Over the last decade, French counter-terrorism strategy has been recognized as one of the most effective in Europe. The French system emerged from painful experienceâunlike other European countries France has faced the deadly threat of Islamic terrorism on its soil since the 1980s. A number of attacks in Paris by the Iranian-linked Hezbollah network of Fouad Ali Saleh in 1985 and 1986 triggered profound changes in the organization and legislative base of French counter-terrorism. These were reinforced after the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) attacks in 1995 and 1996.
The key elements in the French counter-terrorism strategy are the privileged relationship between intelligence services and dedicated magistrates, as well as the qualification of acts of terrorism as autonomous offences punishable by increased penalties. The specific offence designated âassociationâ or âconspiring to terrorism,â makes a pre-emptive judicial approach possible. Meanwhile a sophisticated system named Vigipirate (security alert plan) of nation-wide, pre-planned security measures were developed. After the July 2005 attacks in London, Vigipirate was put in stade rouge (level red) swiftly invoking a large number of extra security measures in public places and public transport throughout France and along its borders.
French authorities understood very early on that Islamist terrorism represented a new, complex threat and developed a system containing decisive advantages. This prevented acts of Islamic terrorism on French territory from December 1996 until October 2004, although various plots were disrupted during this period. These included a plan to bomb the Paris metro in December 2002 and a plot to attack tourist facilities on the French island of Reunion in the Indian Ocean in June 2003. Clearly France remains high on the list of targets for al-Qaeda and associated groups while recent trends challenge the long term effectiveness of the French approach.
It is not this incident alone that has alarmed the French intelligence community. In the first six months of 2005, the French Secret Service (DST) made over sixty Islamic-related terrorism arrests, compared to seventy-six in 2004. This reflects the changes among international jihadists where, according to French counter-terrorism experts, new threats come in addition to existing ones, rather than replacing them. Several trends are regarded as especially worrisome by the French intelligence community.
Firstly, there is the growing importance of what is called the filiÚre Irakienne (Iraqi network); the network recruiting for the insurgency in Iraq. Recruitment seems to take place everywhere, as usual in and near mosques but also in prisons and private gatherings. Moreover, the Internet, where professional multimedia techniques are applied for this purpose, is actively used for recruitment. [2]
Secondly, the recruitment networks operate Europe-wide with recruiters traveling back and forth between various European cities. The Paris based Imam Ben Halim Abderraouf, a foreman of the extremist Jamaat al-Tabligh wal-Daâwa (Society for Propagation & Preaching) movement, apparently played a key role in the recruitment of young Dutch Muslims. Four of them recently traveled on fake Algerian passports via Paris and Damascus to the Syrian-Iraq border area to receive jihad training. A DVD containing footage of their training with explosives in the desert surfaced in the notorious Paris 19th arrondissement. It shows the making of suicide bombs hidden in jackets as well as the devastating effects of these bombs on an autobus and on a constructed scenery of a supermarket and a busy street. The DVD is used for recruiting and indoctrinating other young Muslims. [3]
Thirdly, French experts expect to find Iraq veterans back in France in due course to continue the jihad, just as happened after earlier conflicts. This time however, the insurgents avoid long stays in the combat zone, and instead use the conflict to gain sufficient training and motivation to return battle-hardened to Europe. [4] A dozen young Frenchmen are believed to be in Iraq as combatants, several were arrested along the Iraq/Syria border and an unknown number have probably already returned to France.
