In the eleven years since the US invasion of Afghanistan, Gulalai Jabbar, 28, has become a graduate from Kabul University and is now working as a computer engineer in an Afghanistan's leading telecommunication company. But like the ten thousand or so other young Afghan professionals, Jabbar is also worried about the future of his country, especially after the planned withdrawal of ISAF forces. He fears a civil war may start in Afghanistan again.
The withdrawal of NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A collection of multinational and multilingual and multicultural armed forces, all of differing capabilities, working toward a common goal by pulling in different directions... -led ISAF forces, the transfer of security responsibilities back to Afghanistan, and the process of peace talks with the Taliban are a concern to most Afghans these days. In 2014, it is expected that the ISAF forces will no longer remain in a combat role in Afghanistan, handing over security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
About 65,000 people were killed in infighting between Mujahideen groups between 1992 and 1996 in Kabul alone
Afghan government officials and some security analysts believe the ANSF is capable of handling the country's security alone. But many in Kabul disagree. The city was ravaged by civil war between 1992 and 1996, and its inhabitants are left with many bad memories. About 65,000 people were killed in infighting between Mujahideen groups during that period in Kabul alone.
In March 2011, Afghanistan's Caped PresidentHamid Maybe I'll join the Taliban Karzai ... A former Baltimore restaurateur, now 12th and current President of Afghanistan, displacing the legitimate president Rabbani in December 2004. He was installed as the dominant political figure after the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001 in a vain attempt to put a Pashtun face on the successor state to the Taliban. After the 2004 presidential election, he was declared president regardless of what the actual vote count was. He won a second, even more dubious, five-year-term after the 2009 presidential election. His grip on reality has been slipping steadily since around 2007, probably from heavy drug use... announced the first phase of the transfer of security responsibilities, in which the provinces of Panjsher, Bamyan, and Kabul (excluding Surobi district), and four cities, Herat ...a venerable old Persian-speaking city in western Afghanistan, populated mostly by Tadjiks, which is why it's not as blood-soaked as areas controlled by Pashtuns... (capital of Herat province), Lashkar Gah (capital of Helmand ...an Afghan province populated mostly by Pashtuns, adjacent to Injun country in Pak Balochistan... province), Mazar Sharif (capital of Balkh) and Metharlam (capital of Laghman province) would be handed over to ANSF.
In the second phase announced on November 26, security responsibilities in the provinces of Balkh, Daikundi, Kabul, Takhar, Samangan and Nimroz, and cities including Jalalabad (in Nangarhar The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country.. province), Ghazni (in Ghazni province), Maydan Shahr (in Wardak province), Fayabad (in Badakhshan province), Chaghcharan (in Ghowr province), Shibirghan (in Jawzjan province) and Qalay-e-Naw (in Badghis province) were to be transferred to the local forces.
"In the third phase, the ANSF will take full control of Uruzgan, Kapisa and Parwan provinces," presidential front man Aimal Faizai told news hounds on May 14.
Investors are cautious and many Afghan citizens are considering leaving the country by 2014 because of concerns that the security situation would worsen
La Belle France, the fifth largest contributor to NATO's ISAF forces with nearly 3,300 soldiers, will begin withdrawing its troops from Kapisa province this month (July) and complete it by the end of the year. "Considering ANSF's capabilities, there will be no security gap as the French troops leave. The Afghan forces are capable of filling the vacuum when the French troops start withdrawing from Kapisa," said General Zahir Azimi, the front man of the Afghan Ministry of Defence. According to the ministry, its forces will number more than 350,000 by 2015.
A section of tribal elders and analysts have welcomed the withdrawal. "Pashtun communities do not approve of foreign troops operating in districts, especially when it comes to conducting night raids, violating privacy and disrespecting women and elders. Such controversial raids have triggered popular anger that compelled Karzai to strain his relationship with Washington," said Abdul Hadi, a tribal elder from Helmand province. As a result, both countries signed a deal in April, putting Afghans in charge of night raids by US Special Forces.
"Afghan cops were once among the world's top armies, before they broke down into regional militias during the fierce civil war in the 1990s," said Shukria Barakzai, an Afghan woman parliamentarian. "But now, they're all set to protect and stabilize their country again." They are well equipped, trained and "capable of launching special operations against anti-peace elements in the country," said Barakzai, who headed the parliamentary Defence committee for two years.
