Hat tip to the Instapundit for pulling it all together; lots of EFL-ing.
Director Joe Dante (Gremlins, Small Soldiers, Pirahna, Rock & Roll High School) has made an episode for the Showtime series Masters of Horror which, well, we'll let the Village Voice reviewer describe it:
"This is a horror story because most of the characters are Republicans," director Joe Dante announced before the November 13 world premiere of his latest movie, Homecoming, at the Turin Film Festival. Republicans, as it happens, will be the ones who find Homecoming's agitprop premise scariest: In an election year, dead veterans of the current conflict crawl out of their graves and stagger single-mindedly to voting booths so they can eject the president who sent them to fight a war sold on "horseshit and elbow grease."
The dizzying high point of Showtime's new Masters of Horror series, the hour-long Homecoming (which premieres December 2) is easily one of the most important political films of the Bush II era. With its only slightly caricatured right-wingers, the film nails the casual fraudulence and contortionist rhetoric that are the signatures of the Bush-Cheney administration. Its dutiful hero, presidential consultant David Murch (Jon Tenney), reports to a Karl Roveâlike guru named Kurt Rand (Robert Picardo) and engages in kinky power fucks with attack-bitch pundit Jane Cleaver (Thea Gill), a blonde, leggy Ann Coulter proxy with a "No Sex for All" tank top and "BSH BABE" license plates. Murch's glib, duplicitous condescension is apparently what triggers the zombie uprising: Confronting an angry mother of a dead soldier on a news talk show, he tells this Cindy Sheehan figure, "If I had one wish . . . I would wish for your son to come back," so he could assure the country of the importance of the war. The boy does return, along with legions of fallen combatants, and they all beg to differ.
How fitting that the most pungent artistic response to a regime famed for its crass fear-mongering would be a cheap horror movie. Jaw-dropping in its sheer directness, Homecoming is a righteous blast of liberal-left fury . . .
The director daringly congratulates himself for his courage in Speaking Truth To Power and Sticking It To The Man:
Dante hopes Homecoming functions as a wake-up callânot so much for politicians but for filmmakers. "If this spurs other people into making more and better versions, it will have done its job. I want to see more discussion," he says. "Nobody is doing anything about what's going on nowâcompared to the '70s, when they were making movies about the issues of the day. This elephant in the room, this Iraq war story, is not being dramatized."
"You don't have to be a rocket scientist to see what a fucking mess we're in," he continues. "It's been happening steadily for the past four years, and nobody said peep. The New York Times and all these people that abetted the lies and crap that went into making and selling this warânow that they see the guy is a little weak, they're kicking him with their toe to make sure he doesn't bite back. It's cowardly. This pitiful zombie movie, this fucking B movie, is the only thing anybody's done about this issue that's killed 2,000 Americans and untold numbers of Iraqis? It's fucking sick." . . .
Yes, kids, he's a barking moonbat.
What's worse is the attitude toward veterans of the WOT shown by another reviewer, in Slate
Today, zombies are the perfect metaphor for our soldiers in Iraq: They're shell-shocked, anonymous, and aren't asked to make very many decisions. Unless you personally know a soldier, the war in Iraq has been a zombie war, fought by an uncomplaining, faceless mass wrapped in desert camo and called "our boys." We talk about them all the timeâsupporting them, criticizing them, speaking for themâbut we don't really have a clue as to what's on their minds.
Like Michael Moore's portrayal of US soldiers as not-too-bright grunts in Farenheit 9/11, these descriptions reveal a pitying kind of contempt for the subjects the writers and directors are supposedly championing. Soldiers are merely another class of victim, the subject of pity rather than the object of their own intelligent decisions. They're shell-shocked, they're zombies, children, the unknowing kill-bots who apparently march straight into enemy fire or landmines (since they make no decisions!). Voiceless dupes.
Zombies aren't known for their elocution - so others speak for them, it would seem.
Note the Village Voice writer's point that this is the uncorking of idealogical rage - not the rage of someone who personally knows anyone serving in Iraq. The Slate writer can only guess that U.S. soldiers will agree with Dante's ultimately demeaning satire, more of an expression of an idealogue's rage than an authentic voice from those who have seen first-hand what most only watch on CNN.
The men and woman of the U.S. military can ill-afford this kind of infantile "sympathy" at the moment.
UPDATE: Welcome InstaPundit readers. Good observation from one comment:
So if US soldiers are zombies, guess what classic movie monster Saddam's victims are?
Invisible men.
All too true. As a class, they're the perfect unperson: inconvienent and inexpedient.
