[FoxNews] Forget Biden's laptop lies, the FBI knew that it was real as far back as 2019
President Joe Biden lied from start to finish about his family’s influence-peddling racket. He recently issued a sweeping pardon to his son, Hunter Biden, contradicting his repeated assurances that he would not interfere. This pardon may be one of the most comprehensive in U.S. history, encompassing over a decade of corruption. While some have drawn parallels between this pardon and President Gerald Ford’s pardon of former President Richard Nixon, the comparison falls short. Ford aimed to heal a divided nation; Biden is shielding himself and his family from accountability.
Unlike the corporate media and Democrats, who sought to shield Biden until his political future was doomed, observers of the Biden crime family’s corrupt practices are unsurprised by this latest contradiction. Biden’s claim that he would not pardon Hunter Biden is part of a broader pattern of deception regarding his family’s business dealings in order to conceal his involvement.
At the start of this Congress, the House Oversight and Accountability Committee launched an investigation into Joe Biden’s involvement in his family’s business dealings. Despite stonewalling from the Biden administration, we followed the Bidens’ money trail, exposing the 20 shell companies they set up to hide the shady foreign payments they received, all with Joe Biden at the center of the family business.
Our investigation has exposed how Joe Biden lied repeatedly about his involvement in these schemes that enriched the Bidens to the tune of tens of millions of dollars. Here are some of the biggest lies that we exposed during our investigation.
1. Hunter Biden laptop as Russian disinformation
2. ‘I have never spoken to my son about his overseas business dealings’
[FoxNews] Remember the short-lived dockworkers’ strike which crippled ports on the East and Gulf Coasts in October?
The strike only lasted three days, but cost the American economy billions in lost revenue. The work stoppage was temporarily resolved when the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) agreed to a 61.5% wage increase over the next six years. The ILA and the United States Maritime Alliance tabled other issues, the most important of which is the automation of ports.
The contract extension that was negotiated expires on January 15, 2025 – five days before President-elect Trump takes office for his second term.
However, there is a major glitch, which had been under-reported by corporate media: the two sides stopped all negotiations in mid-November, with the ILA walking away from the negotiating table, stating, "USMX introduced language in their proposal for semi-automated equipment to be used at ILA ports, which this union outright rejected. The ILA recognized this as a renewed attempt by USMX to eliminate ILA jobs with automation and broke off talks."
[AMWAJ] The sudden downfall of Bashar Al-Assad has raised a number of questions about the thinking and roles of his supporters. First and foremost, Russia—the most powerful foreign ally of the Syrian government—played a pivotal role as events unfolded.
According to one high-ranking regional diplomatic source, Assad’s recent visit to Moscow was a turning point. While the Syrian leader was in Russia, forces led by the Sunni Islamist Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) unexpectedly seized Aleppo without a fight. Upon his return to Syria, Assad is said to have expressed anger toward his army. In private meetings, Amwaj.media has learned, he lambasted his commanders as corrupt and untrustworthy—describing his army as a collection of “thieves” who cannot be relied upon. While Assad’s Russian host and counterpart, Vladimir Putin, had promised assistance, the senior regional source suggested that this support was limited to ensuring a safe exit. Given that Assad and his wife are now apparently in Russia, this promise has been kept—at least for now.
The source also provided insights into earlier negotiations on Syria. Proposals for dialogue between the opposition and the government were discussed, with Turkey playing a significant role. Ankara reportedly instructed the opposition to act with restraint, and there was even coordination with the former Syrian prime minister to lead a transitional phase aimed at forming a new state. But none of these efforts really took off, partly due to the reticence of Assad to usher change. In parallel, informed sources in Tehran told Amwaj.media, the Turks allegedly blindsided both Iran and Russia by insisting that movement spotted among rebels in Idlib in recent months was nothing to worry about.
Then there is the role of Iran, the Assad family’s longstanding regional ally. Seeing an armed rebellion take shape amid the Arab Spring protests, the Islamic Republic dispatched its expeditionary Quds Force to save its Syrian partner with blood and great treasure.
