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2024-08-08 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
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'The situation requires the army's intervention.' Lessons from the second Chechen war
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Andrey Zvorykin
[REGNUM] "The situation has already outgrown the scope of the district police department and required the intervention of the army. <…> Troops from the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions and North Ossetia are being transferred to Buinaksk and Makhachkala, and from there by military transport planes to the Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky districts on the border with Chechnya, where fighting with several groups of Wahhabis has been going on for several days now…".
Continued from Page 4
From such reports (in this case we are quoting the Izvestia newspaper ), a quarter of a century ago the country learned of the first “flashes” of what would later be called the second Chechen war.
The official date of the beginning of the war (which, along with the first Chechen war, was long considered the bloodiest conflict on Russian territory since the Great Patriotic War) is recognized as August 7, 1999.
On this day, between 400 and half a thousand militants of the so-called "Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade" led by Shamil Basayev and Saudi Arabian national Amir ibn al-Khattab broke through to the Botlikh district of Dagestan, and large-scale clashes began. At the same time, Dagestani policemen had already entered into battles with local Wahhabis at the beginning of August (the Izvestia report cited above is dated August 5, 1999).
That the situation in the North Caucasus would most likely explode into a new major conflict became obvious much earlier. Immediately after the ink of the signatures under the Khasavyurt peace agreements of August 1996 had dried.
PREREQUISITES FOR WAR
Then, in August 1996, the militants of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”* turned the tide of the war in their favor – during the summer “Operation Jihad” they captured Grozny, Argun and Gudermes.
The command of the United Group of Forces of the Russian Federation insisted on continuing the fighting, primarily on destroying the militant group blocked in Grozny. This was stated by Generals Gennady Troshev and Konstantin Pulikovsky, whose officer son died in 1995 in a battle near Shatoi. The loyal Chechen forces, the government of Doku Zavgayev, also spoke about the need to suppress terrorism.
But the federal leadership, headed by the recently re-elected (under the slogan “Vote or lose!”) Boris Yeltsin, decided to conclude a truce with the separatists.
As one of the signatories of the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty, General Alexander Lebed (at that time, Secretary of the Russian Security Council), later explained, the “insufficiently good” organization of the actions of the federal troops and the deplorable state of their support became obvious.
North Caucasuss Military District had pretty much fallen apart when the USSR broke up. Lebed was the best general the Russians had. He died "when his plane crashed" not very long into Putin-Medvedev's rule, between the Nord-Ost and Beslan atrocities, if I remember.
“Social well-being” also played a role. Society, in a state of shock after the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent internal and external conflicts, had a hard time coping with military action.
This was aggravated by the terrorist tactics adopted by the separatists. More than two hundred people, we recall, became victims of the two largest terrorist attacks: the seizure of a hospital and maternity hospital in Budyonnovsk by Basayev's militants (June 1995) and the hostage-taking in a hospital in Kizlyar (January 1996, organized by Salman Raduyev ).
On August 31, 1996, in Khasavyurt, Dagestan, the representative of the Russian president, Alexander Lebed, and Aslan Maskhadov (at that time, the “chief of staff of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria”) signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya and the cessation of military action.
The Khasavyurt peace did not actually bring peace.
Left to its own devices, the self-proclaimed "Ichkeria" was a failed state for the next three years. In addition to rampant crime (which could also be seen in Dudayev's "Ichkeria" of 1991-1994), post-Khasavyurt Chechnya quickly became a "hub" for the terrorist international.
Djokar Dudavev used to call himself "The Saddam Hussein of the Caucasus." Ah, the good old days.
The presence of the “Black Arab” Khattab (who had previously fought in Afghanistan and Tajikistan) in the military leadership speaks for itself, and the connections of local jihadists with Al-Qaeda* were acknowledged, including in UN Security Council documents.
