by Kirill Semenov
The skirmishes that took place on the border of Iran and Afghanistan on May 27-28 between Iranian border guards and the Afghan Taliban, which currently represent the country's authorities, were rushed by many media and experts to be written almost as an act of terrorist aggression by the Taliban movement against neighboring Iran. It was noted that this is a confirmation of the terrorist nature of the Taliban and their inability to engage in peaceful dialogue.
As evidence of this position, statements were cited about the Taliban declaring war on Iran by one of the alleged "leaders of the Taliban," who was called Abdulhamid Khorasani.
However, firstly, these words of Khorasani were taken out of context, and his statement was only about the possible actions of the Taliban in response to the corresponding steps of Iran. And secondly, this person is currently, in fact, an ordinary blogger who has never been associated with the leadership of the movement. His last position was the chief of police in one of the Afghan districts, from which he was fired.
Waters of stumbling
At the same time, a closer look at the essence of the current escalation makes it clear that the Iranian-Afghan aggravation has nothing to do with any terrorist plans or other aggressive aspirations of the Taliban.
Although the true causes of the escalation, as well as their culprit, have not yet been established, it is possible that the trigger for the current escalation was the water issue.
Back in 1973, Iran and Afghanistan agreed to share water from the Helmand River. Kabul pledged to supply Iran with an average of 820 million cubic meters of water per year. The Helmand River flows through most of Afghanistan and flows into Lake Khamun on the border with Iran. An irrigation dam on the river was built between 1951 and 1953 by the American firm Morrison-Knudsen.
In the 2010s, the Afghan authorities, with US help, rebuilt the dams on the river, which Tehran believes could limit the flow of water to Iran.
The Taliban authorities of Afghanistan have not been able to provide the necessary spillway in the interests of Iran, referring to the silting of the bottom of the reservoir and the riverbed. Kabul officials justify that the reservoir is more filled with silt than water, making it difficult to meet Iranian needs. These technical difficulties arose immediately after the Taliban came to power in the country in 2021.
The Taliban suggested that Iran resort to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the 1973 treaty through arbitration. At the same time, it was noted that the development of relations with Iran is among the priorities of the Taliban's policy.
Tehran, in turn, took a fairly tough stance on this issue, hastening to place all responsibility for the water crisis on the movement.
"The Taliban should be held accountable for their refusal to grant water rights to Iran if it is proven that there is enough water in the dams built on the Helmand River," Iran's special representative for Afghanistan, Hassan Kazemi Qomi , said on May 20.
Earlier, on May 18, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addressed the Afghan authorities on the same issue: "If our experts confirm [that there is no water in the reservoir] , then there are no questions. But if there is water there, then you are obliged to ensure the rights of the inhabitants of Sistan and Balochistan. <…> Take my words seriously so that you don’t regret it later."
The Taliban refused to allow Iranian experts to the dam, considering this requirement a violation of sovereignty. At the same time, Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mottaki responded to Raisi's statement: “ We ask the Iranian government not to politicize the vital issue related to water. It is better to solve such problems through personal negotiations, and not to make noise in the press .”
Such rhetoric was followed by border incidents, for which they blamed each other.
Their emergence was also facilitated by the lack of delimitation and demarcation of the border. Border issues between the two countries have become the causes of clashes before, and in the current tense situation in connection with the water problem, they could become an additional trigger for escalation along with harsh rhetoric from both states.
The official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Taliban government, Abdul-Nafi Takor, accused Iran of shelling the border area of Afghanistan. According to him, both sides lost two people killed.
"Currently, the situation is under control, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan does not approve of clashes with neighbors," he said.
At the same time, according to the Iranian Tasnim agency, on May 27, the Taliban fired at the Iranian border post "Sasoli". As a result, one border guard was killed, two more were injured. The commander of the Iranian ground forces, Kiyumars Heydari, visited the border region on May 28 and said that now " complete security has been established " there.
What is behind the rumors about the war between Iran and Afghanistan
Ultimately, on May 28, the parties agreed to resolve all border incidents and declared the need to continue the policy of good neighborliness.
Historical context
Relations between Tehran and Kabul after the victory of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran were complex and ambiguous. As power shifted in Afghanistan, Iran changed its attitude towards local governments from friendly to hostile and vice versa.
The Taliban is no exception in this sense. Moreover, the dynamics of Iranian-American contacts and contradictions also left their mark on relations with him.
