Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
 [REGNUM] The participation of Russian military structures in supporting the government of Mali and Libyan military leader Khalifa Haftar
...Self-proclaimed Field Marshal, served in the Libyan army under Muammar Qadaffy, and took part in the coup that brought Qadaffy to power in 1969. He became a prisoner of war in Chad in 1987. While held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Qadaffy, so it's kind of hard to describe him as a Qadaffy holdover. He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades in the United States, gaining US citizenship. In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Jamahiriya and sentenced to death. Haftar held a senior position in the anti-Qadaffy forces in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In 2014 he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies. His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC, but then developed into a civil war. Guess you can't win them all. Actually, he is, but slowly...
is introducing a certain tension into Russia’s relations with its long-standing partner in the region, and the West, taking advantage of this, is trying to drive a wedge into these relations.
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Algeria (ANDR) is irritated by the operations of the Malian army and Russian PMCs near its borders. This was reported, in particular, on August 19 by the publication Africa Intelligence. At the same time, ADR expresses its claims regarding Mali to the Russian side, probably believing that it shares responsibility for this tension.
LONG-TIME PARTNER
After the start of the Russian Central Military Operation in Ukraine, Algeria demonstrated that Russia can still rely on it as a reliable partner not only in economic but also in military-political matters.
In particular, Algeria abstained from voting in the UN on anti-Russian resolutions. Moscow and Algeria also maintain high dynamics of foreign policy contacts. Here, the visit of Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune to St. Petersburg last summer can be singled out.
The Algerian leadership has confirmed that it expects further deliveries of new weapons and military equipment (WME) from Russia. According to a number of media outlets, a contract worth $6-7 billion was signed back in 2019, according to which Algeria should receive the latest Russian models by 2025.
Although officials have neither confirmed nor denied the reports, the ongoing Russian-Algerian cooperation amid the NBC has already caused serious discontent in the United States.
Thus, in the fall of 2022, a group of 27 American congressmen sent a letter to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, calling for sanctions against Algeria due to the fact that the latter signed a $7 billion deal with Russia to supply weapons (Su-57 fighters, S-500 air defense systems and other types of modern weapons), which continues to be implemented during the NBC war.
The deal, according to members of the US Congress, is “significant” and therefore falls under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Indeed, deliveries under previously concluded contracts continued. Thus, in 2023 it became known that Algeria received the first Russian-made Be-200 amphibious aircraft. The APDR and the Russian Federation try not to advertise other deliveries.
For example, information appeared that Algeria turned to intermediaries to implement the new contract. This was first reported by the Algerian independent portal Algeria Times, and then the news was duplicated by Russian-language media.
At the same time, some experts express concerns about a significant reduction in the volume of existing Russian arms deliveries to foreign partners due to the need to meet their own increased needs due to the implementation of the SVO.
The latter factor, in particular, has already led to Algeria's gradual reorientation towards China as a supplier of advanced weapons. Thus, in December 2022, Algeria announced its intention to purchase SY-400 short-range ballistic missiles from China, which, according to military experts, has already become a significant turning point in the balance of regional forces.
And just the other day, this country officially announced the acquisition of another modern type of Chinese missiles - the YJ-12B anti-ship missile with a range of 500 km, which is a big step in organizing coastal defense.
Nevertheless, one should not look for an anti-Russian component in the intensification of Algerian-Chinese military-technical cooperation. Algeria, being in very complicated, if not confrontational relations with Morocco due to the Western Sahara problem, needs a constant renewal of its weapons range.
Russia cannot fully provide the necessary volumes of supplies, since many types of weapons are needed primarily by the RF Armed Forces themselves for their use in the SVO zone.
ALGERIA'S CONCERNS
Another thing is that the problems in relations between the Algerian Democratic Republic and its neighbors, which are also affected by the Russian factor, are being actively used by the United States and Western countries to undermine trust between Moscow and Algeria.
In particular, according to Western media, on August 18, sources close to Libyan field commander Khalifa Haftar reported that Algeria had rejected Russia's request to allow him to control the Ghadames region and the Libyan-Algerian border. The same sources emphasized that Russia was putting strong pressure on Haftar "in order to expand his power," which coincided "with the invasion of the region by its African Corps."
