Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has expressed his readiness to take steps to improve relations between Syria and Turkey amid the Arab Republic's overall efforts to achieve regional reconciliation with its neighbors. The move has not gone unnoticed in Ankara. Assad "confirmed Syria's openness to all initiatives" to restore relations between Ankara and Damascus "based on Syria's sovereignty, its territorial integrity, the fight against terrorism and terrorist organizations," according to a statement published on the Syrian president's website. A message addressed to the Turkish leadership was also conveyed to the Russian special representative for Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev.
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It also noted that Syria welcomes all initiatives for reconciliation with Turkey, but stressed that “the success of any initiative must be based on respect” for the country’s sovereignty and stability.
ERDOGAN READY FOR RECONCILIATION
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was quick to respond to his Syrian counterpart in absentia: “There is no reason not to establish [diplomatic relations]. We will act together in developing relations with Syria, just as we acted together in the past. We can never have a problem or a goal to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs.”
Earlier, in November 2022, the Turkish President stated that he considered a meeting with Assad possible after the severance of diplomatic relations with Damascus, which has continued throughout the 13-year civil war in the SAR, which has not yet been formally concluded.
At the same time, Ankara back in 2016 refused to support efforts to change power in Syria, focusing exclusively on the fight against militants of the Kurdish left-wing radical formations of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Since then, all clashes with Syrian government forces from Turkey have been reactive rather than proactive, as was the case during Operation Idlib Dawn in 2019–2020.
However, the process of Turkish-Syrian normalization, launched at the same time with the direct participation of the Russian side, led to only limited results.
THE FATE OF THE "ROAD MAP"
In December 2022, Moscow hosted a meeting between the then defense ministers and intelligence chiefs of Syria, Ali Mahmoud Abbas and Rafik Shahadah, and Turkey, Hulusi Akar and Hakan Fidan. The talks were also attended by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. This was the first official contact between representatives of Turkey and Syria in more than ten years.
And already in April 2023, the defense ministers of Syria, Russia, Iran and Turkey gathered again in the Russian capital, where they discussed, among other things, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territories, which became a stumbling block in the further negotiation process.
Although already in May 2023, the heads of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov, Iran Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Syria Faisal Mikdad and Turkey Mevlut Cavusoglu held another round of talks in Moscow, the issue of the withdrawal of Turkish troops became the topic that prevented progress in other areas.
At this meeting, unsuccessful attempts were made to agree on a roadmap for normalizing relations between Ankara and Damascus and the overall situation in Syria.
But the roadmap has not yet been adopted, and the main reason is that Damascus has called the complete withdrawal of Turkish armed forces from Syrian territory a precondition for any reciprocal steps. It is not known whether Assad is now ready to abandon this demand and discuss the issue directly in negotiations with Erdogan.
Turkey does not consider its presence in Syria illegal, citing the Astana agreements on the creation of Russian, Iranian and Turkish observation posts along the perimeter of the de-escalation zone in Idlib, which, according to the Turks, were recognized by Damascus itself.
The Syrian position on the eve of the presidential elections in Turkey added fuel to the fire, when Assad rejected Turkish initiatives for a possible meeting at the level of heads of state. He made it clear that he did not expect to see Erdogan as president for another term, but would be ready to deal with the opposition. Erdogan, contrary to Assad's expectations, won the elections.
"Ankara and Damascus still have quite a lot of disagreements. In addition, Erdogan remembers very well how, before the presidential elections that were most important for him, Damascus effectively disrupted the negotiations and rejected the Turkish proposal," Anton Mardasov, an expert in the field of security in the Middle East and Africa, told Regnum.
THE KURDISH FACTOR
Nevertheless, the political situation developing around Syria could contribute to reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus.
“There is one factor that can soften Turkey’s negotiating position and can also give Syria the opportunity to intensify trade through opposition territories with Turkey in a difficult economic situation,” Mardasov notes.
The issue is the factor of the American military presence and the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which, with the support of US occupation forces, exercise control over the northeast of the country.
Their attempts to hold another election in the region to legitimize their power over these territories are met with strong opposition in both Ankara and Damascus. In Turkey, they are considered a branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is recognized as a terrorist organization there, and in Syria, they are separatists.
In particular, Hakan Fidan last Monday also called for coordination and integration between the Syrian government and the armed opposition allied with Turkey to combat “PKK terrorism” in northeast Syria, which refers to the SDF.
During a live broadcast on Turkish television, Fidan said: “We believe that a more stable Syria, integrated with its government and opposition, will be a more effective player in the fight against PKK terrorism.”
He also praised the absence of war between Syrian government forces and Turkish-backed armed opposition groups, also known as the Syrian National Army (SNA).
“The most important thing that the Russian and our sides have achieved in relation to Syria is that the war between the regime and the opposition is not continuing at the present time,” he said.
According to Mardasov, it is also beneficial for Damascus to put pressure on the SDF in order to try to regain control of the territories and oil and gas regions. And it is this aspect that is important for understanding the background of the negotiation process between Ankara and Damascus.
In fact, Fidan’s wishes for the government and opposition to unite their efforts to counter the SDS do not seem so far-fetched.
Russian and Turkish military and diplomats have already discussed possible ways to integrate pro-Turkish SNA formations into the government army. The last time was in 2019.
Then a project of the so-called "6th Corps" of the Syrian army appeared, which was to include SNA units. However, not only Assad, but also opposition groups rejected this scheme. But now it will be possible to return to it again, naturally, having secured Russian interests in this process.
