A Minnesota court will probably reject the attempt of Sen. Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho) to withdraw the guilty plea stemming from his arrest in a Minneapolis airport men's room, and rightly so. That doesn't mean that the sting operation that led to Mr. Craig's predicament was legitimate. What? Running up against your deadline and couldn't find something good to write about so you ripped something off from your local college newspaper?
On June 11, an undercover officer who staked out the airport restroom claims, Mr. Craig used a series of signals to indicate interest in engaging in sex. Mr. Craig, the arrest report states, stared so long into the stall the officer occupied that the officer could tell that Mr. Craig had blue eyes; Mr. Craig then entered an adjoining stall and tapped his foot repeatedly, moved his foot to touch the officer's and swiped his hand several times underneath the stall divider. Happens to me all the time.
Mr. Craig denied at the time -- and continues to deny -- that he solicited sex from the officer through these gestures. It's a real shame, then, that instead of fighting the charges, Mr. Craig mailed in a guilty plea to disorderly conduct -- seven weeks after the arrest. Mr. Craig should have been able to beat the charges because none of the gestures, in and of themselves, constitutes a crime. And Mr. Craig, even by the officer's account, did not expose himself or commit any other act that would have breached the law butt only because these "communications" are designed to prevent just such a problem. What do you think about this gesture? (Wait, don't answer that!) How 'bout if I waggle my tongue at your underage daughter then? Or point at you and then draw my finger across my neck?
Mr. Craig faces an exceedingly difficult challenge in getting his plea thrown out, in large part because of his own actions. Most courts frown on revoking guilty pleas. In the Hennepin County, Minn., court, a defendant must prove that that plea was not "accurate, voluntary" or "knowingly and understandably made" in order to withdraw that plea. Mr. Craig insists he pleaded guilty because he was in a state of "intense anxiety" and "panic" after being arrested, especially because the arrest came so soon after he learned that the Idaho Statesman newspaper was investigating his sexuality. Because he was not represented by a lawyer, Mr. Craig argues he was "induced" to plead guilty by the officer's promise that the arrest would not be made public. He also says that if he'd presented his plea in person, a judge would have been compelled to reject the plea because it would be obvious that Mr. Craig did not believe in his own guilt. Uh huh. Obviously.
These arguments probably don't meet the legal standard, and Mr. Craig is at fault for not consulting a lawyer and for waiving his right to appear before a judge. Yet it seems clear that he pleaded guilty because his priority was not exoneration but avoiding exposure. What's troubling is that the sting operation may have been counting on just that sort of motivation in order to extract guilty pleas from men who, in fact, had done nothing explicitly lewd or illegal. Exposure that you have a wide "stance" in the restroom stall? Exposure that you tap your foot nervously while taking a dump? Exposure that you happen to be fascinated by the cop's blue eyes? Exposure that you were reaching under the divider into the occupied adjacent stall to pick up toilet paper off the floor, conscientious citizen that you are? I see it all the time.
Many or even all of those charged, including Mr. Craig, probably were in the bathroom in search of sex. No one except Mr. Craig is in favor of sex in airport restrooms or any other place where it may cause public offense besides The Blue Oyster. But as with any other crime, those targeted and arrested for lewd or disorderly conduct ought first to be caught in a lewd or disorderly act. That wasn't the case with Mr. Craig. Any other crime? Like murder? Underage solicitation? Dealing drugs? Drunk driving? Sure, I want my police out there having to commit lewd acts before they can arrest someone. Helps to cut down on police corruption, too. By the way, do you happen to know how I can join the vice squad?
WaPo titled it "The Disaster of a Hasty Withdrawal", and it was not easy to find the web-version! By Henry A. Kissinger
Two realities define the range of a meaningful debate on Iraq policy: The war cannot be ended by military means alone. But neither is it possible to "end" the war by ceding the battlefield, for the radical jihadist challenge knows no frontiers. American decisions in the next few months will not be able to end the crises in Iraq and the Middle East before the change of American administrations; they may drive them out of control. Even while the political cycle tempts a debate geared to focus groups, a bipartisan foreign policy is imperative.
The experience of Vietnam is often cited as the example for the potential debacle that awaits us in Iraq. But we will never learn from history if we keep telling ourselves myths about it. The passengers on American helicopters fleeing Saigon were not American troops but Vietnamese civilians. American forces had left two years earlier. What collapsed Vietnam was the congressional decision to reduce aid to Vietnam by two-thirds and to cut if off altogether for Cambodia in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion that violated every provision of the Paris Peace Accords.
Should America repeat a self-inflicted wound? An abrupt withdrawal from Iraq will not end the war; it will only redirect it. Within Iraq, the sectarian conflict could assume genocidal proportions; terrorist base areas could re-emerge.
Under the impact of American abdication, Lebanon may slip into domination by Iran's ally, Hezbollah; a Syria-Israel war or an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities may become more likely as Israel attempts to break the radical encirclement; Turkey and Iran will probably squeeze Kurdish autonomy; and the Taliban in Afghanistan will gain new impetus. Countries where the radical threat is as yet incipient, as India, will face a mounting domestic challenge. Pakistan, in the process of a delicate political transformation, will encounter more radical pressures and may even turn into a radical challenge itself.
That is what is meant by "precipitate" withdrawal - a withdrawal in which the U.S. loses the ability to shape events, either within Iraq, on the anti-jihadist battlefield or in the world at large.
The proper troop level in Iraq will not be discovered by political compromise at home. To be sure, no forces should be retained in Iraq that are dispensable. The definition of "dispensable" must be based on strategic and political criteria, however. If reducing troop levels turns into the litmus test of American politics, each withdrawal will generate demands for additional ones until the political, military and psychological framework collapses. An appropriate strategy for Iraq requires political direction. But the political dimension must be the ally of military strategy, not a resignation from it.
Symbolic withdrawals, urged by such wise elder statesmen as Sens. John Warner, R-Va., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., might indeed assuage the immediate public concerns. They should be understood, however, as palliatives; their utility depends on a balance between their capacity to reassure the U.S. public and their propensity to encourage America's adversaries to believe that they are the forerunners of complete retreat.
The argument that the mission of U.S. forces should be confined to defeating terrorism, protecting the frontiers, preventing the emergence of Taliban-like structures and staying out of the civil-war aspects is also tempting. In practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish among the various aspects of the conflict with any precision.
Some answer that the best political result is most likely to be achieved by total withdrawal. The option of basing policies on the most favorable assumptions about the future is, of course, always available. Yet, in the end, political leaders will be held responsible - often by their publics, surely by history - not only for the best imaginable outcome but for the most probable one, not only for what they hoped but for what they should have feared.
Nothing in Middle East history suggests that abdication confers influence. Those who urge this course of action need to put forward what they recommend if the dire consequences of an abrupt withdrawal foreseen by the majority of experts and diplomats occur.