Fourthly, there is a new category of Islamic extremists, almost all offspring of immigrants, who seem to be younger, more frustrated, and more radicalized than the French jihadists of the 1990s. Over the last year, five young Frenchmen were killed in Iraq, one while executing a suicide attack near Fallujah. Although no plots for suicide attacks in France have been discovered yet, the DST fears that cells are planning such a strike and is working hard to discover and foil them. Fears of suicide attacks by young French Muslims were reinforced after the events in London. [5]
Finally, another dangerous trend is the apparent change in focus of the Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an offshoot of the GIA, beyond the borders of Algeria. Intelligence shows that the purported leader of the GSPC, the explosives specialist Abdelmalek Droukdal, has active contacts with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and is planning to combine efforts in the international jihad arena, focusing in particular on France. Since the GSPC is regarded as the most organized extremist organization in Algeria, with its tentacles already reaching far into Spain and presumably into France as well, French security experts take this development seriously. [6]
Developments in Counter-Terrorism
French law enforcement is highly hierarchical in nature, resulting in several agencies and departments within the same agency involved in counter-terrorism. In the National Police these are the aforementioned DST, the General Intelligence Service (RG) and the National Anti-terrorism Division (DNAT). Also the External Intelligence Service (DGSE) of the Defense Ministry has a role in countering terrorism and in addition both the Gendarmerie and the Judicial Police in Paris maintain counter-terrorist judicial and intelligence capabilities.
Frequently these bodies act as little kingdoms, invoking inevitable problems of coordination. Therefore several coordinating structures were created of which the Anti-terrorist Operational Coordination Unit (UCLAT) is the most important. However, without having direct access to the information of the participating bodies and largely dependant on face-to-face meetings, UCLATâs coordinating role remains suboptimal.
A newâand against the French background, almost revolutionaryâinitiative aimed at streamlining this organizational jungle and boosting efficiency, is the sharing of one location and resources by the DST, RG and DNAT in 2006. Although ideas for sharing resources and even a fusion between them from time to time emerged since the 1995 GIA attacks, new threats are prompting a greater convergence of resources and capabilities.
Another initiative is last yearâs creation of a joint French-Spanish anti-terrorism investigation team in which officers will have equal operative powers on each otherâs territory. This is remarkable in contemporary European police cooperation. Another initiative of unprecedented caliber is the reinforced French-US counter-terrorism cooperation under the name âAlliance Baseâ that has been in place since 2002, though only became public last July.
Although the London attacks predictably prompted several new repressive initiatives, like proposals to upgrade the 1995 legislation on video surveillance, tougher penalties for terrorism-related crimes and data retention on all communication, the French have already been searching for original alternatives to supplement conventional counter-terrorism strategies.
A first initiative in this regard was the decision in 2004 to elevate the fight against terrorism to the status of a Chantier national (Major Project); meaning a prioritized cause requiring nation wide efforts. [7] Amongst other things, this entailed an appeal on all government institutions to actively search for indications and information pointing to processes of radicalism in society. A following initiative is the recent announcement of the compilation of a white book on âthe internal security and the threat of terrorism.â [8]
The white book should receive input from various government departments and provide answers to strategic, operational and pedagogical questions involving:
⢠evaluating the actual threat level;
⢠mapping the types of threats and targets relevant for France;
⢠exploring new technological counter-terrorism possibilities;
⢠finding an equilibrium between liberties and security;
⢠enhancing the international counter-terrorism cooperation;
⢠informing society adequately without creating unnecessary fear.
When completed, the white book should serve as a basis for public action against the threat of terrorism in the coming decennia. [9]
The broad appeal on various government institutions and society in both the âChantier nationalâ and the White book are relatively new approaches in this field in Europe. These are necessary and important attempts to take countering terrorism out of the exclusive domain of law enforcement. After all, the recent attacks in London clearly indicate that Islamist terrorism will continue to threaten western European societies for the foreseeable future. As far as the French are concerned, even a very efficient law enforcement and intelligence community will only be part of the answer. To enhance its counter-terrorism approach, France has taken initial steps that ensure a wider participation of society to counter this growing menace.
It's time for the United States to limit financial transactions that involve American companies to governance by secular laws. The swelling oil revenues of the Gulf states have created demand from those markets for U.S. investments in banks, real estate and industrial stocks. Most has been invested according to the usual financial guidelines, but the recent surge in revenues has also stimulated the demand to impose Islamic law (sharia) on financial investments.
