An abortionist who claims to have destroyed more than 20,000 unborn children and who once was Hillary Clinton's OB-GYN says he is doing "God's work" when he terminates a pregnancy.
"Embryos and fetuses spontaneously aborted most, but not all of those 'canceled' by 'God' are ... luckless human souls," wrote William Harrison, referring to an ancient poem describing the plight of mankind.
"But a few spontaneous abortions occur in desired pregnancies with no discernible abnormalities. For those girls and women and their families whose circumstances would make their babies 'luckless human souls,' I 'cancel' them before they become babies."
Harrison's comments came in an e-mail to Warren Throckmorton, whose work has been published by journals of the American Psychological Association, the American Mental Health Counseling Association and the Christian Association for Psychological Studies. He documented his exchange with Harrison on his blog.
#5
More evidence that any ideology that doesn't recognize that man is not the ultimate authority and is limited in what he can and should do ends in the slaughter house.
... There has been a sharp increase in acts of terrorism in Afghanistan since the new Pakistan government assumed office in the last week of March.
NATO officers in Afghanistan have spoken of a 40 per cent rise in infiltration of jihadi terrorists since Pakistan suspended military operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and entered into peace negotiations with them.
Even as acts of terrorism -- including suicide terrorism -- have increased in Afghan territory, there has been a sharp decrease in acts of suicide terrorism in Pakistani territory. This indicates that the new government has made a deal with the Taliban allowing it to operate freely in Afghanistan in return for its stepping down operations in Pakistani territory.
The increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan to assist in its economic development has been a constant source of criticism by Pakistan, which has taken up the issue repeatedly with the US and other NATO countries.
Sections of the media and religious parties in Pakistan have also been critical of the close relations of the Karzai government with India. Urdu newspapers in Pakistan had even accused India of fomenting trouble in Balochistan from covert bases in Afghan territory.
Pakistan thus has a strong motive to target Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan through surrogate Taliban. During the last three years, there has been a steep increase in acts of suicide terrorism by the Neo-Taliban of Afghanistan headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2008 00:00 ||
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Let us be clear here: Not a single general, not a brigadier, a major general, a lieutenant general or a full general, nor any naval officers of the same grades, has suffered any serious adverse consequences for failure upon the field of battle since World War II. At worst, as was the case with Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, some might merely have not been promoted. Others, such as Gen. William Westmoreland, were promoted to chief of staff of the Army after failing to win year after year in Vietnam. So what is the difference and how have things changed over time since the end of World War II?
.... Wilson and his administration also supported, among several others, the semi-official organization known as the American Protective League. This was a group whose quarter-million members took it upon themselves to conduct warrantless searches, phone tapping, arrests (they would be called kidnapping now, because these were civilians arresting civilians), interrogations and a host of other activities we now would see as outrageous. Atop all of this, Wilsons administration created the Committee for Public Information, a domestic propaganda organization designed purely to whip up and maintain support for the war effort, with more than 75,000 employees. In effect, Wilson established as close to a police state as this nation has ever known. It meant, in effect if not by intent, that the political cost for the relief of generals, either by Wilson or by the armed forces, was effectively zero. The commander of the American Expeditionary Force, Gen. John Pershing, therefore had the ability to send no less than 32 of the generals sent over to him packing back home, or doing the generals equivalent of counting towels at the gym....
Truman, despite abysmal polls, was unequivocal when he decided finally to relieve MacArthur from command in 1951 for his repeated insubordination and blatant political maneuvering with the Republican Party. Just before that, the commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgeway, had relieved five division commanders in combat on his own authority (apparently over the screaming protests of the general officer personnel management back in Washington). But those would be the last division commanders relieved so far in our history.
Truman had been at the top of the political game for decades at that point, and arguably was more interested in adhering to his Midwestern values than he was in any re-election he might contemplate. He was famously willing to take the hit, epitomized by his desktop sign, The Buck Stops Here. Discussing MacArthur, Truman told the then-influential Time magazine, I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the president. I didnt fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but thats not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.