But General (r) Abdul Wahid Taqat, a former communist-era intelligence chief and a security analyst, thinks differently. He believes that the US and Britannia would not withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in 2014 as announced, because they have geo-political and strategic interests in the region.
Taliban bully boyz are waiting to exploit an imminent withdrawal and believe that the Afghan cops are not capable of fulfilling their security responsibilities. According to newsreports, investors are cautious and many Afghan citizens are considering leaving the country by 2014 because of concerns that the security situation would worsen.
"The key challenge is cleansing the army of anti-western and religious sentiment," Taqat says, adding that the affiliations of soldiers and officers with the Taliban, anti-Soviet Mujahideen and notorious warlords might undermine the efforts for a unified army, and may lead to a civil war again.
Taliban have meanwhile announced a 2012 spring offensive codenamed Al Farouq. But they also sent a representative to Japan to participate in a peace conference. A few months ago, the Taliban reversed a long-held position and agreed to open an office in Qatar from which they could negotiate, but they stopped the talks over a delayed prisoner swap that would see the US release five bad turban leaders imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
It is pertinent to mention that Hizb-e-Islami, the second largest bad turban group, has also suspended formal peace talks, but in June, they sent a representative to an informal meeting in Gay Paree for talks with members of the three main opposition political parties in Afghanistan and several members of the High Peace Council (HPC).Taliban claimed that they did not attend this meeting.
"A research conference is being organised in Doshisha University of Japan that will discuss Afghanistan among other issues. The Islamic Emirate has also been invited to the conference," Taliban front man Zabiullah Mujahed said in a statement. Former Taliban minister Qari Din Mohammad Hanif will "explain the policies of the Islamic Emirate" in the conference, he said.
Affiliations of soldiers and officers with the Taliban, anti-Soviet Mujahideen and notorious warlords might undermine the efforts for a unified army
"Hanif, who belongs to Yaftali plain district in Badakhshan province, is an important member of Taliban's political committee and was the minister of planning and the minister for higher education under the Taliban regime," said Ahmed Wali Mujib, a veteran journalist. The meeting in Japan was attended by Hanif, Dr Ghairat Baheer (in charge of Hizb-e-Islami's political affairs), Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef (former Taliban ambassador to Pakistain) and Masoom Stanekzai, representative of the HPC. Hanif travelled from Qatar to Tokyo to attend the meeting, according to news reports.
Even in Afghanistan, some analysts and parliamentarians want their government to make peace with Taliban despite their growing dislike for insurgency.
"Our doors are always open for 'good Afghans' for peace negotiations, but not for the foreigners -especially Arabs and Punjabis. We have closed our doors for those who don't belong to us, who don't approve of the constitution of the country, and don't respect the Afghan people," said Barakzai. "Those who do not want to see Afghanistan prosper, whether they are called Taliban or anything else, we will kill them or throw them out." She said peace negotiations should not come in the form of a deal. They were a process, she said, that should begin from the grassroots. Barakzai is confident the Taliban cannot take over again, and will only carry out hit-and-run attacks.
Some call the ongoing peace talks hypocrisy. "On the one hand, Karzai and the US say that they are fighting against 'brutal and barbarian Taliban', calling it a 'war on terror', and on the other hand they are negotiating with the Taliban and appeasing them," said Hafizullah Rasekh, a leader of Solidarity Party of Afghanistan. He said the current Afghan parliament was full of Taliban and Mujahideen leaders who had been involved in war crimes or inhumane killings of thousands of people.
"The president's policy has emboldened the bad turbans. He calls them 'brothers' and stopped the night raids by ISAF that were the only effective operational tactic against the bad turbans," Daily Outlook Afghanistan, a leading Kabul-based English newspaper, said in its June 23 editorial. It said the attack on Qargha lake in Kabul should put an end to myth that the Taliban would soften and a political settlement was possible with beturbanned goons who wanted to impose their primitive worldview on the Afghans.
#3
What Will Happen After Foreign Troops Leave Afghanistan?
The hirelings, aka Taliban foreign troops, will simply fill the void. I believe what the writer and editor meant was 'What Will Happen After the Kaffir Troops Leave Afghanistan?'
More than 3,070 NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A cautionary tale of cost-benefit analysis.... and ISAF deaths have been reported in Afghanistan since 2001 - 223 in 2012 alone - and there are no signs that the violence against western troops will end soon.
