A somewhat optimistic, can-do article about China seen as a free-market challenge/opportunity. Ok, might be an apologist. Long, needs p.49, see link for notes. The rise of China could be good for the West, if only it would rise to the challenge.
China has come a very long way in the past 25 years. The land of the Giant Panda is also the land of giant numbers and achievements:
China's population represents more than one fifth of the world's population: 1.3 billion people. Between 1978 and 2001 China's average growth rate of GDP per capita was at the top of the world's growth performance in this period (1). China's exports grew in value terms by almost 15 times between 1978 and 2001 (2). In 2002 and 2003, China was, second only to the USA, the world's largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (3).
In 1978 almost one in three Chinese people were 'absolutely poor', according to the World Bank. This fell to under one in 20 people by 1998 (4). In 1982 one fifth of China's population lived in urban areas, and almost one in four people were illiterate. By 2000, over one third lived in urban areas and illiteracy levels had fallen to one in 15 people (5). Add to this China's industrial accomplishments: the Three Gorges Dam is the world's largest hydroelectric dam project; China has the world's longest steel-arch bridge; and Beijing Airport will be the biggest in the world by 2008. In 2001 China produced 96 million electric fans, 41 million colour TV sets, and 25 million mobile phones (6).
Yet despite these phenomenal advances, Western commentators interpret trends and events with great pessimism. An acknowledgement of the incredible achievements of China in the past two-and-a-half decades is generally accompanied with a statement of the dangers that the transformation brings. On UK Radio Four's flagship current affairs programme Today in late 2004, Tim Luard, former Beijing correspondent for the BBC, echoed the view that the achievements are actually a source of anxiety: 'The sheer scale of China's economic transformation is matched only by the size of the new challenges and dangers it has created (7)'. The apparent dangers of China's rising wealth and power include the danger to the environment caused by pollution; the danger to employment and the Western economies caused by China's increasing competitiveness; and the possible military aggression of a rising power.
As Stephen Roach, managing director and chief economist of Morgan Stanley, one of the largest investment banks in the USA, pointed out in 2004: 'A fickle world has changed its mind about China again. A year ago, the miracle of Chinese growth was widely seen as a bonanza for an otherwise sluggish global economy. Today China is being cast as a threat - in effect, it has become a scapegoat for many of the intractable problems that a dysfunctional world has been unable to solve.' (8)
Today, the rise of China tends to be viewed in the West purely as a threat. Yet there is no reason why the West could not turn this challenge into an opportunity. China's growing economic power is a challenge for the West, but a challenge that the West can either turn to its advantage or to which it can succumb, by attempting to batten down the hatches and retreat. Perhaps this challenge is just what the West needs to kick it out of its doom-laden sense that things are getting worse and worse. Preparing to meet China's 'can-do' culture could serve to regenerate a sense of ambition and experimentation within Western societies.
Although there are negative aspects of China's economic transformation, these are resolvable. More of a problem is the way that the West is transporting its own concerns into China - its loss of confidence in its own system, its embarrassment of success, lack of entrepreneurship, and attachment to the environmentalist orthodoxy.
So what is going on with China? The West's main fears about this rising power tell us more about the preoccupations and double standards of commentators 'over here' than the life 'over there'. But by examining these fears, we can cut through some of the myths about China, and approach a better understanding of the realities.
Continued on Page 49
#1
China: Disaster Waiting to Happen, would be a better title.
First and foremost, China is a demographic mess. It is moving in the unenviable direction of either having to slaughter hundreds of millions of its own people, or doing the same to its neighbors. Unlike the rest of the world they have defied Malthusian limits to the point of catastrophe.
Secondly, their administrative ability has collapsed. The best way to describe "greater China", outside of the sea coasts, is "internal colonization". They ineptly manage broad sections of the interior of their country as poorly as the British did India in the years leading up to WWII. Again, demographics are key, with everything for the enthnically Han, and nothing for everyone else.
One potential catastrophe that may be averted was the "Warlord-ization" of their military, in which army generals were de facto dictators in their rural military districts for many years. This, at least, was finally realized as a tangible threat to the central government. And yet, while its military is more professional, it is engaged in a ridiculous arms race with the United States, forcing all of its neighbors to build up their own militaries.
