As violence in Libya continues with no end in sight, the debate about a possible military intervention by the West has heated up. But the international community is cautious about getting dragged into the conflict, which threatens to turn into a prolonged civil war. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the US is concerned about Libya "descending into chaos and becoming a giant Somalia." From you mouth to the ear of G*d, Mrs Bill
#2
You remember Somalia, Mrs. Bill? When Mr. Bill turned tail and ran, thus encouraging bin Laden and his ilk?
So does that suggest you want to avoid turning tail and running by not getting involved in the first place? Was that Mr. Bill's mistake?
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03/05/2011 7:52 Comments ||
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#3
The troops were committed to Somalia under George the Elder's tenure. They were sent in after weeks of media manipulation of with images of poor starving Somalis. It was a set up by the media to drive international policy of the US. So we went in and started feeding the population but discovered not a country but a bunch of tribes fighting for territory and power. Made it difficult to make deliveries, particularly when THEY had no problem using denial of food as a weapon. It was in the next administration that the mission creep set in to act as 'Peacekeepers' to allow the management of the food distribution. No one wanted to dirty their hands with the basic principle that you got to beat the warlords into the ground with resultant collateral casualties to achieve the order necessary to build/rebuild the administrative structure to accomplish some of the basics of civilization - food, clean water, law and order. Remember that Les Aspin, newly minted Secty of Defense, turned down the request of the theater commander for tanks and men to do that. That was Billy Boy & Co's contribution of screwing the hooch. It went from food delivery to nation building with hands tied behind their backs. Then when the big embarrassment was handed to them, they choose to run. However, don't be too hard on Billy. The same scenario played out in Beirut. Original purpose transitions into mission creep resulting in a deadly cluster, followed by a bug out. Falls under the "Holy underwear! Sheriff murdered! Innocent women and children blown to bits! We have to protect our phoney baloney jobs here, gentlemen! We must do something about this immediately! Immediately! Immediately! Harrumph! Harrumph! Harrumph!"
Just because its a nail sitting out there, doesn't mean you should attempt to hit it with a hammer.
#6
Gaddafi's survival is an interest of many powerful regimes, for some it is a vital interest.
Here's a ruthless totalitarian dictator whose ideology is based on communism, islamofascism, reactionary third worldism and 'afrocentrism.'
He's sponsored mass fatality terror attacks on major western powers and not only survived but he's managed to turn these powers into meek submissive poodles.
Plus, he's practically swimming in oil monkey.
If this kind of regime can be toppled then no other regime is secure. Conversely if Gaddafi prevails, and exterminates his domestic enemies (and exterminate he will) all other anti western regimes' deterrence versus their subjects will be significantly strengthened.
Anti western regimes survive, pro western regimes fall, this would be the result of the Arab spring.
[Maghrebia] Analysis by Rajeh Said in London for Al-Shorfa.com -- 03/03/11
The two popular revolutions that toppled former presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak constituted a new challenge to al-Qaeda and its ideologues.
This challenge did not arise after a targeted military strike or additional restrictions on the movements of al-Qaeda leaders in their preferred staging areas on the Afghan-Pakistain border.
Instead, the challenge is the result of a wish that came true: the fall of regimes routinely described as "dictatorial" or "apostate" for ruling in a manner contrary to the teachings of Islamic Sharia.
Be careful what you wish for, and all that.
But the irony is that the realisation of this wish created a thorny ideological problem for al-Qaeda leaders. Regimes described as dictatorial and oppressive can be tossed by peaceful popular uprisings and not only through armed action, which some jihadists had long insisted was the only way to achieve regime change.
Al-Qaeda's intellectual dilemma came to the forefront immediately after the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes fell. Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri ... Second in command of al-Qaeda, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is... , al-Qaeda's second in command, recorded a series of messages apparently made just days before Mubarak resigned, following street protests that brought millions of peaceful demonstrators to the Egyptian streets calling for "the fall of the regime".
The messages were al-Zawahiri's first comments on the popular uprising in Egypt. In them, he attacked the Mubarak regime for presenting itself as a secular and democratic regime that uses Islamic Sharia as a source for legislation and not the sole source. He also criticised it for saying that illusory sovereignty stems from the people.
Al-Zawahiri called Mubarak's regime a "Jahilia" regime (meaning un-Islamic) and said that the "democratic process can only be secular and not religious". He lashed out at states with democratic systems, showing disdain for Islamists who are calling for the adoption of "the system known as the civilian state".
Al-Zawahiri's statements appeared out of touch with the aspirations of young men and women who erupted into the streets in Egypt and Tunisia to call for real democratic regimes to replace what they viewed as the corrupt regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali.
His words were reminiscent of a video message released years ago, in which he said change in Islamic countries cannot be accomplished in a peaceful manner. In that message, which was posted on discussion forums along with his latest one, he challenged those who do not share his opinion to provide "one example" of a peaceful revolution that succeeded in changing a regime.