The attacks on Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel and the US Embassy, the liquidation of former Afghanistan's Caped PresidentBurhanuddin Rabbani ... the gentlemanly murdered legitimate president of Afghanistan... last year while he served as a peace envoy to the Taliban, and more recently, murder of a Non-Governmental Organization worker in the capital, show that the assaults are getting bolder.
"The issue is, how will Afghanistan be managed post withdrawal? Where will the money come from? And will the Taliban take over again?" asks Muhammad Ibrahim, an Afghan Defence Ministry official. "We in Afghanistan - and let me be very clear, all of us from the Pashtuns to Tajiks, to Uzbeks to the Hazaras - perceive Pakistain as the main problem."
President Hamid Maybe I'll join the Taliban Karzai ... A former Baltimore restaurateur, now 12th and current President of Afghanistan, displacing the legitimate president Rabbani in December 2004. He was installed as the dominant political figure after the removal of the Taliban regime in late 2001 in a vain attempt to put a Pashtun face on the successor state to the Taliban. After the 2004 presidential election, he was declared president regardless of what the actual vote count was. He won a second, even more dubious, five-year-term after the 2009 presidential election. His grip on reality has been slipping steadily since around 2007, probably from heavy drug use... had praised the slain Rabbani's peace efforts but said that they were "one sided" because the Taliban's only response "was just to kill people." Karzai alleged that these "enemies of peace" - the Taliban and other hard boyz - were "under the influence of foreign intelligence services", by which he meant Pakistain's ISI.
"Let's agree that any endgame in Afghanistan must include Pakistain, the Quetta Shura and even the Haqqanis as part of the solution, instead of leaving them as lingering problems," says Carl Adams. "The Americans need to realize that a draw in Afghanistan is a win for this trio"
"US strategists are trying to stabilize Afghanistan enough to prevent it from becoming a favourable environment for terrorism," said Micheal Semple, an EU representative in Afghanistan who initiated talks with the Taliban. "They calculate that Pakistain would benefit from this and could help achieve it. They consider Pakistain a challenge because they find themselves struggling to get the Pak establishment to deliver on the cooperation they hoped for. And they find Pakistain a puzzle as it is in the first place threatened by the consequences of that non-cooperation - as we have seen in Dir over the past week."
"Rabbani's liquidation was the biggest set-back to peace so far," says a top Afghan Intelligence official. "Who doesn't want peace is very clear. We see the Pakistain connection in this." Most government and intelligence officials in NATO, ISAF and the Afghan government echoed Karzai in blaming Pakistain indirectly for Rabbani's liquidation. But the way Rabbani was killed was quite similar to the murder of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the charismatic leader of Northern Alliance. He was killed by two Al Qaeda jacket wallahs pretending to be journalists just before the September 11, 2001 attacks, an liquidation launched to please Mullah Omar ... a minor Pashtun commander in the war against the Soviets who made good as leader of the Taliban. As ruler of Afghanistan, he took the title Leader of the Faithful. The imposition of Pashtunkhwa on the nation institutionalized ignorance and brutality already notable for its own fair share of ignorance and brutality... , but which might have been set into motion without his consent. A section of the Haqqani Network under the influence of Pakistain's ISI denied killing Rabbani.
Negotiations with Taliban:
Recently, the Karzai government has decided to sit down with its enemies, the Taliban and the Hezb-e-Islami, in Japan. Qari Din Mohammad Hanif, the former Taliban planning minister who had a seal of approval from Mullah Umer, sat down with Afghan official Masoon Stanikzai, a senior member of High Peace Council, to talk. "The Taliban insisted on complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the country after 2014, and called the Karzai government a puppet saying they would not negotiate with them," one official said.
The Taliban, in a statement, also distanced themselves from Pakistain which according to analyst Carl Adams, a former director at CIA who has worked in Afghanistan and Pakistain, "shows how Pakistain's game is ending and how isolated Pakistain stands today in it's own game". He says: "The GHQ lost the plot when the US and NATO started negotiating with the Taliban directly and when OBL was killed."
Quetta Shura, Pakistain and NATO Supplies:
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir, Mullah Abdul Rauf, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmad Jan Akhundzada, and Mullah Muhammad Younis - the elite Quetta Shura members - were all caught in Bloody Karachi ...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous... and other urban areas of Pakistain in a series of joint raids in 2010.