The end result that China desires has multiple goals, none of which are terribly sensible or practical: lebansraum, SE Asian military hegemony and domination of the Pacific, and to become a superpower. But none of these really addresses their serious problems.
China is stuck. There is no easy solution to half a billion excess people in the region--not just theirs, but other nations as well. Were those people just gone, many of its problems would be solved, and radical solutions would be unneccesary. But as it is, all else is a sideshow until that problem is resolved.
#2
AIDS, SARS, bird flu, watered down antibiotics fed to the animals, water shortages, floods, Three Gorges(?) dam, desertification... Will they get their war or decimation (at best) first?
#3
AIDS, SARS, bird flu, watered down antibiotics fed to the animals, water shortages, floods, Three Gorges(?) dam, desertification... Will they get their war or decimation (at best) first?
In a formal cabinet meeting chaired by Iran's new presidentâs first deputy, the ministers printed and ratified an agreement with the Shiites' 12th Imam. In his opening remarks, Parviz Davoudi, Ahmadinejad' first deputy suggested that the cabinet ministers should sign an agreement with 12th Imam, the same way they signed a pact with the new president. The ministers collectively agreed and so there is now an agreement between the two! The ministers then questioned how the 12th hidden Imam will sign the agreement!
The solution was resolved when the government's cabinet ministers agreed to ask Saffar Harandi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance how president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad planned to take the letter to the holy Imam. Next Thursday night, Saffar Harandi dropped the signed agreement to the Jamkaran well, a spot that Moslem religious groups believe is where the Shiite 12th Imam is hidden. This well is also the resting place for tons of letters and requests from Muslim pilgrims.
A short while after the cabinet ministers' collective agreement, the government spent 70 billion rials to feed the needy pilgrims of Jamkaran Mosque. At the Transportation Minister's suggestion, this money would be spent to reconstruct the roads leading to Jamkaran and to allocate large amount of money for other similar projects. There was strong criticism on this from all fronts and even Ahmadinejad seemed very offended. He said that this government was not in power to build roads and that it should be thankful to 12th Imam's blessing for being in power.
We are talking about some of the highest-ranking officials in the Islamic republic. So far as I know, this is not political satire, itâs reportage. And the point is obvious, isnât it? We are not dealing with people like us (although a couple of the more hyper columnists at, say, the New York Times might well suspect that there are lots of evangelicals who secretly aspire to this sort of behavior). The Iranian people are suffering enormously at the hands of this regime, whose president "was not in power to build roads" and owes its legitimacy to a vanished religious figure at the bottom of a well in one of the most beautiful cities in the world.
And for those who thought that Iranian "elections" somehow gave a form of democratic legitimacy to the president and his cabinet, read it again. Itâs the 12th imam, not the people of Iran, who bestows power.
There are two groups of people who ought to be made to read this account several times: those European pseudo-diplomats who think that you can reach a rational modus vivendi with the mullahs; and the innumerable failed diplomats and elected officials (I am thinking, as I so often do, of Senator Richard Lugar and his buddies on the Foreign Relations Committee, who do not deign to take testimony from critics of the Iranian regime) in this country who keep on calling for normalization with Iran. Weâre talking about real fanatics here. Fun reading, yes, but they kill a lot.
Hopping my usual high horse here, I reiterate my contention that personal liberty, not democracy per se, is what distinguishes our side from their side.
Unless it goes through a number of contortions, Islam â of virtually any flavor â is incompatible with democracy due to its insistence that rights not only derive from God (a belief we share) but that only holy men are qualified to interpret God's will, a belief we discarded about the time of John Calvin.
Islam originated in a culture that was fundamentally different from that of the West. Alexander's men bitched when he tried to adopt the court practices of the Persians, arguing that free men didn't kowtow, not even to their king. Islam demands to rule, a tradition that probably originated with Sargon I, while a thousand years before the Profit appeared on the scene civilized man had already worked around to the idea of the king as a referee among other free men. Have a look at the arguments Homer relates among kings and their subordinates, then read Tacitus' critique of the worst of the Roman emperors. Gregory of Tours' Franks were a loutish, scheming lot, but no one was bumping his forehead to the floor at the approach of a Chilperic. When the idea of divine right monarchy did show up, King Charles' subjects chopped his head off. Louis XIV got away with it, mainly because of his wardrobe, I think, but it didn't work so well for Louis XVI.