The secular nationalist separatist Maskhadov, elected "president of Ichkeria" in 1997, did not control the field commanders. And most importantly, he was unable to curb the rising Wahhabi extremism - which was embodied by the previous "president" Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Shamil Basayev (this terrorist even held the post of prime minister in January-July 1998). In February 1999, under pressure from Islamists, Maskhadov introduced Sharia and allowed public executions.
Even earlier, at least since 1998, radicals began “exporting the revolution” beyond Chechnya – not only for “ideological” purposes, but also to ensure drug trafficking, which was hindered by Russian border guards.
WAHHABI FOOTHOLD
Basayev and Khattab's units conducted more than three dozen test sorties in different directions, eventually deciding to strike at the mountainous regions of Dagestan. Here, as the militant leaders thought, they would be provided with support from the local population.
During the first Chechen campaign, the Dagestani Wahhabi preacher Bagautdin Kebedov established contacts with Khattab and the “Ichkerian” commanders.
In May 1998, in the village of Karamakhi (Buinaksk district of Dagestan), Kebedov's supporters seize the police station and get weapons. In July, emissaries of Basayev and Khattab arrive in the village seized by extremists and call for the establishment of an Islamic state throughout the North Caucasus.
By August 1998, the so-called Kadar zone was formed - a "separate Islamic territory" with centers in the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. The Russian administration and security forces do not control this zone, where checkpoints with green banners and signs "You are entering a territory where Sharia law is in effect" are located on the roads.
At the same time, Basayev threatened that if the Russian authorities encroached on the Kadar zone, his “Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade” would enter the fray.
"Around the same time, Chechen fighters, together with the leaders of Dagestani Wahhabis, held a Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan* in Grozny. The chairman of the shura (congress) Shamil Basayev declared that the two fraternal peoples should unite into a single Islamic state and oppose Russia," recalled Askhab Abdurazakov, the head of the administration of the Tsumadinsky District of Dagestan in the late 1990s, in an interview with RIA Novosti.
At that time, in 1998, the federal center was trying "not to aggravate the situation." In September, the then head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, later head of the government, Sergei Stepashin, came to Karamakhi, where he stated, among other things, the following:
"I would warn everyone against labeling us as 'Wahhabis' or 'extremists'. We have freedom of religion... We will all help you peacefully, I give you my word of honor."
Be that as it may, when, less than a year later, the gangs of Basayev and Khattab invaded Dagestan, they came upon prepared ground.
Organizing decisive resistance to aggression became one of the first tasks of the new Prime Minister of Russia (since August 9, 1999) Vladimir Putin.
DAGESTAN FIGHTS BACK
On August 7, 1999, Basayev and Khattab's militants, joined by Arbi Barayev's "Special Purpose Islamic Regiment," captured the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, Tando, Shodroda, and Godoberi in the Botlikh region. The invasion was called "Operation Imam Gazi-Magomed" - named after one of the comrades of Imam Shamil, a fighter against the Russian presence in the Caucasus in the 19th century.
Since September 9, the “Islamic Shura (Council) of Dagestan” created by Bagautdin Kebedov has proclaimed the “Islamic State of Dagestan” headed by Sirazhudin Ramazanov, a protégé of Basayev and the “Chechen Goebbels” Movladi Udugov.
However, the invading Islamists did not receive the support they had hoped for.
The militants immediately began negotiations with government officials and the local population, trying to win them over to their side, Magomed Umargadzhiev, head of the Botlikh region in 1999, recalled in a conversation with TASS.
"But the conversation didn't go well. I arrived in Botlikh at 2:30 p.m., and by that time the spontaneous militia had already begun," Umargadzhiev said. " People came out with what they had, even old people: with picks, shovels, with weapons. We started organizing all this, created a headquarters. <…> The entire administration apparatus received radios and pistols from the head of the district police department, and we began work."
The "federal forces" came to the aid of the police and the newly created militia. Earlier, the 102nd brigade of internal troops was transferred to cover the border in the Tsumadinsky district. And then army units also entered the action.
