engagement. I wonder what the ROE of the special forces is?
Not surprisingly, this unprecedented level of special forces activity is having a devastating impact on the Taliban's effectiveness and morale. British commanders have reported a significant drop in their casualty rates, while the number of roadside bombs has fallen by a quarter.
I imagine the locals appreciate such things.
Equally important, the high attrition rate has led many potential Taliban recruits to have second thoughts about risking their lives for the cause. "When the average life expectancy of a commander Number Three is around six months, it certainly concentrates the minds of those who are thinking about joining the insurgency," says a senior British officer working with SAS units in Afghanistan. "Suddenly there is an awareness that there is a price to be paid for planting roadside bombs. Families are less keen to let their sons volunteer."
It would be tempting fate to say that we are finally winning the war against the Taliban, especially as the overall casualty rate for Nato forces this year is the highest since Western troops first deployed in late 2001. But these recent successes do suggest that the mission is heading in the right direction at last, with all the implications that might have for its future success.
Perhaps not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning?
Unfortunately, however, the overwhelming majority of the British public appears to be totally unaware of these highly significant developments. That was the case again this week over Nato's decision to redeploy British troops from the bitterly contested town of Sangin, where 106 soldiers have lost their lives over the past four years.
Sangin will hardly go down in the annals of this campaign as a stunning success. The woefully under-resourced
Hopefully that will be changed once the Tories have a handle on the economy.
British contingent was never able to achieve its original objective of dominating the area surrounding this strategically important town. But through their heroic efforts, British troops did manage to defeat repeated Taliban attempts to retake the town, killing hundreds of insurgents and denying the enemy control of a vital supply route.
#3
I wonder if it is this situation, plus the attrition caused by our UAVs and, probably, the Afghan special forces on the Pakistani side of the border, that has triggered the talk of a Pakistan revolution that we had an article about yesterday...
I am reminded of Rudyard Kipling's Kim, for some reason.
[Ennahar] Clashes between the Mauritanian army and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are not in the interests of Algeria. Although some gun-hung tough guys are eliminated from time to time, it also allows the terrorist organization to recover large quantities of arms and ammunition.
The terrorist organization managed, according to reports, to seize quantities of arms and ammunition after each confrontation with the Mauritanian army. The latest was the announcement issued by AQIM following the military operation on Mauritanian territory last Friday, and recovering a large quantity of arms and ammunition including 8 two Kalashnikov, two PK, three RPG, 4 guns, 9 bullet proof vests, etc..
According to experts, these weapons are carried by the gun-hung tough guys to the north of Algeria where the residue of terrorism in their stronghold surrounded by security forces, to commit terrorist operations on Algerian territory and then return back to the south where they live in peace on the Malian territory.
Despite the efforts of the Mauritanian authorities in their fight against the terrorist organization on the borders of Mali and sometimes even on Malian territory, they often wipe setbacks due to lack of means. What makes the terrorist organization even stronger and the consequences affect the security of both Mauritania and Algeria.
Posted by: Fred ||
09/25/2010 00:00 ||
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Top|| File under: al-Qaeda in North Africa
Boesoeker: If you want to post a lotta stuff, please make your contributions more rewarding by making mods' jobs easier: Keep posts WoT with Wot and so on.
#4
Thank you, Besoeker. It's much appreciated, especially since you've been posting a great many articles lately. (I do hope that "remaining" will be a very long time.)
#5
Cessna press release. No doubt light aircradft make great close air support, when there is no air or ADA threat. And they are cheap too!
Posted by: 49 Pan ||
09/25/2010 15:24 Comments ||
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#6
So-called light-attack turboprops are cheap both to build and to fly. A fighter jet can cost $80m. By contrast the 208B Caravan, a light-attack turboprop made by Cessna, costs barely $2m. It also costs as little as $500 a hour to run when it is in the air, compared with $10,000 or more for a fighter jet. And, unlike jets, turboprops can use roads and fields for takeoff and landing.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