There were lots of quibbles about which men were free, and what kind of powers the king had, and often the concept was honored in the breach, but the idea remained, often not even expressed because it was so ingrained. The usurpation of human dignity that was common in the East was only sporadically a feature of parts of the West. Now we have to contend with four or five thousand years of inertia, and unless we push the point that democracy is an effect, not a cause, we're not going to bring the Wonderful World of Islam into the modern world. They'll always be ruled by holy men, with djinns and efrits and such lurking in closets and under beds and beturbanned imams calling for jihad because God demands to rule every aspect of every person's life. They'll just be doing it in parliaments.
#1
Unless it goes through a number of contortions, Islam â of virtually any flavor â is incompatible with democracy due to its insistence that rights not only derive from God (a belief we share) but that only holy men are qualified to interpret God's will
That actually ain't the problem. The problem is the core belief in Islam that humanity is not capable of governing itself. I'm not talking about morality and religious ritual -- Judaism and Christianity both have their own codes for those, but also recognize that people have the ability to agree upon a set of rules outside of those from the divine and that those rules -- unless unjust in very specific and limited ways -- are as morally binding as the core requirements of the religion.
The Islamic theory is that man-made laws are meaningless; the only meaningful law is sharia. *THAT* is incompatible with democracy.
Following that's the "inshallah" attitude at its philosophical core. The Judaic and Christian tradition is that God made the physical laws and, excepting very limited examples of miracles, He also obeys them. The Islamic tradition is that everything happens because Allah wills it so; if the same thing happens every time you try X it's because Allah made the same decision every time.
Posted by: Robert Crawford ||
10/20/2005 8:04 Comments ||
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#2
There were a LOT more checks and balances in the Louis XIV regime than people (specially non-French) know and also much more than in your average Muslim sultanacy (1).
(1) Hint: When a minister was suspected of stealing from public treasure or when people tried to poison him, he couldn't just have all suspects and their relatives to the third generation be impaled and do away with it like it would have happenned in Turkey. He had to have them tried and some were released. Many of teh actions perpetrated openly by your average sultan (or Arab dictator) would have cased Louis XIV to be declared demented or unfit to rule and deposed.
#3
From my simpleton point of view, the problem with Islam is the "I'm right, you're wrong, (and hence in most cases you must die)" attitude. If they only got over that hurdle, the rest would fall into place, including the democracy thingie and personal liberty. Humility is the key.
Posted by: Rafael ||
10/20/2005 14:53 Comments ||
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#4
be a cold f*cking day in hell before I bow to any islamist punk imam.
Posted by: Frank G ||
10/20/2005 15:48 Comments ||
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#5
Louis XIV got away with it, mainly because of his wardrobe, I think,
I would argue that it was because he threw fabulous parties, but otherwise Heah, heah!
Another day, another international conference, another meaningless display of unity. But with lovely gift bags, we're sure.
The latest example: a UNESCO compact, sanctified in October at a conference in Tunisia, supporting the rights of nations to control the import of entertainment from other countries, all in the name of "cultural diversity." Otherwise Bugs Bunny cartoons would pose a mortal threat to the state-controlled monoculture of most nations. The United States opposes the compact, because we're mean and hate everyone, if you read the press. But was the U.S. vote correct? Let us consider.
The original sponsors were France and its stepchild Canada; figures. No country is more prickly about preserving its own culture than France; they regularly have le panique attaq whenever small fragments of other tongues infect their pristine lingo. Their cinema is heavily subsidized, producing endless movies about older-yet-unquestionably-masculine men who pensively smoke while contemplating a girl's knee observed on a beach in 1972. Canada also mandates local content, because there's so much difference between someone who grew up in southern Manitoba and someone who grew up in upper North Dakota. The North Dakotan grows up without a sense of what it's like to be annoyed by bilingual candy-bar wrappers, for example. Might as well be from different planets.
