Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Text taken from a V Kontakte post by Great France, based on material by A. Vinogradov
On September 1, 1939, speaking at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Mussolini announced the forthcoming decision to declare Italy a "non-belligerent party" that was not going to "take any initiative whatsoever in opening hostilities." He motivated such a step by "persistent concern for the proper provision and protection of national interests" and "Germany's failure to fulfill its allied obligations."
According to D. Grandi, the then Minister of Justice, “confusion and anxiety, bitterness and disappointment, mixed with anger and irritation, showed through in every ... word and gesture” of the Duce. This "confusion of the soul" was also stated by Ciano, to whom Mussolini spoke on September 4 about "the desirability of an early attack against Yugoslavia in order to seize the Romanian oil fields." Through Prince K. Aldobrandini, who was a member of Pius XII's circle of associates,
The status of a "non-combatant" soon began to weigh Mussolini: publicly praising the "lightning and unparalleled brilliant victories of German weapons", he secretly envied Hitler, dreaming of his own triumphant blitzkrieg. Already at the end of January 1940, the Duce explained to Ciano that the further preservation of neutrality would certainly be fraught with "the inevitable pushing of Italy into the class" B "of the European powers." But the Savoy dynasty, the financial and industrial oligarchy, the largest agrarians, the commanding elite of the country's armed forces held the opposite point of view, believing that it was better to stay away from the war as long as possible.
The top hierarchs of the Fascist Party, who went behind the scenes in the frontiers of the Fascist Party, E. De Bono, C.-M. de Vecchi, D. Grandi, D. Bottai, I. Balbo. The latter has repeatedly stated almost openly, that an alliance with Hitler means "cleaning Germany's boots". However, all these figures since May 1939 preferred the line of "passive resistance", not advertising their enthusiasm for the alliance with Berlin, but not objecting to it either.
The Duce, willy-nilly, had to reckon at first with the “neutralist” views of King Victor Emmanuel III, who did not tolerate the Germans and was inclined to active behind-the-scenes searches for an agreement with the Western powers, primarily with Great Britain. The text of his telegram sent to Mussolini on September 17, 1939, revealed these moods of the monarch: “Now, after the liquidation of Poland, I express the hope that you will be able to negotiate through diplomatic channels and if the British, despite the sinking of their merchant ships, will agree on them, it will be possible, perhaps, to achieve some constructive solution.
By the end of the winter of 1939/1940. The Duce realized that his hopes of convening a "new Munich", where he would play the role of first violin, would not come true. At the same time, he seemed to believe without hesitation in the imminent and inevitable victory of his partner in the Axis, telling Ciano at the end of February 1940: “In Italy there are still fools and criminals who believe that Germany will be defeated. And I tell you that Germany will win.” This conviction was strengthened after the meeting with Hitler on March 18, 1940 at the Brenner Pass, which to a large extent influenced Mussolini's decision to enter the war.
During the conversation, the Duce repeated to the Fuhrer three times that "now we are ready to march towards victory together with you", emphasizing that "the government and the party now unanimously agree on the impossibility of remaining neutral, even for a short time." Mussolini told Hitler that Italy's entry into the war would "probably happen, perhaps in June or perhaps in August." Not the last role was played by the tough position of the Fuhrer, who explained to his ally that “he [Hitler] is absolutely sure of the inseparability of the future destinies of Germany and Italy, since the victory of Germany will mean the victory of Italy, and the defeat of Germany will immediately entail the instant end of the Italian empire.” Hitler thus made it clear to Mussolini that they were “tied with one rope” and thereby warned Italy against repeating the “variant of 1915”, which was memorable for Germany.
The Brenner meeting put an end to G. Ciano, D. Grandi, D. Bottai's still undisturbed calculations of reaching an agreement with the West, using the mediation mission of US Deputy Secretary of State S. Welles, who visited Rome, Berlin, in February-March 1940, Paris and London. In Italy (he visited there at the end of February and in the second half of March), the personal representative of the American president had conversations with Ciano and was twice received by Mussolini, to whom he hinted at the benefits that awaited Italy if she remained neutral. The promises of the White House, however, did not have the desired impact on the Duce. Then F. D. Roosevelt took a decisive step, sending him on May 27, 1940, a personal urgent message through the US Ambassador in Rome, W. Philipps.
