Posted by: Frozen Al ||
05/01/2014 00:00 ||
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#1
A Right Wing News Artic on TOPIX, i.e. "A DEADLY RECIPE FOR WAR WID CHINA", denoted that there may be no US CVN forward deployed in WESTPAC next year for four months while the CVN USS GEORGE WASHINGTON rotates wid the CVN USS RONALD REAGAN, leaving America + overseas Allies highly vulnerable iff China + PLA decide to bust a move to take over disputed islands.
As led by US budget cuts, the USA = USDOD is no longer able to fight 2-to-2-1/2 Ocean Wars as during the Cold War thru post-9-11, but can now only fight 1-to-1-1/2 minor wars or limited mil actions, or 1 minor war and 1 major UNO-led peacekeeping action.
#3
Everything I've read by the good folks at Information Dissemination is that the LCS is a ship in search of a mission. I'm not expert enough to judge, but to me 'LCS' is just another phrase for 'corvette'. Not sure the Navy needs a whole bunch of expensive corvettes.
Posted by: Steve White ||
05/01/2014 11:22 Comments ||
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#4
I agree with Steve White "Not sure the Navy needs a whole bunch of expensive corvettes."
But I do think they could use a few heavily loaded Impalas for land assaults by the Marines
#5
...pending resolution of the future sequester impact.
Ahh-so! More budget games.
The failure to fund to the refueling and overhaul is another example of how the irrationality of sequestration has produced similarly irrational responses from the Defense Department. Critical defense priorities have borne the brunt of budget cuts while lower priority programs have survived.
Also known as "The Admiral's Barge Syndrome".
Posted by: Bobby ||
05/01/2014 12:31 Comments ||
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#6
Congress could save a lot of money by mandating that Airforce 1 and 2 could not leave US continental airspace.
Posted by: Pearl Borgia1889 ||
05/01/2014 13:05 Comments ||
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#7
We don't buy stuff we need for DOD, we buy stuff the conglomerates want to sell. Gotta keep the graft flowing.
Posted by: ed in texas ||
05/01/2014 19:48 Comments ||
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#10
Traditionally, when the USN formally retires a CV, it also retires most or all of its escorting Battle Group - CGS or CGNS, DDGS, FFGS, SSNS, USMC Amphibs, etc.
* FYI TOPIX, WORLD NEWS > [Various] UKRAINE CRISIS HAS LED TO UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING BY DRONE.
Somewhere out there, perhaps in the skies = high atmosphere over your city or hometown [or island], is a US experimental aircraft that has allegedly flown for over 500 days-n-counting, + NOBODY KNOWS FOR CERTAIN WHY.
[DAWN] THE details leaked from the government-army huddle to discuss the ongoing talks with the TTP were surely meant to underline the government's clarity, resolve and determination when it comes to achieving meaningful results in a clear timeframe on the dialogue front. Yet, the vague details passed on to the media about what was discussed and decided at the meeting only underscored just how shoddily the dialogue process has been managed so far.
The very fact that the participants had to direct the interior minister to push the TTP to finally reveal its demands and to indicate to the TTP that the process will not be open-ended, suggest something that could already have been guessed at: negotiations so far have been desultory and conducted inside only the barest of frameworks and timeframes.
It already seems a lifetime ago when, in late January, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf... announced his final push for negotiations -- a final push that was supplanted by yet another final push after the TTP ended its ceasefire recently and which is now apparently supplanted yet again by yet another so-called final push for a results-oriented dialogue.
What can be extrapolated from the government's contortions over the dialogue issue is two things: one, the government wants dialogue to succeed at nearly any cost; two, the government is so keen to convince the TTP of its bona fides that it is willing to let the TTP dictate the pace and the content of the dialogue process.
This is unfortunate in the extreme and can only set the stage for achieving the opposite of what the government is publicly claiming it is seeking through dialogue. But then, with an agenda that seemingly goes no further than seeking a reduction in violence -- to bring it down to a level that the public can live with -- and does not appear to have a problem with engineering peaceful co-existence between the state and the TTP, can the government really be said to have even a conceptual understanding of what negotiations with insurgencies seeking the violent overthrow of the state are supposed to be all about?
Added to the already existing and known problems has been another dimension in recent weeks: tensions between the military and the civilian leadership. It is surely not a coincidence that the otherwise voluble and loquacious TTP spokespersons have been rather quiet of late, preferring to let the media wars and the civil-military tensions remain centre stage.