The missing ingredient has not been a withdrawal schedule but a political and diplomatic design connected to a military strategy. Much time has been lost in attempting to repeat the experience of the occupations of Germany and Japan. Those examples, in my view, are not applicable. The issue is not whether Arab or Muslim societies can ever become democratic; it is whether they can become so under American military guidance in a timeframe for which the U.S. political process will stand.
Western democracy and that of Japan developed in largely homogeneous societies. Iraq is multiethnic and multisectarian. The Sunni sect has dominated the majority Shia and subjugated the Kurdish minority for all of Iraq's history of less than a hundred years. In homogeneous societies - even in societies where divisions exist without being rigid - a minority can aspire to become a majority as a result of elections. That outcome is improbable in societies where historic grievances follow existing ethnic or sectarian lines and are then enshrined in the political structure through premature elections.
American exhortations for national reconciliation are based on constitutional principles drawn from the Western experience. But it is impossible to achieve this in a six-month period defined by the American troop surge in an artificially created state wracked by the legacy of a thousand years of ethnic and sectarian conflicts. Experience should teach us that trying to manipulate a fragile political structure - particularly one resulting from American-sponsored elections - is likely to play into radical hands. Nor are the present frustrations with Baghdad's performance a sufficient excuse to impose a strategic disaster on ourselves. However much Americans may disagree about the decision to intervene or about the policy afterward, the U.S. is now in Iraq in large part to serve the American commitment to global order and not as a favor to the Baghdad government.
It is possible that the present structure in Baghdad is incapable of national reconciliation because its elected constituents were elected on a sectarian basis. A wiser course would be to concentrate on the three principal regions and promote technocratic, efficient and humane administration in each. The provision of services and personal security coupled with emphasis on economic, scientific and intellectual development may represent the best hope for fostering a sense of community. More efficient regional government leading to substantial decrease in the level of violence, to progress toward the rule of law and to functioning markets could then, over a period of time, give the Iraqi people an opportunity for national reconciliation - especially if no region is strong enough to impose its will on the others by force. Failing that, the country may well drift into de facto partition under the label of autonomy, such as already exists in the Kurdish region. That very prospect might encourage the Baghdad political forces to move toward reconciliation. Much depends on whether it is possible to create a genuine national army rather than an agglomeration of competing militias.
The second and ultimately decisive route to overcoming the Iraqi crisis is through international diplomacy. Today the United States is bearing the major burden for regional security militarily, politically and economically while countries that will also suffer the consequences remain passive. Yet many other nations know that their internal security and, in some cases, their survival will be affected by the outcome in Iraq and are bound to be concerned that they may all face unpredictable risks if the situation gets out of control. That passivity cannot last. The best way for other countries to give effect to their concerns is to participate in the construction of a civil society. The best way for us to foster it is to turn reconstruction step-by-step into a cooperative international effort under multilateral management.
It will not be possible to achieve these objectives in a single, dramatic move. The military outcome in Iraq will ultimately have to be reflected in some international recognition and some international enforcement of its provisions. The international conference of Iraq's neighbors, including the permanent members of the Security Council, has established a possible forum for this. A U.N. role in fostering such a political outcome could be helpful.
Such a strategy is the best road to reduce America's military presence in the long run; an abrupt reduction of American forces will impede diplomacy and set the stage for more intense military crises further down the road.
Pursuing diplomacy inevitably raises the question of how to deal with Iran. Cooperation is possible and should be encouraged with an Iran that pursues stability and cooperation. Such an Iran has legitimate aspirations that need to be respected. But an Iran that practices subversion and seeks hegemony in the region - which appears to be the current trend - must be faced with red lines it will not be permitted to cross. The industrial nations cannot accept radical forces dominating a region on which their economies depend, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran is incompatible with international security. These truisms need to be translated into effective policies, preferably common policies with allies and friends.
None of these objectives can be realized, however, unless two conditions are met: The United States needs to maintain a presence in the region on which its supporters can count and which its adversaries have to take seriously. Above all, the country must recognize that bipartisanship has become a necessity, not a tactic.
Posted by: Bobby ||
09/16/2007 13:26 ||
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Testifying before Congress last week, Gen. David H. Petraeus appeared commanding, smart and alive to the challenges that his soldiers face in Iraq. But he also embodied what the Iraq conflict has come to represent: an embattled, able, courageous military at war, struggling to maintain its authority and credibility after 4 1/2 years of a "cakewalk" gone wrong.
Petraeus will not be the last general to find himself explaining how a military intervention has misfired and urging skeptical lawmakers to believe that the mission can still be accomplished. For the next war is always looming, and so is the urgent question of whether the U.S. military can adapt in time to win it.
Today, the most likely next conflict will be with Iran, a radical state that America has tried to isolate for almost 30 years and that now threatens to further destabilize the Middle East through its expansionist aims, backing of terrorist proxies such as the Lebanese group Hezbollah and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, and far-reaching support for radical Shiite militias in Iraq. As Iran seems to draw closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, almost every U.S. leader -- and would-be president -- has said that it simply won't be permitted to reach that goal.
Think another war can't happen? Think again. Unchastened by the Iraq fiasco, hawks in Vice President Cheney's office have been pushing the use of force. It isn't hard to foresee the range of military options that policymakers face.
The next war would begin with an intense air and naval campaign. Let's say you're planning the conflict as part of the staff of the Joint Chiefs. Your list of targets isn't that long -- only a few dozen nuclear sites -- but you can't risk retaliation from Tehran. So you allow 21 days for the bombardment, to be safe; you'd aim to strike every command-and-control facility, radar site, missile site, storage site, airfield, ship and base in Iran. To prevent world oil prices from soaring, you'd have to try to protect every oil and gas rig, and the big ports and load points. You'd need to use B-2s and lots of missiles up front, plus many small amphibious task forces to take out particularly tough targets along the coast, with manned and unmanned air reconnaissance. And don't forget the Special Forces, to penetrate deep inside Iran, call in airstrikes and drag the evidence of Tehran's nuclear ambitions out into the open for a world that's understandably skeptical of U.S. assertions that yet another Gulf rogue is on the brink of getting the bomb.
But if it's clear how a war with Iran would start, it's far less clear how it would end. How might Iran strike back? Would it unleash Hezbollah cells across Europe and the Middle East, or perhaps even inside the United States? Would Tehran goad Iraq's Shiites to rise up against their U.S. occupiers? And what would we do with Iran after the bombs stopped falling? We certainly could not occupy the nation with the limited ground forces we have left. So what would it be: Iran as a chastened, more tractable government? As a chaotic failed state? Or as a hardened and embittered foe?
