[American Greatness] Ukraine’s vaunted counteroffensive is not going well. In the months leading up to its launch, proponents said it would be "decisive." Former American general David Petraeus predicted "the Ukrainians [would] achieve significant breakthroughs and accomplish much more than most analysts are predicting." But, instead, the front lines have barely budged, and Ukraine has lost enormous numbers of men and equipment.
This debacle provides important lessons for the United States and students of warfare more generally.
NATO DOCTRINE RUNS INTO REALITY
Ukraine is using new tactics, equipment, and operational plans for its shock brigades after months of intensive training by NATO. NATO built these units in its own image, prioritizing offense, maneuver, and combined arms tactics.
Unfortunately, what looks good on paper does not always work in the field.
Extensive minefields, drone-sighted artillery, and entrenched defenders mean Ukrainian forces can barely advance into "no man’s land." They are being stopped at the skirmish line and have gotten nowhere close to the second and third echelons of Russian defenders. Dozens of Leopard II tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles—NATO’s state-of-the-art land warfare equipment—have been blown up and set on fire by mines, kamikaze drones, and artillery during the stalled offensive.
In spite of much bragging in recent months about its superior training, equipment, and operational art, the NATO-trained brigades have not performed particularly well. Well-choreographed combined arms tactics were supposed to provide a significant advantage, but they neglected mine-clearance and air defense. Thus, Russian attack helicopters have had a field day blowing up Ukrainian armor at leisure. Judging by the barely avoided friendly-fire incident shown here, the Ukrainians are not maneuvering their equipment with a lot of panache, even when they’re not under helicopter attack. A lot is going wrong.
While NATO devoted a lot of energy and money to training, it has little recent experience with this kind of warfare. NATO training was based on an elaborate theory of how conventional wars would go, but experience is necessary to refine and modify such doctrines. It is telling that the one brigade making any significant advances during the counteroffensive was not one of the new ones, but rather one made up of veteran Ukrainian soldiers using ex-Soviet equipment.
Finally, as with the initial stages of the Russian invasion, the Ukrainians have neglected the principle of mass. Their brigades are advancing here and there, but the only way something could conceivably be achieved is by massing a dozen or more brigades in a narrow and vulnerable part of the front.
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