The fate of this document was fatally affected, however, by an accidental combination of circumstances. The fact is that Welles, in a confidential conversation with British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain, described the Duce as “a tired and degraded, uncouth and vindictive village peasant,” which he did not fail to inform his ambassador to Italy, P. Loren. This secret telegram was intercepted and deciphered by Italian military intelligence.
As a result, the enraged Mussolini categorically refused W. Philipps an audience and the message fell into the hands of his son-in-law. In particular, it said: “President Roosevelt invites the Duce to immediately inform him of all the wishes and requests of Italy, which he is ready to immediately bring to the attention of the French and British governments. Whatever the nature of a possible future agreement, concluded on the basis of these Italian proposals, President Roosevelt promises to vigorously petition England and France for a firm commitment to keep it in force until the end of the war, while guaranteeing Italy participation in the post-war peace conference on equal terms with the belligerents. All that is required of Italy is to give clear assurances that it will not further unduly increase its claims, as well as it will unfailingly maintain its neutrality throughout the conflict.
But the Duce has already “bitten the bit.” Ciano noted in his diary: “You need something completely different, unimaginable, to dissuade Mussolini. In essence, the problem is not at all that he wants to achieve this or that, but that he longs for war. If he could peacefully have even twice what he demands now, he would reject it.”
As early as March 31, 1940, in a secret memorandum addressed to Victor Emmanuel III, Mussolini, bluntly speaking about the "inevitability" of Italy's entry into the war, emphasized that "we are talking about an independent and parallel war to that waged by Germany, and pursuing the goal: freedom on the seas and a window on the ocean ... Therefore, the question is not to decide whether or not to enter the war, but only to determine when and how to do it in the best possible way, postponing our entry to the latest possible date into the war also because Italy is absolutely unable to afford a long war, in other words, she cannot spend hundreds of billions.
However, the capture of Denmark and Norway by the Nazis in April 1940 prompted the Duce to force things. On April 11, in the presence of Ciano, he dropped the historic phrase: “It is humiliating to sit back while others are making history. To make a people great, you must send them into battle even with kicks in the ass, which I will do. To the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General F. Rossi, who dared to recall the low level of combat readiness of the army, Mussolini said: “If I had to wait until the army was completely ready, then I would have to enter the war in a few years, while I must join immediately."
The belligerents - both the Western allies and Germany - did not at all rule out the possibility of Italy's participation in the war and took this into account in their plans. During the Brenner meeting, Hitler informed Mussolini that the Wehrmacht High Command, in developing the upcoming operations on the Western Front, proceeded from the fact that Italian troops would conduct active military operations against the French in the Alps and in Savoy. The French Military Committee, having considered the probable actions of the Allies against Italy, recognized on May 6, 1940, the most expedient to confine itself to defense in the Alps, Tunisia and other African possessions. By agreement with the British General Staff, it was also supposed to hold key positions in the Mediterranean and disrupt the sea communications of Italy, exposing its coast to heavy shelling from ships and air bombardments,
On May 10, 1940, at 5 o'clock in the morning, the German ambassador in Rome, N. G. Mackensen, informed Mussolini that the troops of the Third Reich had launched an offensive in Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg an hour ago. Duce commented on this: "The Allies lost the campaign ... In a month I will declare war on them." Nevertheless, Italy continued to adhere to the wait-and-see tactics for the time being. And only at a closed meeting on May 29, chaired by Mussolini, which was attended by Crown Prince Umberto, Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces P. Badoglio, chiefs of the main headquarters of all three types of armed forces - General M. Roatta (land army), General D. Prikolo (Air Force) and Admiral D. Cavagnari (Navy), its members set a date for entry into the war - immediately after June 5.
In Berlin, this decision was received without much enthusiasm. Hitler and his inner circle were aware that it was dictated solely by political considerations - the Duce, fearing to be late for the division of the "French pie", wanted to get what was due to him, and, as he believed, legally, a large piece. Mussolini frankly revealed to P. Badoglio, who was trying in vain to delay, at least until the end of June, the country's entry into the war, the true motives for his decision: “The war will be short, and I need to have only a few thousand dead to sit down at the negotiating table conference among the other winners. To match his prime minister and "dear cousin", Victor Emmanuel III unexpectedly demonstrated fighting ardor, usually extremely indecisive and doubtful.