In their urgent desire to find new markets, Americans have opened the door to Islamist expansionism. The Dow Jones Islamic Markets index and Islamic U.S. banks and financial products, which are catering exclusively to Muslims, only advance the Islamic impetus to impose sharia-governed banking on the West. For example, Michael J.T. McMillen, a partner at Dechert, and "a pioneer in the burgeoning Islamic banking and finance market," aggressively solicits and accommodates sharia compliant transactions. If Islamic investors want to abide by sharia, nothing prevents them from doing so. But there is no reason for American banks, businesses and investment firms to introduce Islam or any other religion into the U.S. capital markets.
American legislators, regulators and businessmen should follow the lead of Ontario's Premier Dalton McGuinty who on September 11, responding to the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice, which applied to arbitrate civil cases in the Muslim community according to sharia, declared: "There will be no Shari'a law in Ontario. There will be no religious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians." Mr. McGuinty said religious arbitrations "threaten our common ground," and promised his Liberal government would introduce legislation "as soon as possible" to outlaw them in Ontario. "Ontarians will always have the right to seek advice from anyone in matters of family law, including religious advice," he said. "But no longer will religious arbitration be deciding matters of family law."
Meanwhile, in the United States, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) is urging Muslims to contact their elected representatives and urge them to sign a House resolution recognizing the upcoming fast of Ramadan and commending Muslims for their faith. There is nothing wrong with recognizing Ramadan. Many other resolutions had been adopted to recognize different religious holidays. There was even a special resolution adopted on July 1, 1999, "Supporting religious tolerance toward Muslims." However, there is no precedent for commending any particular faith and we should not set one now.
That CAIR, a Saudi-supported organization, has the chutzpa to initiate such commendation is not surprising, especially in view of the latest presidential declaration on Sept. 26, that "Saudi Arabia is cooperating with efforts to combat international terrorism." This is despite the fact that "in September 2004 the Secretary of State designated Saudi Arabia, for the first time, as a country of particular concern for its severe violations of religious freedom within its borders."
Moreover, a recent GAO report on "U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address Islamic Extremism" noted: "The Department of State's 2004 International Religious Freedom Report to Congress states that freedom of religion does not exist in Saudi Arabia and that basic religious freedoms are denied to all but those who adhere to Saudi Arabia's sanctioned version of Sunni Islam." Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia, also received a waver of financial sanctions, despite its failing to stop "slave trade in prostitutes, child sex workers and forced laborers." In addition, according to the GAO report, "Saudi donors and unregulated charities have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years."
Indeed, that activity has not stopped, as evident from the August capture of Y'akub Abu Assab, a senior Hamas operative, who transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars and operational instructions from Hamas headquarters in Saudi Arabia to East Jerusalem. From there, he distributed the money as instructed to families of suicide bombers and for Hamas activities in the West Bank and Gaza.
Moreover, as reported by the GAO "in July 2005, a Treasury official testified before Congress that Saudi Arabia based and funded organizations remain a key source for the promotion of ideologies used by terrorists and violent extremists around the world to justify their agenda." The promotion of sharia into the U.S. business environment meanwhile goes on apace. Since this is the same Islamic ideology that is used by Islamist terrorists, its acceptance in any civil forum is not a good thing.
Rachel Ehrenfeld, author of "Funding Evil; How Terrorism is Financed â and How to Stop It," is director of the American Center for Democracy and a member of the Committee on the Present Danger. Alyssa A. Lappen is a freelance journalist who frequently contributes to FrontPageMagazine and other online journals.
By the time you read this itâs possible the story will be front-page news, or will have been debunked, but right now the mainstream media is virtually ignoring the bomb explosion outside the University of Oklahomaâs stadium during the Kansas State-Oklahoma football game October 1.
Joel Hinrichs III, a 21-year-old engineering student at OU, was killed when the explosive device detonated outside the stadium. Authorities immediately labeled it a suicide. OU President David Boren has reportedly tried to calm the university community by claiming it was simply a troubled young man taking his own life. But the truth is no one knows whether Hinrichs deliberately detonated the bomb or it went off accidentally.
One Oklahoma news outlet quoted witnesses who said Hinrichs tried to enter the stadium carrying a large backpack, but took off running when a security guard tried to look inside the backpack.
At the university-owned apartment Hinrichs shared with a student from Pakistan, police found a large cache of explosive materials.