There are reasons to protect local culture, of course. American culture is The Borg, assimilating all. Drop a VCR and a TV in a remote Amazonian village, return a year later, and what do you find? Nothing, because you forgot to supply the generator. But leave one of those, and within six months the kids will be running around saying "No Luke I am your father" and making whoom-whoom lightsaber sounds. This fact gladdens the hearts of some, since it shows that American values -- freedom, justice, explosions -- are universal. But it also puts cultural conservatives in a bind, because modern pop culture is crass, rude, naughty, and often indefensible. Do we really want to defend the right of American record companies to export Li'l Kim diatribes against all the b-word rapperettes who set her up? Doesn't it bother anyone that China has entire factories devoted to pumping out pirated copies of "Scarface," because the global demand for that rags-to-twitches cocaine opera is so insatiable?
It was easier when the Yanks stood for nylons and chocolate bars.
Continued on Page 49
Posted by: Steve ||
10/20/2005 09:07 ||
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Tunisia, after all, has 800,000 Internet users. If a dozen of them are under 20 and know how to use BitTorrent, well, Comedy Central's "Adult Swim" gets passed around Africa by next Saturday.
Gah!
"Adult Swim" is Cartoon Network. Lileks has failed us!
Posted by: Robert Crawford ||
10/20/2005 10:25 Comments ||
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#2
Adult Swim has some of the best programming on cable right now....
Posted by: Mark E. ||
10/20/2005 11:35 Comments ||
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#3
And Comedy Central is most know for dumping the funniest show of the nineties, Mystery Science Theatre 3000. You know, I wonder if Lileks has met Mike and the 'bots; he is a neighbor.
Posted by: Eric Jablow ||
10/20/2005 17:47 Comments ||
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#4
O/T -- I recommend the show Brainiac - if you can find it on your cable system (G4TTV channel). Wacked out UK version of Mythbusters. Totally a hoot.
On October 15, 2005, an historic Iraqi victory was registered in the 6,235 polling centers across the country. Millions of Iraqis cast their ballot for a "yes" or a "no" to the new constitution.
Regardless of the final results, the political process in the post-Baath Iraq is emerging as a victor against the stubborn terror attacks by al Qaida and the Saddam regime remnants. From that angle alone, the bloc of 15.4 million registered voters â including those who voted "no," or weren't able to participate because of fear â have defeated one more time the forces of Jihadism and Baathism.
On January 30, the very first free election in Iraq dealt the first blow to the Terrorists. The October 15 referendum produced the second defeat to the Jihadists. Here is why:
Security Victory
With 155,000 American troops, 22,000 coalition forces, and about 200,000 Iraqi soldiers and policemen, deployed efficiently, Iraq's territories have been secured by significant deterrent forces. The Jihadists and their cross-borders allies, who have been attempting to wage massive attacks since mid-summer, were denied the capacity to disrupt the voting process. That alone is a field victory for the US-Iraqi alliance: For a second time in one year, the Iraqi people were allowed to express its will freely, while Jihad terror was incapable of reversing the democratic process.
Moreover, on October 15, the military defense of Iraq registered higher scores: Between last January and October, more than 130,000 Iraqi troops who guarded the legislative elections were trained, equipped and strengthened with another 60,000 before being deployed on the ground for the referendum protection. The credit of this achievement goes certainly to U.S. â but also NATO â forces, which were able to equip the "new Republic" with arms and muscles within less than one year. It paid off clearly, for even while al Qaida was recruiting within Iraq, and reinforced via Syria with thousands of Terrorists, the qualitative and quantitative race was obviously won by the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi army. After two-and-a-half years of terror-insurgency, Abu Musab al Zarqawi's networks weren't able to stop or defeat the new Iraq's defenses. The success of the referendum is clear evidence: There was a security victory in Iraq.
The National Consensus Widens and Strengthens
On January 31 of this year, 8.5 million Iraqis challenged not only Zarqawi and the former Baathists, but also the vast networks of Jihadism and many dictatorships in the region by casting their votes to select hundreds of candidates and elect an assembly. The new republic produced a parliament despite the calls for an emirate by al Qaida and the skepticism of the Arab League. That was the beginning of the democratic journey in the country. But democracy doesn't mean one vision and one choice: many parties mean many programs. A national consensus between most Shiites and all Kurds and other minorities began, despite a misrepresentation of smaller groups such as the Christian Chaldo Assyrians, Turkomen and Mandeans: The big picture was being shaped. A numeric majority in Iraq was opposed at least by two foes.