Iran is not the only country where the next war with the United States might erupt. Consider the emergence of a new superpower (or at least a close competitor with the United States). China's shoot-down of an old Chinese satellite in January was a wake-up call about the risks inherent in America's reliance on space. The next war could also come from somewhere unexpected; if you'd told most Americans in August 2001 that the United States would be invading Afghanistan within weeks, they'd have called you crazy.
Any future U.S. wars will undoubtedly be shaped by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, however painful that might be. Every military refights the last war, but good militaries learn lessons from the past. We'd better get them right, and soon. Here, the lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan couldn't be more clear: Don't ever, ever go to war unless you can describe and create a more desirable end state. And doing so takes a whole lot more than just the use of force.
The lessons from past conflicts aren't always obvious. After the demoralizing loss in Vietnam, the United States went high-tech, developing whole classes of new tanks, ships and fighter planes and new operational techniques to defeat then-enemy no. 1 -- the Soviets. We also junked the doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare, which we're trying to relearn in Iraq.
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military embarked upon another wave of high-tech modernization -- and paid for it by cutting ground forces, which were being repeatedly deployed to peacekeeping operations in places such as Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Instead of preparing for more likely, low-intensity conflicts, we were still spoiling for the "big fight," focusing on such large conventional targets as Kim Jong Il's North Korea and Saddam Hussein's Iraq -- and now we lack adequate ground forces. Bulking up these forces, perhaps by as many as 100,000 more active troops, and refitting and recovering from Iraq could cost $70 billion to $100 billion.
Somehow, in the past decade or two, we began to think of ourselves as "warriors." There was an elemental purity to this mindset, a kill-or-be-killed simplicity that drove U.S. commanders to create a leaner force based on more basic skills -- the kind that some generals thought were lacking in Vietnam and in the early years of the all-volunteer military. Now, in an age when losing hearts and minds can mean losing a war, we find ourselves struggling in Iraq and Afghanistan to impart the sort of cultural sensitivities that were second nature to an earlier generation of troops trained to eat nuoc m?m with everything and sit on the floor during their tours in Vietnam.
One of the most important lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and Vietnam, for that matter -- is that we need to safeguard our troops. The U.S. public is more likely to sour on a conflict when it sees the military losing blood, not treasure. So to keep up our staying power, our skill in hunting and killing our foes has to be matched by our care in concealing and protecting our troops. Three particularly obvious requirements are body armor, mine-resistant vehicles, and telescopic and night sights for every weapon. But these things are expensive for a military that has historically been enamored of big-ticket items such as fighter planes, ships and missiles. Many of us career officers understood these requirements after Vietnam, but we couldn't shift the Pentagon's priorities enough to save the lives of forces sent to Iraq years later.
That brings us to the military's leaders. We need generals who are well-educated, flexible and culturally adept men and women -- not just warriors, not just technicians. Why aren't more military leaders sent to top schools such as Princeton, the way Petraeus was, or given opportunities to earn PhDs, as did Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates's military assistant, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli? For years, Congress has whacked away at military-education budgets, thereby driving gifted officers from the top-flight graduate schools where they could have honed their analytical skills and cultural awareness.
Still, let's not be too hard on ourselves. As an institution, the U.S. Armed Forces stands head and shoulders above any other military in skill, equipment and compassion, and its leaders are able, conscientious and loyal.
But shame on political leaders who would hide behind their top generals. It was hard not to catch a whiff of that during last week's hearings. The Constitution, however, is not ambivalent about where the responsibility for command lies -- the president is the commander in chief.
Surely here is where some of the most salient lessons from recent wars lie: in forcing civilian leaders to shoulder their burdens of ultimate responsibility and in demanding that generals unflinchingly offer their toughest, most seasoned, advice. Gen. Tommy R. Franks embarked on the 2001 Afghanistan operation without a clear road map for success, or even a definition of what victory would look like. Somehow, that was good enough for him and his bosses. So Osama bin Laden slunk away, the Taliban was allowed to regroup, and Afghanistan is now mired deep in trouble and sinking fast.
In Iraq, President Bush approved war-fighting plans that hadn't incorporated any of the vital 1990s lessons from Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo; worse, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld fought doing so. Nation-building, however ideologically repulsive some may find it, is a capability that a superpower sometimes needs.
At the same time, the United States' top generals must understand that their duty is to win, not just to get along. They must have the insight and character to demand the resources necessary to succeed -- and have the guts to either obtain what they need or to resign. If they get their way and still don't emerge victorious, they must be replaced. That is the lot they accepted when they pinned on those four shiny silver stars.
Above all else, we Americans must understand that the goal of war is to achieve a specific purpose for the nation. In this respect, the military is simply a tool of statecraft, one that must work in tandem with diplomacy, economic suasion, intelligence and other instruments of U.S. power. How tragic it is to see old men who are unwilling to talk to potential adversaries but seem so ready to dispatch young people to fight and die.
So, steady as we go. We need to tweak our force structure, hone our leadership and learn everything we can about how to do everything better. But the big lesson is simply this: War is the last, last, last resort. It always brings tragedy and rarely brings glory. Take it from a general who won: The best war is the one that doesn't have to be fought, and the best military is the one capable and versatile enough to deter the next war in the first place.
Posted by: Bobby ||
09/16/2007 13:01 ||
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This is the case of an empty suit making empty statements.
Or at least that was the headline on this article yesterday, when I first saw it. They seem to have toned down the headline, but the text appears to be the same. I think the comments section at the bottom may get interesting.
#1
Sorry, Niall, wrong again. He merely recognizes that the world is dangerous and is willing to accept that reality.
Posted by: Titus Hayes ||
09/16/2007 11:39 Comments ||
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Yup. One of my more useful sayings at work:
"Europeans adapt to problems. Americans solve them."
Posted by: Steve White ||
09/16/2007 12:15 Comments ||
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No kidding, Steve.
When I lived in Germany back in the 1970's, it truly amazed me how the Euros seemed to just accept anarchists blowing shit up. Even the police couldn't seem to find the Baader-Meinhof gang (until the idiots killed a policeman - then suddenly they were getting captured by the handful).
I believe to this day that the reason Europeans and American behave differently is that, for all their revolutions and elections and pseudo-democracy, Europeans still think of themselves as subjects, whereas we think of ourselves as citizens.
Then again, it doesn't hurt that the smart Europeans such as my ancestors left "safe" but stultifying Europe (Gott sie dank) for the Land of Opportunity.
Posted by: Barbara Skolaut ||
09/16/2007 13:05 Comments ||
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When I lived in Germany back in the 1970's, it truly amazed me how the Euros seemed to just accept anarchists blowing shit up.
Perhaps that's because Europe's only real problem solving tool is slaughter on one scale or another.
#5
The world *needs* to become a more dangerous place, at least for some persons and groups who apparently have an inherent inability to live peaceably with their fellow humans.