Mullah Mir Muhammad was caught from Faisalabad on January 26, 2010 in a joint raid by Pak and American intelligence officials when Americans intercepted a messenger and immediately asked Paks to take action. Also in Pak custody is Mullah Abdul Salam, caught in January 2010, and Maulvi Abdul Kabir, caught from Nowshehra on 20th February 2010 in similar raids by Pak and American teams.
"The problem is Pakistain," says former Afghan intelligence chief Amarullah Saleh. "The shelters are in Pakistain, and the war in Afghanistan is facilitated and run from Pakistain. What other clarifications do they want?"
In Pakistain, extensive diplomatic efforts have been made by US and British diplomats including NATO officials to convince the government to re-open NATO supply lines. Stephen Tyne, a NATO logistical expert, says, "It costs NATO an extra $10,000 per 20-foot container with an additional $1.3 billion bill apart from bribing CAR nations with over $500 million to supply NATO, thanks to Paks blocking the routes."
About 90 percent of non-military supplies to Afghanistan went through Bloody Karachi. Today, close to 75 percent of the cargo is shipped through the northern network.
While ties between Pakistain and NATO have been worsening since the embargo began, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen showed his annoyance in Brussels when he said it was not business as usual with Pakistain. That created panic in the Pak camp where meetings were called at the highest level. A top US military official who spoke on condition of anonymity said, "General Allan had been told repeatedly by the Pak COAS that they are waiting for the right time. We expect the route to open any time soon with a candid apology on the Salala incident too."
"Everybody is hopeful we can get something back on track with Pakistain," US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John F. I was in Vietnam, you know Kerry Senator-for-Life from Massachussetts, the Senate's current foreign policy expert, filling the vacated wingtips of Joe Biden... (D-Mass) said in an interview with The News Agency that Dare Not be Named. "Paks make money off that route...That may interest them at some point... but on the other hand, we can't be prisoners of one relationship with something as vital to our national security interests."
Pak Brigadier (r) Rahid Wali Janjua explains the Pak perspective: "Strategic Depth is a redundant theory first perceived by General (r) Aslam Baig. Pakistain has come a long way after that. Pakistain now wants a democratic government in Afghanistan which is legitimate with proportional ethnic representation in it."
'America is not retreating':
"Let's agree that any endgame in Afghanistan must include Pakistain, the Quetta Shura and even the Haqqanis as part of the solution, instead of leaving them as lingering problems," says Carl Adams. "The Americans need to realize that a draw in Afghanistan is a win for this trio. Any future guarantors of Afghanistan as a state - powers such as Soddy Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in their national face... , China, Russia, and NATO - must understand that the solution must include them or there really is no long-term solution."
"Transitioning security and governance to the Afghans does not mean America's departure, and I want Pakistain to hear that loud and clear," said Kerry, who has made several trips to Pakistain. "And I want Afghans and the neighbours to hear that loud and clear. America is not retreating from its interests. We're really trying to be more effective about the way in which we're going to support them."
"The time has come for some give and take on Afghanistan," says Adams. "Once those concessions are made, we must have international guarantees of a workable peace. Without all that coming together, there will only be another decade of war, with or without the Americans there."
Asked about the endgame in Afghanistan, he said: "The US and NATO will not go back, for now."
[Dawn] THE cycle of violence in Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... continues unabated. This time it was the myrmidons, killing 18 Punjabis in Turbat who were en route to Iran and then presumably onwards to being smuggled into Europe. Suspicion has fallen on Dr Allah Nazar and the Baloch Liberation Front, known to be active in the area. The only, though grim, difference in the latest attack by the Baloch separatists is the number of people killed in the incident. Attacks on Punjabis trying to make their way to Europe illegally have occurred before, particularly in the Mand area closer to the border with Iran. In fact, the human smugglers operating through Balochistan are believed to have changed their routes after clients trying to escape to a better future baulked at the risks along the original smuggling path. But the BLF and Allah Nazar appear to have caught up with them, instilling more fear in Punjabis daring to cross through remote Baloch-dominated territories.