A news report in Oklahoma said Hinrichsâ apartment building and three adjoining buildings were cordoned off with police tape, and on Sunday night FBI and ATF agents and the Norman police bomb squad were removing the materials. A later report claimed the material in the exploded bomb was TATP, said to be the same material used by the London bombers in July. It also was alleged that a few days before his death, Hinrichs tried to buy a large amount of aluminum nitrate.
An Associated Press report quoted the president of OUâs Muslim Student Association as saying Hinrichsâ roommate, Fazal M. Cheema, and three other Muslim men were taken into custody immediately after the bombing, led in handcuffs from a party they were attending. All were later released. The Tulsa World reported October 6 that authorities were questioning Muslin students.
According to Oklahoma News 9, Hinrichs had been attending âthe same Norman mosque once attended by convicted 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui.â
Is it possible Hinrichs intended to detonate his bomb inside the stadium, standing somewhere among the 84,000 attending the game?
My source in Oklahoma, Kevin Donahue, asks some interesting questions: ââŠwhy would a suicide bomber who reportedly didnât want to hurt anyone else, have such a large cache of explosives that police had to clear four buildings? âŠwhy build a bomb to kill yourself? Why not just slash your wrists? âŠWhy is the Joint Terrorism Task Force the lead agency in the case? Why is OU increasing security measures if this was a single guy committing suicide?â
I donât know if this was a case of a depressed kid who decided to kill himself in a way that would attract a lot of attention, or whether it was a terrorist incident gone awry. I have believed for a long time that terrorism in the nationâs heartland might have more impact on Americans than attacks in New York or other large cities. It will be interesting to see whether the mainstream media, especially the cable news shows, grab this story and force federal authorities to tell us what they know.
#1
It will be interesting to see whether the mainstream media, especially the cable news shows, grab this story and force federal authorities to tell us what they know.
Short anwser: They won't.
It would under-mine the current MSM narritive that the GWOT is illegitamite, just like the rest of the Bush Administration's works and even it's very existence.
Posted by: N guard ||
10/08/2005 9:43 Comments ||
Top||
#2
Always coverups, self-censorship, anti-profiling, no followups, incompetence, disinformation until the body parts fly. What we don't know is the scariest. Very interesting story,
#3
That would be ammonium nitrate. Most likely this dirtball was either working on his own or had a few friends that encouraged him, but wouldn't do anything themselves. So he was a "from scratch" bomber. Such people frequently blow themselves up.
He probably figured that he would leave his backpack in the stadium, where it would injure and kill people, and then start a "mad bomber" reign of terror on the campus. Big plans.
#4
It's been one week and, save for local news in OK and a quick semi-gratuitous story on FOX News, the MSM's silence is deafening ... The only sources covering this story are blogs, BBS' and sites such as NEIN and WND whose reputations for reliability are suspect ...
#6
There's no mystery here and nothing for the MSM to report: the feds are keeping it under wraps until their investigation is complete (i.e., until they've arrested everybody they're going to).
What's the chance that a suicidal techie would go the bomb route, just happen to have a Pakistani roommate and friends, just happen to live near a mosque, and just happen to try to get into a filled stadium before blowing up. Nah, nothing here -- move along.
Tony Blair confirmed last week that bombs used to kill eight British soldiers in Iraq were a type used by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and groups that it supports in Lebanon.
His words were circumspect, but the point was clear: London considers Tehran responsible for killing British troops in Iraq. Blair's accusations confirm that the British-secured zone, once praised as a triumph for the 'softly-softly' approach, is a model no more. In recent weeks death squads have kidnapped and murdered journalists, most famously Steven Vincent, an American freelance writer who had warned of Iranian infiltration of the police. Dozens of Iraqis have fallen victim to Iranian-backed militias.
It did not have to be this way. The Iranian challenge in Iraq has long been apparent. In January 2004, Lebanese Hizbollah opened offices across southern Iraq. In the centre of Basra, Lebanese Hizbollah flags flew from an annexe to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq headquarters.