In fact, the four-way cooperation between Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria in northeastern Syria is the very same “nightmare” of Western analysts:
"There will come a time when an agreement will eventually be reached between the main guarantors in Syria. As normalization continues, I see the main opposition (SNA) being integrated under Turkish leadership back into the fold of the regime as part of some final deal.
Turkey prioritizes the war against the SDF over any hostility towards the regime. It hopes to create a four-way front (Turkey, Russia, Syria and Iran) to fight the territory controlled by the SDF. However, due to the US presence in northeast Syria, this is difficult,” commented on Fidan’s statement on his social network Australian and South African analyst Anthony Avis du Busson, who collaborates with leading European and Israeli publications.
BAGHDAD IN THE GAME
Many experts are inclined to view the current stage of normalization between Ankara and Damascus with cautious optimism, since a new important player has emerged that can complement Russia's efforts to reconcile Assad and Erdogan. We are talking about Iraq.
In particular, at the very end of May, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani told the private Turkish television channel Haberturk TV that his government was working on reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus.
"God willing, we will soon see some steps in this direction," Sudani said, adding that he was in contact with both Assad and Erdogan to discuss efforts to reconcile them.
Iraq has already helped in implementing the agreement on normalizing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the necessary mediation experience is available.
Then, in the run-up to a landmark agreement to resume diplomatic relations between the two regional powers in 2023, with China's active participation, Baghdad hosted a series of talks between Riyadh and Tehran.
It is also important to note that numerous Iraqi forces that are now part of the country's security forces supported the Syrian government in the civil war, and many of them are still in Syria.
Sudani, who was also the first Iraqi prime minister to visit Syria in 13 years, was able to raise Iraq's relations with Turkey to a new qualitative level, which not so long ago seemed difficult to achieve. This happened during Erdogan's first visit to Baghdad in 12 years.
During the meetings, it was agreed to create a Turkish-Iraqi Operational Center to combat militants of the PKK, which is banned in Turkey. Now, there may be talk of gradually involving Syria in this initiative.
In addition, the Turkish-Iraqi transport corridor project “Road of Development” from Turkey to the Persian Gulf via Iraq could be extended to northeastern Syria after it is cleared of pro-American SDF formations.
At present, despite the restrictions, Turkish goods continue to go to Syria, and Syrian goods to Turkey. Therefore, Syria’s interest in using the opportunities of transport corridors from Turkey to partially bypass sanctions is obvious.
“Ankara and Damascus are trying to show respect for Iraq’s attempts to play mediator, and so they are officially declaring their readiness to negotiate again,” notes Anton Mardasov.
At the same time, according to the expert, in order to bring this process to its logical conclusion, numerous obstacles must be overcome.
FROM FRIENDSHIP TO HATRED
As often happens in the East, deep personal hostility sometimes outweighs pragmatism and is capable of spoiling any positive background of interstate relations. In fact, this is a serious obstacle to Turkish-Syrian normalization.
Erdogan has repeatedly called Assad a "butcher" and a "murderer." Assad himself considers Turkey, led by Erdogan, an aggressor country that occupies Syrian territory and is a "sponsor of terrorism."
Paradoxically, the personal hostility between the leaders of the two countries arose precisely because of their previous rather close relations, which could even be called friendly. At that time, the leaders of the two countries made private visits to each other with their spouses.
Turkish-Syrian relations in the 2000s were the most successful example of Ankara's policy known as "zero problems with neighbors." And even after the start of the Syrian revolution, Erdogan continued to take a favorable position toward Assad.
Turkey did not immediately rush to provide assistance to the Syrian opposition, unlike, for example, Saudi Arabia and a number of other Arab states.
In the first months of the Syrian conflict, Erdogan's government actively pursued shuttle diplomacy, which involved regular trips by Turkish officials to Damascus for consultations and to find ways out of the crisis, and distanced itself from direct support for opponents of the Syrian government.
Ankara tried to persuade Damascus to carry out reforms, repeal emergency laws, release political prisoners and allow political parties to operate.
Naturally, Erdogan also expected that his mediation efforts would pay off in full and, in addition to maintaining good relations with Assad, he would be able to achieve legalization of the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization recognized as terrorist and banned in the Russian Federation), which he considered his political allies, in the SAR. In this way, Turkey would further strengthen its influence in Syria.
By June 2011, according to some reports, Assad had verbally agreed to the reform plan proposed by the Turkish side and even allowed for the possibility of the return of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members to the country, but without granting them the right to create a political party.
However, he soon denied his agreement with these proposals. This dealt a severe blow to the pride of Erdogan, who believed that he could be the one to resolve the Syrian crisis and stop the bloodshed in the country.
Finally, another Turkish settlement plan, which was personally brought to Damascus on August 9, 2011 by the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, was rejected by Assad. He refused to allow some representatives of the Syrian opposition, including representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, to take power.
That was when the final break between Turkey and Syria occurred, and Erdogan began to perceive Assad as his enemy.
The point of no return can be considered the destruction by Syrian air defense of a Turkish RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft with two pilots in June 2012, which, according to the Syrians, violated their airspace.
This event was preceded by a series of border incidents since the end of 2011. After which Ankara stepped up military aid to the Syrian opposition, which Assad perceived as a betrayal.
Therefore, whether the leaders of the two countries will be able to shake hands, if not in Moscow, then in Baghdad, still remains a big question.
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