Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] On the night of December 22, the US armed forces launched a combined strike on Yemeni territory controlled by the pro-Iranian movement Ansar Allah (Houthis). The operation, according to the Pentagon, was intended to reduce the military potential of the Shiite group and disrupt attacks on US Navy warships and merchant ships in the Red and Arabian Seas.
However, in practice, the Americans, without intending to, gave the Houthis a powerful propaganda trump card.
An American F/A-18 multirole carrier-based aircraft has been shot down, becoming the first confirmed loss of American aviation since the start of Operation Guardian of Prosperity. And it is quite difficult to believe that the blame for the loss of the aircraft lies solely with the Americans themselves.
THE TARGET IS THE CAPITAL
The targets of the current raid were Houthi military facilities in Sana'a, the capital of Yemen (under Houthi control since 2014). Weapons depots and the movement's command post, identified in the Attan area, were identified as priority targets.
The current US attack on Houthi targets has become one of the largest in the past year and a half.
It was only slightly inferior in the number of targets attacked to Operation Guardian of Prosperity, which began the confrontation between Ansar Allah and the American contingent in the Middle East.
The exact number of US forces involved is not disclosed, and objective monitoring also gives conflicting views on the number of strike assets involved.
At the same time, the Pentagon does not hide the fact that the December US operation was the most intensive combat use of the American navy since World War II.
PROMPT RESPONSE
Although attacks on Houthi ground infrastructure are usually a one-sided game and the movement “responds” to them asymmetrically – with strikes on American allies’ facilities in the Middle East (mainly Israel) or attacks on military and civilian vessels, this time the reaction to the American strikes was almost immediate.
After the first wave of strikes, the Houthis launched several kamikaze UAVs and an anti-ship cruise missile in the direction of the American aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, but all strike weapons were quickly shot down by the ship's air defense systems.
The US fleet suffered no damage. However, one of the carrier-based aircraft was missing.
Air defenses from the guided missile cruiser USS Gettysburg mistakenly shot down an F/A-18 multirole aircraft (assigned to a squadron of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman) that was taking part in strikes on Houthi-controlled Sanaa.
Although the crew of the plane survived, the loss of the F/A-18 greatly reduced the media impact of the strikes on the Houthis and gave rise to numerous rumors about the presence of some “new military technologies” in Ansar Allah.
Of course, the Houthis have managed to “ground” enemy aircraft before.
Thus, during the conflict in Yemen, they shot down American-made F-15 fighters at least three times, but all of them were assigned to the army of the "Arabian Coalition" led by the Saudis and were piloted by Arab crews. But until recently, they had not managed to reach the US Air Force.
Unsurprisingly, the Houthis quickly took credit for their opponents' blunder.
The movement's spokesman, Yahya Saria, later claimed that Yemeni revolutionaries had shot down the plane. According to him, it took eight cruise missiles and 17 drones to "trap" one of the planes. Saria also hinted that the damage to the US Navy was not limited to just one carrier-based aircraft.
HACKERS, LASERS AND MILITARY ADVISERS
Naturally, such an unexpected outcome of the night operation almost immediately gave rise to a wave of rumors and hypotheses about the real picture of the battle. Thus, the version that the "friendly fire" of the American cruiser was skillfully provoked by the enemy gained great popularity.
Allegedly, Ansar Allah units used advanced electronic warfare technologies against US naval forces and “substituted” the target, as a result of which the USS Gettysburg crew mistook their own aircraft for an enemy missile.
There was also quite a lot of talk about special "laser systems" implanted in Houthi UAVs and missiles. The latest guidance technologies allegedly made it possible to overcome the dense barrage of naval air defenses and destroy one of the planes that bombed Sanaa.
In support of this hypothesis, the facts were cited that Houthi missiles, unlike Iraqi and Lebanese ones, regularly and easily penetrate the famous Israeli Iron Dome system. After Saria's briefing, this version became one of the main ones in the Arabic-language segment of the Internet.
However, in practice, such rumors were spread mainly by bloggers close to Ansar Allah and were not supported by any evidence.
The Western blogosphere assessed the situation somewhat differently, and was quick to recall not only Iranian but also Russian military advisers, whose hypothetical participation Western tabloids had periodically written about throughout the year.
According to Western media, Moscow shared with Sana some "advanced developments" (including a simplified analogue of laser emitters), which were tested against the US in combat conditions. However, this version contains a large number of assumptions and distortions, and therefore also does not stand up to criticism.