Posted by: Mike ||
12/04/2005 9:40 Comments ||
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#2
All the Showtime networks are freeview this weekend on DirecTV. The shows were so awful I stayed with the history channel.
Showtime is just speeding up its eventual death with this series.
Posted by: Barbara Skolaut ||
12/04/2005 19:44 Comments ||
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#4
Showtime has been broadcasting Farenheit 911 a couple times every week for the last few months. I wonder what impart this has had on GW's performance rating?
#2
Okay, it uses academic language. But it's not psychobabble. The concept of "power distance" for instance is a practical issue if you've ever tried to do business with an Indian from the Brahmin class (as I have). The disdain many Brahmins have for "lesser" people is breathtaking for most Americans, as is their willingness to treat others in a very self-serving and openly contemptuous way if they can get away with it -- as they can in their own culture. Not all Brahmin-caste people are like this, but many are and that's the history of the caste-based society there.
I support our outreach to India as a closer ally, but it's a big mistake to think that because we share a language we also share common values. We do, but only to a point. And that's the point of the series of articles at that site.
#3
Lotp, just where do non-Indians fit in the caste system? Read: Do Brahmins pull this sh*t on Americans???
(Self-serving -- well then how the hell is the caste system supposed to function in the long-term when the upper caste is encouraged to act on short-term impulse??? I know I'm off, so please tidy this up.)
Posted by: Edward Yee ||
12/04/2005 10:50 Comments ||
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#4
An interesting read, but something looks off here:
"...the core Anglosphere nations of America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK have... moderately high masculinity ...China (and presumably other parts of the Sinosphere) has middling masculinity...Spain, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and other nations of the Hispanosphere tend to have middling masculinity (Portugal and Brazil -- the Lusosphere -- are similar).
(Masculinity as defined in the article:..."males dominate a significant portion of the society and power structure, with females being controlled by male domination...")
Re: the masculinity index, another way to interpret that category has to do with the valuation placed on traditionally 'masculine' roles and values: hard work, sacrifice, risk-taking (reflected in other ways in the Uncertainty category), objectivity (i.e. facts vs. feelings when making decisions and evaluations). Note that a culture or country can treat its women like sh*t and still not be very masculine in this sense. Many Arab countries fall into that latter category IMO.
Hispanic women, and Arab women in many places, wield significant power but it tends to be through indirect and often emotional manipulation rather than openly.
#6
Actually India's place in the Anglosphere is a topic of constant contention at that site. I've not noticed you commenting there, unless you have yet another nom d'guerre?
The experience of Arab fighters in Iraq is the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement, as they constitute the third generation of Salafi-jihadists. An examination of the social structure of these fighters provides important insights into this generation and the similarities and differences with the previous two generations.
While the secrecy surrounding foreign fighters in Iraq and the lack of impartial sources on their activities make the collection of quality information very difficult, âIslamic Forumsâ have become a key outlet for information. These forums specialize in providing information on slain fighters, and in recent times have divulged the names and details of 429 such fighters in Iraq [1]. The analysis in this article is largely based on these figures.
Two recent articles have extensively studied the phenomenon of âArab Volunteersâ in Iraq. The first is by Israeli researcher Reuven Paz, who has analyzed 154 names and found that 94 (61%) were Saudis and came from the following regions: 61 from Najd, 12 from Qassim Burida, 7 from Mecca and Hijaz, 5 from the South and 2 from the North [2]. Paz also found that these Saudis perpetrated 23 suicide attacks, and that roughly 45% of the suicide bombers were from Najd.
The remaining fighters found in Pazâs study were: 16 Syrians (10.4%); 13 Iraqis (8.4%); 11 Kuwaitis (7.1%); 4 Jordanians, and 2 from Algeria, Morocco and Yemen each; and one each from Palestine, United Arab Emirates and Sudan. Paz also noted that their ages ranged from 25-30 years. Some of them were married, some were holders of higher education degrees, most of them went to Iraq through a friend or relative, and the majority came from neighboring countries.
The second article is a study by Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, who question the credibility of the lists published by al-Qaeda supporters, and contend that they were published for mobilization and recruitment purposes [3]. They also argue that many of persons mentioned in the list have been found to be living in Saudi Arabia and were never involved in jihadi activities in the first place. But the Saudi magazine âAl-Osbuâiahâ and al-Arabiya.net had previously published a report based on the same list and no response was forthcoming from the people whose names were mentioned [4].
Using methodology and information generated by the aforementioned articles, this article furthers studies the social structure of Salafi-jihadists in Iraq by analyzing the following factors: country of origin (geography), age, marital status and participation in other conflicts.