Whether a tactic born of hatred or desperation, the killing of 'outsiders' in Baloch areas only ends up diminishing support for the Baloch cause. The state has engaged in its own violence against the Baloch -- military operations, missing persons, kill-and-dump operations -- and that is certainly a big factor in the violence that the Baloch separatists engage in. But it is a self-defeating tactic. Lose the sympathy and support of reasonable and right-thinking people across Pakistain and the Baloch will be more than ever at the mercy of a security establishment that views them with suspicion at the best of times. The solution is, of course, well known by now: the governments, both provincial and federal, must push for an end to state violence while at the same time meaningfully reaching out to the disaffected Baloch who have an ingrained suspicion of how the bigger provinces treat the geographically vast but sparsely populated province. Allah Nazar's armed separatists are still not believed to number more than a few hundred. But seven years into the latest Balochistan insurgency more Baloch may be tempted to join him and others of his ilk if they don't see any change in the state's approach.
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[Dawn] FRIDAY night's drone attack brings to mind another one from March 2011. Raymond Davis had barely left Pakistain when a strike killed 40 men at a jirga in North Wazoo. Like the NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A cautionary tale of cost-benefit analysis.... supplies stand-off, the Davis incident had fuelled anti-Americanism in Pakistain, become a bone of contention in the US-Pakistain relationship and was only solved after prolonged wrangling. Now the resolution of another crisis in ties -- except this one lasted seven months, and had more significant consequences -- has also been marked by a drone attack, this one killing 20 people. Although they are more likely to have been Islamic fascistithis time, the message was obvious: America intends to get back to business immediately, and will not let Pak concerns get in the way of its counterterrorism goals. But the sheer insensitivity -- and imprudence -- of the timing demonstrates that, after a rocky year and a half with Pakistain, the US still hasn't realised how carefully certain aspects of the relationship need to be handled.
Friday's strike will play right into the hands of opposition parties and right-wing elements that are inciting public opinion against the reopening of NATO supply routes; a lack of resolution on the drone programme was precisely one of the points they have been bringing up. It also has the potential to increase the security risk to truckers and the communities they pass through. And the attack has exposed the fact that, despite parliament having taken a strong stand against unilateral drone strikes and despite the public rhetoric of Pak officials, a new approach was not developed behind the scenes as the two countries tried to revive the relationship. Which also suggests that the US views this moment not as a new chapter in ties, but as a continuation of the old story now that one inconvenient road block has been removed.
Pakistain need not deny that the drone strikes have done this country good too, taking out senior figures in the Pak Taliban. Despite their civilian casualties, they are more precise than conventional Pak air strikes can ever be. And this country has not played its cards right either, supporting the programme in private conversations with American officials -- at least historically -- while railing against it in public. Ultimately, though, these are now unilateral strikes carried out by a foreign country on Pak soil, and they anger citizens across the ideological spectrum. A joint mechanism to run the drone programme needs to be developed and made public. And until then, it would be wise to ensure that the biggest strikes do not take place at the worst possible times.
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[Saudi Gazette] Another July 5 came and went; it's now 35 years since a dark night enveloped Pakistain.
The country has been trying to shed the legacy of a dictator ever since, but has miserably failed. Gen. Zia ul Haq's ...the creepy-looking former dictator of Pakistain. Zia was an Islamic nutball who imposed his nutballery on the rest of the country with the enthusiastic assistance of the nation's religious parties, which are populated by other nutballs. He was appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom he hanged when he seized power. His time in office was a period of repression, with hundreds of thousands of political rivals, minorities, and journalists executed or tortured, including senior general officers convicted in coup-d'etat plots, who would normally be above the law. As part of his alliance with the religious parties, his government helped run the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, providing safe havens, American equipiment, Saudi money, and Pak handlers to selected mujaheddin. Zia died along with several of his top generals and admirals and the then United States Ambassador to Pakistain Arnold Lewis Raphel when he was assassinated in a suspicious air crash near Bahawalpur in 1988... 11-year rule had left deep scars on the conscience of the nation. It was he who helped the sectarian genies to come out of the bottle; now no one knows how to get them back.
He divided the nation on religious and sectarian lines -- a gimmick to prolong his grip on power. In these 35 years, the Pak nation slipped backward on human rights One man's rights are another man's existential threat. , women empowerment and religious tolerance, and the liberal, enlightened and tolerant Pakistain of yesteryears vanished from people's memory.
We see Gen. Zia's footprints in people's behavior and mindset, in events that put the whole region on fire and the ongoing bloodshed and turmoil. Afghanistan and Kashmire are his living legacies.