Overall, the most likely and realistic version of events remains a technical error on the part of the American cruiser's crew.
However, even in this scenario, the Pentagon will have to approach the planning of future combined operations against the Houthis more carefully - so that they cannot exploit the identified vulnerability and do not begin to “drive” American aircraft under fire from their own naval air defenses.
[Jpost] Here are two names that will go down in ignominy in Israel: Nahum Manbar and Gonen Segev.
Why? Because they worked for the Iranians against their own people.
In the 1990s, Manbar – a kibbutznik with a checkered past – set up shop in Europe and started selling arms to Iran, including the ingredients, equipment, and expertise to make chemical weapons.
In 1998, he was sentenced to 16 years for collaboration and providing information to an enemy. He served 14.5 years of his sentence.
Segev, a former minister in Yitzhak Rabin’s cabinet turned drug smuggler (he was arrested for trying to smuggle thousands of ecstasy tablets into Israel from Amsterdam), was recruited abroad by Iranian intelligence in 2012.
In 2019, Segev – whose vote was critical in the passage of the 1995 Oslo II accords in the Knesset – pleaded guilty to charges of espionage and supplying the enemy with information and was sentenced to an 11-year prison term, which he is currently serving.
Both these cases made huge headlines in Israel: Israeli Jews working for the enemy. The Wikipedia entry on Manbar includes this telling sentence: “Manbar’s activities, some of which were conducted in Britain, drew the attention of MI6, which could not believe that an Israeli could be working so closely with Iran and concluded that Manbar was a Mossad agent trying to penetrate Iran’s defense establishment.”
In other words, Britain’s vaunted intelligence service believed it so far-fetched that an Israeli would be working so closely with the Iranians that they thought it must be a ruse; that Manbar must be a double-agent.
These cases were once startling exceptions that dominated the headlines, painting espionage as an aberration. No more.
The last year has seen the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) arrest dozens of Israelis working for – and getting paid by – Iran or Hezbollah with the express purpose of spying on or sowing discord in Israel.
SPYING FOR THE ENEMY
The instances of spying for the enemy that come to light are now so frequent that Sunday’s announcement that the Shin Bet arrested two east Jerusalem Arabs for passing information to Hezbollah barely cracked the chock-full news cycle.
True, the two arrested were not Jews – but Arabs – but this, too, would have garnered much more attention in years past. Now, cases of Israelis – Jews or Arabs – indicted for espionage or assisting the enemy during war are so common that they barely elicit outrage.
Why? What has changed? Why are there currently so many more cases of Israelis spying for the enemy?
The Shin Bet has uncovered about a dozen separate espionage cases involving dozens of Israelis over the last year. The large number of these cases indicates Iran is increasing its intelligence efforts and shifting its methods and targets.
Consider the following: On December 17, it was revealed that Erdler Amoyal, a 23-year-old Jewish Jerusalemite, was arrested on suspicion of espionage on Iran’s behalf and allegedly proposed setting fire to a police station and causing a power outage on Jerusalem’s light rail.
On December 9, the Shin Bet announces that Artyom Zolotarev, a 33-year-old from Nof HaGalil, was arrested after being recruited by Iran to carry out a number of disruptive actions inside Israel aimed at fostering internal divisions, including spraying anti-government graffiti and burning vehicles.
In October alone, some 20 people were arrested for everything from surveillance of military installations to attempted assassinations, and they included a Bnei Brak resident, recent immigrants from Azerbaijan, and east Jerusalem Arabs.
ISRAELIS WORKING FOR IRAN
Several reasons have been given for this upsurge in Israelis working for Iran.
The first has to do with Iran significantly ramping up its espionage and disruptive efforts inside Israel.
This stems from operational considerations – remember, Iran attacked Israel directly on two occasions this year, and photographs of military installations reportedly assisted them in aiming for their targets – and also an increased motivation to penetrate Israel following the July assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in a secure location in Tehran.
The escalation of the conflict and readiness of Iran to hit Israel directly has led to an increase in Iran’s efforts to gather intelligence.
Second, the Islamic Republic has spread a wide net, targeting individuals across the Israeli spectrum. While the popular perception might be that Israeli Arabs are the most likely to spy for Iran due to an ideological affinity with the regime’s goals, this is not the case.
Rather, they are targeting haredim, new immigrants, people with a criminal background, and ordinary citizens, often going after those with financial difficulties motivated by the prospect of making some quick money. Iran has been offering significant amounts of money for tasks such as painting graffiti or taking pictures.
