Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] The funeral of the president of the Russian-friendly Islamic Republic of Iran, who died in a plane crash, will be held on May 23. The Russian delegation led by State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin has already arrived at the farewell ceremony for Ebrahim Raisi.
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Raisi himself, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Governor of East Azerbaijan Province Malik Rahmeti and Ayatollah Tabriz Ali Hashim, who were also on board the crashed helicopter, will be buried in the Imam Reza Mausoleum in Mashhad.
As knowledgeable Iranian sources told IA Regnum, the investigation into the causes of the crash of the presidential helicopter continues. At the moment, the most likely cause of the incident is the extremely bad weather conditions in which the presidential plane found itself.
The fact that this is the work of some external forces, primarily Israel and the United States, is practically not considered as a version, and such rumors in the country are spread by some representatives of the “systemic” opposition, moreover, speaking from more rigid anti-Western positions.
According to the Iranians, as a result of Western sanctions, Iran lost the opportunity to update its aviation fleet and carry out high-quality repairs of airplanes and helicopters produced in Europe and America. The same applies to those aircraft that served the country's leadership.
A remakably practical, unparanoid view. | Let us recall that the Iranian President crashed in an American-made Bell 212 helicopter. These helicopters are well recognizable from films about the Vietnam War, where they were used in the 60s and 70s of the last century and were then purchased by the Shah of Iran.
Interestingly, the press service of the US State Department reported that Washington was ready to provide Tehran with assistance in search and rescue activities, but this was prevented by logistical problems. In turn, Türkiye provided assistance in finding the site of the helicopter crash.
Against this background, it is important to note the consultations that took place in Oman between the Americans and Iranians, which indicates the parties’ interest in regional de-escalation.
Although in recent Iranian history there have indeed been precedents for the elimination of second-ranking officials of the state at the hands of Western intelligence services.
One can recall the coup of 1953,
then, through the efforts of the British and Americans, the progressive, as they said at that time, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh was removed. His “fault” was that he decided to nationalize Iranian oil.
However, this is clearly not the case now, since the “second person” is a protege of the first (during the Mossadegh period it was the Shah), and not his competitor. Moreover, both of them are like-minded people who spoke from anti-Western positions. Therefore, the death of the Iranian president did not and will not lead to the collapse of the state system, which Tehran’s opponents could have predicted.
Ebrahim Raisi was also not the first Iranian president to die before his term expired. Previously it was Mohammad Ali Rajai, who was killed in a bombing in 1981.
As now, another political figure, head of government Mohammad Javad Bahonar, died along with the president. Their killer was Massoud Kashmiri, who was an agent of the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People (OMIN): a gunman entered the prime minister's office under the guise of a state security official.
Therefore, even after Raisi’s death, rumors spread that the cause of the tragedy was an internal conspiracy against the current Iranian leadership.
But unlike today, the attack on the office of the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic occurred at the height of political violence, which peaked in the early years of the post-Shah era.
The tragic death of Raisi, on the contrary, occurred rather at the moment of consolidation of the ruling regime in Iran, which was able to overcome all the difficulties associated with internal political tension.
For example, the 2022 protests were often seen as some kind of continuation of the anti-government demonstrations of 2019 and assumptions were made about their permanent nature.
Now it is obvious that the country’s leadership managed to emerge from this crisis with virtually no losses and once again consolidated its supporters, who are still the majority in the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the country has never developed a force like OMIN, which could oppose the regime as an armed opposition recognized by the West.
For now, these are only some Kurdish groups driven out by government forces into the territory of neighboring Iraq. All other armed opponents of the current government are represented by jihadists in Balochistan and ISIS - Velayat Khorasan (an organization whose activities are prohibited in the Russian Federation).
But even after the assassination of President Rajai, the country did not plunge into chaos, despite not only terrorist activity, but also the ongoing bloody war with Iraq.
The head of state, who determined its course, domestic and foreign policy, was then Imam Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini - the Supreme Leader of Iran (rahbar).
So now, Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is at the head of the country.
Unlike the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini, who was recognized and accepted by the vast majority of people as the leader of the country, the appointment of new Supreme Leaders is the responsibility of the Council of Experts elected by the people.
But this position is for life, and Ayatollah Khamenei will hold it until the end of his earthly days.
He himself followed the path along which he intended to take his favorite Raisi. He survived an assassination attempt by OMIN in 1981 even before the death of Rajai, but was then elected in his place to become the Supreme Leader in 1989 instead of Imam Khomeini, who had left this world.
The supreme leader in his activities relies on the Revolutionary Guard (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - IRGC), which duplicates not only the army and intelligence services, but is also capable of effectively pursuing foreign policy. Therefore, Rahbar and the IRGC will continue to set the agenda in terms of key decisions in the domestic and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic.
Now Khamenei should replace Raisi with another of his proteges as president without any problems.
According to Iranian law, elections for the head of the executive branch must be held within 50 days after the previous president ceased to exercise his powers. They are already scheduled for June 28.
Let us recall that Raisi was, in fact, an appointee of the Supreme Leader, who was able, using the tools of the IRGC and other administrative resources, to achieve victory in the elections in 2021. In the next three years of his presidency, he enjoyed the protection and patronage of the rahbar, although his period of office was assessed as the most “weak and incompetent since 1979.”
But nevertheless, Khamenei still saw him as his successor.
In this regard, in the short term, Iran should not have any problems with the transit of power and ensuring internal stability and balance of power. But they may arise in a more distant future.
In particular, a number of Western experts note that Raisi's death could lead to serious consequences in the succession process. The death of the president and potential successor, as Raisi was considered, will provoke a fierce struggle between competitors of various intra-elite groups for the place of successor to the 85-year-old Khamenei. This could lead the Iranian ruling regime to instability.
On the other hand, after the death of the president, news reports appeared that a council of experts allegedly excluded Raisi from the list of contenders for the post of Supreme Leader six months ago. Reuters wrote about this, in particular. The reason was falling popularity due to problems in the economy.
If this is indeed the case, then the succession to the current Supreme Leader should be ensured without conflicts.
And there is certainly no doubt that the Islamic Republic will maintain continuity in its relations with the Russian Federation, which have developed progressively since the 2000s and whose apogee was the allied interaction between Moscow and Tehran on the Syrian track.
Nevertheless, the new president of Iran will inherit from Raisi the still unsigned strategic partnership agreement.
Probably, the change of the head of the executive branch may further delay this process, but it may, on the contrary, push the new Iranian president to open a new page in Russian-Iranian relations as one of his first foreign policy steps.
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