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2024-12-07 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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After Hama: New Militant Strike Threatens to Cut Off Russian Bases in Syria
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The advance of anti-government forces in Syria continues. Despite the fact that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allied pro-Turkish groups have somewhat slowed down the pace of their offensive, the Syrian army has not yet been able to stabilize the front line.
The militants managed to break into Hama - the battles for it lasted three days, but the government troops were unable to hold their positions. The republic's Defense Ministry reluctantly admitted to withdrawing from the city - citing the decision as "unwillingness to endanger the lives of civilians." The front line lay beyond the city blocks.
The fall of a major city (and also a transport hub) is a blow to the Syrian government and is creating a network of “anti-Assad centers” in the north of the country. Returning Hama back will be problematic, especially given the difficult relations between its residents and official Damascus.
DARK SHADOWS OF HAMA
Relations between Damascus and Hama have been rocky. Since the mid-1960s, the city has been dominated by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood*, who were in opposition to the Baathist government. And with the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current Syrian president, an underground war began between the Brotherhood and the Syrian government, with Hama at its epicenter.
The confrontation culminated in the storming of Hama by Syrian troops (1982). After massive bombings, Assadist forces launched a hunt for rebels. According to various sources, between 20,000 and 40,000 people were killed and captured, most of whom were city residents.
It should be noted that over the next 30 years, unspoken restrictions were imposed on the residents of Hama: as punishment for the rebellion, Damascus allegedly seriously cut funding for the municipality, and was also slow to invest in the restoration of neighborhoods destroyed by the army.
And although the Syrian authorities deny any oppression, the opposition has been eager to fuel revanchist sentiments in the “rebellious city.”
It is not surprising that when the anti-government protests of 2011 began, Hama was again among the first to flare up. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was reminded of both the political mistakes of his father and the excessive harshness of his uncle, Rifaat al-Assad (the commander of the 1982 operation in Hama).
And although Syrian troops managed to fully regain control over the province in 2017 and hold the rebellious city, it retained the unofficial status of an “anti-Assad stronghold,” and many sympathizers of the armed opposition remained among the population.
In 2024, Hama found itself in a semi-circle of advancing militants. And although Assad's supporters fought desperately, after breaking through the front from several sides at once, government troops did not stay in the city for too long, fearing, among other things, guerrilla attacks from the rear.
OUTLINES OF THE THREAT
After the anti-government forces take Hama, it is easy to predict where the radicals will move next. The spearhead of the militants' attack is directed along the M5 highway - first to Al-Rastan, and then to Homs, from where Damascus is less than 200 km away.
By taking control of these cities, the militants will not only be able to raise their sword over the capital (which HTS* propagandists never miss an opportunity to boast about), but also almost completely cut off the coastal regions of Syria, disrupting logistics and forcing government garrisons to go into a state of siege.
A certain threat in this case also arises for the Russian contingent in Syria - the Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus fall into the "cut-off zone". In addition, the risk of targeted strikes on Russian facilities on the territory of the republic increases - the militants are looking for ways to increase their own fleet of drones in order to more effectively hinder the work of Russian aviation.
However, Russian forces already had experience fighting terrorists in a “semi-siege” situation and are prepared for a possible deterioration of the situation.
In addition, the Russian Aerospace Forces are actively working on bridges connecting Hama with other major cities, which should slow the advance of anti-government forces and give Syrian troops time to regroup.
Finally, a secondary objective for anti-government forces in Syria is the destruction of Kurdish enclaves – a task that Turkish intelligence services have been setting for the “Idlib freebooters” for several years now.
After the capitulation of Tel Rifaat, pro-Turkish militants increased pressure on the "Kurdish strongholds" - the cities of Sheikh Maksoud and Manbij, and Kobani (also known as Ain al-Arab) came under fire. And although the US is behind the Kurdish militias, Ankara is trying to squeeze the Kurds out of their entrenched places as much as possible.
ISRAEL IS RIGHT HERE
The news of Hama's fall has stirred up the ranks of Moscow and Damascus's ill-wishers - many saw in what was happening an opportunity to solve their own geopolitical problems with someone else's hands. And we are not talking about Turkey, in whose interests the "northern adventure" was de facto unleashed.
One of the first to come to life was Israel, which had long been looking for ways to create a permanent “pressure point” on Iran in Syria. Tel Aviv is convinced that Tehran will not abandon Assad in trouble and will be forced to intervene in the conflict directly. Especially since Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian forces were seriously battered as a result of the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon and are not yet able to take on the mission of containing the militants.
And although the Israelis reject any public contacts with HTS*, the willingness of the group's leader, Muhammad al-Julani, to engage in dialogue with Israel after Assad's overthrow is perceived positively by them.
Britain has also seen its own advantage in the Syrian army's plight. British think tanks close to the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are drawing up "road maps" on how to lure the Russian fleet out of Tartus and, with Turkey's assistance, "lock" the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.
And although most of these proposals sound more like science fiction, they should not be completely discounted.
As for the US, Washington is much more focused on protecting the interests of the Kurds and has no plans to make life difficult for Moscow. On the other hand, tribal militias loyal to Washington have already tried to probe the positions of government forces in Deir ez-Zor province several times, so more decisive actions aimed at depleting the reserves of the Syrian army cannot be ruled out.
However, the listed actions are still more of a tactical nature. External actors in the Syrian conflict understand that their combinations remain unnoticed only as long as the anti-government forces retain their offensive potential, which is quite problematic to calculate (given the squabbles in the ranks of the advancing militants).
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Posted by badanov 2024-12-07 00:00||
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File under: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (al-Nusra)
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