Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Gevorg Mirzayan
[REGNUM] On the evening of September 25, President Vladimir Putin held a meeting of the Security Council's Standing Conference on Nuclear Deterrence. At the event, Putin publicly announced changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine. And the changes are fundamental.
One of the most important innovations is the expansion of the number of cases in which Russia allows the use of nuclear weapons.
"The previous version of the principles of state policy only spoke about the launch of ballistic missiles as a condition for a retaliatory strike. Now we are talking about the launch of aircraft, tactical and strategic cruise missiles, as well as drones, hypersonics, and in general any massive launch of aircraft," explains Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, to Regnum.
This change is related to the development of non-nuclear weapons. During the Cold War and even in the 1990s, conventional weapons were nowhere near the destructive power and delivery speed of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
Therefore, they did not fundamentally threaten the principle of guaranteed retaliatory strike – that is, the ability of a country to strike back if attacked. The principle that makes it senseless for an aggressor country to start a nuclear war.
Now, thanks to the development of cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and even drones, a number of countries have the ability to deliver a disarming strike using conventional means. And Moscow is responding.
"Now the mass use of conventional weapons can lead to a nuclear response. This logically follows from the text of the previous doctrine, where a nuclear strike is prescribed in the event of a threat to the infrastructure that ensures the possibility of a guaranteed nuclear response. Otherwise, the enemy will be tempted to hit this infrastructure for a subsequent unpunished nuclear strike," Nikita Mendkovich, head of the Eurasian Analytical Club, tells Regnum.
Hence the change in terms. Russia is essentially abandoning the formulation that nuclear weapons can be used in a non-nuclear war, in the event of a critical threat to the existence of the Russian Federation. And also for Belarus.
Another innovation was the permission to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state if it commits aggression against Russia with the support or participation of a nuclear state.
Again, during the Cold War, this principle would have been considered dangerous because it did not allow for the possibility of waging “wars on the periphery” – conflicts between Moscow and Washington in Third World countries, where the superpowers supported local players and let off steam.
But, firstly, then we were talking about a conflict on the periphery, and now we are talking specifically about aggression on the sovereign territory of Russia - something that was absolutely unthinkable during the Cold War and therefore was not taken into account in nuclear doctrines. Secondly, the level of support for the Kyiv regime from the US and the West as a whole is now unprecedented - in essence, the Americans and the entire NATO bloc are fighting against Russia with the hands of the Ukrainians.
Changes in Russia's nuclear doctrine will, of course, cause criticism in the West. They are already being called an escalation of the conflict. But all these changes are, in essence, the West's response to new threats. And threats not only to Russian sovereignty, but to the entire world.
"The West continues to look for 'dead zones' in our nuclear concept to implement the strategy of a thousand cuts. That is why we are forced to adjust the rules," says Nikita Mendkovich.
For example, the West’s hybrid war against Russia has demonstrated that the effect of Russian nuclear deterrence is not yet working sufficiently.
"It only partially prevents other powers from entering a direct war against Russia using non-nuclear weapons. The West itself is considering the possibility of launching missile strikes deep into Russian territory. The US and Europe went for escalation because they considered its risks to themselves less painful than the risks from the consequences of Ukraine's defeat," Dmitry Suslov is sure.
According to him, Western countries convinced themselves that Russia would not use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. And they did something that was considered unacceptable during the Cold War - they tried to inflict a hybrid defeat on Russia or even move to a direct non-nuclear war.
At the same time, Vladimir Putin systematically tried to change the West's mind. First, he declared that Moscow would interpret Kyiv's permission to fire long-range missiles at Russian territory as Western countries entering a war against the Russian Federation.
After this, over the course of several days, a series of publications appeared in Western media that Biden might not make a decision on long-range strikes deep into Russia. In addition, it turned out that in the United States, many Pentagon officials, led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, as well as members of the National Security Council, headed by Biden's national security adviser Jake Sullivan, are against such a decision.
"Only Secretary of State Antony Blinken is in favor. And this is logical, given that the head of the State Department has a more hawkish and uncompromising approach towards Russia. Well, and he thinks much less strategically than the realist Jake Sullivan," says Dmitry Suslov.
Now Vladimir Putin is announcing new provisions in the nuclear doctrine, in which his warnings are already officially written down. At the same time, it is possible that Moscow will take a third, consolidated step.
"For the West to believe in the seriousness of Moscow's intentions, it is necessary not only to limit itself to words, but also to continue deeds. To support Russian steps with direct actions. For example, by continuing exercises on the use of nuclear weapons, preparing nuclear tests," Suslov noted.
But behind the changes in the nuclear doctrine, there is another, more global plan. It is to prevent the war that the world is being pushed toward by Western elites who have stopped fearing nuclear Armageddon. They have literally lost their fear, which means it needs to be brought back.
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