In exchange for quiet, British officials have turned a blind eye to the Iranian challenge. When Shia militias turned away from schools girls not conforming to Muslim standards of dress, British forces did nothing to guarantee them a right to education. When young gangs plastered the University of Basra with posters of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, British officials remained silent. An official assessment following Muqtada al-Sadr's uprising in April 2004 blamed a British political officer in al-Kut for 'intentionally toning down' reports of [Shia] insurgent activity'. In Amara, British officials transferred the Baath party headquarters to the Badr Corps; many locals wanted to use it as a health clinic instead. The Iranian-trained militia festooned their new headquarters with anti-coalition slogans. British troops refused to be provoked.
For terrorists and their sponsors, British restraint is assumed. There is little fear of military reprisal. A major factor behind the Iranian government's willingness to murder British troops has been the impotence and naivety of UK diplomacy.
It has become conventional wisdom among the foreign policy elite that military force is never appropriate. The outbreak of the Iraqi insurgency and the fumbled reconstruction have reinforced anti-war sentiment among the chattering classes. If only President Bush had listened to the international community and allowed United Nations inspectors to finish their job, they say, war might have been averted.
War should always be the last resort. But a credible military threat is sometimes necessary to maintain peace. In the case of Iran, British cabinet officials have undercut diplomacy. As tension between Washington and Iran escalated last month, for example, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was asked about the possibility of military action. 'US Presidents always say all options are open. But it is not on the table, it is not on the agenda. I happen to think it is inconceivable,' he told the BBC on 28 September. Al-Jazeera's headline for this was: 'No military action against Iran.'
Straw may have wanted to reinforce the notion that London remained committed to diplomacy, playing to a British public conditioned to view the American President as a reckless cowboy and religious nut. But his words were interpreted in Tehran as weakness.
Engagement alone can backfire. Between 2000 and 2005, trade between Iran and the European Union has almost tripled. During the same period, it doubled its number of executions and spent several billion dollars on its nuclear programme.
Iranian diplomats may be sincere. They may have impressed Straw. But the Islamic republic's structure leaves them impotent. Only the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Intelligence Ministry wield power. It is no accident that Iran's envoy to Iraq was not from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, but from the division of the Revolutionary Guards charged with the export of revolution.
Diplomacy backed by the threat of military force can be a winning combination. What little success the negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear intentions have had are due not only to European carrots, but also American sticks.
Iran is not alone in this. Examining Libyan leader Muammar Gadaffi's decision to settle his differences with London and Washington, US columnist Charles Krauthammer suggested it was no coincidence that 'Gadaffi's first message to Britain, the principal US war ally and conduit to White House war counsels, occur[red] just days before the invasion of Iraq.
'And his final capitulation to US-British terms occur[red] just five days after Saddam Hussein is fished out of a rathole.' Had Straw assured Gadaffi he need never fear military reprisal, the Libyan leader would today be nearing completion of his nuclear bomb. Might matters.
If democracy prevails in Iraq, the Iranian leadership understands that 70 million Iranians will clamour for the same rights. Iraq's success poses an existential challenge. While Iran's youth crave Western pop, fashion and freedom, ideology dominates the Islamic republic's leadership. Khomeini's constitution enshrines theocracy and the export of revolution.
No amount of reform can change that. And no amount of engagement can ameliorate its challenge.
The best the West can hope for is containment. Diplomacy can repulse the Iranian challenge in Iraq, but nice words alone are insufficient. Deals must be obeyed and promises kept. Sometimes that takes a willingness to use force.
Armies, not words, are a diplomat's most potent tool.
Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, is the editor of the Middle East Quarterly
Posted by: Steve White ||
10/08/2005 23:19 ||
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The threat of Islamic terrorism to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) is surprisingly real. Aside from the possibility of an al-Qaeda strike against U.S. and other Western interests in the country, there are a number of indigenous Islamic networks that have the potential to either engage in serious acts of terrorism on their own or in conjunction with international terrorists. Of these indigenous networks the most important is an organization formerly called People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). This article highlights the emergence, evolution and threats posed by PAGAD and similar organizations, which use legitimate causes as a subterfuge for furthering their radical Islamic agenda.