Although the tide was turned against Sunni rebels and fighting frozen for the past four years, western sanctions gradually hollowed out the Syrian state. As the government in Damascus turned to large-scale drug trafficking to generate revenue, it became sorely apparent that only petrodollars and political pressure on western capitals from Gulf Arab states would enable a semblance of reconstruction. On this basis, Iran welcomed the pioneering decision by the Emiratis to reopen their embassy in Damascus in late 2018, ending seven years of estrangement. Facilitated by Abu Dhabi, Assad also gradually re-engaged with others who had backed the rebellion against his rule—including Saudi Arabia.
But things took a turn following the Oct. 7, 2023 Palestinian surprise attack on Israeli border communities. As Hezbollah immediately opened a “support front” against Israel following the eruption of the Gaza war, the Emiratis reportedly sought to prod Assad into standing on the sidelines. Barely a week later, the diplomatic mission of Yemen’s Ansarullah movement in Damascus was shuttered, ostensibly as a precondition for Assad’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. The distancing from Ansarullah, better known as the Houthis, was particularly pronounced as the group over the past year rose to become a key member of the Axis through its drone and missile attacks on Israel as well as disruption of shipping in the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, as Israel frontally assaulted the Iranian presence—taking out the Quds Force command that helped Assad cling to power, and even razing an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus—the Syrian government largely kept mum. The same lukewarm approach was apparent in the statement Assad issued following Israel’s killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s southern suburb earlier this year.
In other words, while Syria’s geography and official state ideology made it central to the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, Assad was apparently leveraging “non-resistance” to rehabilitate his standing among Arab allies of the US.
So when HTS rolled into Aleppo and Hama without a fight, Iran was in no rush to come to Assad’s aid. The senior regional diplomatic source explained that despite the Syrian government’s urgent request for Iranian support, logistical constraints and operational risks—including potential Israeli airstrikes—made such assistance impractical. This, according to the source, further highlighted Iran’s growing burden in the Syrian crisis, which was no longer tenable. If direct access was to be physically constrained by Israeli air power, mindful of repeated bombings of runways in both Aleppo and Damascus as well as threats against Iranian flights in recent weeks, it ultimately diminished the value of Syria as an ally.
In this context, the Quds Force is said to have established contact with HTS, securing assurances amid the collapse of the Syrian army that Shiite Muslims and Shiite shrines as well as the Iranian embassy would be left untouched. The extent of the involvement of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus in this initiative is unclear. Nonetheless, as Iran’s evacuated embassy was ransacked on Dec. 8, the state broadcaster in Tehran highlighted that the assailants were “not affiliated with the group in charge [of Syria],” alluding to HTS having kept its word.
Snip.
The arc of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is long, but became particularly pronounced over the past decade. As the Syrian military was on the verge of defeat in 2013, the Lebanese movement and Iran were equally alarmed. Both saw the threat of Sunni militancy taking root across the region. Nasrallah and then-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani also passionately charged that Damascus was crucial to the wider “resistance” against Israel, convincing Iran’s leadership that full-scale intervention was a must.
So in the spring of 2013, Hezbollah fighters moved into Al-Qusayr. Situated southwest of Homs, a key node connecting Damascus with the Alawite coastal heartlands, the region was vital to rebel factions which had emerged amid the Arab Spring. Its location near the border with Lebanon allowed them to smuggle in fighters and weapons, putting up stiff resistance against forces loyal to Assad. The battle was bloody, claiming the lives of over 100 members of Iran’s foremost Arab ally. But in the end, Qusayr was returned to Assad’s control, and the battle was later—together with Russia’s military intervention in 2015—chronicled as the turning point in the war against Sunni militants.
