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2024-12-10 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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Inside story: Hezbollah, Iran and the downfall of Assad
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[AMWAJ] The sudden downfall of Bashar Al-Assad has raised a number of questions about the thinking and roles of his supporters. First and foremost, Russia—the most powerful foreign ally of the Syrian government—played a pivotal role as events unfolded.
According to one high-ranking regional diplomatic source, Assad’s recent visit to Moscow was a turning point. While the Syrian leader was in Russia, forces led by the Sunni Islamist Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) unexpectedly seized Aleppo without a fight. Upon his return to Syria, Assad is said to have expressed anger toward his army. In private meetings, Amwaj.media has learned, he lambasted his commanders as corrupt and untrustworthy—describing his army as a collection of “thieves” who cannot be relied upon. While Assad’s Russian host and counterpart, Vladimir Putin, had promised assistance, the senior regional source suggested that this support was limited to ensuring a safe exit. Given that Assad and his wife are now apparently in Russia, this promise has been kept—at least for now.
The source also provided insights into earlier negotiations on Syria. Proposals for dialogue between the opposition and the government were discussed, with Turkey playing a significant role. Ankara reportedly instructed the opposition to act with restraint, and there was even coordination with the former Syrian prime minister to lead a transitional phase aimed at forming a new state. But none of these efforts really took off, partly due to the reticence of Assad to usher change. In parallel, informed sources in Tehran told Amwaj.media, the Turks allegedly blindsided both Iran and Russia by insisting that movement spotted among rebels in Idlib in recent months was nothing to worry about.
Then there is the role of Iran, the Assad family’s longstanding regional ally. Seeing an armed rebellion take shape amid the Arab Spring protests, the Islamic Republic dispatched its expeditionary Quds Force to save its Syrian partner with blood and great treasure.
Although the tide was turned against Sunni rebels and fighting frozen for the past four years, western sanctions gradually hollowed out the Syrian state. As the government in Damascus turned to large-scale drug trafficking to generate revenue, it became sorely apparent that only petrodollars and political pressure on western capitals from Gulf Arab states would enable a semblance of reconstruction. On this basis, Iran welcomed the pioneering decision by the Emiratis to reopen their embassy in Damascus in late 2018, ending seven years of estrangement. Facilitated by Abu Dhabi, Assad also gradually re-engaged with others who had backed the rebellion against his rule—including Saudi Arabia.
But things took a turn following the Oct. 7, 2023 Palestinian surprise attack on Israeli border communities. As Hezbollah immediately opened a “support front” against Israel following the eruption of the Gaza war, the Emiratis reportedly sought to prod Assad into standing on the sidelines. Barely a week later, the diplomatic mission of Yemen’s Ansarullah movement in Damascus was shuttered, ostensibly as a precondition for Assad’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. The distancing from Ansarullah, better known as the Houthis, was particularly pronounced as the group over the past year rose to become a key member of the Axis through its drone and missile attacks on Israel as well as disruption of shipping in the Red Sea.
Meanwhile, as Israel frontally assaulted the Iranian presence—taking out the Quds Force command that helped Assad cling to power, and even razing an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus—the Syrian government largely kept mum. The same lukewarm approach was apparent in the statement Assad issued following Israel’s killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s southern suburb earlier this year.
In other words, while Syria’s geography and official state ideology made it central to the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, Assad was apparently leveraging “non-resistance” to rehabilitate his standing among Arab allies of the US.
So when HTS rolled into Aleppo and Hama without a fight, Iran was in no rush to come to Assad’s aid. The senior regional diplomatic source explained that despite the Syrian government’s urgent request for Iranian support, logistical constraints and operational risks—including potential Israeli airstrikes—made such assistance impractical. This, according to the source, further highlighted Iran’s growing burden in the Syrian crisis, which was no longer tenable. If direct access was to be physically constrained by Israeli air power, mindful of repeated bombings of runways in both Aleppo and Damascus as well as threats against Iranian flights in recent weeks, it ultimately diminished the value of Syria as an ally.
In this context, the Quds Force is said to have established contact with HTS, securing assurances amid the collapse of the Syrian army that Shiite Muslims and Shiite shrines as well as the Iranian embassy would be left untouched. The extent of the involvement of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus in this initiative is unclear. Nonetheless, as Iran’s evacuated embassy was ransacked on Dec. 8, the state broadcaster in Tehran highlighted that the assailants were “not affiliated with the group in charge [of Syria],” alluding to HTS having kept its word.
The arc of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is long, but became particularly pronounced over the past decade. As the Syrian military was on the verge of defeat in 2013, the Lebanese movement and Iran were equally alarmed. Both saw the threat of Sunni militancy taking root across the region. Nasrallah and then-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani also passionately charged that Damascus was crucial to the wider “resistance” against Israel, convincing Iran’s leadership that full-scale intervention was a must.
So in the spring of 2013, Hezbollah fighters moved into Al-Qusayr. Situated southwest of Homs, a key node connecting Damascus with the Alawite coastal heartlands, the region was vital to rebel factions which had emerged amid the Arab Spring. Its location near the border with Lebanon allowed them to smuggle in fighters and weapons, putting up stiff resistance against forces loyal to Assad. The battle was bloody, claiming the lives of over 100 members of Iran’s foremost Arab ally. But in the end, Qusayr was returned to Assad’s control, and the battle was later—together with Russia’s military intervention in 2015—chronicled as the turning point in the war against Sunni militants.
A decade later, Qusayr once again held special symbolism as the Syrian army faltered in the face of the blitz led by HTS. With the fall of Aleppo and Hama within the span of days—and apparently without any real fight—Homs was in the spotlight. Without it, Assad would be left with only Damascus, cut off from the coast. Accounts of what happened next are conflicting. Initially, insiders charged that up to 2,000 members of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force were to be deployed for one last stand.
But Hezbollah’s deployment turned out to be far smaller, with commanders quickly concluding that a withdrawal was in order after an operational assessment, Amwaj.media has learned. Shortly afterwards, informed sources explained, a decision was made to evacuate the country through the same route that had been used to enter the Syrian conflict back in 2013. According to a source in the area, soon after the Hezbollah convoy—said to have been made up of dozens of vehicles—crossed the border towards the Hermel district in Lebanon, Israel struck. Hezbollah keeps casualty figures a secret, but the losses from the bombing are said to have been “big.”
| America supposedly went after the Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries coming over the border to aid Assad’s forces, and Israel got Hezbollah? Fascinating. |
Following the deadly debacle, a well-informed source in Lebanon told Amwaj.media that the decision to enter Homs and then withdraw was taken by a “Lebanese individual” and not upon an Iranian request or leadership decision. If accurate, this account of events raises concern that Hezbollah is no longer as disciplined as before. It also indicates troubling and potentially chaotic times ahead, as Iran and its allies struggle to adapt to a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.
Assad fell because “he wanted to prove to the west that he is not a warmonger,” an Iranian hardline lawmaker thundered as images emerged of HTS in control of Damascus. What this message may hold, and whether it will emerge as the dominant and coordinated approach of Tehran and allied capitals, remains to be seen.
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Posted by 3dc 2024-12-10 00:00||
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