While al-Zawahiri's messages, both old and new, were being posted online, Egyptian Vice President Omar Suleiman ... Now former Vice president of Egypt. From 1993 until his appointment to that office in 2011 he was Minister without Portfolio and Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (EGID)... announced that Mubarak was stepping down, meeting the demand of the protesters. The Egyptian army, which assumed power during a transitional period, appeared to be serious about meeting the aspirations of protestors. Demonstrators sought Mubarak's departure, a campaign against rampant corruption in state institutions, and constitutional amendments that would open the door to real democracy that allows for the peaceful transfer of power, political pluralism, and press freedoms.
The Egyptian authorities began immediately to prosecute former regime officials for involvement in corruption and amending articles of the constitution to allow greater competition for the presidency and for parliamentary seats. The new leadership also started licensing political parties that were awaiting approval for 20 years such as the Centre Party, which was founded by former leading figures of the Moslem Brüderbund.
The brotherhood appears to ready to make the transition into a legal party after being banned for several decades.
Decades of violence brought oppression, not change
The ability of the Egyptian population to change the regime through peaceful demonstrations brings to mind three decades of security turmoil that Egypt witnessed because jihadists like al-Zawahiri insisted on the use of violence and armed action as the only ways to change the regime.
Jihadists assassinated former President Anwar Sadat in 1981. The next regime, led by Mubarak, reacted by imposing an emergency law, violently suppressing Islamists, and preventing any political activity that could lead to any change in the regime (as exemplified by the dissolution of the Labour Party and the prevention of the Moslem Brüderbund from participating in political life).
This security and political crackdown was reinforced throughout the 1990s because the jihadists continued with more acts of violence against symbols of the state -- such as politicians and security officials -- as well as Western tourists who visited Egypt, and who constitute an essential part of the livelihood of a large segment of Egyptian workers in the tourism sector.
This became the formula offered by Egyptian officials when foreign visitors raised the issue of opening the way for greater political freedoms: any easing of the iron grip through which the regime holds various segments of society will usher the Islamists into power, they would argue.
Some officials accepted this argument and ignored for many years the human rights ... which are not the same thing as individual rights, mind you... violations and the political and security crackdowns that occurred in Egypt, along with other "police" states. Others attempted to persuade Egypt and other countries that political reforms and acceptance of popular demands could help and not threaten efforts to combat al-Qaeda and those described as Islamist thugs.
However, The infamous However... the Egyptian regime was quick to dismiss calls for political liberalisation, arguing that it would allow the Islamists to obtain power as happened with the Moslem Brüderbund during the Egyptian People's Assembly elections in 2005 and with Hamas, always the voice of sweet reason, in the 2006 Paleostinian elections.
Despite the fact that this argument may be true to some extent -- i.e. that elections may bring Islamists to power -- the fundamental weakness, it appears, is the confusion between political Islam and al-Qaeda. In fact, there is a fundamental difference between political Islam and the jihadist movement because the latter uses armed violence as an essential means -- sometimes the only means - for regime change.
Political Islam vs. al-Qaeda
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between political Islamists and al-Qaeda is their differing view towards political pluralism. While the brotherhood accepts it and defends its participation in parliaments that include non-Islamist parties (which may be secular or national), al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements with a similar ideology do not accept this at all. They reject what they consider as "infidel parliaments" (since they control personal status laws), reject multi-party systems, and refuse to accept any democratic transfers of power.
The Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement was among the first Islamist groups that responded to this line of thought, which argues that it is not permissible for Islamists to abandon power if they lose elections. This Tunisian group stated, in reviews in the 1990s, that it would give up power if Islamists lost the elections.
It is likely that this debate between political Islam and al-Qaeda will resurface, with the former preparing to engage in electoral contests to be held in the coming months in both Egypt and Tunisia. It is also likely that their political participation will be met with opposition from supporters of al-Qaeda on the pretext that it is contrary to the correct teachings of Islam.
Continued on Page 49
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#1
A very interesting note in the article is that, in Sweden, jury trials are limited to free speech cases. This is likely a remnant of Viking Law, which distinguished it, with some overlap, from Germanic Law.
[Asharq al-Aswat] Having danced around the issue for months, Iran's 'Supreme Guide' Ali Khamenei has, at last, ordered the arrest of the top leaders of the opposition 'Green' movement.
Reports from Tehran indicate that former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi and former parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi have been transferred to the Heshmatieh prison in eastern Tehran. The two men who continue to challenge the legality of President Mahmoud Short Round Ahmadinejad's re-election in 2009 are accompanied by their wives.
Mousavi and Karrubi had been trying to create a loyal opposition, something impossible in a system like that of the regime in Iran.
The basic principle of the Khomeinist system is that of Walayat al-Faqih, or rule by the theologian. Under it, the 'Supreme Guide' has the final word on all issues, both sacred and profane. If he deems fit, he could even suspend the principles of Islam.
In 2009, the ' Supreme Guide' endorsed Ahmadinejad's re-election even before the votes had been counted.
Mousavi and Karrubi were left with a dire choice: act within the Khomeinist system and swallow Ahmadinejad's re-election or reject the ruling by the 'Supreme Guide' and become opponents of the system.
They knew that politically active Iranians are divided in two camps.
One camp belongs to those who hope for change within the regime.
