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2022-11-23 Afghanistan
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The Afghan National Resistance Front Outlines Its Strategy: Implications For US Foreign Policy
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 Key paragraphs: [EurasiaReview] On November 15, 2022, the Foreign Policy Research Institute conducted an in-person and Zoom event titled, "The Future of Resistance® in Afghanistan," with Ali M. Nazary, the head of foreign relations for the National Resistance® Front (NRF). Nazary, an articulate front man for the NRF and the anti-Taliban
...mindless ferocity in a turban...
cause in Afghanistan, presented one of the most comprehensive briefings to a general American audience to date of the NRF’s goals and strategy. This short essay will provide a brief description of those goals and strategy and assess what this may mean for U.S. foreign policy.
According to Nazary, the NRF is fighting for a democratic, decentralized Afghanistan with equal rights for all citizens, including gender equality. To achieve this goal, NRF guerrilla forces are conducting a classic Maoist insurgency that is in the first stage of gathering strength in the countryside while exhausting its enemy. The NRF hopes to move soon to the next stage of the insurgency by liberating select regions of the country, which would allow them to gain the resources for the final stage of fighting large-scale battles to overthrow Taliban rule.
Continued from Page 4
Nazary characterized the Taliban as being riven by factionalism based on conflicts over resources and tribal differences. Most interesting were his comments on the relationship between the Taliban and the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
. According to him, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) terrorist group in Afghanistan has itself splintered into several smaller groups, some of whom have established good relations with the Haqqani Network. Islamic State members who have fled Syria and Iraq for Afghanistan do not have the same animosity towards the Taliban as some ISKP groups. Reportedly, the Taliban used some Islamic State emigres to conduct assassinations of rival Taliban members and suppress the Hazara
 ...a grouping of Dari-speaking people of Sino-Tibetan descent inhabiting Afghanistan and Pakistain. They are predominantly Shia Moslems and not particularly warlike, which makes them favored targets...
rebellion in Sar-e Pul Province in August. (However,
by candlelight every wench is handsome...
other reporting indicates that a bloody internecine war between the Taliban and ISKP continues, especially in eastern Afghanistan). Characterizing the NRF as still fighting the Global War on Terror by opposing the Taliban and their terrorist allies, Nazary presented the NRF as the only democratic force that can be relied on as a counterterrorism ally in Afghanistan. He alluded that the United States may wish to use the NRF to fight terrorist groups in Afghanistan as it used Kurdish forces to fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Nazary’s comments on the NRF’s vision for the political future of Afghanistan unambiguously emphasized the need for a decentralized governmental system that devolved power to the provinces and districts. According to him, Afghanistan’s cycle of violence for over five decades has been the result of the centralization of power in Kabul and in one man, be that man a monarch, communist general secretary, or president. When asked how exactly decentralization could be implemented, he suggested that this would be left up to the people via a referendum. Upon further questioning, Nazary denied that decentralization was a step towards partitioning Afghanistan between the ethnic minority groups in the north and the Pashtun tribes in the south, saying that Afghanistan had not reached that stage "yet" and should not pursue that option until other options such as federation (a union of partially self-governing states where the central government has ultimate authority), or confederation (a union of fully self-governing states where the central government has only the authority they allow it), are tried.
However,
by candlelight every wench is handsome...
the NRF goal of a decentralized Afghan state will likely lead to either a confederation that maintains Afghanistan’s current territorial integrity or a partition that will end it. Decentralization is antithetical to a strong federal system where the provinces and districts can be subordinate to decisions from Kabul. Therefore, under the logic of decentralization, a confederation is the best option for maintaining a united Afghanistan with the ethnic minorities, who make up approximately 40 percent of Afghanistan’s population, controlling their areas and the majority Pashtuns controlling the rest of the country. The best scenario for the NRF would be a parallel Pashtun uprising that replaces the Taliban and joins them in confederation, possibly with regional capitals in Mazar-e Sharif and Qandahar, and with an incompetent oligarchy
... derived from the Greek words oligos, a few and the verb archo, to rule, to govern, to command . Oligarchies are invariably effectual rather than established, to whit, they disguise themselves as other systems, working as the real government behind the face of of democracy, fascism, socialism, monarchy, or what have you...
of braggarts, crooks, and flim-flam men in Kabul to conduct foreign relations while the two halves of the country establish their own political, social, and security systems.
However,
by candlelight every wench is handsome...
a confederated Afghanistan is unlikely because the Taliban would never agree to it voluntarily and it would take a complete victory over the Taliban, as happened in November—December 2001, to impose such a system on the Taliban. Even in the fall of 2001, Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance units never advanced far into predominantly Pashtun areas. The defeat of the Taliban in these areas was achieved through a combination of anti-Taliban Pashtun tribal forces supported by American advisors on the ground and copious amounts of air support. The NRF likely realizes that such a combination is unlikely to reoccur and that they alone cannot defeat the Taliban throughout Afghanistan without a parallel anti-Taliban Pashtun insurgency. Therefore, the strong emphasis on decentralization by an official NRF front man seems to indicate that the NRF aims to only defeat the Taliban in majority-Tajik and other ethnic minority areas of northern Afghanistan. With the Taliban maintaining control in southern and eastern Afghanistan and little hope of political compromise between the two parties, this makes partition the most likely end result of a successful military campaign by the NRF and other anti-Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan.
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR US FOREIGN POLICY?
The partition of Afghanistan goes against a general principle of opposing separatism. Since many of the world’s states are multiethnic, separatism writ large can create a slippery slope of undermining the territorial integrity of states and therefore the international order. However,
by candlelight every wench is handsome...
the results of separatism have been accepted as de jure by the United States and the international community numerous times in the past several decades with the fall of the Soviet Union, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the velvet divorce of Czechoslovakia, and the separation of South Sudan from Sudan and East Timor from Indonesia. It is currently recognized de facto in Libya and Somalia, which are divided into two or even three separate independently functioning regions or ministates.
If the NRF or a broader resistance organization defeats the Taliban in the predominantly minority areas of northern Afghanistan and forms a functioning civil government accepted by the various ethnic groups there, would the United States be willing to recognize a partitioned Afghanistan? One argument is that this would be bad for the principle of the territorial integrity of states but good for US counterterrorism objectives. An Afghanistan partitioned along generally north-south lines would deny international and regional terrorist groups access to the borders of the Central Asian states, which those governments would welcome because it would severely decrease the threat of terrorism and internal unrest. It would provide the United States with greater opportunities to develop the intelligence and infrastructure to disrupt terrorist operations in the Taliban portion of Afghanistan. A pluralistic northern Afghanistan could also serve as an alternate example for those Taliban-controlled areas and a refuge for those fleeing Taliban misrule, further undermining the Taliban regime.
About the author: Philip Wasielewski is a 2022 Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
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Posted by trailing wife 2022-11-23 01:16||
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