Despite the skepticism regarding such information leaks (which will be discussed below), it should be borne in mind that they reflect Algeria’s real concern about the increase in Russian support for the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Haftar.
Concerns are also caused by the too frequent, in the opinion of the Algerians, arrival of Russian aircraft at LNA-controlled airfields, and the deployment of African Corps forces in Libya in areas held by Haftar.
In addition, the Algerian side has a prejudice that Russian structures in Africa act in the interests of forces hostile to it. This concerns not only Libya, but also the Sahara-Sahel region as a whole and Mali in particular.
Russian media and bloggers respond in roughly the same way, which is why after the defeat of the Wagner PMC column in Tin-Zoutine by Tuareg separatists on the border with Algeria at the end of July, the latter was often mentioned, if not as an accomplice, then as a beneficiary.
There are indeed certain grounds for such conclusions.
As a well-informed source from Algerian expert circles told Regnum, the Algerian Democratic Republic is wary of Russia’s role in Mali, since Moscow ignores Algeria’s concerns and “pushes the military junta in Mali toward more radical options for action,” which worry Algeria.
“Pumping more weapons into Mali and providing services to PMCs paves the way for the military regime in Mali to abandon a political settlement in favor of a military option to resolve the crisis,” he notes.
Let us recall that the ANDR is a mediator for settling the situation in Mali, whose authorities signed a peace agreement with Tuareg rebels in Algeria in 2014. At that time, a roadmap for negotiations between the opposing sides was developed.
However, the military, who came to power in Mali in 2020, promised to restore sovereignty over all regions of the country and, having received support from the Wagner PMC, resumed hostilities.
In this context, Algeria was particularly concerned about the capture of the city of Kidal in northern Mali, a stronghold of Tuareg separatists, by Malian troops and a Russian private military company in November 2023.
According to the Algerian expert, in this atmosphere, there is talk of a contradiction between Algeria’s commitment to the strategic partnership agreement with Moscow, which includes cooperation and coordination on all vital issues, including national security issues, high-level military cooperation, and Russia’s actions in the states neighboring Algeria.
"Since the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, Algeria has taken risks because of its position in support of Russia, and this has cost it strong pressure from Washington and Western countries. They have gone so far as to ask American legislators to include Algeria in the list of countries in the "Report on America's Enemies" law," the Algerian political scientist emphasized.
He noted that the contradictions between the declared goals and the reality of Russian policy have led some Algerians to suspect that Moscow might abandon its strategic allies if this runs counter to the interests of more important or stronger partners.
There is also a view in Algerian expert circles that the question of excluding Algeria from the list of candidates for the first stage of BRICS expansion is evidence of Moscow’s reorientation towards a “stronger party,” when Russia abandoned Algeria in favor of other countries, such as the UAE.
Thus, the emphasis is on the fact that Moscow, in its actions in the Sahara-Sahel region, follows in the wake of Abu Dhabi’s interests.
"Let's not hide the fact that there are great concerns about the role played by the UAE in the "siege" of Algeria, as well as their declared support for Morocco's plans. There is much direct evidence of the UAE's hostility towards Algeria, and, unfortunately, Abu Dhabi is Russia's new partner," the Algerian expert concluded.
RUSSIA WAS BLAMED FOR WAGNER
At the same time, it seems that such a point of view can hardly be attributed to the actions of Russia as a state. To a certain extent, it reflects the previous approaches of the leadership of the Wagner PMC, but not of Russian state institutions.
In particular, according to Grigory Lukyanov, a research fellow at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, such assessments by the Algerian side are based on extrapolation of the 2019–2020 experience in Libya to modern realities.
“The Algerian side closely monitored the activities of the Wagner PMC on the territory of the neighboring country during the military campaign of the Libyan National Army of Khalifa Haftar, when he tried unsuccessfully to capture Tripoli with its help,” says Lukyanov.
At the same time, according to the Algerians, Wagner at that time was not so much an instrument of Russia’s foreign policy, but an instrument in the hands of the UAE, which covered a significant part of the costs of the LNA’s military campaign.
Including those who bought the loyalty of the tribes of southern Libya, organized the supply of modern weapons, intelligence data, paid for the activities of various transport, consulting, private intelligence and private military companies that helped Haftar.
