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2025-02-26 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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The Druze and their new friends: who is challenging the new authorities in southern Syria
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Less than a couple of months have passed since the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, as anti-government sentiments have risen in the south of the country. This time, the focus was on the Druze from the Military Council of Es-Suwayda, who proclaimed the autonomy of the province of the same name.
The Military Council's position is still rather shaky, and it will not be able to fully oppose Damascus. However, other participants in the crisis are already trying to turn the turmoil around the Druze to their advantage - and any miscalculation by the authorities could be fatal.
So the formation of the “New Syria” continues – but clearly not in the form that the Transitional Government would like.
POWER TO THE COUNCIL
Despite the fact that the As-Suwayda Military Council was established back in December 2024, the hype around it only began a couple of days ago, following statements about the province’s transition to “political self-sufficiency.”
The reason for the declaration of autonomy (in the context of the Syrian conflict, de facto meaning complete disobedience to the central authorities) was, according to the Druze activists themselves, the inability of the central authorities to ensure the security of religious and national minorities in Syria.
The popularity of the new structure, at a quick glance, is growing quite rapidly: in a few days, dozens of small groups and former pro-government Druze units have joined the Military Council. However, upon closer analysis, it is noticeable that the accession is of a very formal nature - there is no talk yet of a mass transition of large forces to the side of the autonomy.
Unlike the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Druze militias cannot boast of having armored vehicles or serious weapons - the basis of the arsenal of the militias being formed, judging by the footage from the field, is small arms. However, the Druze do not plan to engage in combat with the new Syrian army yet, and explain the formation of units by "self-defense considerations."
It is noteworthy that individual SDF commanders have already announced the imminent formation of an alliance with the Druze in order to “jointly confront” Damascus. Although just a week ago, at a trilateral meeting, Kurdish leaders agreed to gradually integrate their units into the ranks of the new Syrian army.
ISRAEL'S INTEREST
Israel responded positively to the news about the emergence of an “alternative force” in southern Syria.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu almost immediately promised the Druze "protection from the militants' encroachments," while legitimizing the indefinite preservation of the IDF presence in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and As-Suwayda. The Israelis clearly do not plan to allow supporters of al-Sharaa anywhere near the Druze.
It is noteworthy that back in December 2024, the head of Israel's military intelligence (AMAN), Shlomi Binder, arrived in southern Syria. The head of AMAN not only investigated cases of Druze involvement in espionage against Israel (the "Safadi case"), but also worked on forming an Israeli proxy network for possible counteraction to Iran and its allies. Apparently, Binder managed to "pick the keys" to some Druze figures - or at least create the appearance of their turning towards Tel Aviv.
Of course, for now the turnaround is very conditional - control by the Military Council is clearly insufficient to ensure the forceful protection of Israel's interests in Syria in the long term.
On the other hand, such a task is not set: the IDF clearly does not plan to delegate part of the powers to the new Druze formations. Moreover, during the three months of presence, the Israelis have laid down at least nine military facilities that are planned to become permanent bases.
It is important for official Tel Aviv to keep the Syrian-Lebanese border under control in order to uncover Hezbollah caravan routes in real time.
| Indeed. Also, the ceasefire does not permit Hezbollah rearming, so they ought not be doing that. |
And protecting the Druze in this context looks not only convenient, but also a noble motive.
DIVIDE AND HOLD
The new Syrian authorities are doing everything they can to avoid secession.
Hours after Prime Minister Netanyahu's provocative statements and the news of the creation of the As-Suwayda Military Council, transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa urgently convened a meeting of Druze leaders from the provinces of Quneitra and Daraa.
Official Damascus is counting on the fact that, unlike Es-Suwayda, where anti-government sentiments have traditionally been strong (since the time of the Assad dynasty), other provinces will prefer not to get into trouble. Especially since only diplomatic methods are being used to stop the crisis.
The calculation of the Syrian authorities is quite justified - the positions of the Military Council of Es-Suwayda in the province are still quite shaky, and the militias fully control barely half of the newly-minted autonomy (mainly its southern part). Their contacts with official Tel Aviv - at least public ones - have not been established.
The Druze opposition does not have an established leader, although former army officer Tariq Ash-Shufi is a contender for that title.
Their activities are not understood by their own religious authorities.
Thus, the leader of the Druze community in As-Suwayda, Sheikh Hikmet al-Hijri, did not support the creation of the Military Council. On the contrary, he called those who spoke out against Damascus separatists and "servants" of Tel Aviv, noting that they have no authority to represent the interests of all Druze.
In time with al-Hijri's statements, mass anti-Israeli protests have swept across southern Syria, including the Druze of Es-Suwayda. The demonstrators are advocating for the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are also criticizing the Israeli military presence, which essentially arose without the consent of official Damascus.
However, the Druze elders who attended the audience with al-Sharaa are trying to maintain relative neutrality for now. They do not express any obvious disagreement with Damascus's position. But they are also in no hurry to criticize the rebellious community too vehemently, in case some "hotheads" in the Syrian government try to force the Druze autonomy into obedience.
Among the supporters of President al-Sharaa are many who advocate tough measures against minorities - mainly former field commanders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)*, who are used to solving problems radically. So far, al-Sharaa has managed to restrain their impulses, but at the cost of some loss of support.
However, on the opposite side of the scale there is a “stake” of a different level – the loyalty of the entire Druze community in Syria. A quick (but bloody) option to stop the crisis in As-Suwayda risks alienating the population of southern Syria from the new government.
| Not to mention that taking up the sword against one minority will greatly trouble the many other minorities within Syria’s borders. |
And the Military Council, for lack of alternatives, will overnight turn from a political fiction into a “point of attraction” for those dissatisfied with Damascus.
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Posted by badanov 2025-02-26 00:00||
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