Naturally, the Sunni representation was missing. Jihadists and Baathists have used all the means to intimidate the moderates. Radical clerics used their influence to boycott the Government. Besides, political mistakes were made by both the Shiite-Kurdish and Coalition authorities, which have alienated other Sunnis. However, the January victory laid the groundwork for change in the political landscape. Seeing a new parliament acting, media flourishing, and political life developing, many Sunni groups, cadres and leaders crossed the line from boycott to engagement in the political process: First by adhering to the constitutional discussion; second by participating in the referendum, even with a "no" cast.
By August 2005, there was a Sunni "position" toward the constitutional debate. Many among them distanced themselves from the Zarqawi "refusal of all constitutions" to a "criticism of this constitution." The integration was slow, and will remain so, but it is happening. The national consensus is not total, but it is widening and strengthening, by bits.
Now an overwhelming majority of Iraqis have put an end to the dictatorial past and rejected the terrorist agenda. The differences are nevertheless wide, but the country wants political "treatments."
The Federal Structure Is Adopted
The Kurds want a strong federation, as an alternative to what they claim is their right for self-determination. Other smaller minorities support a federal entity, if they are allowed to shape ones for themselves. The Shiites have accepted a federated region for the Kurds, as a mean to keep them in Iraq, and wouldn't mind one for themselves. As long as democracy is the choice, either option is a winning for the Shiites: If the country is centralized, the Shiites have a 65 percent majority. If the country is a federation, the largest entity will be theirs. The Sunni political establishment is alone in its rejection of what it believes is a door to "partition" of the country. But their analysis is still influenced by the old Pan Arabist ideology. For if the various ethnic and religious groups are recognized and their rights guaranteed, why would they split the republic, even if they have a basic right for self-determination? As I argued, Saturday, on an al Hurra TV panel â along with other Iraqi, Arab and American analysts â the issue is not about the constitutional provisions, but about the determination by all Iraqi communities that the country is pluralist. The democratic Sunnis will soon come to realize that the federal solution is the only efficient alternative to partition. Not only will Iraq benefit from this solution, but Sudan, Lebanon and other multiethnic countries in the region.
The Distribution of Oil Dividends
The current constitution provides a ratio for benefits from oil production. The bottom line is simple: in the past, Saddam Hussein robbed the country and used the money to buy weapons and to send Iraqi soldiers into bloody campaigns against Iran, Kuwait and the Kurds and Shiites. Future revenues will be used to help the marginal regions (mostly Shiites and Kurdish) to grow economically. But the Sunni areas will benefit as well. A federal Iraq is designed to have a national authority to administer the country-level development. The Sunnis, situated geographically in the center, are also in the center of Iraq's educational, economic and social life. They will be part of the oil economic renaissance. Under a modern federal Iraq, a Sunni middle class has a greater chance of benefiting from "a national growth" than under a Saddam mono-party regime or a Taliban-like system.
Conclusion
Jihadi terrorism is most likely destined to strike again and continue to do so, but the defenses of Iraq and democracy are growing stronger. In this decades-long conflict, that has witnessed bloodshed and destruction on U.S. shores, the success of the referendum in Iraq is as valuable as a Normandy-like victory for U.S. and coalition forces.
The war is long from being won, but one of America's most important allies has grown bolder and stronger. The United States sacrificed 2,000 of its best young soldiers to remove a dictator, fight al Qaida in Iraq and protect the rise of a civil society. In return, a new republic was formed, and millions of citizens have been able to take their destinies in their hands. In the middle of the War on Terror, October 15 was a great achievement of the United States, but above all an Iraqi victory. If we divide the number of US soldiers who died in the conflict till October 15, we'd realize that for each fallen hero, 4,500 Iraqi voters were given the right to vote against Terror. In the global conflict with Jihadism, U.S. efforts and sacrifices are triggering greater resources against the empire projected by Ayman Thawahiri and Usama Bin Laden.