A decade later, Qusayr once again held special symbolism as the Syrian army faltered in the face of the blitz led by HTS. With the fall of Aleppo and Hama within the span of days—and apparently without any real fight—Homs was in the spotlight. Without it, Assad would be left with only Damascus, cut off from the coast. Accounts of what happened next are conflicting. Initially, insiders charged that up to 2,000 members of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force were to be deployed for one last stand.
But Hezbollah’s deployment turned out to be far smaller, with commanders quickly concluding that a withdrawal was in order after an operational assessment, Amwaj.media has learned. Shortly afterwards, informed sources explained, a decision was made to evacuate the country through the same route that had been used to enter the Syrian conflict back in 2013. According to a source in the area, soon after the Hezbollah convoy—said to have been made up of dozens of vehicles—crossed the border towards the Hermel district in Lebanon, Israel struck. Hezbollah keeps casualty figures a secret, but the losses from the bombing are said to have been “big.”
America supposedly went after the Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries coming over the border to aid Assad’s forces, and Israel got Hezbollah? Fascinating.
Following the deadly debacle, a well-informed source in Lebanon told Amwaj.media that the decision to enter Homs and then withdraw was taken by a “Lebanese individual” and not upon an Iranian request or leadership decision. If accurate, this account of events raises concern that Hezbollah is no longer as disciplined as before. It also indicates troubling and potentially chaotic times ahead, as Iran and its allies struggle to adapt to a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
Assad fell because “he wanted to prove to the west that he is not a warmonger,” an Iranian hardline lawmaker thundered as images emerged of HTS in control of Damascus. What this message may hold, and whether it will emerge as the dominant and coordinated approach of Tehran and allied capitals, remains to be seen.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] Now former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad resigned on Sunday, December 8, ordered a peaceful transfer of power and left Syria. The TASS news agency later reported that he and his family had arrived in Moscow, where they had been offered asylum.
Earlier, armed opposition forces, continuing their victorious march that began just over 10 days ago, occupied Homs in the north and Daraa to the south of Damascus and advanced unhindered toward the Syrian capital, taking it under full control on the same day that marked the fall of the Assad dynasty, which had ruled Syria for more than 50 years.
Meanwhile, in Damascus, which had fallen into the hands of the armed Syrian opposition, its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani delivered a speech on Syrian state television that ended with the words “the future is ours,” then visited the Umayyad Mosque. In a show of his efforts to ensure an orderly transition, Jolani said that Syrian state institutions would remain under the supervision of Assad’s appointed prime minister until the full transfer of power.
In turn, when the rebels entered the government palace, its chairman Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali said he was ready to work with any leadership and called for unity.
"We are ready to cooperate, and all the property of the people and the institutions of the Syrian state must be preserved," he said, adding that " they belong to all Syrians."
Jolani also banned entry into government offices and ministries so that they could continue to operate until a new transitional government was established.
THE FATE OF RUSSIAN BASES
In Russia the flags of the old regime were quietly removed from Syrian diplomatic institutions, which indicates a peaceful transition of power and that there will be no “government in exile,” and that dialogue will be conducted with those who currently rule the country from Damascus.
The issue that is most pressing for Russia now is the fate of two Russian military bases in Syria – the Khmeimim air force base and the Tartus naval base. Will the new Syrian authorities in Damascus implement the agreements to transfer these facilities for use by Russia?
There is a lot of speculation and unverified information on this matter, especially in Western and Middle Eastern media, which claim that Russian military personnel are returning to their homeland en masse.
In particular, information has emerged that Russia has allegedly requested support from Turkey in withdrawing personnel from Russian military bases from Syria.
As Regnum News Agency managed to find out from Turkish sources, such requests could indeed have taken place, although their existence is not directly confirmed. At the same time, it is noted that this concerns Russian military facilities scattered throughout Syria, which, among other things, were used to organize joint Russian-Turkish patrols in the northeast. The situation does not affect the main bases in Khmeimim and Tartus.
Thus, both main Russian bases in Syria continue to function for now.