The targeting of new immigrants – a number of those arrested have been from the former Soviet Union – also may have an unfortunate ripple effect beyond a threat to Israeli security: fostering suspicion and stigmatizing specific demographics among the public.
Furthermore, Iran has been able to cast a wider net largely thanks to social media, which they leverage to recruit people. The digital approach to recruitment allows Iran to reach segments of the population that they would not have been able to access before the advent of platforms like Telegram.
As Iran spreads a wider net, more actively trying to recruit spies and reaching out to broader demographics, the likelihood of detection by the Shin Bet also increases. The more you engage in this type of activity, the greater is the risk of being found out.
Indeed, Iran’s increased activity has triggered an escalation in Israeli counterintelligence efforts.
The Shin Bet has invested heavily in technology and surveillance tools to detect espionage networks, leading to a higher rate of arrests and dismantling of operations but also straining the organization’s resources. And as Iran’s efforts multiply, the challenges of detection will become more complex.
The upsurge in these cases is a product of the clash between Iran’s intensifying ambitions and Israel’s determination to protect itself. The cases of Manbar and Segev were once shocking outliers; today, they are part of a larger pattern.
[Jpost] Whatever path forward is chosen, the Houthis will need to suffer more serious blows because, currently, they feel emboldened.
The Iranian-backed Houthis launched another ballistic missile at Israel early on Tuesday, marking the fourth such attack in two weeks – the others coming on Saturday, Thursday, and last Monday. The Houthis are increasing their attacks and showing they are not deterred by Israel’s strikes or rhetoric.
Defense Minister Israel Katz visited the Arrow air defense battery that intercepted the missile. He said, “We will not accept the fact that the Houthis continue to fire at the State of Israel. We will deal with the heads of the Houthis in Sana’a and everywhere in Yemen.”
Katz made similar comments on Monday when he vowed that Israel would severely weaken the Houthis. He compared Israel’s actions on this front with the way Israel had fought Hamas and Hezbollah. He noted that Israel had eliminated Hamas leaders Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
Katz was clear on his vow regarding the road ahead.
“We defeated Hamas, we defeated Hezbollah, we blinded the defense systems in Iran and damaged their production systems, we toppled the Assad regime in Syria, we severely wounded the axis of evil, and we will also severely strike the Houthi terrorist organization in Yemen who are the last ones standing."
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also vowed to increase retaliation against the Houthis. He said Israel would act with force, determination, and sophistication, in comments on Sunday.
HOUTHIS REMAIN UNDETERRED
The Houthis have not been deterred by these words. Not only are they not deterred, but the more Israeli officials make bold statements, the more the Houthis will launch missiles to show it has no effect on them.
The Houthis understand the strategic and tactical picture. They have been attacking ships for a year and received only a very modest response from the US naval forces, which have been deployed as part of an operation designed to protect shipping.
It’s important to understand that what the Houthis are doing is relatively new in the region. They are not a state seeking to blockade a waterway but are a terrorist group acting as if they are a state.
They have succeeded in cutting down the ability of many firms to ship via the Red Sea. They have also continued attacking Israel with relative impunity. Israel has carried out three rounds of airstrikes against the Houthis, one in the summer, one in the fall, and one recently in December.
However, the strikes have not deterred the Houthis. This is because they steeled themselves in war against Saudi Arabia for years after Riyadh intervened in Yemen in 2015. Saudi Arabia had many of the latest warplanes and technology thanks to close ties with the US, yet Riyadh could not defeat the Houthis.
The Houthis have dug in on the high ground of the mountains of Yemen. They have had Iranian backing and advice for years about constructing tunnels to hide missiles and how to deploy rockets quickly. The Houthis have developed a more sophisticated missile and drone program than Hamas and Hezbollah.
Hamas hides underneath civilians to launch rockets and attacks, but it has to exist in a relatively small area of Gaza. Hezbollah carpeted southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley with weapons and missiles, but it was not able to hide its long-range missiles and is so close to Israel that it’s easily within striking distance for the IDF. The Houthis are 2,000 km. away from Israel, requiring complex planning to strike them.
There is another fact in this war, which is not one that most of those making statements want to acknowledge. Precision airstrikes usually do not win wars. Precision firepower on warplanes is not a magic wand, and it often deceives militaries into thinking they can accomplish things that cannot be achieved solely with warplanes.