The most difficult times may still be ahead in this conflict waged by the Jihadists, but somewhere in the Middle East, some people have spoken against democracy's enemies: and that is one victory.
â Walid Phares holds degrees in law and political science from Saint Joseph University and the Lebanese University in Beirut, a Masters in international law from the Universite de Lyons in France and a Ph.D. in international relations and strategic studies from the University of Miami.
He has taught and lectured at numerous universities worldwide, practiced law in Beirut, and served as publisher of Sawt el-Mashreq and Mashrek International. He currently teaches Middle East political issues, ethnic and religious conflict, and comparative politics at Florida Atlantic University.
Dr. Phares has written seven books on the Middle East and published hundreds of articles in newspapers and scholarly publications such as Global Affairs, Middle East Quarterly, and Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies. He has appeared on CNN, MSNBC, NBC, CBS, ABC, PBS, and BBC as well as on radio broadcasts.
Aside from serving on the boards of several national and international think tanks and human rights associations, Dr. Phares has testified before the US Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East and South East Asia and regularly conducts congressional and State Department briefings.
Dr. Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C.
Visit Dr. Phares on the web at walidphares.com and defenddemocracy.org
#1
Read the whole thing, but here's the conclusion for thoughtful, intelligent, calm, and sane folks - "In this decades-long conflict, that has witnessed bloodshed and destruction on U.S. shores, the success of the referendum in Iraq is as valuable as a Normandy-like victory for U.S. and coalition forces."
Where's Dan Rather when you need him? -snicker-
Posted by: Bobby ||
10/20/2005 14:41 Comments ||
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For me personally, there is a sense of deja vu. Nearly 31 years ago, on December 25, 1974, a powerful earthquake flattened towns along the Karakorum Highway and killed nearly 10,000 people. I travelled with a university team into the same mountains for similar relief work. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had made a passionate appeal for funds around the world, had taken a token helicopter trip to the destroyed town of Besham, and then made fantastic promises of relief and rehabilitation.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in relief funds received from abroad mysteriously disappeared. Some well-informed people believe that those funds were used to kick off Pakistanâs secret nuclear programme.
Posted by: john ||
10/20/2005 17:05 ||
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Well, Bhutto did say in 1971 (following the defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war) that Pakistan would "eat grass" in order to have atomic weapons.
So a few hundred thousand non-Punjabis suffer.. no problem for the Pak elite.
Posted by: john ||
10/20/2005 19:00 Comments ||
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And I wonder what the funds of 2005 will be used for?
Posted by: john ||
10/20/2005 20:33 Comments ||
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Apple. Nike. Starbucks. Al Jazeera. Brands with global recognition. A firm will invest millions of dollars to maintain not only visibility, but also to construct an image that serves corporate interests. Strict management within a firm, and expensive legal action against anyone who uses a brand without authorization, are now part of the price of doing business in global markets.
How about Al Qaeda? While we tend not to think of it that way, Al Qaeda has a serious marketing problem: how can it protect itself from rivals who want to cash in on the brand? And if it can't protect its name or reputation, what does that mean for its operations?
A firm can lose control of its global brand through regional differences among managers, issuing conflicting messages, or the general adoption of a name for a whole class instead of the specific firm (Kleenex, anyone? Tabasco?). All of these are threats to the Bin Laden network.
In October 2004, for example, the group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged its loyalty to Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and by January 2005 changed its name from Tawhid and Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) to Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad Fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of the Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two Rivers), aka "Al-Qaeda in Iraq." Doing this was in one sense a step backward for al-Zarqawi, a man who had been at turns rejected by and independent from Bin Laden. On another level, it was a move to take control of the more visible brand.
Al-Zarqawi was a petty thug in Jordon prior to his experiences in Afghanistan. He rose to prominence as one of the "Afghan Arabs" but there is no evidence that the Jordanian was even admitted to Al Qaeda -- the best of the best -- let alone its central command. There is even a hint of pettiness in the way Al-Zarqawi organized a cell in Germany whose members described themselves as "Jordanians who did not want to join Al-Qaeda," and later Al-Zarqawi spent his time working with a Kurdish group in Northern Iraq. His was hardly a prestigious position.
