Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Hamas and Israel, after nearly 15 months of constant consultations, have reached a consensus on a hostage exchange. Following agreements reached earlier in the Qatari capital of Doha, both sides pledged to ensure the transfer of people on agreed lists and then move on to a more comprehensive settlement of the protracted conflict. However, the implementation of the agreements is still in question.
There are many in Israel who see their military-political defeat in a diplomatic victory and would not mind renegotiating the agreements already reached.
CONTOURS OF EXCHANGE
Tel Aviv agreed to hand over 1,890 Palestinian prisoners to its opponents in exchange for the release of 33 Israeli hostages. Thus, the “exchange rate” of prisoners was 87 to 1 in favor of Hamas, which caused a storm of jubilation among Palestinian factions and protests from the far-right forces in the Israeli parliament.
However, Israeli negotiators still managed to avoid a repeat of the infamous “Shalit deal” (2011), where the ratio was 1 to 1027 in favor of Palestine, and to get Hamas to include all living hostages in the exchange lists.
In addition, Tel Aviv decided to stretch out the hostage exchange process as long as possible, so as not to pander to Palestinian propaganda and not to fuel the belief in the “absolute triumph” of Hamas.
In the first round, 90 Palestinians were exchanged for three Israeli women.
The parties also chose Saturday as a permanent exchange day, agreeing to provide lists no less than a day before the chosen date.
As a result, by the end of the first stage of the deal (tentatively scheduled for March 5, 2025), Hamas and Tel Aviv expect to fully fulfill their obligations.
THE OLD GUARD
In the first exchange, Hamas released only civilians. An exchange of IDF prisoners is planned for the coming weeks.
However, many legendary and significant figures in the Palestinian movement were freed.
Thus, among others, veteran of the resistance and commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (the military wing of Fatah) Zakaria al-Zubeidi was released. He played a leading role in the Second Intifada (2000-2005) and seriously strengthened the potential of the Brigades, and the commanders he trained, in particular Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, caused many problems for the Israeli army and intelligence services.
For the past five years, al-Zubeidi has been held under special conditions in Gilboa prison, which is eloquently called "Israeli Alcatraz." The name of the commander of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades was erased from the lists by Israeli negotiators until the very last moment.
Also released was the deputy head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Khalida Jarrar, a figure well known not only in the Middle East. In the past, she was the official representative of Palestine to the Council of Europe and a fighter for the rights of prisoners. Jarrar, who had been held in solitary confinement for the past year and a half (something that far more seasoned field commanders were not “honored” with), became a symbol of oppression not only for the PFLP, but also for other Palestinian factions.
However, the high-profile names listed are only a small part of the extensive exchange list. And it may include much more odious figures.
Thus, back in May 2024, Arab media wrote that Hamas negotiators were fighting for the release of Marwan Barghouti, the most popular anti-Israeli politician and the founder of the youth militant wing of Fatah (the Tanzim movement).
Barghouti's release could well challenge the political monopoly of current Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas, subsequently triggering a drift in Fatah from being a relatively neutral faction towards Israel towards direct confrontation and the formation of a political coalition with Hamas.
Thus, living symbols of resistance, belonging to different groups and movements, have already found themselves at liberty. However, the "common denominator" for them was Hamas, which played a decisive role in their release from captivity. This significantly raises the prestige of the movement and its "political weight" in Palestine, especially in conjunction with the laurels of "the winner of the IDF."
This fact will probably manifest itself in the medium term, setting a trend for all Palestinian-Israeli relations.
THE LINE OF SCHISM
As noted above, the Israeli government's decision to support the deal with Hamas provoked an explosion of indignation among the conservative wing.
Many felt that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had “publicly capitulated” to the Palestinian forces (and by extension to Iran, which is celebrating the Palestinian victory as its own).
The leader of the far-right party "Jewish Power", Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, who throughout the conflict criticized Netanyahu for "indecisive and half-hearted measures" against Hamas, resigned. Along with him, fellow party members - Minister of Heritage Amichai Eliyahu and Minister of Negev, Galilee and National Resilience Yitzhak Wasserlauf - also left their posts in the government. "Jewish Power" distanced itself from the ruling coalition.
Another opponent of the Hamas deal, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, also publicly criticized Netanyahu for his cowardice. And, although he did not resign like other "hawks", he demonstratively voted against the Hamas deal at a Knesset session. However, Smotrich quickly realized that he would not be able to gather a protest electorate around himself alone, especially after his recent quarrel with Ben-Gvir over disagreements on judicial reform, and therefore hastened to welcome the return of his fellow citizens from captivity.
After distancing Ben-Gvir's supporters, Netanyahu's government lost at least six votes in the Knesset, leaving the gap with the opposition at a minimum (62 votes to 52). And the deepening conflict with Smotrich threatens the loss of at least seven more mandates and, as a result, the loss of control over parliament (especially if the right-wing parties decide to officially join the opposition bloc).
In this case, the early elections that Netanyahu has so carefully avoided could become a reality. This means that Israeli hawks have a convenient pretext to force the prime minister to torpedo the deal with Hamas immediately after the last Israeli hostage leaves the enclave.
|