In fact, as a source in the Kremlin told TASS, the leaders of the armed opposition guaranteed their safety. Therefore, the Russian military can take its time and give the negotiators a chance to resolve the issue of the future of these military facilities with the new authorities.
It is obvious that it is very important for Russia to maintain a military presence in Syria, as Russian military facilities are the main logistical hub for supporting operations in Africa and projecting power in the Mediterranean.
A sticky point, that.
So far, there has been no serious deterioration in the situation in the provinces of Latakia and Tartus, where they are stationed.
KURDS AND PRO-TURKISH GROUPS
In Damascus, rebels immediately began trying to maintain order and imposed a curfew. Additional forces were mobilized to prevent looting.
The Syrian opposition is thus trying to prevent a power vacuum and is taking steps to curb unrest and anarchy. However, it now faces the difficult task of bridging divisions in a country devastated by war and still divided between various armed groups.
Turkish-backed opposition fighters from the Syrian National Army (SNA) are battling the US-allied Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the north of the country. The SNA captured the city of Manbij on December 8, while the ISIS* terrorist group is still active in some remote areas of the Syrian desert.
It is not yet clear whether the pro-Turkish SNA groups operating in the north of the country will be able to find a common language with the armed opposition that has captured Damascus, or whether the country will face a new stage of escalation. The same applies to the further confrontation between the SNA and the SDF.
Interestingly, the Kurdish factions associated with the US consider the armed opposition led by al-Jolani to be the most capable with which to begin negotiations on coexistence within the framework of a “new Syria,” in contrast to the pro-Turkish SNA.
Public messages from Syrian Kurdish officials are that Jolani and his men are more independent from Ankara and far less anti-Kurdish than many SNA factions.
Well sure. Hayat Tahrir al Sham only objects to your godless Communism and your independence, not your ethnicity. So all you need do to be golden is accept their form of Islam and swear submission, whereas the SNA’s lord and master in Ankara demands that you all die and disappear from history.
Clearly, the new transitional government, centered in Damascus, will need to address key issues such as access to energy resources, water supplies, and agricultural areas. Many of these resources are controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces in the east of the country, which has already become a significant factor in undermining Assad's rule.
Therefore, as Khaled Hoja, former president of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, notes, Jolani needs to negotiate with the SDF for access to resources such as fuel from oil fields near Deir ez-Zor.
Oh good — I was afraid the Kurds had nothing to bargain with for their continued existence.
TURKEY'S CONCERNS
The possibility of new alliances in Syria that do not correspond to Turkish interests is the biggest concern in Ankara, so any understanding between groups that Turkey considers terrorist will be a headache for it. And such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
The poor darlings.
It is obvious that the further the armed opposition moved away from Idlib towards Damascus, the less leverage Turkey had in the form of cutting off electricity, the Internet, and aid for refugees in Idlib.
Some American experts also pointed out the emergence of problems between Turkey and Jolani. In particular, the director of the Turkish program at the Middle East Institute in the United States, Gonul Tol, noted that Turkey may not be able to control the forces that captured Damascus, since they are unpredictable and pursuing their own interests. “Does Turkey really want a jihadist organization to rule a neighboring country?” she said.
Sure they do. They just want it to be their captive jihadi org, a Muslim Brotherhood type without ideas above their station.
At the same time, it should be kept in mind that for now, it is the Turkish military who are the people who can freely drive their armored vehicles from Idlib to Damascus. Therefore, at the moment, it is Turkey that remains the most influential player in Syria.
THE US DILEMMA
The United States also maintains a military presence in Syria, in the northeast and at At-Tanf in the southeast. As Assad's army collapses, American-controlled rebel groups in the southeast have been able to establish control over vast areas of the Syrian desert, with the support of the US military.
In addition, the US has long had channels of communication with al-Jolani, who was their "secret partner" in the fight against ISIS*.
Really?
On the other hand, American and British political strategists have done much to change his image in the direction of "moderation." The same Kurds make curtseys to him, clearly not without American prompting.
