Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Since the outbreak of the major crisis in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, Iranian threats against Israel have become much more frequent, mostly echoing news of another attack by Israeli “leader hunters.”
In less than a year, Israel has eliminated at least 20 members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” led by Tehran (with Tel Aviv officially claiming responsibility for only 14 people).
The others spontaneously evaporated, I suppose. | These were mainly mid-level commanders, but there were also some fairly important figures among them, such as, for example, the creator of the Lebanese Hezbollah missile program, Fuad Shukr.
Tehran has been making threats but has not been particularly keen on escalation.
However, after the assassination of the head of the Hamas Politburo, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran, the matter took a fundamentally different turn. The death of a high-ranking guest and comrade in the "Axis of Resistance", who also arrived for the inauguration of the Iranian president, was very painfully received by Iranians, who were accustomed to seeing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a "shield and sword" in the fight against the Israeli threat.
DELAYED RESPONSE
Haniyeh, at a very inconvenient time for the new Iranian government, has joined the list of “significant victims” of the Iranian-Israeli asymmetric conflict, joining the ranks of the founder of the “Axis of Resistance” Qasem Soleimani and nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who is considered the “father of the Iranian nuclear program.”
And although Israel never took responsibility for the liquidation of Haniyeh, the "handwriting" of the assassination attempt was quite clear. To ignore such an action would be to give tacit consent to the Israelis to carry out even more daring attacks.
At the same time, Iran, although promising, is in no hurry to strike back. And there are several reasons for this.
The first (and most obvious) is the need to “build up strength” before launching. Despite the significant stockpiles of weapons both among the Iranians and their proxy groups, every attack that claims the status of “revenge” requires careful preparation.
Thus, if Tehran prepared for Operation Martyr Soleimani (2020) for five days, it took almost two weeks to prepare for Operation True Promise (2024), which was a response to the Israeli airstrike on the consulate in Damascus.
Given that with each new operation Iran seeks to surpass the cumulative effect of previous actions, preparation of a “retaliatory move” for the recent incidents in Tehran and Beirut may take several more weeks.
At the same time, it is not at all necessary that Tehran will remain silent all this time - “harassing strikes” from the Lebanese Hezbollah and Yemeni Houthis, as well as the “Islamic Resistance of Iraq” may well accompany preparations for more serious steps.
This is quite consistent with the US State Department's statements that Iran will strike Israel within the next 48 hours.
The second reason is the desire to stretch the action for as long as possible and thereby maximize its final effect. For example, Tehran, until the end of 2023, made references to Operation Martyr Soleimani when conducting actions against Israel, thereby emphasizing the systematic and inseparable nature of its struggle.
It is quite possible that the Iranian leadership is initially considering the possibility of launching strikes in “waves,” alternating the resources of the main proxy groups.
A certain role in Tehran’s strategy is also played by the reluctance to disrupt the negotiation process on Gaza. The implementation of the “Peace Plan” proposed by the Joe Biden administration, although not fully in line with Iranian interests, underlines the readiness of the Iranian influence network to stay within the mainstream of a diplomatic settlement.
While Israel, with its desire to torpedo the deal, is, on the contrary, increasingly perceived as a “political bully.” And this directly affects the willingness of the world community to stand up for it in the event of a large-scale conflict.
Finally, a direct clash between Israel and Iran would immediately untie the hands of Tehran's opponents and allow them to accuse it of aggression. Given that the Iranian leadership is aiming for a gradual easing of tensions with the West, no one wants to give their opponents an extra trump card.
DIVIDE AND RULE
For now, Tehran is betting on maintaining the “Middle East suspense” for as long as possible, while simultaneously ratcheting up the rhetoric and promising crushing blows not only to Israeli territory, but also to the targets of its neighbors and partners.
The frequency of warning statements from Tehran has increased in the last 24 hours, including in light of rumors circulating in the region's media about an Israeli preemptive strike on Iranian territory, allegedly sanctioned by the White House.
The ultimate goal of the manipulations is to destroy the anti-Iranian “anti-missile coalition” (which the US is hastily assembling) before it is fully formed.
Moreover, most of Israel's potential defenders have already experienced the power of Tehran's counter-actions in one way or another. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remember them especially well, for whom the confrontation with the Houthis resulted in multi-billion dollar losses.
To some extent, Iran’s “public intimidation” tactics are even bearing fruit. For example, Egypt has neatly deflected the US call to “jointly protect” Israeli airspace from possible attacks. Cairo, which takes Tehran’s threats very seriously, has chosen not to disrupt the already difficult diplomatic settlement between the two countries and has distanced itself from the conflict.
Israel's second "old ally," Jordan, is also in question. Even if Amman does take part in protecting Israeli territory from shelling, it will seek to downplay its own contribution so as not to aggravate the royal house's relations with the large Palestinian community.
It is much more likely that the main burden of "cleansing" Israeli airspace will ultimately be taken on by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, relying on the military infrastructure that was created in these countries with the participation of Washington. The international coalition, whose forces are concentrated in the Red Sea, will also join the process.
In fact, the emerging defense model is entirely based on the experience of responding to Operation True Promise and does not assume that Tehran, in avenging Haniyeh, will deviate too much from its previous tactics.
And although the parties to the conflict continue to boast of their combined military might and readiness for any development of events, everyone would prefer that the next round of escalation between Iran and Israel occur within the framework of a given scenario and not push the region towards a major conflict.
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