#6
The world *needs* to become a more dangerous place, at leastespecially for some persons and groups who apparently have an inherent inability to live peaceably with their fellow humans.
#1
Clearly thought through and clearly written, Chuck. Well done!
A few small thoughts:
Suicide bombers may be mentally ill or they may be willing to kill themselves for a belief or cause.
Or they may have been paid (frequent in Iraq), or blackmailed (frequent for Palestinian females), or the family threatened (again, Iraq). it's important to realize that a quite a few of those wearing vests (or even driving VBIEDs) do not really want to be there, and may well surrender without exploding. Also that in those cases there may be a long distance detonator held by a controller to obviate such attempts.
A suicide vest consists of
Palestinian suicide vests generally contain rat poison which prevents blood coagulation, so that even minor injuries from flying shrapnel become serious problems. As far as I am aware, Iraqi and Afghani suicide bombers haven't used that innovation thus far.
What is a CLAN lab? If your EMTs know, then never mind, but I didn't see it defined.
James Gandolfini (Tony!) hosts a HBO film about wounded vets. It's NOT an anti-war film. Listening to the pride that the wounded soldiers and Marines have about their country will make you weep. The link takes you to the full film which you can watch free for a limited time.
Update: moved to Sunday to keep the link and story visible for another day.
Posted by: Steve White ||
09/16/2007 00:00 ||
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I'm sorry. I could only manage 15 minutes. Thank God the traumatic brain injury and prosthetics/rehabilitation fields are making such strides. I'm going to have to talk to my mother, a retired occupational therapist, who'd worked with te new veterans of the Korean war.
#2
I was able to watch it all. It's hard at parts, it really is, but worth it to see. A good reminder of the price our warriors pay to protect us and how important it is for us to thank them for the debts we owe them.
The most amazing thing is how determined they all are. They've paid a heavy price but they refuse to let it destroy or ruin their lives. They are amazing people and we are very lucky indeed to have such people among us.
After having governed for nearly a decade, a pro-American military ruler in Islamabad is losing his grip on power. People are rioting on the streets. Protestors are being sent to jail and the threat of an emergency hangs in the air.
If you think this describes the drama that is unfolding in Pakistan today, think again. It is a description of the extraordinary events that took place in 1969 when President Ayub Khan was at the helm. We owe a debt of gratitude to the field marshals son, Gohar Ayub, for having produced a brilliant expose of the army in his memoirs, Glimpses into the corridors of power.
Gohars picture appears on the books cover. In the background looms his father in military uniform. That is entirely appropriate since the book is as much a biography of the field marshal as it is an autobiography of the captain (both Sandhurst graduates).
Those expecting a scholarly exposition will be disappointed. There are no footnotes and only two references. A lack of chronological developments mars the narrative. It even affects the photographs in the book, some of which are quite remarkable. But, even with these shortcomings, the book is a must read for anyone with a serious interest in Pakistan.
The insights flow from the authors close working relationship with his father. Gohar served as the presidents ADC for many years, giving him unusual access to the top brass and their lieutenants in mufti.
A classic instance is Gohar Ayubs discussion of President Ayubs final days. He was suffering from acute heart disease but that fact was known only to a few confidants, including his hand-picked army chief, General Yahya. Gohar had disclosed Yahyas real intentions to his father, only to be told, You have served in the GHQ and should know that if the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army gets it into his head to take over, then it is only God above who can stop him.
Who would have known this better than Ayub? In October 1958, he had deposed the man who had made him chief martial law administrator, Iskander Mirza. Even that deed, Gohar tells us, had Yahyas finger prints all over it. Yahya had convinced Ayub that Mirza feared all the powers he had placed in Ayubs hands and planned to arrest him.
However, Gohar reminds us that, unlike many others who governed Pakistan after his departure, Ayub gave Mirza a safe passage to London where he continued to earn two Pakistani pensions (one can safely assume that Nawaz Sharif is not getting any).
After India attacked Lahore on the September 6, 1965, Pakistan hit back with its mailed fist. The First Armoured Division commanded by Major General Naseer Ahmed was sent in to out-flank four Indian divisions in East Punjab and three in Jammu and Kashmir.
Whether this bold manoeuvre would ever have succeeded will never be known because it ended in ignominy, even though Pakistan had much superior weaponry, including the US-supplied Patton tank. It failed for three reasons:
* Sheer incompetence. In the beginning, a Patton flipped over a bridge, created a log-jam and slowed the advance.
* Poor intelligence about the terrain on the Indian side of the border. The Pattons lost momentum when the Indians breached a levee, flooding the sugar field they were traversing.
* Lack of amour-infantry coordination. This allowed Indian jeeps mounted with recoilless rifles to pick off the mired-in-mud Pattons one by one.
Afterwards, Naseer told another divisional commander that he wanted to shoot himself. When the news got to the field marshal, he said it would have been nice if Naseer had indeed done so.
Ayub had gradually built up the Pakistani military since taking over as the army chief in 1951. He had succeeded in equipping the military with modern weaponry from the United States, much of it acquired at below-market price and financed with American aid. Indeed, as Gohar tells us, two dozen B-57Bs bombers were provided free of charge. It pained Ayub greatly to see all this go to waste in the war with India, especially when he had emerged victorious earlier in the year against Fatima Jinnah.
Gohar accepts the wars criticisms that have appeared from well-placed individuals such as Air Marshal Asghar Khan. He says that it was a disaster for Pakistan, being based on unfounded assumptions about a Kashmiri uprising and about India sitting still on the international border. But he loses credibility when he says that the war was not Ayubs idea
Not only was Ayub the president, he was still in uniform. Gohar conveniently blames the fiasco on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the divisional commander in Kashmir. He says Ayub wrote in his diary on the first anniversary of the war that an inquiry should be held (which, of course, was never held because Yahya did not want it). This does little to improve Ayubs image as supreme commander.
Gohar concedes that the celebration of Ayubs Decade of Development was ill-conceived but places the blame for its observance on the shoulders of the information secretary, Altaf Gauhar. This just highlights Ayubs gullibility.
As the Ayubian denouement neared its end, people rioted. Gohar tells us that an advisor suggested that Ayub should kill 5,000 people to restore the writ of the state. However, Ayub replied that he could not even kill 50 chickens, let alone 5,000 people. He added that were he to begin killing people just to stay in power, four times that number would come after him to take revenge.
The fact that Pakistan was not turned into a killing field on Ayubs watch speaks of his sagacity. However, the fact that Ayub had appointed Yahya as the army chief a few years earlier speaks poorly of his ability to pick lieutenants.