This is most clear from the failure of the US-led coalition against Saddam Hussein to stop the Scud attacks on Israel during the Gulf War. That was called the “great Scud hunt,” and it wasn’t so great, nor did it achieve the intended results. Saddam’s regime was deploying Scuds in the Anbar province, specifically in the desert, making it hard for the US and its allies to find them.
The Houthis are rolling missiles out of tunnels in the mountains, and it is incredibly difficult to preempt or predict. Finding the stockpiles and eliminating the Houthi leadership may be even harder.
This does not mean it is impossible to defeat the Houthis. However, Israel would do well to be careful about learning the wrong lessons from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.
Israel’s war in Gaza has gone on for a year and two months, and Hamas is not yet defeated. Hamas controls most of Gaza, holds 100 hostages, and continues to dictate terms in the hostage talks.
Even in northern Gaza, where the IDF’s 162nd Division has been unleashed for two months to hunt down terrorists in Jabalya, Beit Lahiya, and Beit Hanun, the terror threat continues. On Monday, the IDF said three soldiers were killed by an explosion in Beit Hanun. There are still terrorists in Beit Hanun – near the border with Israel – despite a year of operations.
LESSONS FROM OTHER FRONTS MAY NOT BE APPLICABLE IN YEMEN
In Lebanon, Hezbollah has been weakened, but it still exists. It may have lost leaders and weapons, but it would be foolish to think it has vanished. Is Hezbollah weaker today than in 2006? It may regrow itself.
Similarly, Israeli officials have taken credit for the fall of Bashar al-Assad, but the reality is that Assad fell because of his own hollow regime and the ability of the opposition to mobilize and take advantage of the weakening of Hezbollah.
Lastly, the lessons of Israel’s strikes on Iran are not yet clear.
Text taken from the Telegram channel of kramnikcat
Not sure about the terminology used here, so I will replace the most obscure ones with my interpretations, Can't be helped.
[ColonelCassad] The US problem with the Ticonderogas modernization can be divided into 3 parts.
1. The state of the industry. Naval ship repair in the US has generally degraded to the level we are used to here against the backdrop of the post-Soviet Achtung: delays in deadlines (sometimes several times), fires on units under repair, low quality of repairs as such, sometimes with the impossibility of sending a repaired steamer to the BS, a shortage of personnel and other delights greatly complicate the maintenance of combat readiness of the fleet.
2. The state of the ships themselves. Before the Ticonderogas, the US only once solved the problem of returning non-aircraft-carrying combat surface ships to service at the age of ~40 years: these were the Iowa-class battleships under Reagan. They met the modernization of the 1980s with a much less exhausted resource (mostly since the mid-1950s they were mothballed) and at a completely different level of industry. At the same time, the modernization of the Iowas was not simple and the forty-year-old steamships did not show miracles of reliability.
3. The most important thing. The same line is ahead for the "Burkes", which were introduced in the successful years in the 1990s and early 2000s at 3-4 units per year.
Neither Flight III "Burkes" nor, especially, DDG (X) will be built at this rate, while no ship can be in more than one place at a time. Will the volume of DDG (X) in combination with FFG-62 be enough? Let's see. Ship repair in the States does not show any trends for improvement yet. Drones in the framework of Distributed Lethality will not help much: if the current war proves anything, it is the fact that a drone lives until serious electronic warfare.
#1
....Part of the problem is that we knowingly destroyed the US shipbuilding industry decades ago.
My dad worked for the old American Ship Building company in Lorain, OH (they had a second smaller yard in Toledo). In 1983, they had three drydocks, all big enough to handle anything that could get through the St Lawrence Seaway.
They also had a berserk union demanding more money for far less work (their last demand was a 20% raise and a 4-day week). They did NOT have USN contracts, because the Navy wouldn't give them to yards that didn't have 4 year contracts with their unions - the union said anything past 3 years was completely off the table.
And so AmShip went under, and they weren't alone. The only major building yards left are the ones with nonstop USN contracts, and they're overwhelmed by needed maintenance, much less any new construction. The surviving yards know they have the USN by the shorts, and they have zero incentive to fix it.
Time well past when 30% of the union pension funds must be made up of the company they are employed by. You sink the company, you sink your pension fund.
#4
34 years I spent in a shipyard we had up and down years but mostly up building Navy supply ships and commercial oil tankers. good mix plus repair on Navy ships, and had an effective trainee program for
maintaining labor needs.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
