It's astonishing how one errant word or metaphor can disarm readers' or hearers' critical faculties. Exhibit A: Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's citing the War of 1812 as a precedent for the U.S. Army to integrate coastal defense into its post-Afghanistan, post-Iraq slate of missions.
The War of 1812 reference made Hagel the butt of countless jokes. Military wags roundly lampooned the secretary for deriving guidance for today from such an antiquarian reference. After all, today's ultramodern U.S. military has little to learn from its early history. Right?
Well, no. It's not right at all. The substance of Hagel's remarks was mostly lost amid the wisecracks. In reality, what he proposes makes eminent good sense for ground-pounders searching for their identity in maritime Asia.
What do listeners hear when someone draws the War of 1812 analogy? Two things, it seems. One, that the person drawing the analogy sees a United States defending its immediate environs against an outside, far stronger maritime power. It's not a globe-straddling superpower. It's a local power trying feebly to protect its shores. No serious thinker would pattern contemporary methods on such a lackluster precedent.
The founding-era U.S. Army and Navy, their political masters, and Congress placed their hopes in short-range coastal artillery — all gunnery was short-range in yesteryear, with combat reach under five nautical miles — and gunboats to hold enemies at bay. That was homeland defense on the cheap, befitting a nation loath to levy taxes to fund a battle fleet to mount a forward high-seas defense. This approach availed little, as naval historians Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan pointed out in their chronicles of the War of 1812 at sea. Like today's wags, Roosevelt and Mahan ridiculed the idea of land-based coastal defense. They wanted to send the fleet, and presumably would have sent its air arm as well once naval aviation became a going concern.
The good news is that Secretary Hagel wasn't talking about withdrawing from the world or reverting to the brave old world of coastal artillery. He was talking about equipping and training the U.S. Army to shape events at sea from shore, in distant theaters like the Western Pacific and China seas. Shore-fired weaponry has come into its own since the age of coastal-defense proponents Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and James Madison. Using long-range precision weaponry such as truck-launched anti-ship and anti-air missiles may be coastal defense. But it's an intensely offensive-minded brand of coastal defense, capable of pummeling ships and planes throughout large volumes of sky and sea.
Far from pushing obsolescent concepts that never worked in the first place, then, Hagel was looking backward to look ahead. What else is history for?
#1
The problem with this analysis is that the coastal defense system of 1812 was not only cheap, it was useless. The gunboats were ineffective, and the shore batteries had insufficient range.
For instance, examine current Chinese strategy, or look at Japanese strategy during WW2. Concentric layers of defense, designed to keep the enemy away from the final target. (The problem the Japanese had was too many gaps in the system, due to their navy being eradicated.)
Any defensive line will eventually fall to an attacker with enough firepower and patience.
Posted by: ed in texas ||
12/07/2014 9:43 Comments ||
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#2
The problem with this analysis is that the coastal defense system of 1812 was not only cheap, it was useless. The gunboats were ineffective, and the shore batteries had insufficient range.
#3
Mobile tube launched missile system is about the only equivalent possibility. The demonstrated ability of Saddam to move his missiles in face of Allied air supremacy indicates some viability. Accuracy and sufficient payload (see-Falklands), given that ships today are not commissioned with armor belts, also makes it viable. The real issue is that you don't want the enemy to get that close to begin with. That's why you fight 'over there', not 'here'.
#6
Its a legit function - the Army has land based missiles in its bailiwick. And such things could be used as gap fillers for sea denial assets given the shrinking size of the USN. Imagine a battery or two temporarily stationed near, say... the Spratleys, with theater-ranged SAMs. Give the Chinese conniptions without putting a single naval asset at risk (leaving them to work offensively)
#7
We should put the first battery in Hyannis Port right in front of the Kennedy compound.
And then put the next one in front of the nifty multi-million dollar pad whatshisname bought as a retirement home for him and whatshername and the kids.
There is a dog in there somewhere but I don't want to defame the innocent.
Posted by: Bill Clinton ||
12/07/2014 14:44 Comments ||
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#8
I'd like a pair at the fish camp in case I need to extend the scallop season.
#9
Imagine a battery or two temporarily stationed near, say... the Spratleys
Given that we'll probably see less and less USN carrier presence in the Western Pacific,it makes sense. It'd work for islands like Taiwan or the Spratleys, or as part of area-denial or choke-point defense like the Malaccan straits. The concept has already been to proven to be effective, at least one time (think "Israeli Sa'ar class corvette.")
That said, "coastal defense" is a non-starter. Too many rice bowls threatened, with some validity. Even if the concept were implemented, it'd either be done half-assed, or sloughed off to Reserve or National Guard units.
#10
This is not a silly idea!
think of the existing, historic coastal defense fortifications in the US, with specific designs to control the access points to key navigable ports, rivers, harbors and industrial areas. Perfectly positioned for shoretosea guns of missle defences. Currently, there is nothing in these locations except tourists. Now think of a cargo ship, capable of more than 15 knots, of modest size, and imagine it captained by a jihadist crew bringing a nasty cargo of aerosol containers, or some of the 40kg of radioactive material captured in Iraq by ISIS, or a hold full of vertical launched HE rounds with sarin or engineered smallpox. Now imagine them refusing to stop for customs and LE inspection as they approach the port. What above.50cal is positioned to stop them? and above 15 knots, how capable is a airborne SWAT insertion against small arms? Can the USCG board at that speed effectively? This is not a silly idea!
Beuhler......Beuhler?
Coasties cutters have a main deck gun on some of them. I know the new Fast Patrol "Sentinal" Cutters have a Mk 242 Bushmaster as their main gun, which would certainly punch holes in a cargo ship. Pappy may know more about the Puddle Pirate Navy (said with love and respect - Coasties save lives every day) .
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