And here the main question arises: will the connection with the US of the forces that have taken control of Damascus lead to a conflict of interests between the US and Turkey for influence over Jolani?
At the same time, it is far from clear in Washington whether Jolani’s claims about future democratic reforms in Syria are genuine. It is one of the unknowns in the swirl of uncertainties in the crisis, which is changing so quickly that Western intelligence analysts themselves admit they are having a hard time keeping up.
Therefore, the US, like Turkey, also believes that the armed opposition may be uncontrollable, and they do not trust it completely. However, it is obvious that the US has an effective lever of pressure on it - sanctions. Promises to lift them can make Jolani more accommodating and bring significant investments to the country.
For Arab states, and especially the Gulf Arab monarchies, which welcomed the relatively peaceful transition of power in Damascus, a US decision to lift restrictions on Syria is needed in order to begin investing there.
But here, among other things, the ability of the new Syrian authorities to prevent a new wave of chaos in the country, which would negate investment prospects, will also play a role.
Both the US and Syria's Arab partners therefore face a dilemma.
On the one hand, they would like to eliminate the figure of Jolani from the game as a person who left ISIS* and was in Al-Qaeda*, who in many ways discredits the image of the new Syrian government. But on the other hand, if he is eliminated, there may not be another figure in the country who would keep the situation under control: fight ISIS*, suppress the internal opposition, but in such a way as not to raise many questions, and force all other factions in the country to recognize the authority of Damascus.
And for now it seems that there is no alternative to Jolani. And so it turns out that one "tyrannical regime" that could not fulfill its functions was replaced by another, more "fresh".
OPPORTUNIST OR JIHADIST?
Of course, there are many indications that the leader of the armed opposition is an opportunist who has changed many masks, and it is difficult to say which one is real. But it is also obvious that he leaves loopholes to return to his radical views if he thinks that this will be in demand again.
Therefore, Jolani appears before different audiences in different images. Radicals are still his loyal "electorate", and it is worth noting that he explains his current steps to them as temporary political expediency, and justifies each decision with a Sharia prescription.
That’s what I would believe, but I’m just a little Midwestern suburban housewife, so what do I know?
Thus, the seemingly significant concessions to Christians, Alawites, Druze and other religious minorities in Syria are so far only temporary.
To do this, Jolani found a Sharia loophole to, on the one hand, show his “goodwill” to the Alawites, Christians, Druze and Ismailis, but, when necessary, get rid of them.
Thus, the radicals recognized the status of all these communities as musta'min, "non-Muslims" who came from the "lands of the infidels" to conduct business or trade in Muslim territory for a long time.
On the one hand, this gives them the opportunity to "throw dust in their eyes" and even demonstrate their privileged status. They say that they are exempt from many taxes and are "under protection."
But the problem is that this is a temporary status, and at any moment the radicals can demand that the musta'min leave their territory, or convert to Islam, since formally they are considered “guests” and not the indigenous population.
This also creates problems with the right of these communities to own and use their religious sites. They are prohibited from many transactions involving the purchase, sale or ownership of real estate and agricultural land, as they cannot be their owners, but only tenants, etc.
In this regard, despite the change in form, there are doubts about the change in the content of the core of the armed opposition. It may make concessions to local Christians and Alawites for a time, but then abandon them. It is enough to observe the rhetoric of foreign jihadists operating in Syria, including those from the Russian Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as from China, who, despite the voiced "moderate" programs of their leadership, promise that Syria will only be a springboard for the transfer of "jihad" in their understanding to the Caucasus, Central Asia and East Turkestan.
It’ll be interesting to see if HTS rejoins the Al Qaeda borg once they don’t need to appease anyone anymore, or if they’re going to be an independent caliphate now that they conquered the place.
#1
The US has no interests in Syria. The DS had interests there. We’ll take all the Christians. Ohio has newly available real estate in a city named Springfield.
Posted by: Super Hose ||
12/10/2024 10:41 Comments ||
Top||
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