In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, the invasion put Al-Zarqawi in the right place at the right time. The so-called "Al-Zarqawi letter" of 2004, while more likely a product of the Baathists than of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, outlined an approach that matched the local insurgency and contradicted what Al-Qaeda was trying to do elsewhere. More recently, the Al-Zawahiri letter recovered in Iraq in July provides evidence of a center that is not only out of touch with the situation in the field, but concerned about how the regional leader's actions may be contrary to the global goals. In the letter Al-Zawahiri asks, "even if we attack the Shia out of necessity, then why do you announce this matter and make it public, which compels the Iranians to take counter measures?" He argues that "among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable⊠are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages" -- particularly by beheadings, a tactic associated with Al-Zarkawi personally. Doctor Al-Zawahiri reminds Al-Zarkawi that "we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the mediaâŠfor the hearts and minds of our Umma."
Yet while Al-Zawahiri makes suggestions, he does not issue commands. He does not because he (and the remaining core of Al Qaeda) is in no position to do so. Without that kind of discipline, Al-Zarqawi is free to pledge allegiance to Bin Laden, run his operations to suit himself, and grab the spotlight.
For another example consider "Azzam the American," formerly Adam Gadahn of Orange County, California, noted for releasing public threats in the name of Al Qaeda against Los Angeles and Melbourne. While the FBI has declared that Azzam has connections to Abu Zubaydah in Pakistan, his tape has not been authenticated as a statement from the leadership of Al Qaeda, and by making specific and unfulfilled predictions he undermined the credibility of the organization. Is he really working for Al Qaeda, or is he grabbing attention for himself?
This pattern will almost certainly continue. Al Qaeda has long been a "franchise" operation, but now anyone who wishes to do so can declare themselves to own one of the franchises. KFC wouldn't put up with such an arrangement, but Usama Bin Laden and the core of Al Qaeda don't have a choice. At best, the franchisees will approximate some of the past positions of Al Qaeda, and in so doing turn Usama Bin Laden into the Col. Sanders of transnational terrorism. More likely each will each go its own way, destroying the value of the brand. Much as the IRA finds itself in opposition to the "Real IRA," or elements of the Palestinian Authority fight one another for control, the division of effort will undermine the various "Al-Qaedas." In turn, it will become more difficult for the original Al Qaeda to recruit competent people. Threats will be contradictory, or will fail to materialize. An organization with a reputation for terror will evolve into something more like a nuisance. If Al Qaeda were a legally-constituted organization it would be in court protecting itself, but that's not an option. The founders and leaders of Al Qaeda have to stand and watch as the image they have crafted is rendered worthless.
It's a pity there's no trademark protection for criminal organizations, isn't it?
Too bad, so sad. But all is not lost; I have some friends in the Patent & Trademark Office. Any of you al-Q types, drop me a line and I'll fix you up with a hearing. You will have to appear in person, of course...
Excellent two-parts article that totally undoes the "Che myth"(Tm) so successfully propagated by Fidel and Hollywood; I believe this was done for the (happy) birthday of his death, a couple of days ago.
Now, if only all the bobos and antiglobo kids who proudly wear the face of a never-do well, mass-murdering, unbathing , repressive commie on their tee-shirts in the name of Freedom would understand...
See at link.
By Humberto Fontova
FrontPageMagazine.com
This is the fourth article in our "Leftwing Monsters" series, the first of which featured Humberto Fontova's profile of Fidel Castro. "Leftwing Monsters" is a feature of www.discoverthenetworks.org where the entire series will be archived -- The Editors.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Another day, another international conference, another meaningless display of unity. But with lovely gift bags, we're sure.
The original sponsors were France and its stepchild Canada; figures. No country is more prickly about preserving its own culture than France; they regularly have le panique attaq whenever small fragments of other tongues infect their pristine lingo. Their cinema is heavily subsidized, producing endless movies about older-yet-unquestionably-masculine men who pensively smoke while contemplating a girl's knee observed on a beach in 1972. Canada also mandates local content, because there's so much difference between someone who grew up in southern Manitoba and someone who grew up in upper North Dakota. The North Dakotan grows up without a sense of what it's like to be annoyed by bilingual candy-bar wrappers, for example. Might as well be from different planets.