And take the hit he did. In the wake of the overtly political MacArthurs relief MacArthur had not-so-privately maneuvered for the Republican Party presidential nomination as early as 1930, while he was chief of staff of the Army Trumans opposition made mincemeat of the president. There were calls for impeachment, his popularity dropped to 22 percent, and he lost the first round of his partys primaries....
#1
Not a single general, not a brigadier, a major general, a lieutenant general or a full general, nor any naval officers of the same grades, has suffered any serious adverse consequences for failure upon the field of battle since World War II.
It's also fortune. Walker died in an accident during the debacle and retreat in Korea and Ridgeway [the Petraeus of that conflict] stepped in and turn the collapsing American/ROK/UN army around. General Dean was captured in the early days during the confusing and losing fight around Taejon, to spend the rest of the war as a POW. Being dead or captured sorta rates a little higher on the penalty category than being fired.
The pendulum has swung too far in denigrating the value of technology in war. Anything that smacks of high-tech warfighting is ridiculed as legacy or Cold War thinking. Today, however, we are at risk of over-correcting and dangerously undervaluing high-technology.
Historians Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson make an important point: Technology has permitted the division of mankind into ruler and ruled.[18] Technology is part of our culture; it is, in fact, our asymmetric advantage. Recently, strategic theorist Colin Gray noted: [H]igh technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A high technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its wars in any other than a technology-led manner.[19]
Some underrate technology because they are drawing the wrong lessons from history. For example, in writing the new counterinsurgency manual the drafters relied heavily upon lessons learned from insurgencies of the 1950s-70s. These were eras when, significantly, high-technology in general, and airpower in specific, had little to offer. Hence, it is no surprise that the discussion of airpower in the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is limited to a five-page annex, and that short discussion is leery of airpower out of fear of collateral damage.
Ironically, todays precision air weaponry, especially the new Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, have produced what retired Army General Barry McCaffrey insists is a a 100-year war-fighting leap-ahead that has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.[20] The result? Human Rights Watch activist Marc Garlasoc recently conceded that he thinks airstrikes probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists.[21]
Equally important, todays insurgent is not low-tech. In a recent article, retired Army officer John Sutherland invented the word iGuerrilla for what he describes as the the New Model Techno-Insurgent who exploits technology in a wide variety of ways.[22] Sutherland argues that the iGuerrilla cannot be swayed by logic or argument and insists this kind of insurgent is markedly different from those of the twentieth century who, he contends, are relegated to the dustbin of history. Yet much of our doctrine today is premised on twentieth-century insurgents.
To me, this risks missing the opportunity to exploit technological opportunities. We may be reaching the tipping point where the research and development capabilities of the nation-state can significantly exceed the abilities of an adversary dependant upon improvising from off-the-shelf technologies.
Tell the Japanese. After the failure at Guadalcanal, their gains contracted. After the naval battles of the Philippines, their naval defense were decimated. When Okinawa as taken, their inner defense lines were breached. Their cities were literally burning to the ground around them. The Imperial Japanese Staff continued to follow an irrational path which included plans using human waves of civilians to try to delay the inevitable. It took two wake up calls to bring logic back to the process. Even then, desperate elements within the military attempted a coup to prevent a rational conclusion to the conflict. Dealing with the irrational is not new. It is only 'will' or lack there of that by application in a manner they understand will rational return to the equation. We spend a lot of time and effort to avoid applying will.
#2
We Americans must use technology in warfare as a lever. We do not have the human assets, read fodder, for attacks, unlike the Chicoms, or the Jihadis. Even they will eventually feel the effects of attrition.
Posted by: Alaska Paul ||
07/09/2008 15:03 Comments ||
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#3
We do not have the human assets, read fodder, for attacks, unlike the Chicoms, or the Jihadis.
One of the lessons learned by the Chinese in Korea is that they don't have enough fodder either.