The Zia regime helped establish a number of madrassas with the financial support of the West, which turned out to be breeding grounds for militancy. Afghan and Pak Taliban, numerous sectarian outfits and the political straitjackets in the country are all his bequests.
Gen. Zia changed the nation into a hysterical mob ready to kill and maim. Until we undo the changes he brought about in people's minds and hearts, this nation will continue to grope in darkness.
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Does Pakistain have an Afghanistan strategy? Is it still a carry-over from the cold war era policy embedded in the desire for using Afghanistan as a strategic backyard in case of a conflict with India? Can the Pak military decouple its Afghanistan strategy (if there is any) from the perceived Indo-Afghan-American nexus that this establishment views as inimical to Pakistain's interests? And will Pakistain ever take into account the criticism that flows from its alleged nexus with certain shades of "good Taliban"?
These questions - critical of an army that is already stretched out, particularly on the western border, spread out in parts of embattled Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa ... formerly NWFP, still Terrorism Central... and Tribal Areas, and dealing with an insurgency in Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... - are being asked inside and outside Pakistain. The international community is closely watching the role of Pakistain Army.
Financially, for the military itself, engagement in Balochistan as well as in FATA has turned out to be an extremely expensive affair. The roughly four billion dollars the US now owes Pakistain for the 140,000 plus deployment in FATA is a case in point. It has spent this money on the US request but is still waiting for reimbursement.
A series of discussions with senior military officials clearly suggests that the past romance with the idea of "strategic depth" has made way to greater realism. Most of officials, also in the ministry of foreign affairs, are reconciled with the fact that Afghanistan will remain under the gaze of the US-led NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A collection of multinational and multilingual and multicultural armed forces, all of differing capabilities, working toward a common goal by pulling in different directions... and virtually in the control of the non-Pashtun dominated security establishment for a long time to come. This "nightmarish" prospect simply works against the obsolete idea of placing or desiring a "friendly" government in Kabul. And the increasing collaborative framework among New Delhi, Kabul and the USA serves as another almost immovable stumbling block against any plans Pakistain Army may have for Afghanistan.
It is neither a revelation nor a coincidence that the US, India and Afghanistan share concerns against the Pak security establishment for having been either in cahoots or in working relations with several non-state actors
It is no revelation, nor a coincidence that all three nations share concerns against the Pak security establishment for having been either in cahoots or in working relations with several non-state actors; for India, Lashkar-e-Taiba ...the Army of the Pure, an Ahl-e-Hadith terror organization founded by Hafiz Saeed. LeT masquerades behind the Jamaat-ud-Dawa facade within Pakistain and periodically blows things up and kills people in India. Despite the fact that it is banned, always an interesting concept in Pakistain, the organization remains an blatant tool and perhaps an arm of the ISI... alias Jamaat-ud-Dawa ...the front organization of Lashkar-e-Taiba... and Jaish-e-Mohammad ...literally Army of Mohammad, a Pak-based Deobandi terror group founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in 2000, after he split with the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin. In 2002 the government of Pervez Musharraf banned the group, which changed its name to Khaddam ul-Islam and continued doing what it had been doing before without missing a beat... are the Pak military's first line of defence. For Kabul and Washington, the so-called Quetta shura and the Haqqani Network , which are striving to end the "foreign occupation" of Afghanistan, are the "veritable arms" of Pak security establishment.
India, Kabul and the USA are convinced that such groups constitute an essential part of the instruments that Pakistain Army has deployed to pursue its foreign policy objectives. As a consequence, there is ever greater unity among the three countries on the issue of countering Pakistain for its "abetment of terrorist forces operating on the western and eastern borders."
Pak Army as well as elements within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still appear to be in a reactionary mode. Without charting a clearly defined way for Pakistain, they all say in unison that "without knowing what the Americans want in Afghanistan and in the region, we cannot devise and spell out our policy." They still maintain, and in this case legitimately, that for Pakistain, Afghanistan is a long-term reality and it cannot frame its policy in the "endgame context."
This appears to be a faulty approach as predicating our own policy on external factors thus far has taken us nowhere. It cannot be helpful in future either. Unless the Pak security establishment is clear itself and abandons foreign policy instruments that serve as the basic ingredient of discord in its relations with India, Afghanistan, and the United States, it will not be able to pursue even well-intended objectives in Afghanistan.