Surely, when the ISI is turning to using posters and banners to promote and defend its chief in the style of a political party and ministers have waded needlessly into controversies by politicising the trial of Gen (retd) Pervez Perv Musharraf ... former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date ... , the TTP need not worry about a united state achieving anything meaningful when it comes to rolling back militancy and extremism through dialogue.
Posted by: Fred ||
05/01/2014 00:00 ||
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[DAWN] IT seems like deja vu. The empire has struck back, orchestrating a media campaign and public rallies in its support. With familiar Islamist faces carrying larger-than-life portraits of the army and ISI chiefs, the spectacle is ominous. Such a public display of support for the head of the spy agency is rare, if not unprecedented.
Less than seven years after the return of the democratic order, the military is back in the arena, upping its public political profile. It is a return to the old cloak and dagger game between the civil and military authorities. There may not be a winner in this bitter power struggle, but the collision has heightened political uncertainty in the country.
The initial silence of the government over the relentless slander campaign against the ISI and its chief has for sure triggered the military's backlash. But the tension between the PML-N government and the generals has been building up for quite some time.
In fact, it was a story foretold when Nawaz Sharif ... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf... returned to the helm for the third time last year. It is partly the case of past baggage that refuses to go away, keeping alive the distrust of each other. But there are some other key policy differences that have escalated the tensions.
For several days the government watched from the fringes as the ISI bashing on Geo triggered a media civil war that sharply polarised the country's political landscape. The damage control came a bit too late. It also fuelled widespread perception that the government had deliberately allowed the situation to flare up.
The statements by some ministers lent further credence to the allegation that the government was a party to the conflict. The military too lost all rationality by feeding its own narrative into the media war, branding its critics anti-state. It also went too far in publicly calling for the closure of Geo and reportedly stopping its broadcast in cantonment areas. The proxy war through the media created a very messy situation.
Things seem to have cooled down a bit, but the events of the last two weeks have changed the country's political atmosphere. All sides seem to have been badly bruised in the ugly fracas. Of course the war of channels has exposed the charade of the free media. But neither the government nor the country's powerful military establishment has come out unscathed in this free-for-all.
In fact, the government seems to have badly miscalculated its prowess. The attempt to manipulate the situation and to bring the military under pressure appears to have boomeranged, making the government perhaps the biggest loser in the whole episode. The crisis has led to a realignment of political forces.
It is not just the old jihadi 'assets' like Jamaat-ud-Dawa ...the front organization of Lashkar-e-Taiba... that have come out to defend their old patrons, but many mainstream political parties have also jumped on to the pro-military bandwagon. In an unprecedented move the Sindh Assembly passed a unanimous resolution expressing solidarity with the security agencies. Not surprisingly, the government now finds itself in a tight corner and is forced to stand behind the military, at least on the Geo issue.
Yet, it seems extremely difficult for the two sides to mend fences with the widening gap between them on some key policy issues. The treason trial of retired Gen Musharraf and the government's soft peddling on militancy remain the main sources of tension. What is most worrisome for the military leadership is mounting discontent within the ranks, particularly among the junior officers.
It was this pressure that forced the new army leadership to provide protection to the former army chief and avoid his appearances before the special tribunal for several months. Musharraf finally appeared after a reported deal that he would be allowed to leave the country after the indictment. But that did not happen. Mr Sharif would not let his tormentor out.
But the most sensitive issue souring relations is the government's ambivalence over the military's war against militancy. The statements by senior ministers apparently sympathetic to the Taliban enrage the young officers in the battlefield. There is growing anger, not just because of the government's reluctance to own the war, but due to its failure to attend the funerals of soldiers and officers killed in battle.
GHQ is reportedly inundated with letters from officers on the front line expressing outrage over the government's apathetic attitude. Many more soldiers and officers are killed in the battlefield as the Sharif government is engaged in so-called peace dialogue.
It is not that the military and the ISI have not been castigated for their policies and high-handedness before. But the kind of slander campaign run by a section of the media has diverted attention away from genuine criticism on the working of the security and intelligence agencies. Being in a war makes the officers more sensitive to critical remarks about their institution.
Indeed, civil and military relations are not easy to manage in Pakistain given its chequered political history. But democracy cannot work without the two being on the same page on critical national issues. The responsibility lies with both the institutions. Only better governance and greater ability for policy direction on part of the elected government and not a confrontationist approach could establish civilian supremacy.