The other is that of regime change.
Supporters of ' change within the regime' argue that a strong president, for example Mr. Mousavi, backed by a massive mandate could restore the prestige of the state vis-à-vis the parallel authority of the Faqih, and introduce social and political reforms demanded by the people.
Those who argue for 'regime change' claim that the Khomeinist system cannot be reformed.
Thus the stark choice is: change within the regime or regime change?
Mousavi and Karrubi tried to avoid the choice for as long as they could.
For a while they came close to rejecting the system, thus attracting a mass following.
Soon, however, their fear of embarking on the unknown persuaded them to step back and reassert their 'faith in the Constitution of the Islamic Theocratic Republic.'
It is interesting that they are sent to prison at a time that they are further than ever from a 'regime change' position.
Why did Khamenei decide to sent the two historic figures of Khomeinism to prison at this time?
One reason is his growing fear that the wave of unrest that has unfurled over the region might reach Iran. In that case, Mousavi and Karrubi could serve as iconic figures in the first phase of an uprising.
The Tehran leadership has been watching the events of the past two months in the region with acute interest.
It has noted the total absence of religious themes and xenophobic tones with the emphasis put on social and political demands. It has also noted that the young educated urban middle classes provided the backbone of the uprisings with the so-called 'Mustazafin' (the Downtrodden) watching on the sidelines.
It was also clear that the rebellious youth used tactics and techniques first tested in Iran during the 2009 uprisings against Ahmadinejad's re-election.
Khamenei may have decided that it was time to re-unite the factions still loyal to him. Part of the price for that was the removal of Mousavi and Karrubi from the chessboard.
The regime is also nervous about next year's parliamentary elections.
Mousavi and Karrubi had threatened a boycott, a move that would have stripped the exercise of whatever credibility it might have claimed.
With Mousavi and Karrubi in prison, and unable to communicate with the outside world, the exercise could go ahead without being challenged by former grandees of the regime.
The problem, however, is that Mousavi and Karrubi have not been removed from the chessboard. They have been moved sideways.
Even in prison they remain a thorn in the side of the regime.
The two prisoners of Heshmatieh, together with two former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami provided a valuable interface that helped protect the system from collision with the underlying currents of 'regime change.'
There are signs that Khamenei is preparing to move against Rafsanjani and Khatami as well.
Rafsanjani's most important position, the Speakership of the Assembly of Experts, is already in ejection mode. By the end of March, he will be replaced by Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani. There is also talk of pushing him out of his second position as Chairman of the Expediency Council.
Rafsanjani has tried to wiggle his way back into official favour. He has used the religious term 'fitnah' (sedition) to describe the ' Green' movement and reasserted his ' absolute obedience ' to the 'Supreme Guide'.
Nevertheless, don't be surprised if, within the next few months, he finds himself rubbing shoulders with Mousavi and Karrubi in Heshmatieh.
A campaign has also been launched against Khatami, accusing him of involvement in all sorts of foreign plots. The daily Kayhan claims that the former president received vast sums of money from a neighbouring country to help overthrow the regime.
Almost no one, including those who don't like Khatami, would believe such claims.
However, The infamous However... at least part of the regime is preparing the ground for Khatami's arrest and imprisonment.
Mousavi and Karrubi, and to a lesser extent Rafsanjani and Khatami, have acted as shock absorbers for the regime. They have fostered the dream, some may say illusion, that the regime, though absolutist, is open to reform nevertheless.
The four men have also claimed that non-violent opposition is still possible within a regime that has always dealt with its opponents with violence.
The removal of the four men from the equation is bound to have two immediate effects.
First, it will encourage supporters of 'regime change'. Their argument would be simple: a regime that cannot tolerate mild criticism from its own former brass hats is unlikely to listen to tougher criticism from the masses.
Mousavi, Karrubi, Rafsanjani and Khatami have never demanded any major reform such as reducing, if not abolishing, the powers of the Faqih. Nor have they called for open elections in which every citizen and every political party would be allowed to participate without the prior approval of the Council of Guardians.
Their removal could radicalise the opposition by opening a greater space for groups that preach armed struggle which, in most cases, could mean terrorism.
Another effect of the latest move by Khamenei would be to intensify the power struggle that has been going on among regime loyalists.
Divisions exist within the regime's political façade as Ahmadinejad's faction comes under pressure from the faction led by Chief Justice Sadeq Larijani and the coalition led by Tehran Mayor Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf.
The Islamic theocracyary Guard Corps (IRGC) is also split into factions with a growing number of mid-ranking officers demanding that the force distance itself from partisan politics.
The removal of the Mousavi-Karrubi challenge could further encourage that position.
By sending Mousavi and Karrubi the regime acted out of fear. Students of history know that whenever a ruler acts out of fear he ends up with even greater fear.
Machiavelli identified fear as one of the two instruments of rule, the other being persuasion. What he meant was that the ruler should be feared by his subjects, not the other way round. In Iran today, the ruler is in fear of those supposed to be his subjects.
Continued on Page 49
Posted by: Fred ||
03/05/2011 00:00 ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Zawahiri
Mahmoud 