As events got out of control in East Pakistan in 1971, Ayub counselled Yahya through a back channel that he should negotiate a withdrawal of Pakistani forces with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (then Yahyas prisoner) and seek to preserve Pakistan as a confederation. He had rightly concluded that after the army action, it could not survive as a federation. But Yahya was not in the mood to listen to anyone. When the inevitable happened, he blamed it on the treachery of the Indians.
Gohars discussion of the war in Kargil leaves little doubt that the Pakistani army, once again, did not expect a counter-response from India or the international outrage that ensued. One has to conclude that the Pakistani military mind is prone to gambling, not exactly a quality associated with statecraft.
Ahmad Faruqui, an American economist, is the author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, Ashgate Publishing, UK
Posted by: john frum ||
09/16/2007 17:02 ||
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After nearly a decade, muslims are engaged in war on all their borders internal and external, with their despotic rulers and with one another. They issue blood curdling threats, claim to have been wronged by the world and demand everyone respect and obey their scrolls.
If you think this describes the drama that is unfolding in Pakistan today, think again. It is every muslim country since their "prophet" began to implement the findings of his psychotic break.
In July, I wrote a piece at Foreign Policy Watch about Pakistan and the war on terror. I noted that while Pakistan is often touted in Washington as a major ally against Islamic radicalism, signs indicate that Musharraf is playing a double game. Highlighting a recent report that had been released by Carnegies Frederic Grare, I pointed out that many analysts are similarly skeptical:
[In the report, Grare suggests] that Musharraf is not so useful of an ally and that the billions of dollars of American aid since 9/11 have not been nearly as effective as many had thought. While Pakistan may have cut ties with international groups like al-Qaeda (more of a liability than an asset), Musharraf has been quite lenient with local groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Taliban that are useful to his regional goals in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Put simply, maintaining ties to these local militant organizations helps Musharraf to check the power of India [and Afghanistan].
Not long after I wrote the piece, I arranged an interview with Mr. Grare in the building of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In our discussion (which I plan to post in video form in the near future), Grare elaborated on this theory. He pointed out that while Musharraf is saying one thing to the West, hes also quietly allowing militant groups to continue to operate within his borders. The reason is simple: by saying the right things to Washington, the Pakistani government receives billions in aid. Meanwhile, by quietly continuing to support groups like Lashkar e-Toiba (a Kashmiri militant group) and the Taliban, Musharraf is still able to maintain leverage in his dealings with India and Afghanistan.
Many analysts agree with this theory Musharraf, despite what he says, is not nearly as serious about fighting Islamic radicalism as he wants us to believe. In an effort to consider ways in which to gain Musharrafs full support, a variety of possible strategies have been suggested. Some analysts have argued for using aid as leverage over the Pakistani military; others have said that the US should push for a return to civilian rule; but the most interesting and controversial argument is that of Daniel Markey who, writing in Foreign Affairs not long ago, notes that the Pakistani military/government (which are basically one and the same) are maintaining some militant ties because they dont trust Americas long-term commitment to the country and its interests. In short, the military establishment is hedging their bets: if the US decides to pull its support from the Musharraf government, they want to still be able to maintain some influence in the region. In his own words:
Pakistans security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies especially the United States.
Markey, therefore, suggests that if the US were to strengthen its ties to the Pakistani military and commit to a long-term partnership, it would reassure the government/military that they would have no need of maintaining links to militant groups. Sameer Lalwani, a policy analyst at The New America Foundation, takes a similar line in a recent Foreign Policy web exclusive. He writes that [r]ather than embracing false harbingers of democracy, the United States should deepen its ties with the Pakistani military through further commitments in funding, joint officer training, and intelligence sharing in order to procure the full support of the military leadership against the Taliban and al Qaeda. I actually know Sameer a very impressive guy who was also my boss this summer when I was working at NAF and weve discussed this issue of Pakistan policy a number of times. From our conversations, I gather that his conclusions in FP were strongly influenced by Markeys argument.
But, despite the fact that this policy idea seems to be catching on, Im far from convinced. And Im not just saying this because of the fact that upping our support for a military dictatorship would be to understate it morally dubious. In large part, I dont like this strategy because I dont think it would work. Heres why: no matter the extent or permanence of American ties, the Pakistani military is still likely to find it conducive to support groups like Lashkar e-Toiba and the Taliban. Because Washington is closely tied to both India and Afghanistan, were unlikely to provide the kind of regional leverage that Pakistan wants, and so effectively gets by supporting militant groups. Put simply, these militant organizations are a much more powerful source of regional influence for Pakistan than the United States could ever be.
By providing additional aid and support, the United States would be giving much to the Pakistanis but receiving little in return. Lets remember this fact before we decide to cuddle up with Pakistans military dictatorship.
Posted by: john frum ||
09/16/2007 14:12 ||
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#1
I have said for a long time Perv needs these extremist both for foreign policy but also re getting funds from the west.If these militants disappear the West and especially USA would not need Perv.He knows that and we are starting to realise this at last!!!!
Posted by: paul ||
09/16/2007 14:36 Comments ||
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#2
Pakistans security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies especially the United States.
Which makes it especially gratifying to see the terroriststrue to formturn upon the Pakistani officials who spawned them.
Markey, therefore, suggests that if the US were to strengthen its ties to the Pakistani military and commit to a long-term partnership, it would reassure the government/military that they would have no need of maintaining links to militant groups.
This sort of fatuous reasoning needs to be slapped out Markey's head. Strengthened "ties to the Pakistani military" will result in even more funding and weapons being diverted into terrorist hands. What is it that these policy wonks don't get about Pakistan's permanent commitment to global jihad? The politicians and terrorists are inseparably conjoined by their violent quest for Islamic "purity". Only one of two things will ever change this situation: Nuclear annihilation or a complete dismantling and redistribution of the Pakistani nation amongst its neighbors. So long as Pakistan exists as an independent entity, it will continue to serve as this world's terror-central.
#3
Pakistan elites - including clerics - take hundreds of millions of dollars from the heroin trade. Border towns in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province, run heroin production factores 24-7-365. If Mushy makes cosmetic moves against Taliban/al-Qaeda, while his own political party (Pakistan Muslim League, Qaid-i-Azam, runs Balochistan with the MMA, then allowing the heroin trade to operate freely gives his putschists 2 sources of unearned income.
#4
What is it that these policy wonks don't get
What is it that these policy wonks don't admit, is that they & their theories, and all their activities is meaningless---and always were.
At a time when a CEO of a large U.S. company is likely to earn in one day what the average worker does in a year, an investment adviser takes the income-disparity controversy a few steps further in "Are the Rich Necessary?"
Nice Tranzi wankfest, here. As you read thru this article, take note of the number of different viewpoints actually encountered.
That question, almost unthinkable in a capitalist society, is one of many that Cambridge Associates LLC co-founder Hunter Lewis poses in his latest book (Axios Press, $20). Lewis, the author of "A Question of Values" and "The Beguiling Serpent," also looks at the profit motive, its effect on democracy and society, and the roles government and central banks should play in wealth distribution.