By June 10, Italy had concentrated Army Group West against France under Crown Prince Umberto. It consisted of the 4th Army, which occupied the northern sector of the front - from Monterosa to Montgranero, and the 1st Army, stationed south - from Montgranero to the sea. The group consisted of 22 divisions (12,500 officers and non-commissioned officers, 300,000 soldiers), it was armed with about 3,000 guns and over 3,000 mortars. She was opposed by the French Army of the Alps - only six divisions (175,000 people). The terrain along the Italo-French border is such that the valleys parallel to it served as excellent natural trenches for the French, who skillfully equipped them in terms of engineering, fortification and fire. And the Italian General Staff, judging by its behavior, intended to storm this powerful barrier head-on.
Although the Italian army was still very far from the final completion of the training of the first echelon troops, Mussolini ordered an offensive along the entire front on June 18, when the defeat of France by the Wehrmacht was already a fact. The Duce himself, accompanied by Ciano, flew to Munich at the invitation of Hitler to discuss the terms of the truce requested by the Vichy government on 17 June. As is clear from the memorandum of the Italian Foreign Ministry, handed to Ciano Ribbentrop, Italy was going to present France with a large bill. She claimed French territory up to the Rhone River, including the cities of Lyon, Valence, Avignon, expected to get Corsica, the French colonies of Tunisia, Djibouti and Ojali, naval bases in Algiers and Morocco (Algiers, Oran, Mers-el-Kebir, Casablanca ), insisted on the transfer to her of 40-45% of the French military and merchant fleet, military aviation,
But the Fuhrer besieged his partner, referring to "the political inexpediency of presenting unnecessary demands to France, since it is much more profitable for the Axis powers at the moment to preserve the existence of the French government, which not only has sovereignty, albeit limited in some way, but still, but is also ready to cooperation". Ribbentrop also allowed himself to rebuke Ciano: "You can't have your eyes bigger than your stomach, you have to show moderation." Frustrated, Mussolini reluctantly agreed to Hitler's proposal to postpone the satisfaction of Italian territorial and colonial claims, as well as the problems of future indemnities and reparations from France, until peace negotiations.
June 20 Mussolini returned to Rome, where he was waiting for another "surprise". His favorite offspring of the OVRA - the secret fascist political police - intercepted and recorded a telephone conversation that took place on June 19, 1940 between the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General M. Roatta and General P. Pintor, who commanded the 1st Italian Army in the Alps. The latter, not embarrassed in abusive language against the king, Mussolini and Badoglio, reported to his boss that "the troops entrusted to him are absolutely unable to attack, since they have not yet reached the appropriate level of combat readiness."
This news stunned the Duce, who, pouring out his soul to his son-in-law, exclaimed in his hearts: “And this is happening now, after nine months of waiting and taking into account the hopeless conditions in which the French are now! And if we had entered the war in September [1939], what would have happened?!”
In an effort to somehow "save face", the Duce ordered Badoglio and Prince Umberto to attack the enemy at all costs on June 20-21. However, the desperate attempts of the Italian troops to storm the "Alpine Line" failed. The French troops fiercely resisted, and the only thing that the Duce's army managed to achieve was to move deep into foreign territory in the Menton region by only 1 kilometer. Mussolini, however, counted on the landing of a large landing of Alpine paratrooper shooters in Lyon in order to occupy this city on June 22, but the final act of the French drama confused his last cards.
On June 22, 1940, representatives of the French and German high command signed a ceasefire agreement. A day later, on June 23, the Germans, who felt themselves masters of the situation, showed their allies the courtesy of flying a French delegation to Rome, authorized to negotiate surrender. Realizing the meagerness of their "successes" in the war, the Italian side considered it good to be satisfied with the occupation of French territory with an area of 832 km² with a population of 28,000 people. Under the terms of the armistice signed on June 24, France undertook to create a 50 kms wide demilitarized zone along the Italian-French border, as well as to demilitarize the naval ports of Toulon, Ajaccio, Bizerte, Oran and some areas in Algeria, Tunisia and on the coast of French Somalia.
For all the time of the fighting, the Italian army lost 631 killed, 616 missing and about 3,700 people wounded, frostbitten and captured. The total losses of the French did not exceed 410 soldiers and officers.
Based on materials: A. Vinogradov. Italy's entry into World War II. "Questions of History", No. 10 (31), 1992.
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