From August 9 to 25, battles took place for the height of Oslinoe Ukho west of Botlikh between the Islamists (who occupied the mountain on August 9) and the fighters of the 7th Guards Airborne Division. The paratroopers took the height after two assault attempts, in one of which Major Sergei Kostin was killed.
The Botlikh-Tsumadin campaign continued until the end of August. On the 23rd, Basayev announced the withdrawal of his main forces. On the 29th, federal troops began a "cleansing" of militants in the village of Karamakhi.
MASKHADOV LEAVES NO CHOICE
It should be noted that Moscow left “Ichkeria” one last chance to fulfill the Khasavyurt agreements.
On August 12, the Russian government proposed a joint operation against the militants to Maskhadov. But he only verbally condemned Basayev and Khattab. The next day, the "government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria" called Moscow's proposal to strike at Islamist positions in Chechnya interference in internal affairs.
Maskhadov left no other choice but to completely dismantle the hotbed of terrorism in the North Caucasus, which the “Republic of Ichkeria” had become.
And on August 25, the Russian Air Force carried out the first air raids on militant bases and camps.
Meanwhile, on September 5, Basayev and Khattab began a second invasion of Dagestan. The stated goal was to help the Kadar zone. On September 7, the militants were stopped five kilometers from Khasavyurt.
On September 11, gangs began to leave Dagestan, and four days later, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev reported to Prime Minister Putin that the republic had been completely cleared of terrorists.
FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN
On September 30, units of the Russian Armed Forces entered the territory of Chechnya from the north-west, north, north-east and east (in the last case, under the command of the deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, General Vladimir Bulgakov, who also participated in the first campaign).
In just half of October, the Russian Armed Forces managed to occupy two-thirds of the republic's territory, crossing the Terek on October 18, 1999. The militants retained Grozny and the mountainous regions of the region.
In December 1999, the "federal forces" laid siege to the Chechen capital, in January the "Grozny" task force under the direct command of General Bulgakov stormed the city, and on February 6, 2000, the capital of Chechnya returned to Russian control.
On April 20 of the same year, the first deputy chief of the General Staff of Russia, Valery Manilov, announced the end of large-scale operations on the territory of Chechnya.
This hot phase of the second Chechen campaign was reminiscent of the initial stage of the first war, when the “federalists” managed to advance just as quickly to the Terek, occupy large settlements, including Grozny, and, it would seem, take control of almost the entire territory of the republic.
But there was also an important difference that largely determined the outcome of this war.
KADYROV'S CHOICE
On October 6, 1999, Maskhadov called on religious leaders in Chechnya to declare a "gazavat" - a holy war against Russia. But the bet on turning the war into a religious one did not work, and it was unlikely to work.
At the very beginning of the war, the chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov, went over to the Russian side, which was expected, given his attitude toward the Wahhabis, who set the tone in the leadership of “Ichkeria”.
The Wahhabization of Chechnya that followed the death of Dzhokhar Dudayev was very much disliked by the Sufi Kadyrov. In 1998, the Congress of Muslims of the North Caucasus, organized by him, condemned Wahhabism; in June 1999, Akhmat-Khadzhi attempted to overthrow Maskhadov, but failed.
With the outbreak of hostilities, Kadyrov called for an end to resistance to federal troops. He facilitated the peaceful transfer of control over several districts to the "federalists", for which he was declared an enemy of Chechnya by Maskhadov and removed from his post as chief mufti.
The choice made by Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov was one of the most striking examples of what experts of those years called the "Chechenization of the conflict," that is, its transformation from a confrontation between Russia and Chechnya into a struggle between various forces within the republic itself. This was achieved by working with target groups within Chechen society, with a special emphasis on the elite (one can recall, for example, the transition of the Yamadayev clan to the side of the federal forces). Russia relied on those who realized all the "charms" of terrorist "independence" and the fatality of armed struggle against the many times superior federal forces for the Chechen people.