#4
We have made huge advances but we don't have the ability to take advantage of them in many cases. Many of our weapons are expensive to build and take a long lead time to produce. We can knock out a tank with a single missile but a country could produce more cheap tanks than we have missiles.
The way to defeat the US would be in quantity of targets. Our ammunition is so scarce and expensive that if you present more targets than we have high-tech missiles to hit them with, you win.
The worst scenario would be a mix of fully capable tanks along with others that are basically just a shell and a motor. Indistinguishable visually from the fully capable target, we would waste a lot of ammunition on targets of little military value.
The answer to that threat is the enhanced radiation warhead that simply kills all the tank crews but it would be hard politically to use such a weapon against a mosquito like Iran, for example.
#5
"Reaching the Tipping Point...off-the-shelf technologies" > methinks DESERT STORM better marked that Point. You can go back even earlier to Osama's war agz the Soviets + Putin in Afghanistan where ELDERLY REDEYE MISSLES STILL MANAGED TO SHOOT DOWN A LARGE NUMBER OF NEWER SOVIET = SOVIET EQUIPPED ARMED HELOS, or the early '80's ISRAELI AIR VICTORIES over Lebanon.
The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul has been looked as an attack on the sovereignty of the Republic of India. This inhuman act was condemned all over the world, fortunately India's Ambassador Jayant Prasad was not present there at that movement.
Posted by: Fred ||
07/09/2008 00:00 ||
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Top|| File under: al-Qaeda
#1
If I recall correctly, there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan, or in any other country except Indonesia. With that many of them there must certainly me a significant number of wackos for AQ to 'inspire' through attacks. Plus, since India was part of the Ummah for a long time it would be considered a legitimate target. It will be interesting to see how India responds.
Posted by: Menhaden S ||
07/09/2008 8:05 Comments ||
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#2
The wife of the owner of my favourite Indian supplies shop told me the last time she went home the Muslims in their quarter were behaving queerly, which spooked her. She also mentioned the large number of Muslim religious television shows, which had not been so on her previous visit. Your comment about the number of Indian Muslims jibes with what I've heard before, Menhaden. It reads like things there are starting to get really interesting.
#3
My wife is in New Delhi (she'd Indian) and she has also mentioned the Muzzies acting odd...more so than usual.
While there may be a lot of Muzzies in India, they're still vastly out numbered by the Hindus, and they have long memories. I'd expect to see a lot of Muzzies get killed if they really act up.
Some of the more radical Hindu groups are just looking for a reason to go hammer-and-tongs on the Muzzes. Can't say I blame them.
#5
I have wondered why India was not directly targetted. The Hindu are not even people of the book and there is the bit about once being Muslim and the Kashmir issue. I came up with two possible answers: (1) Muslim-Indian Jihadi would be valuable at infiltrating the west (2) The Hindu nationalists would not hesitate to go Medieval and the Indian Muslims know that. Perhaps they are finally coming around and listening to the Jihadi's. Even a small segment of such an enormous population could mean a lot of Jihadi.
Perhaps I was wrong on the first, or Al Queda doesn't feel it's worthwhile and needs a new front and new blood after losing in Iraq.
#6
Infiltrating the West with Indian Muslims is right on target. Lots of computer engineers and techies working in sensitive companies with government contracts. Many manage hotels and shops that import goods from that neck of the woods, too, and curry-eaters just don't set off alarms.
A year ago, the conventional Beltway wisdom had it that Iraq was a failed state. Today, the same wisdom holds that it is less chaotic but still fragile, dependent entirely on a U.S. presence to survive. But judging by recent comments from Nouri al-Maliki, even this view may be out of date.
Addressing Arab ambassadors in Abu Dhabi on Monday, the Iraqi prime minister made headlines by saying his government was "looking at the necessity of terminating the foreign presence on Iraqi lands and restoring full sovereignty." Mr. Maliki has also been playing hardball with the Bush Administration in concluding a status-of-forces agreement by the end of the year, when the current U.N. mandate authorizing the U.S. presence in Iraq expires.