Pakistain's Afghanistan policy, or the military's strategy for that country to be precise, still seems to be pegged to the American endgame in Afghanistan as well as to future political set up in Kabul.
Given the broader US policy matrix on the region, one can safely assume that even the United States will not think of a conclusive "endgame" in Afghanistan. Nor can it afford to think of exiting from that country lock stock and barrel.
Given the broader US policy matrix, one can safely assume that even the United States will not think of a conclusive "endgame" in Afghanistan. Nor can it afford to think of exiting from the country lock stock and barrel
American and Indian presence in Afghanistan is now almost a constant. So is Pakistain's interest in Afghanistan because of the geographical proximity. Pakistain's security establishment shall have to factor that in when thinking of its engagement with Kabul. Washington and Kabul shall also have to accord recognition to this Pak interest. This might create a middle ground for all the four countries to hammer out a mutually acceptable collaborative framework, which could also help remove mutual mistrust.
But, in the words of Carolyn Brooks, a political analyst and a former insider, "If the US et al would stop badgering Pakistain about the Haqqani Network, I am sure that Pakistain would gladly give him up. But unfortunately the US knows nothing of face saving. Pakistain is still upset about the NATO incident last November and the unfortunate deaths of the Pak troops."
Brooks, in a reference to the Pak security establishment's reactive bent of mind, also says that "Pakistain needs to find a way to come into more of a Western way of thinking if it wants to continue to receive money from the west."
The Pak economy is in doldrums. The impact will be visible in a few years as the population increases and unemployment rises. Pakistain cannot afford a perennial state of conflict with the US or even India. If it does, that means economic disaster. And the disaster will be even more pressing for the military establishment itself. Unless it wants to turn the country into another Afghanistan, Sudan or Somalia, the army and its supporters in the civilian government will have to get into a proactive, economy-oriented policy framework.
Among a certain group of international relations and foreign affairs wonks, Kenneth Waltz is an iconic figure. That's why foreign policy cognoscenti were all atwitter when they picked up the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine and saw a cover story by Waltz with the headline: "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb."
Waltz has long argued that when it comes to nuclear weapons more may be better. But given the recent escalation of tensions and threats between Iran and, well, everyone not named Syria, Waltz's position could best be described as a lonely one.
We recently caught up with the 89-year-old Waltz at his home on Maine's central coast...
#2
Walz needs to take his medicine - he's losing it. A Middle East with nuclear weapons = Next world war. Since when has any major weapon system ever been held back ... over the long term? Whatever weapons exist - are always used . The words "nuclear deterrence" can never exist in the Middle East. It's a dangerous fallacy to think that because deterrence existed for a brief time between the USA and the former Soviet Union ... that therefore the concept can be applied elsewhere.
#3
Nothing less than astounding how liberals can twist their "no nukes!" policy to "theocratic fascist state should have nukes" as long as it is to the detriment of America.
#4
We missed Iran El Supremo the Ayatollah Khamenei telling the nation to prep for the "end times" + that the focii of Iran's national policies is the return of the 12th Imam, didn't we???
KHAMENEI may be waitin' for a spell yet ...
> the Boy is not born yet.
> He hasn't joined the US Mil = elite Soldier.
> Was not converted to Islam while in the US Mil.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
In the eleven years since the US invasion of Afghanistan, Gulalai Jabbar, 28, has become a graduate from Kabul University and is now working as a computer engineer in an Afghanistan's leading telecommunication company. But like the ten thousand or so other young Afghan professionals, Jabbar is also worried about the future of his country, especially after the planned withdrawal of ISAF forces. He fears a civil war may start in Afghanistan again.
Wazoo
...the creepy-looking former dictator of Pakistain. Zia was an Islamic nutball who imposed his nutballery on the rest of the country with the enthusiastic assistance of the nation's religious parties, which are populated by other nutballs. He was appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom he hanged when he seized power. His time in office was a period of repression, with hundreds of thousands of political rivals, minorities, and journalists executed or tortured, including senior general officers convicted in coup-d'etat plots, who would normally be above the law. As part of his alliance with the religious parties, his government helped run the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, providing safe havens, American equipiment, Saudi money, and Pak handlers to selected mujaheddin. Zia died along with several of his top generals and admirals and the then United States Ambassador to Pakistain Arnold Lewis Raphel when he was assassinated in a suspicious air crash near Bahawalpur in 1988...