On June 12, 2000, Akhmat Kadyrov was appointed head of the Chechen Republic by decree of President Vladimir Putin.
LOCAL BATTLE WITH A GLOBAL ENEMY
In turn, the “Ichkerian” leadership, having lost hope for the support of the population, exhausted by rampant banditry, took a course towards internationalizing the conflict – fortunately, the foundation for this had been laid back in the “peaceful” years of 1996–1999.
The militants (who were already called “shaitans” by the locals) received support with weapons, volunteers and instructors from radicals ranging from the Taliban* to the already mentioned Al-Qaeda*.
Suffice it to say that during the active phase of the fighting, the "Eastern Front of Ichkeria" was commanded by Khattab's comrade-in-arms, the Saudi Abu al-Walid. The deputy head of the military council of "Ichkeria" and Basayev's successor as head of the "Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade" was the Jordanian Abu-Hafs al-Urdani. A large unit within the "Islamic Regiment" was commanded by the Yemeni Abu Jafar.
A completely logical result of this evolution was the reformatting of the formally secular “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria” into the Wahhabi “Caucasus Emirate”* that took place in 2007. In 2014, the “Emirate” swore allegiance to the “Islamic State”*, which was also expected.
Thus, it was the second Chechen war that marked the beginning of Russia’s large-scale fight against international terrorism, which is currently continuing in Syria (since 2015).
DE-SHAITANIZATION
Although the phase of large-scale military operations involving the Russian Armed Forces ended by April 2000, the low-intensity conflict continued until the end of the 2000s.
Along with the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the forces subordinate to Kadyrov's government also became the terrorists' opponents.
The separatists have adopted the tried and tested tactics of sabotage and terror.
The largest actions of the militants were the terrorist attacks on the Dubrovka Theatre Centre in Moscow (October 23–26, 2002, 130 people died), and on the building of School No. 1 in Beslan, Ossetia (September 1–3, 2004, 333 people died).
The explosion at the Dynamo stadium in Grozny on May 9, 2004, took the lives of seven people, including the President of the Chechen Republic Akhmat Kadyrov and the Chairman of the State Council Khusein Isayev.
The Russian government's response was not long in coming. In 2002, during a special operation by the FSB, Khattab, who led the foreign fighters, was eliminated, and his successors Abu al-Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani were subsequently killed.
 In March 2005, "President" Aslan Maskhadov, who was hiding in the mountains, was killed, and a year later, his successor Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev. In July 2006, Shamil Basayev was eliminated.
The CTO (counter-terrorist operation) regime in Chechnya was officially lifted on April 16, 2009, as announced by Dmitry Medvedev, then the President of Russia.
By that time, the overwhelming majority of the militant leaders and political functionaries of “Ichkeria” had been killed; the rest had either fled abroad or gone deep underground.
At the same time, local counter-terrorist operations were repeatedly carried out later, in individual settlements and localities in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.
In September 2013, the last “president of Ichkeria” and “emir of the Caucasus Emirate” Doku Umarov, who claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Nevsky Express train in 2009, the explosions in the Moscow metro in 2010, and the explosion at Domodedovo Airport in 2011, was liquidated in the Sunzhensky district of Ingushetia.
Nowadays, the threat of religious extremism in the North Caucasus has not been completely eliminated (it is enough to recall the terrorist attacks on June 23 in Derbent and Makhachkala), but the large-scale gang underground was neutralized in the 2010s.
The ideological heirs of the "Ichkeria" militants are trying to replay the results of the second Chechen war on the battlefields of the SVO, fighting on the Ukrainian side as part of the "Dzhokhar Dudayev battalion" and similar units. They are opposed by the forces of the Russian Armed Forces, which also includes the "Akhmat" battalion, named after the first head of the Chechen Republic, Hero of Russia Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov.
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In March 2005, "President" Aslan Maskhadov, who was hiding in the mountains, was killed, and a year later, his successor