Background
The Muslim community makes up an estimated 2.3% of the South African population. Although well-established Muslim communities can be found throughout the country, the Muslim community in Cape Town represents 7% of the Western Capeâs population. Conditions within that region are substantially different from other parts of the country, which have contributed to PAGADâs initial success. Primarily, poverty and related social problems affect the Muslim community in the Western Cape to a much greater extent than other Muslim communities in the Republic. Secondly, the Muslim community in Cape Town is predominately of Malay origin and came to Cape Town as part of the slave trade during the 18th century, as opposed to Muslims in other parts of the country who are predominately of Indian origin.
An Islamic revival in South Africa began in the 1950s, as teachers and professionals in the Western Cape tried to mobilize themselves into coherent movements. The Islamic revival essentially derived its religious inspiration from modern Islamic movements in Pakistan and Egypt. In December 1970 the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa (MYM) was established. The Iranian revolution in 1979 had a massive impact on the consciousness of South African Muslims and led to the formation of the Qibla Mass Movement, an anti-apartheid movement inspired by the universal egalitarian message of the Islamic revolution in Iran.
The Qibla Movement
Qibla was created in the early 1980s to promote the aims and ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa and in due course transform South Africa into an Islamic state, under the slogan âOne Solution, Islamic Revolution.â [1]
During the anti-apartheid struggle Qibla simultaneously supported the black consciousness movement in South Africa, in particular Pan Africanism. Although Qibla is a purely South African organization, it is manipulated from a safe distance by the Iranian intelligence services, which use the organization not only to propagate the world view of the Islamic Republic, but also as a cover to conduct espionage in RSA. In order to broaden its support base inside the South African Muslim community, Qibla initiated three projects:
1. Played a key role in the formation of the Western Cape-based Islamic Unity Convention (IUC), which was formed in 1994 to serve as an umbrella organization for more than 250 Muslim groups. The objective of the IUC is to promote Islamic unity in South Africa, as a precursor for an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in the country.
2. Positioned itself as the driving force behind the militant/extreme components in PAGAD, in particular the G-Force.
3. Assumed control over the IUCâs Radio 786. This medium proved to be useful in mobilizing individuals within the Muslim community for its cause.
Although clearly not a terrorist organization, Qibla nonetheless has whole-heartedly embraced Iranâs Islamic Republic. In his book, âQuest for Unityâ Achmad Cassiem (a leader of Qibla and the current head of IUC) provides an insight into the revolutionary ideology of groups like Qibla and PAGAD:
âAny social order which does not rotate on the axis of justice is not fit for survival. The minimum demand of the oppressed under the guidance of Islamic ideology is for a just social order. Anything less than a just social order is betrayal, is treason to the oppressed people and their glorious martyrs. The essence of jihad is sacrifice and it is necessary because a revolutionary is not merely an exponent of revolutionary rhetoric but one who attacks what is oppressive and exploitative in order to destroy and eradicate it. No revolutionary worthy of the name is therefore threatened and blackmailed â not even with death.â [2]
PAGAD
It was the ideological and spiritual environment created by Qibla that led to the emergence of PAGAD on 9 December 1995. Another major factor in the emergence of this organization was the extraordinarily high crime rate in the Western Cape. Indeed PAGADâs initial primary objective was to serve as a broad anti-crime front. Under its banner a variety of organizations and concerned citizens with diverse ideological, political and religious persuasions sought to combat the criminal gangs and drug dealers in their communities.