Geography
Based on a list of mujahideen posted on the al-Saha web forum (http://alsaha.fares.net), the ranks of the Salafi-jihadists fighting in Iraqâmost of whom are part of Zarqawiâs al-Qaeda in Iraq organizationâcome from all over the Arab World, with Saudis being the majority (200 fighters â 53%), 13% from Syria, 8% from Iraq, 5.8% from Jordan, 4% from Kuwait, 3.8% from Libya, with the rest distributed among other countries (see Chart 1) while the geographical origin of 52 names remains unknown.
While these numbers are not comprehensive, they do give an idea as to the complexion of the mujahideen in Iraq, and indicate that the largest percentage belongs to countries surrounding Iraq, presumably because accessing Iraq is easiest for these fighters. Moreover, jihadi leaders in neighboring countries (particularly in Saudi Arabia) regularly call on mujahideen to join the jihad in American-occupied Iraq. In addition, the on-going conflict between the Saudi regime and the Saudi al-Qaeda network is forcing many young Saudi Salafi-jihadists to migrate to Iraq. Many of these jihadis are prominent fighters and ideological trainers; a good example being the Salafi-jihadist ideologue Abdullah Rashid al-Rashoud, whom Zarqawi eulogized after he was slain by American forces near al-Qaim.
In addition, there are many North Africansâprincipally Moroccans, Algerians and Libyans, among Arab fighters. This is because local Salafi-jihadist movements in these countries are in conflict with their governments. Therefore, as in Saudi Arabia, overwhelming security pressures are forcing fighters to search for new havens.
Interestingly, in the list posted on the al-Saha forum, the number of local Iraqis among the ranks of the Salafi-jihadists is very low (around 8%), which indicates that insurgent Iraqis prefer to join indigenous ânationalistâ resistance networks, rather then foreign-led extremist ideological movements. Another interesting fact is that Egyptians no longer represent a significant constituency among Arab fighters as was the case in Afghanistan and Bosnia. This is primarily because the role of jihadist movements has receded in Egypt and many former leaders of jihadist organizations have now publicly renounced violent methods.
Finally, it is worth re-iterating the seriousness of the threat posed by returnees from the Iraq conflict, especially in light of recent reports that the United States intends to substantially reduce its forces in Iraq over the next two years. The Arab volunteers in Iraq are acquiring cutting-edge fighting skills, and are exposed to an extremely powerful ideological influence in an environment of total war, characterized by concepts such as walaâ and baraâ (loyalty and disavowal) and mufasala (dissociation). It is imperative on the authorities of neighboring countries to devise effective rehabilitation programs and avoid resorting to typical security solutions.
Age, Education, Recruitment and Previous Combat Experience
Out of the 429 fighters listed in the al-Saha study, only the ages of 85 are known. Based on these statistics the average age of foreign fighters in Iraq is 27. Moreover, out of 429 fighters only 22 (5.1%) have had fighting experience in other regions, demonstrating that the foreign fighters in Iraq do indeed constitute the third generation of Salafi-jihadists. Furthermore, the average age is similar to that of the Saudi fighters whose names were released in the new list of the 36 most wanted [5].
It is worth noting that 17 out of 31 fighters (58.6% - only 31 of the 429 had data available on education) quit their education to join the fight against the American occupation. This is also evident in the high percentage of BA degree holders (19.4%), which is different from what typically occurs in Salafi-jihadist movements, whose ideologues are normally the ones with high levels of education while the fighters are mostly young men who have not completed their education (see table 2).
Another interesting fact is that 22 of those fighters are married, and among those whose career status is known, 8 out of 18 (44%) work in the private sector, with some even being investors. This lends further credence to the notion that the occupation of Iraq, and all the excesses that surrounds it, is generating new developments in erstwhile socio-economically stable Salafi-jihadi networks.
Finally, in regards to recruitment, the majority of those coming from the same area, for instance Burida in Qassim or Hael in Saudi Arabia, have entered Iraq together or were recruited through relatives. This is evident in the recurrent names of major tribes such as Shammari, Otaibi, Shahri and Motairi, which indicates that kinship and friendship are major modes of recruitment.
Posted by: Dan Darling ||
12/04/2005 01:15 ||
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Link ||
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#1
interesting, but what about chechnyians? When I worked with ISG, I analyzed captured jihad media. Chechnyian propaganda was the majority of it. Are they mostly dead now? (I hope)
Posted by: Ray Robison ||
12/04/2005 22:23 Comments ||
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Posted by: Red Dog ||
12/04/2005 17:37 Comments ||
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#2
The debate over torture is only useful if you happen to believe in the perfectability of man. I'm a Hobbesian, meself. We should be feeding these bastards their own children's living flesh until they tell us what we want to know.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