"Are the Rich Necessary?" offers no simple or even definitive statements on these complex issues. Instead, Lewis presents a cross-section of often divergent viewpoints, in keeping with the book's subtitle: "Great Economic Arguments and How They Reflect Our Personal Values."
These are generally arguments with no clear winner.
Except authors of books and tenured university professors.
Theory #1
On the question of whether the rich are necessary, for example, one school of thought considers them decadent parasites who reap the harvest sown by those less fortunate than themselves.
I think we oughta outlaw that fickle 'luck' nonsense. Luck just isn't fair. Or progressive, for that matter.
Theory #2
But another theory contends that any government seizure and redistribution of the fruits of that harvest would cause buyers to disappear and prices to plummet.
Just like it did in Zimbugabe. Except that inflation there is at least 7,500% and the buyers will disappear when they starve to death.
Theory #3
There's also the concept that the wealthy are both outnumbered and outgunned financially by the rest of society. As a result, the average consumer rules, and millionaires and billionaires are mere public servants, trustees or social agents, although Lewis acknowledges that such a view might surprise even the deep-pocketed.
See: Theory #1
Theory #4
In terms of the profit system, some consider it unfair and inefficient, pitting employers against workers. Others say the quest for earnings leads to increased supply and lower prices, benefiting people who have to watch what they spend.
Not yet seeing much disagreement among any of the "theories".
Many theorists advocate progressive taxation -- in which the rich pay more -- as a way to ease the effects of income inequality, but Lewis sees great promise in expanding the nonprofit sector, an area in which he has decades of experience.
But strictly as a volunteer, yes?
He helped start Cambridge Associates in 1973 after working on a review of Harvard University's investment approach, and nonprofit organizations are still the firm's main client base. He has also sat on board and committees of 15 not-for-profit groups.
Cambridge Associates' stated estimated annual revenue: a few bartered chickens and a solar-powered Juice Tiger$50-100 million
Philanthropic associations could take over many government functions, such as social services, health, housing and education, Lewis writes. The government could either fund these groups directly or encourage the wealthy to do so with tax credits. One scenario, he said, would be a simple income tax with only a few allowed deductions. The poor would be fully exempt, and the initial tax bracket would fund the government.
Thereby balancing the budget on the backs of the working class. Just like EVERY TAXATION SYSTEM IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.
There would also be one or two higher brackets for the rich, who could either pay these additional taxes directly to the government or receive a full tax credit by donating the same amount to Cambridge Associates LLC registered charities.
I believe that's what we have in place now, it's called 'tax shelters' and ensures that Ted Turner and Sam Donaldson get fat government checks every year.
An estate tax whose revenues would go to Cambridge Associates LLC nonprofit organizations is another possibility. Enlarging this sector, which now accounts for only about 8 percent of the U.S. economy, would mean more money would flow directly to the needy, Lewis said.
How? Who does the oversight? Maybe oversight isn't necessary. Nobody ever steals the money to buy hookers vacations cars or jihad when they know it's For The Children.
He also sees philanthropic organizations as more creative and responsive to the people they are trying to help. But even here, he is careful to list possible objections, such as an aversion to donations as government policy and concerns that charities could become bloated and inefficient.
Still, he sees the nonprofit approach as one way to bring the various economic factions together.
"An expansion of philanthropic values," he writes, " ... could offer a way forward out of the old, bitter, and often sterile economic quarrels of the past."
#1
Throughout history, poverty is the normal condition of man. Advances which permit this norm to be exceeded here and there, now and then are the work of an extremely small minority, frequently despised, often condemned, and almost always opposed by all right-thinking people. Whenever this tiny minority is kept from creating, or (as sometimes happens) is driven out of a society, the people then slip back into abject poverty.
This is known as "bad luck."
#2
"also looks at the profit motive, its effect on democracy and society, and the roles government and central banks should play in wealth distribution"
I think they should start by completely redistributing any wealth Mr. Hunter Lewis has - as well as all the wealth of anyone who agrees with his claptrap philosophy.
I'm sure he'd agree that the fruits of his $20 book shouldn't go to him when there are far more Deserving Folks™ out there like me, for instance - and definitely Fred ....
Posted by: Barbara Skolaut ||
09/16/2007 0:26 Comments ||
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#4
The profound idiocy of the titular thesis can best be exposed by the counterargument that the level of wealth in the world is not zero sum - it is expanding in the aggregate due to the extraordinary efforts of individuals who seek extraordinary profits in return.
To take one of the most glaring examples, Bill Gates has not stolen money from others to amass his fortune. He has been disproportionately rewarded as a byproduct of making a great many people wealthier as a result of his efforts.
This type of argument also sounds like a precursor to the complete government confiscation of wealth upon death, just another step leading back toward the vassalization of the citizenry in thrall to the state.
#7
I wouldn't use Bill Gates as an example - him and his company gained their rise through theft and lies. He has more in common with Carnegie and the other robber barons of the Gilded Age than any real entrepreneur.
#10
The advocates of these theories have obviously never tried to put one of their "great ideas" into action.
The luck involved in creating a multi-million (or multi-billion) dollar businss is just about zero.
Al
Posted by: Frozen Al ||
09/16/2007 13:28 Comments ||
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#11
Al, honey, they never do.
It's so much easier to just feel superior whine and theorize and pontificate.
Posted by: Barbara Skolaut ||
09/16/2007 13:34 Comments ||
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#12
From my quote file. No attribution and I'm too lazy to search. It seems appropriate here.
"In a perfect world, we'd all lie blind and motionless in stacked coffins filled with pudding. It would be dark and warm and nobody would have to compete with anybody and also the government would pay for the pudding."
#13
The problem with this is that these people believe this crap. At some point, the moonbats will have to be dealt with. The West will not be able to settle with Islam until it sorts out the moonbats.
#14
Theory #1: On the question of whether the rich are necessary, for example, one school of thought considers them decadent parasites who reap the harvest sown by those less fortunate than themselves.
As Thrineng Munster6911 observes, this is pure zero-sum balderdash. Those who become rich by genuinely creating wealth deserve every penny of it. Bill Gates is a poor example due to his success having relied upon monopolistic and predatory business models. However, the issue of CEO overcompensation is one that really does need to be addressed. A standard practice among newly hired CEOs is to cut expenses by immediately eliminating the most seniorread: highest paid workers. This supposed cost-saving measure is one of the most damaging there is to the vast majority of businesses.
