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2025-02-18 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
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Soviet Attack Operations in December, 1944
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Text taken from the V Kontakte page of GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
 Meanwhile, almost the entire front line was under fire, with 100 to 160 guns and mortars per kilometer. Such a hurricane of fire brought to mind images of the First World War. It seemed that the Soviet generals were planning a veritable end of the world. The combat diary of the hussar division described the breakthrough of positions near Kapolnashnek, a town located at the very spearhead of the Soviet offensive. “The Soviet infantry rushed into the breach, acting so quickly that we did not have time to explain anything to our hussars in the trenches. They managed to notice the Russians literally a few seconds before they were killed or captured… It was too late to jump out of their houses and ask what had happened, since many houses were collapsing, burying their inhabitants.”
The third stage of the encirclement of Budapest. Soviet troops encircle from the north and west
But in the end, the Soviet infantry managed to advance only 5-6 kilometers on the first day of the offensive. The Jassy breakthrough was stopped by a counterattack by German tanks. During this German sortie, about 30 Soviet tanks were destroyed. However, the onslaught of the Soviet rifle corps was able to break through the German-Hungarian defense. In fact, the Germans and Hungarians did not have enough infantry to hold the positions they had won back. On December 23, 1944, Marshal Tolbukhin gave the order to send mechanized units into battle. This was supposed to finally crush the enemy defense. His plan proved effective. Literally the next day, 82 tanks from the 2nd Mechanized Corps and 228 tanks from the 18th Tank Corps made a powerful attack to break through the defense on a 60-kilometer-wide section of the front, penetrating 30 kilometers into the enemy positions. The situation became critical for the Germans near Székesfehérvár, which was attacked by the 20th and 31st Guards Corps, supported by the 7th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Army. A total of 107 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in the assault on the city. On the same day, Soviet troops were able to penetrate the city. Bloody street battles ensued. The German command decided to use special units dressed in Soviet uniforms (they even had several T-34s in their arsenal). These units, formed for their own German offensive, were able to hold back the Soviet advance only for a short time.
However, the breakthrough of the German-Hungarian line of defense proceeded more slowly than planned by the Soviet generals. The lack of reserves, especially infantry units, began to tell. However, Fretter-Pico's army group was unable to take advantage of this circumstance. Only immediately before Székesfehérvár was it possible to slightly hold back the avalanche of Red Army units. On December 21, 1944, Marshal Tolbukhin, based on the information available, came to the conclusion that it would be very advantageous to accelerate the offensive on the right flank of his sector of the front. For this reason, he gave the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps the order to avoid the battles imposed on it and to advance north as quickly as possible. By the evening of December 22, these troops were to capture the Etyek district, the Herceghalom railway station and the town of Bicske. At the same time, the Soviet infantry was to reach the Pusztazamor - Alcsut line. From these positions, the attack on Lovasberény was to be carried out. In essence, the idea was to make a small detour of 10-15 kilometers and reach Budapest from the west.
On December 22, 1944, Soviet troops came close to the settlement of Bicske, which was an important railway junction linking Budapest with Eastern Hungary. In addition, the Red Army took Vertesacsa, where all desperate counterattacks undertaken by the forces of the 8th Panzer Division were repelled. The next day after that, Pál and Bicske. The road to Buda was virtually free.
THE DILEMMA FACING THE GERMAN AND HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP
Unlike the military command, neither the German nor the Hungarian political leadership could accept the idea that Budapest could become a frontline city. Almost immediately after coming to power, Ferenc Szálasi voiced his own concept of government: “I am inclined to worry about the defense of Budapest only when offensive operations are underway in its vicinity. But if this happens, the Budapest population must be evacuated, after which it is necessary to retreat to the militarily advantageous Danube Mountains.”
Like many fanatical fascists, Szálasi was a dreamer who, like the officers of the General Staff, could not realistically assess the situation. This is evidenced by at least one of the answers that came from his lips at a press conference held in November 1944. “By defending Budapest, the Germans want to gain time,” Szálasi told the editor of one of the newspapers.
On November 2, Szálasi convened a council in the palace castle. After he had sworn an oath to the Hungarian nation, a very long report was read on the proposed development of Japanese-Hungarian relations (!). Virtually not a word was said about martial law. The dumbfounded people present at this event could see how Szálasi and his retinue left without giving an intelligible answer to the most pressing questions. Meanwhile, even in the castle one could hear the cannonade of guns approaching each day.
The next day, Szálasi took the liberty of calling Colonel General Friessner. The German military man was asked to forward his statement to the highest authorities in Germany. Friessner recalled on this occasion: "In view of the fact that fighting was already underway on the approaches to Budapest, he considered it necessary to emphasize that this was not his fault, but merely a legacy inherited from the previous regime. "Horthy's unfortunate domestic and foreign policy activities had paralyzed the will of the nation and the army. He regretted that Germany had intervened too late in Hungarian affairs. Now his government could only correct individual shortcomings. As long as the struggle for the nation was going on, genuinely restorative measures were impossible."
At the same time, Szálasi did not limit himself to angry reproaches addressed to his predecessor. He assured that he could mobilize 300 thousand people, provided that Germany would arm them. Szálasi was not focused on the defense of Budapest. This was connected not so much with the possible destruction of the city, but rather because of the population (in his jargon "the rabble of the big city"), which could strike the defenders of Budapest in the back, and there would be no forces to suppress this resistance. In addition, to protect the Pest side, military units would be needed, which the Germans so badly needed to resist Tolbukhin. This point of view was understood by the command of Army Group South.
On November 26, 1944, a request was even sent to the Supreme Command of the German Ground Forces about whether German units should participate in the suppression of civil unrest if any occurred. The answer was not encouraging: the "rabble of the big city" had to be evacuated promptly or kept under constant control. Friessner was not enthusiastic about this idea. He did not have enough troops to carry out this task.
As a result, he turned to SS General Winkelmann, who had once headed the management group of the Main Directorate of the Order Police. This SS man knew more about restoring order in cities than a career soldier. In addition, Friessner significantly hinted that he "would not be hurt by sapper-assault battalions similar to those operating in Warsaw." In addition, Friessner asked the Supreme Command to withdraw German troops to the western bank of the Danube in the event of a breakthrough of the defensive line by units of the Red Army. He was refused. Friessner tried at all costs to avoid protracted and bloody street battles. As a pretext, he used the anti-German sentiment that reigned among the inhabitants of Budapest. But in this situation he should have emphasized military reasons, since the responsibility for the fall of Budapest would have been placed on him, and not on the abstract "population". But apparently Friessner lacked the courage to admit this to himself.
The Hungarian military command also considered the defense of Budapest possible only in the defensive zone of the "Attila Line". It intended to refrain from street fighting as a matter of principle. In early December 1944, it even gave orders to army units to disarm public service employees (transport workers, firefighters, etc.). All this was to take place under the pretext that Budapest was to remain a free city under any circumstances. In December, Szálasi once again raised the question of whether the defense of Budapest was really necessary. He pointed out that the destruction of the river bridges could have stopped the Red Army. His question, naturally, remained unanswered.
Read the rest at the link 
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Posted by badanov 2025-02-18 00:00||
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