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| India-Pakistan |
| Cuddling Up With Pakistan |
| 2007-09-16 |
| By Jeb Koogler In July, I wrote a piece at Foreign Policy Watch about Pakistan and the war on terror. I noted that while Pakistan is often touted in Washington as a major ally against Islamic radicalism, signs indicate that Musharraf is playing a double game. Highlighting a recent report that had been released by Carnegie’s Frederic Grare, I pointed out that many analysts are similarly skeptical: [In the report, Grare suggests] that Musharraf is not so useful of an ally and that the billions of dollars of American aid since 9/11 have not been nearly as effective as many had thought. While Pakistan may have cut ties with international groups like al-Qaeda (more of a liability than an asset), Musharraf has been quite lenient with local groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Taliban that are useful to his regional goals in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Put simply, maintaining ties to these local militant organizations helps Musharraf to check the power of India [and Afghanistan]. Not long after I wrote the piece, I arranged an interview with Mr. Grare in the building of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In our discussion (which I plan to post in video form in the near future), Grare elaborated on this theory. He pointed out that while Musharraf is saying one thing to the West, he’s also quietly allowing militant groups to continue to operate within his borders. The reason is simple: by saying the right things to Washington, the Pakistani government receives billions in aid. Meanwhile, by quietly continuing to support groups like Lashkar e-Toiba (a Kashmiri militant group) and the Taliban, Musharraf is still able to maintain leverage in his dealings with India and Afghanistan. Many analysts agree with this theory — Musharraf, despite what he says, is not nearly as serious about fighting Islamic radicalism as he wants us to believe. In an effort to consider ways in which to gain Musharraf’s full support, a variety of possible strategies have been suggested. Some analysts have argued for using aid as leverage over the Pakistani military; others have said that the US should push for a return to civilian rule; but the most interesting and controversial argument is that of Daniel Markey who, writing in Foreign Affairs not long ago, notes that the Pakistani military/government (which are basically one and the same) are maintaining some militant ties because they don’t trust America’s long-term commitment to the country and its interests. In short, the military establishment is hedging their bets: if the US decides to pull its support from the Musharraf government, they want to still be able to maintain some influence in the region. In his own words: Pakistan’s security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies — especially the United States. Markey, therefore, suggests that if the US were to strengthen its ties to the Pakistani military and commit to a long-term partnership, it would reassure the government/military that they would have no need of maintaining links to militant groups. Sameer Lalwani, a policy analyst at The New America Foundation, takes a similar line in a recent Foreign Policy web exclusive. He writes that “[r]ather than embracing false harbingers of democracy, the United States should deepen its ties with the Pakistani military through further commitments in funding, joint officer training, and intelligence sharing in order to procure the full support of the military leadership against the Taliban and al Qaeda.” I actually know Sameer — a very impressive guy who was also my boss this summer when I was working at NAF– and we’ve discussed this issue of Pakistan policy a number of times. From our conversations, I gather that his conclusions in FP were strongly influenced by Markey’s argument. But, despite the fact that this policy idea seems to be catching on, I’m far from convinced. And I’m not just saying this because of the fact that upping our support for a military dictatorship would be — to understate it — morally dubious. In large part, I don’t like this strategy because I don’t think it would work. Here’s why: no matter the extent or ‘permanence’ of American ties, the Pakistani military is still likely to find it conducive to support groups like Lashkar e-Toiba and the Taliban. Because Washington is closely tied to both India and Afghanistan, we’re unlikely to provide the kind of regional leverage that Pakistan wants, and so effectively gets by supporting militant groups. Put simply, these militant organizations are a much more powerful source of regional influence for Pakistan than the United States could ever be. By providing additional aid and support, the United States would be giving much to the Pakistanis…but receiving little in return. Let’s remember this fact before we decide to cuddle up with Pakistan’s military dictatorship. |
| Posted by:john frum |
| #4 What is it that these policy wonks don't get What is it that these policy wonks don't admit, is that they & their theories, and all their activities is meaningless---and always were. |
| Posted by: gromgoru 2007-09-16 19:58 |
| #3 Pakistan elites - including clerics - take hundreds of millions of dollars from the heroin trade. Border towns in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province, run heroin production factores 24-7-365. If Mushy makes cosmetic moves against Taliban/al-Qaeda, while his own political party (Pakistan Muslim League, Qaid-i-Azam, runs Balochistan with the MMA, then allowing the heroin trade to operate freely gives his putschists 2 sources of unearned income. |
| Posted by: McZoid 2007-09-16 17:17 |
| #2 Pakistan’s security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies — especially the United States. Which makes it especially gratifying to see the terrorists—true to form—turn upon the Pakistani officials who spawned them. Markey, therefore, suggests that if the US were to strengthen its ties to the Pakistani military and commit to a long-term partnership, it would reassure the government/military that they would have no need of maintaining links to militant groups. This sort of fatuous reasoning needs to be slapped out Markey's head. Strengthened "ties to the Pakistani military" will result in even more funding and weapons being diverted into terrorist hands. What is it that these policy wonks don't get about Pakistan's permanent commitment to global jihad? The politicians and terrorists are inseparably conjoined by their violent quest for Islamic "purity". Only one of two things will ever change this situation: Nuclear annihilation or a complete dismantling and redistribution of the Pakistani nation amongst its neighbors. So long as Pakistan exists as an independent entity, it will continue to serve as this world's terror-central. |
| Posted by: Zenster 2007-09-16 14:49 |
| #1 I have said for a long time Perv needs these extremist both for foreign policy but also re getting funds from the west.If these militants disappear the West and especially USA would not need Perv.He knows that and we are starting to realise this at last!!!! |
| Posted by: paul 2007-09-16 14:36 |