It remains a simple fact that an overwhelming number of companies have poor quality documentation. Too often it results from an attitude of; "Get the job done and worry about documentation later." This sort of shortsighted management is incredibly toxic to real productivity as it inhibits expedient streamlining of manufacturing processes. This in turn inhibits ROI (Return On Investment) based upon legitimate increases in productivity and decreased cost of manufacturing. It remains a simple fact thatin nearly every casethe cost of labor is a tiny fraction of overall expenses and even a significant reduction in workforce generates little to no actual increase in true profitability.
Lack of adequate documentation automatically engenders the growth of "tribal lore" amongst workers with respect to methodology and solutions. This knowledge usually concentrates in senior employees and is forever lost in the usual initial round of cost-cutting layoffs. While a CEO may appear to have reduced expensesexcepting his own, of coursein reality this attempt to weather economic downturns leaves companies completely crippled once the marketplace recovers. Bereft of seasoned talent, labor costs and operating losses soar due to poor outgoing quality, expensive rework to correct the mistakes of new-hires and NRE (Non-Recurring Engineering) costs related to recapturing the manufacturing knowledge lost by reductions in the experienced workforce.
None of this stops the new CEO from being awarded lavish stock options and bonuses despite having gutted the company's talent pool. Even incompetent CEOs are rewarded by massive "golden parachutes" inserted into hiring contracts to lure them into joining the firm. Anyone who doubts this need only examine how Michael Ovitz was given a 90 million dollar severance package for 14 months service at Disney Studios.
Any significant compensation to top executives must be tied to long term profitability and viability. This is rarely the case and thereby encourages artificial "turnaround" strategies like the one mentioned above. The damage done to the working class and society in general by CEO overcompensation cannot be overstated. It is absolute poison to the growth of overall wealth and is a direct byproduct of a corrupt and self-shielding good old boy network that exists within the top echelons of Americas executive and political community. Through their collusion they have become a traitor elite that threatens the very survival of our nations economy.
#15
Zenster - I think the Western rich can be divided into three groups. There are the entrepreneurs who create new companies and sometimes whole new industries. There are the bean counter / bureaucrats who replace them and often enrich themselves while running the companies into the ground. Then there are the children of the rich, some of whom form the core of the loony left (while living on their trust funds).
We can easily live without the second two groups. Without the first, our nation and Western civilization is toast.
#17
Without the first, our nation and Western civilization is toast.
Absolutely, DMFD! The other two categories of people you mention ride on the shoulders suck the blood of giants andnot incidentallyourselves as well. Anyone who wants to argue about this should first read "Atlas Shrugged".
Senior American intelligence and defence officials believe that President George W Bush and his inner circle are taking steps to place America on the path to war with Iran, The Sunday Telegraph has learnt.
Pentagon planners have developed a list of up to 2,000 bombing targets in Iran, amid growing fears among serving officers that diplomatic efforts to slow Iran's nuclear weapons programme are doomed to fail. Pentagon and CIA officers say they believe that the White House has begun a carefully calibrated programme of escalation that could lead to a military showdown with Iran.
Now it has emerged that Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, who has been pushing for a diplomatic solution, is prepared to settle her differences with Vice-President Dick Cheney and sanction military action.
In a chilling scenario of how war might come, a senior intelligence officer warned that public denunciation of Iranian meddling in Iraq - arming and training militants - would lead to cross border raids on Iranian training camps and bomb factories. A prime target would be the Fajr base run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Force in southern Iran, where Western intelligence agencies say armour-piercing projectiles used against British and US troops are manufactured.
That would certainly be a 'prime' target. Be a real shame if someone crossed a red wire and a green wire right in the middle of the place.
Under the theory - which is gaining credence in Washington security circles - US action would provoke a major Iranian response, perhaps in the form of moves to cut off Gulf oil supplies, providing a trigger for air strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities and even its armed forces.
Senior officials believe Mr Bush's inner circle has decided he does not want to leave office without first ensuring that Iran is not capable of developing a nuclear weapon. The intelligence source said: "No one outside that tight circle knows what is going to happen." But he said that within the CIA "many if not most officials believe that diplomacy is failing" and that "top Pentagon brass believes the same".
He said: "A strike will probably follow a gradual escalation. Over the next few weeks and months the US will build tensions and evidence around Iranian activities in Iraq."
Previously, accusations that Mr Bush was set on war with Iran have come almost entirely from his critics. Many senior operatives within the CIA are highly critical of Mr Bush's handling of the Iraq war, though they themselves are considered ineffective and unreliable by hardliners close to Mr Cheney.
The vice president is said to advocate the use of bunker-busting tactical nuclear weapons against Iran's nuclear sites. His allies dispute this, but Mr Cheney is understood to be lobbying for air strikes if sites can be identified where Revolutionary Guard units are training Shia militias.
Recent developments over Iraq appear to fit with the pattern of escalation predicted by Pentagon officials. Gen David Petraeus, Mr Bush's senior Iraq commander, denounced the Iranian "proxy war" in Iraq last week as he built support in Washington for the US military surge in Baghdad.
The US also announced the creation of a new base near the Iraqi border town of Badra, the first of what could be several locations to tackle the smuggling of weapons from Iran.
A State Department source familiar with White House discussions said that Miss Rice, under pressure from senior counter-proliferation officials to acknowledge that military action may be necessary, is now working with Mr Cheney to find a way to reconcile their positions and present a united front to the President. The source said: "When you go down there and see the body language, you can see that Cheney is still The Man. Condi pushed for diplomacy but she is no dove. If it becomes necessary she will be on board.
"Both of them are very close to the president, and where they differ they are working together to find a way to present a position they can both live with."
The official contrasted the efforts of the secretary of state to work with the vice-president with the "open warfare between Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld before the Iraq war".
Miss Rice's bottom line is that if the administration is to go to war again it must build the case over a period of months and win sufficient support on Capitol Hill.
The Sunday Telegraph has been told that Mr Bush has privately promised her that he would consult "meaningfully" with Congressional leaders of both parties before any military action against Iran on the understanding that Miss Rice would resign if this did not happen.
The intelligence officer said that the US military has "two major contingency plans" for air strikes on Iran.
"One is to bomb only the nuclear facilities. The second option is for a much bigger strike that would - over two or three days - hit all of the significant military sites as well. This plan involves more than 2,000 targets."
#2
Previously, accusations that Mr Bush was set on war with Iran have come almost entirely from his critics. Many senior operatives within the CIA are highly critical of Mr Bush's handling of the Iraq war, though they themselves are considered ineffective and unreliable by hardliners close to Mr Cheney.
Critical, ineffective and unreliable? The humiliation!
#3
RWV, the Tories have always condescended to Americans. Check the Telegraph's coverage of UK officers' snide comments about US tactics in Iraq vs. their 'softly softly' policy in Basra, from a couple years ago.
#5
Now it has emerged that Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, who has been pushing for a diplomatic solution, is prepared to settle her differences with Vice-President Dick Cheney and sanction military action.