From its inception until the eventual split in September 1996, there were three distinct strands within PAGAD:
1. Populist moderates and concerned citizens.
2. Islamic extremists and Qibla infiltrators that became the primary driving force of PAGAD after the split in 1996.
3. Drug dealers that used PAGAD to protect their âturfâ against competitors.
Modus Operandi and Target Selection
Initially PAGAD employed a dual strategy, acting as a community pressure group while at the same time forming and activating covert cell structures known as the G-Force. The patterns of militancy evident in PAGAD activities indicated the prevalence of both paramilitary-style attacks on alleged drug dealers perpetrated primarily by G-Force members, and mass marches by PAGAD supporters intended to portray the organization as a grass-roots movement. PAGADâs modus operandi developed in the following stages:
1996-1997: The Fight Against Drug Dealers. Between July 1996 and December 1997, PAGADâs covert structures were implicated in 222 acts of violence against alleged drug dealers and their property. Explosives were used in 124 incidents in comparison to the use of firearms in 98 incidents. [3]
1998: Reaction to Opposition. From July 1998 onwards PAGAD began to target academics and clerics critical of the tactics employed by its G-force. At the same time, the personnel and facilities of the stateâs security and intelligence community were attacked by PAGAD. The explosion outside the offices of the police special investigation task team on 6 August, 1998 elevated PAGAD into the world of Islamic terrorism. Moreover, the increasing selectivity of targets by PAGADâs covert teams reflected a noteworthy qualitative shift in strategic objectives. Furthermore, PAGAD attacked business linked to the U.S., after the latter launched missile strikes against targets related to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998.
1999-2000: Restaurants and Public Places. There was a significant change in suspected PAGAD-related acts of violence after 1998. Although the number of bombing and shooting incidents declined, PAGAD became more deadly and indiscriminate. Attacks were no longer focused on drug dealers and gangsters but tended to target public places and places of entertainment. Between January and August 1999, six bomb explosions injured 81 people, while 17 armed attacks killed 17. In 2000, at least 14 prominent acts of terrorism that included attacks against eyewitnesses in PAGAD-related court cases, restaurants and international interests were recorded. For example, on 29 August a car bomb was detonated near the United States consulate injuring seven people.
PAGADâs covert activities came to a standstill with the arrest and prosecution of its prominent leaders. However, since the underlying reasons for its existence were never addressed, the possible re-emergence of PAGAD or similar organizations cannot be discounted.
Conclusion
Ostensibly created to fight drugs and the socio-economic problems that are associated with it, PAGAD was essentially a political organization with distinct Islamist objectives. Should the RSA government be able to effectively combat gang violence and drugs it is likely that Muslim extremistsâparticularly in the Western Capeâwould find other issues to bolster public support. Indeed after the establishment of PAGAD, similar structures with seemingly identical aims were formed: People Against Prostitutes and Sodomites (PAPAS), Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO), and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders (MAIL). Each of these organizations represented a different challenge and therefore a different support-base. In other words, each organization has a specific target from which small numbers of extremists could be recruited.
It is also clear that community-based organizations modeled on PAGAD are heavily penetrated by the highly secretive Qibla organization. Qibla uses this penetration to marshal support for its Islamic revolutionary aims. Although in many respects Qibla is worlds apart from al-Qaeda and the broader Sunni Islamic militancy which it inspires, nonetheless its radical ideology can prepare vulnerable individuals for terrorist recruitment further down the line.
The key question, of course, revolves around the likelihood of an al-Qaeda attack against Western interests in South Africa. For its part, the government of RSA hopes that its neutrality in the so-called war against terrorism and its pro-Palestinian stance will spare it from the wrath of international jihadists.
The real threat is to U.S. and other Western interests in the country; in this respect there are major causes for concern. As a nascent democracy, South Africa is obsessed with protecting basic rights, rights that could be exploited by international terrorists working in tandem with local militants. This ârights-basedâ environment is compounded by widespread official corruption in South Africa that makes it very easy for skilled and experienced terrorists to operate and further their aims (for instance by acquiring fake documentation) without fear of detection. Moreover, South Africa has porous borders and large immigrant communities that can shelter terrorists. Furthermore, high-value targets, including large embassies and the headquarters of multi-national corporations, proliferate in the country.
Notes
1. N Jeenah, PAGAD: Fighting fire with fire, Impact International, Vol. 26, No. 9, 1996, p. 9.
2. A Cassiem, Quest for Unity, Cape Town: Silk Road International Publishers, 1992, p. 68
3. R Friedman, âGovt. blamed for lack of action as war escalatesâ, 24 January 1997, Cape Times, Cape Town.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