During the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan, which began in the same 1979 as the revolution in Iran, Washington and Tehran surprisingly turn out to be virtually allies in the Afghan issue, supporting the anti-Soviet resistance.
The United States, through Pakistan, helped the Sunni "Peshawar Seven" (the coordinating body of part of the Afghan Mujahideen groups). At the same time, Iran provided assistance to both the "Shiite G8", which united the Shiite armed factions with headquarters in Iranian Mashhad, and the Sunni field commander Ismail Khan - "The Lion of Herat", the commander of the "Western United Group" of the Afghan Mujahideen.
The Taliban movement after coming to power in Afghanistan turns into one of the main opponents of Iran, despite Sudan's attempts to reconcile them with each other. In 1998, Iran and the Taliban were on the brink of war. But the movement itself was soon temporarily neutralized by the hands of the United States.
According to Ryan Crocker , the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani was involved in important U.S.-Iranian negotiations after the September 11 attacks, when the parties were looking for ways to defeat the Taliban.
In 2001, after the US began the so-called. global war on terror, Iran secretly cooperated with the administration of George W. Bush in the elimination of the Taliban*. In the same year, Tehran and Washington, under the auspices of the UN, worked together to sign the Bonn Agreement to accelerate the process of state building in post-Taliban Afghanistan and begin the repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran.
The American intervention in Afghanistan temporarily strengthened Iran's position in that country. Tehran at a certain point was able to rely not only on fellow believers - the Shiites-Hazaras and its longtime partner in the fight against the Taliban Gulbuddin Hekmatyar , but also on the Taliban itself, which was forced to get closer to Iran.
In particular, the head of the Taliban movement, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, was killed by the Americans in May 2016, when he was returning from Iran. There, he held relevant negotiations with the Iranian side, which was confirmed by the Taliban spokesman.
However, it should be borne in mind that Tehran has always considered Afghanistan as a continuation of "Greater Iran". There are not only local Tajiks close to the Persians in culture and language, the second ethnic group of Afghans after the Pashtuns, but also fellow Iranians Shiites-Hazaras.
Iran even had plans to create its own puppet formations in Afghanistan. In particular, after 1992, Tehran worked out the possibility of creating under its leadership in the north of Afghanistan two quasi-states - the Tajik-Khazarean and Herat Islamic republics.
The Iranian leadership believed that these republics and Tajikistan (where a civil war was then going on and politicians loyal to Iran could come to power) would allow the formation of an "eastern Iranian arc" - a military-political alliance of Dushanbe, Afghan Hazaras and Tajiks under the leadership of Tehran.
Therefore, the aspect of Iran's "great-power" ambitions towards Afghanistan and attempts to put pressure on the Taliban leadership from these positions should not be discounted at the present time either.
Escalation not needed by Russia
On the whole, the aggravation of the situation around Afghanistan seems to be a very risky trend for Russia's interests.
Why the Islamic world refrains from sanctions against Russia
The problem is that it is not the Taliban who can open a “second front” against Russia, but Moscow may be drawn into an escalation that it does not need, following the provoked aggravation of the situation on the borders of Afghanistan and Russian partners in the CSTO.
The risks increase given that public opinion and the media are already set in such a way that the Taliban will be blamed for any aggravation around Afghanistan. Although some of our partners would probably like to resolve their own contradictions with them by Russian hands.
The Jewish Roots of the Taliban
So now that the tribe lost any hope for GREAT KHAZARIA bordering to Russia …
Afghanistan it’s a good substitute
All Jews should move there, they are the same trash anyway.
Posted by: ACA JOE ||
05/30/2023 15:53 Comments ||
Top||
#4
The whole issue of "Intent" was manufactured BS. None of the regs or laws governing handling classified have an "intent" component. It was just invented by Dem/DoJ lawyer smoke merchants to sound like it mattered.
What Mills and Hilda did was stripping classified markings/headers, pre-text messages of Classified determinations and then send them via an unsecured server, compromised by exactly who you imagine would do so. The did it becasue Hilda cou;dn't be bothered with the clumsiness of restricted handling, and she simply expected it to be pushed aside as befit her exalted status as heir-apparent to the Presidency, and woe until those who displeased her!
And Champ didn't care about saving Hilda, but he was fixated on his own skin and image. The whole thing was a travesty and everyone in the business knows it. But it just strengthened the belief that people who are connected to the power-center that is the Obama Cabal are immune from the law as long as they are loyal and silent.
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