But the twice-ousted prime minister seems to have learnt no lesson from his own experience. It is a disaster in waiting.
Posted by: Fred ||
05/01/2014 00:00 ||
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#1
They are animals possessing Korans and Nukes. What could go wrong?
[Ynet] We should take advantage of Paleostinian organization's current weakness to remove threat from its root.
In a series of moves made by the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas ... a graduate of the prestigious unaccredited Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow with a doctorate in Holocaust Denial... in the past few weeks, the Paleostinians succeeded in shaping the immediate agenda in their conflict with Israel.
Israel's reactions were "measured," as the government spokespeople said. Cautious economic punishing, a campaign aimed at degrading Abbas, and of course -- criticism against the American administration's weak response. Inwards, Israel's ministers called on the opposition to put the usual disputes aside and stand by the state's leaders in the battle which suddenly came upon us. "We don't talk to terrorists," nor to those who join forces with them.
And what about Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason,? What will become of it in the situation created?
Everyone agrees with the estimate that this is one of Hamas' toughest hours. It rushed to run into the open arms of its bitter enemy -- Fatah -- after a series of defeats. It was expelled from its base in Damascus, Iran cut its aid to the organization because of the stance it adopted, and Egypt -- which was Hamas' strategic support not so long ago -- declared it a terror organization.
In the international arena, the US cannot make any contact with Hamas under the law, and Europe is committed not to recognize the organization until it adopts the three principles of the Middle East Quartet ... The Quartet are the UN (xylophone), the United States (alto), the European Union (soprano), and Russia (shortstop). The group was established in Madrid in 2002 by former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar, as a result of the escalating conflict in the Middle East. Tony Blair is the Quartet's current Special Envoy.... . Turkey is embroiled in internal struggles, and it is unlikely that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ... Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi only they haven't dumped him yet... will get involved in the Gazoo Strip issues. Most Arab and Islamic countries have had enough of the Strip, so Hamas is isolated, humiliated and weaker than ever.
Its only ray of light is Russia, which is indeed committed to the Quartet decisions by virtue of its membership in it, but supports the intra-Paleostinian reconciliation agreement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov even telephoned Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and congratulated him on the reconciliation with Fatah.
This is the moment for the Israeli government to seriously consider the option of destroying Hamas fervently. No one will come to its rescue, no one will incite the public opinion to save it, no one will suggest the appointment of an international commission of inquiry into what happened in this war. This way, the prime minister will be able to "remove the threat from its root" and prevent a future Hamas takeover of Judea and Samaria sponsored by a Paleostinian national unity government.
Such a war will exact a heavy, bloody price from Israel -- in losses and injuries. This is a terrible price. But if we accomplish our mission, we shall remove the greatest threat to Israel of its destruction by Hamas, a threat which Israel's spokespersons never cease to mention. Such a move will seriously harm Hezbollah, whose leader has been stating recently that he is not interested in war with Israel.
This is the only context in which one can understand the preparation of the public opinion here for a war to the point that the opposition will be required to suspend its struggle against the government's policy.
The swiftness of events taking place in the Middle East obliges us to make decisions as soon as possible, while the world is still preoccupied with the Ukraine crisis (and so Russia will not rush to intervene in favor of Hamas), and the international economy has yet to enter another crisis.
If Israel fails to take advantage of this rare opportunity it has chanced upon, the circumstances may change. The aforementioned coincidence will pass and Hamas will survive and gain renewed strength. The region's countries will realize that even in the extreme situation described here, Israel was deterred from confronting its weakened enemy, which still aspires to destroy it, in a fatal conflict. This could have far-reaching implications on the status of a country which sees itself as a regional power. The credibility of its deterrence will wear out completely.
There is, of course, another alternative, which is to negotiate with the rival while it is in its inferior position. I have been writing and talking about this for 10 years now. If this option is rejected out of hand, we are left with the two I mentioned -- taking advantage of the circumstances to destroy the threat or continue to march in place in the "no policy" swamp while accepting its malignant prices until Israel's power of deterrence against a non-state enemy disappears.
#1
It's the "Palestinian 'People'" who are the terrorist organization---not branches like Hamas, or Fatah, or Islamic Jihad*, or Shahids of Bugs Bunny.
#2
We really do need a word for those that are all about Holocaust Denial on one hand but then think the Nazi's didn't go far enough on the other. Anti-semite really doesn't capture the vileness of this sort.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Pervez 
Quartet