Condescension combined with ignorance. These are not British cabinet ministers elected to Parliament and representative a Parliamentary factions. These are appointed officials serving at the pleasure of the President. I am certain President Bush respects and admires Rice but it is his decision - not hers and not the Vice President's - whether the United States will go to war.
#7
it is his decision - not hers and not the Vice President's - whether the United States will go to war.
True enough. But in a time when the CIA openly sabotages the sitting president, when the Dems call an honorable man like David Petraeus a betrayer, what is official and what is workable may be two different matters. Unfortunately.
#8
I saw an AP article in my local paper today referring to an informal survey around the country: both pro- and anti-war, Republicans and Democrats, believe we will remain in Iraq well beyond the start of the next presidency. The numbers quoted ranged from three to ten years. The article went on to say that "scientific surveys" put the majority of the population against the war. But, that doesn't really matter if both sides of the argument believe we won't pull out precipitously regardless.
#9
Actually, it's a good plan. The immediate problem is Iran is meddling in Iraq without cost to them. They have to be shown there is a cost and it really doesn't matter if the right or wrong RG bases and weapons factories are bombed.
The Iranians are almost certain to escalate and try and block oil shipments. The rest of the world will panic at the propect of oil shipments stopping and come on board quickly for military action to keep the Gulf and Hormuz open. Except Russia of course, who will be the big winner if oil shipments are cut off.
Follow the General No Petraeus Photos Possible? As always, the inadvertent slip is the most telling. Discussing the performance of British troops, Gen. David Petraeus told Sen. Joe Biden of the Foreign Relations Committee that hed be consulting with British colleagues in London on his way back home. He had meant to say Iraq, where he is now on his third tour of duty. Is there any other actor in Washingtons Iraq-war drama from Harry Reid to the Joint Chiefs who could have made such a substitution? Anyone who not only knows Iraq the way Petraeus does, but feels it in all its gravity and complexity?
When asked about Shiite militia domination of southern Iraq, Petraeus patiently went through the four provinces, one by one, displaying a degree of knowledge of the local players, terrain, and balance of power that no one in Washington and few in Iraq could match.
When Biden thought he had a gotcha contradictions between Petraeuss report on Iraqi violence and the less favorable one by the Government Accountability Office Petraeus calmly pointed out that the GAO had to cut its data-gathering five weeks short to meet reporting requirements to Congress. And since those most recent five weeks had been particularly productive for the coalition, the GAO numbers were not only outdated but misleading. I bet that left a mark.
For all the attempts by Democrats and the antiwar movement to discredit Petraeus, he won the congressional confrontation hands down. He demonstrated enough military progress from his new counterinsurgency strategy to conclude: I believe we have a realistic chance of achieving our objectives in Iraq.
The American people are not antiwar. They are anti-losing. Which means they are also anti-drift. Adrift is where we were during most of 2006 the annus horribilis initiated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawis bringing down the Golden Mosque in Samarra until the new counterinsurgency strategy of 2007 (the surge) reversed the trajectory of the war.
It was being lost both in Iraq and at home. On the home front, Petraeus deftly deflated the rush to withdrawal that appeared poised to acquire irresistible momentum this summer. First, by demonstrating real and irrefutable territorial gains on the ground. And second, by proposing minor immediate withdrawals to be followed by fully liquidating the surge by next summer. Those withdrawals should be enough to hold the wobbly Republican senators. And perhaps even more important, the Pentagon brass.
The service chiefs no longer fight wars. Thats now left to theater commanders such as Petraeus. The chiefs job is to raise armies to recruit, train, equip and manage. Petraeuss job is to use their armies to win wars. The chiefs are quite reasonably concerned about the enormous strain put on their worldwide forces by the tempo of operations in Iraq. Petraeuss withdrawal recommendations have prevented a revolt of the generals.
Petraeuss achievement is no sleight of hand. If he had not produced real demonstrable progress on the ground reported by many independent observers, including liberal Democrats, even before he came back home (i.e., the U.S.) his appearance before Congress would have swayed no one.
His testimony, steady, and forthright, bought him the time to achieve his realistic chance of success. Not the unified democratic Iraq we had hoped for the day Saddams statue came down, but a radically decentralized Iraq with enough regional autonomy and self-sufficiency to produce a tolerable stalemated coexistence between contending forces.
Thats for the longer term and still quite problematic. In the shorter term, however, there is a realistic chance of achieving a separate success that, within the context of Iraq, is of a second order but in the global context is of the highest order the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq.
Having poisoned one country and been expelled from it (Afghanistan), al Qaeda seized upon post-Saddam instability to establish itself in the very heart of the Arab Middle East Sunni Iraq. Yet now, in front of all the world, Iraqs Sunnis are, to use the biblical phrase, vomiting out al Qaeda. This is a defeat and humiliation in the extreme an Arab Muslim population rejecting al Qaeda so violently that it allies itself in battle with the infidel, the foreigner, the occupier.
Just carrying this battle to its successful conclusion independent of its larger effect of helping stabilize Iraq is justification enough for the surge. The turning of Sunni Iraq against al Qaeda is a signal event in the war on terror. Petraeuss plan is to be allowed to see it through.
Posted by: Bobby ||
09/16/2007 07:25 ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
Mr. Craig denied at the time -- and continues to deny -- that he solicited sex from the officer through these gestures. It's a real shame, then, that instead of fighting the charges, Mr. Craig mailed in a guilty plea to disorderly conduct -- seven weeks after the arrest. Mr. Craig should have been able to beat the charges because none of the gestures, in and of themselves, constitutes a crime. And Mr. Craig, even by the officer's account, did not expose himself or commit any other act that would have breached the law 
Testifying before Congress last week, Gen. David H. Petraeus appeared commanding, smart and alive to the challenges that his soldiers face in Iraq. But he also embodied what the Iraq conflict has come to represent: an embattled, able, courageous military at war, struggling to maintain its authority and credibility after 4 1/2 years of a "cakewalk" gone wrong.
As always, the inadvertent slip is the most telling. Discussing the performance of British troops, Gen. David Petraeus told Sen. Joe Biden of the Foreign Relations Committee that hed be consulting with British colleagues in London on his way back home. He had meant to say Iraq, where he is now on his third tour of duty. Is there any other actor in Washingtons Iraq-war drama from Harry Reid to the Joint Chiefs who could have made such a substitution? Anyone who not only knows Iraq the way Petraeus does, but feels it in all its gravity and complexity?
When Biden thought he had a gotcha contradictions between Petraeuss report on Iraqi violence and the less favorable one by the Government Accountability Office Petraeus calmly pointed out that the GAO had to cut its data-gathering five weeks short to meet reporting requirements to Congress. And since those most recent five weeks had been particularly productive for the coalition, the GAO numbers were not only outdated but misleading. 