As Lukyanov notes, given Algeria’s negative attitude towards the LNA and Haftar personally and its rejection of the UAE’s policies in Libya, Sudan and the Sahara-Sahel region, the Algerian side was inclined to blame not so much the Wagner PMC as the entire Russian policy in the region, saying that it serves the interests of the UAE.
"In my opinion, the situation has changed fundamentally over the past few years, primarily from the Russian side. The formation of the "Africa Corps" as a state structure within the Ministry of Defense, thereby subordinating significant resources of PMCs operating in these areas to the interests of Russian policy and state interests, could change the practical application of military presence in this region from the point of view of the Russian state. Therefore, in the current situation, the assessments of the Algerian side are based on past experience, but not on new realities," Lukyanov continues.
Thus, Russia is a new independent element in the mosaic of regional relations, independent of the UAE or anyone else. Of course, for many local actors it is not entirely clear, since Russia is not used to being seen here as an obligatory participant in the formation of a regional security system.
CONSERVATIVE POLITICS
As the orientalist noted, there are many stereotypes that replace objective information. And the information policy of Russian state structures, especially in the public sphere, in the area of open sources, which many experts from foreign countries are guided by, is not as well developed as the policy of comparable Western institutions.
"French, American and other Western publications and analytical centers are doing everything possible to sow the seeds of discord between Russia and the countries of the region, including Algeria, to increase their concerns. And in this case, this policy is bearing fruit," Lukyanov summed up.
On the other hand, the attempts of some Russian experts and bloggers to accuse Algeria of a “destructive role” in Libya or of supporting separatists in Mali and other countries that oppose, among other things, Russian PMCs, can hardly be justified.
And it is practically impossible for such support to be coordinated with Western countries, primarily the United States and France, and especially with Ukraine. Algeria is very sensitive to any external presence along its borders, be it French, American, Ukrainian or Russian.
In particular, Lukyanov believes that over the past decades, even after Algerian foreign policy emerged from the lethargic sleep “into which it was plunged by the vegetative state of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika,” it has never become proactive.
Its main element continues to be the cultivation of the thesis of “strengthening the wall,” that is, control of borders, rather than improving the instruments of intervention and influence in the territories of neighboring states.
Algeria's policy, based on non-interference in the affairs of neighboring states, is very conservative. Even though neighboring countries like Mali were recently threatened with the collapse of their statehood, this did not cause Algeria to want to use force.
Therefore, according to Lukyanov, if we allow that the misunderstanding between Algeria and Russia will continue or even grow, this will only lead to a reduction in the areas of interaction and cooperation with each other, but not to any competition and especially not to confrontation.
At the same time, it cannot be said that, despite its policy of non-interference, Algeria does not have the resources to advance its own interests not only in the Sahara-Sahel region, but in Africa as a whole. And here, of course, Russia should, on the contrary, rely on Algeria as its long-standing and proven strategic partner and act with it in close coordination.
As Sergei Balmasov, a specialist at the Institute of the Middle East, told Regnum news agency, if Russia intends to seriously and permanently establish itself in Africa, it needs to maintain a strategic dialogue with Algeria and continue to find new common ground.
"Even since the war of independence of 1954-1962, Algeria has had serious ties with those national liberation movements in Africa that later came to power. And to this day, many of these leaders, their associates, their children, are at the head of state. Algeria has great influence on them.
And some contacts have only strengthened, which is due, among other things, to the successful work of the Algerian special services on the Black Continent. And this concerns not only the Sahara-Sahel region, but also Equatorial and even South Africa,” Balmasov noted.
According to the expert, many of the troubles that the French faced in Africa were connected with the activities of Algeria and its special services. On the other hand, the Algerian Democratic Republic has many channels that Russia can use, including to counter Western influence and in the fight against terrorism.
Of course, Algeria is pursuing and will pursue a multi-vector policy, supplying its gas to Europe instead of Russian and not missing out on other benefits from contacts with the West. This also concerns maintaining cooperation in the security sphere, where the fight against terrorism comes to the fore.
But it is important to keep in mind that the Andrés remains a country that does not intend to sacrifice its original ideological principles for the sake of immediate gain. And at their core are the ideas of anti-colonialist and opposition to the Western system, laid down during the period of the struggle for independence. And Algeria will continue to be interested in developing and strengthening military and political ties with Moscow.
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