the Martin-Bellinger Report, as it has come to be known,
described their estimate of the Japanese threat to Hawaii. Prophetically,
they wrote in the Possible Enemy Action paragraph:
(a) A declaration of war might be preceeded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the
operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships
and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous
form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be
launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred mile.
* * * * *
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability
that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite
of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us
in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be
slow to start.
To prevent the Japanese surprise attack that they described, Martin and
Bellinger, cognizant of the shortage of long-range reconnaissance aircraft,
described the action open to them: “Run daily patrols as far as possible to
seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with
present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable
measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.”