Mr. Maliki's comments are an assertion of confidence in his country's stability and not without cause. Fully nine of Iraq's 18 provinces are now under domestic security control. Al Qaeda is being smoked out of its last urban refuge in Mosul. The Iraqi army has performed with increasing skill and confidence against Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, which has also been ousted from its urban strongholds. Iraq will take in some $70 billion in oil revenue this year. T. Boone Pickens, the Texas oil magnate, told us yesterday that Iraq could double its current production, to five million barrels a day, in coming years.
More important, Iraq seems to have been able to consolidate the security gains achieved by the surge, even as the last of the surge brigades deployed in 2007 are now returning to the U.S. That makes further reductions in U.S. force levels look increasingly plausible, a further validation of President Bush's "return on success" strategy.
Mr. Maliki's comments were also designed for domestic Iraqi political consumption another sign of that country's robust democratic debate. With elections scheduled for the autumn, Mr. Maliki wants to show he's nobody's pawn, especially not America's. The Sadrists continue to play the nationalist card, even as they are themselves pawns of Iran. The rise of Iraqi nationalism is inevitable and largely welcome as a unifying national force. Remember all of those who said an Iraqi Shiite government would merely be a tool of Iran?
The Prime Minister is also making it clear to his Arab neighbors that his government is not about to collapse. Apparently, they believe him: Jordan, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have announced plans to break the Arab diplomatic embargo of Iraq and return their ambassadors to Baghdad; the UAE has also forgiven $7 billion of Iraqi debt. Perhaps Saudi Arabia and Egypt will follow.
The significant question now is the pace and extent of any U.S. withdrawal, and the nature of any long-term U.S. military presence. Despite Mr. Maliki's comments, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie was quick to add that the call for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal was "conditioned on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security," according to the Associated Press. In other words, Mr. Maliki is not endorsing the Barack Obama agenda of immediate U.S. withdrawal starting on January 20.
Our view is that Iraq and Mr. Maliki would benefit from striking a security agreement this year while Mr. Bush is still in office. Despite Iraq's impressive security gains, Iran can still do plenty of mischief through its "special group" surrogates. The U.S. can help deter Iranian trouble, especially with Iraq elections scheduled for this year and next.
Inside Iraq, a significant long-term U.S. presence would also increase the confidence of Iraq's various factions to make political compromises. And outside, it would improve regional stability by giving the U.S. a presence in the heart of the Middle East that would deter foreign adventurism. This is the kind of strategic benefit that the next Administration should try to consolidate in Iraq after the hard-earned progress of the last year.
Our sense is that, with the exception of the Sadrists, all of Iraq's main political factions want the U.S. to remain in some significant force. Iraq is now a democracy, however, and perhaps as their confidence grows the Maliki government and Iraq public opinion will think differently. But that kind of withdrawal timetable should be mutual and not imposed by a new U.S. President acting as if the Iraq he'll inherit in 2009 is the same as the Iraq of 2006. That would mean U.S. forces could be withdrawn with honor, and in victory.
#1
The big question is now the last big election in Iraq, that will settle once and for all representation and power sharing. From there, the minority will have to rely on leverage and the majority on persuasion, not coercion, and to keep its unity, lest the minority leverage itself into power.
#1
"it still strikes us that the historical lesson from that enormous tragedy at the opening of the previous century {i.e., WWI} would still find application today."
Now more than ever. Anyone trying to kill an insane king on the verge of getting nukes had better succeed with the first shot.
#1
But now the crucial time has come and Assad is going to have to decide in the next few months which camp he really belongs to: the West's side or Iran's.
Tell me when Iran gets the crap bombed out of them and I'll tell you when Syria picks sides.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
A year ago, the conventional Beltway wisdom had it that Iraq was a failed state. Today, the same wisdom holds that it is less chaotic but still fragile, dependent entirely on a U.S. presence to survive. But judging by recent comments from Nouri al-Maliki, even this view may be out of date.
