Article

2022-07-19 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:

His interview questions are in bold typeface.
[ColonelCassad] Just now I answered questions during the NWO for the military commissar Kotenok's channel.

About the course of the NWO

After Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the headquarters of the groupings, the RF Armed Forces intensified strikes against the Armed Forces of Ukraine and enemy infrastructure. Is the "operational pause" over or never happened?

- The operation, in fact, did not stop. The regrouping of troops or the withdrawal of individual formations for rest does not mean that offensive operations or missile strikes against enemy troops and infrastructure have ceased.

In the last week, we have seen how the focus of strikes has shifted to the destruction of concentrations of troops and equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the destruction of artillery missile systems, which can be interpreted as a "softening" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass before the upcoming offensive operations on the Seversk-Soledar line and in the Artemovsk region, as well as increasing efforts to move into the Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration.

- The pace of progress towards Slavyansk slowed down. What is it connected with?

- The main efforts are now concentrated on breaking through the Seversk-Soledar front in order to provide access to Artemovsk from the north and to Slavyansk from the east. The group advancing on Slavyansk from the northwest is obviously in the phase of replenishment and regrouping after the past battles in the area of the Valley, Bogorodichny and Svyatogorsk. The terrain and large forest areas to the north-west of the city, as well as the line of the Seversky Donets covering Slavyansk from the north, make the offensive difficult.

- The DPR announced the semi-encirclement of Avdievka. When can we expect the blockade of Donetsk to be lifted? What factors facilitate and, conversely, inhibit the process?

- Avdievka is well supplied through Orlovka, and the Avdievka-Konstantinovka highway could not be used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine before after they were kicked out of Novobakhmutovka and Novoselka-2.

The assault on Avdievka from Kamenka and the industrial zone at this stage does not promise quick results, so here and in the future we will observe a positional front and intensive work of artillery and MLRS from both sides. The main problem is that the entire Advievka and the adjacent territories have been turned into a solid fortification, a frontal assault on which, for military reasons, is inexpedient.

- The announced counter-offensive of Kyiv still does not begin. Where to wait for the activation of the enemy? What are the manpower reserves of the regime, taking into account the heavy losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass?

- The most probable directions of the enemy's offensive are Krivoy Rog, Nikopol and Zaporozhye (in the direction of Vasilyevka, Tokmak and Pologa).

The ongoing capture of random citizens on the streets, as well as mass cases of desertion from the front, indicate that the declared 1 million people in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is a purely propaganda figure. In fact, the total number of people under arms is significantly less.

Nevertheless, work is underway not only to plug holes in the front with poorly trained cannon fodder, but also to prepare more well-coordinated brigades that can be concentrated for an offensive in one of the indicated directions.

Potential forces that are desirable for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for some serious actions - from 5-7 armored personnel carriers to 80-100 guns, MLRS and heavy mortars + several aircraft and helicopters. In addition to the actual organization of such a grouping, an equally important problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is the problem of secretive concentration of these troops in order to avoid strikes by the RF Armed Forces even before advancing to the lines of attack.

The experience of failed offensives in the area of Gulyaipol and Davydov Brod has shown that the RF Armed Forces have the ability to stop enemy activity with concentrated artillery and air strikes.

- Following the "holy javelin" in Ukraine, the "holy haymars" has already been invented. Attacks on warehouses, headquarters and communications of the Allied Forces are not weakening. What does the tactics look like using the MLRS and OTRK supplied to Kyiv in targeting objects and overcoming air defense? Is there an antidote for the wunderwaffe?

- The United States operates within the framework of the concept of network-centric warfare, hoping to slow down the intensity of their fire impact on the Armed Forces of Ukraine and reduce their offensive potential by strikes against the command and logistics structure of the RF Armed Forces and the armies of the LDNR. The APU here is only performers and a screen. Target designation data is provided by American technical intelligence, as well as agents of the SBU on the ground.

Countermeasures - tracking down and destroying complexes (one has already been destroyed, so that with proper work they are destroyed in the same way as the S-300 complexes, Tochka-U OTRK and Uragan MLRS), as well as the active use of the dispersal of fuel and lubricant depots and ammunition to reduce the effectiveness of such strikes.

The same applies to the issue of protecting command infrastructure facilities. In general, it is necessary to adapt to this tactics of the enemy, since he, obviously, will adhere to it further.

- Are we ready to drag out the conflict in Ukraine and, in fact, does Russia have options other than victory?

- It is quite obvious that the Russian Federation has long been acting within the framework of the concept of a long-term conflict in the framework of the “Syrianization” of the war in Ukraine. The official position on achieving all the goals set by the NWO has not changed since February.

Specific terms, as before, are not indicated - the need for long-term work to achieve the stated goals has already been completely reconciled, and a number of processes to increase the grouping of troops in Ukraine and changes in the military-industrial complex also indicate preparations for a long confrontation with the United States and NATO in Ukraine.

Of course, Russia will strive only for victory, which will not only guarantee its sovereignty, but also provide advantageous positions in the formation of a new world order. In this case, the victory will write off all costs. The absence of a positive result in Ukraine will, in turn, have severe domestic political consequences for the country. This, in fact, is what the United States is betting on, dragging out the war in Ukraine in every possible way and raising the degree of escalation.

- How adequate are the statements that the collective West is running out of stocks of weapons and ammunition for deliveries to Ukraine?

- Supply problems are more of a logistical and production nature. In the long run, with the active production of the necessary range of weapons, they are quite solvable for the US and NATO.

This seems to be a less significant problem for the US than the economic and political costs of the sanctions war against Russia. In the first case, the consequences are exclusively military and Ukraine bears the costs. In the second case, the costs hit directly those establishment groups that unleashed the war.

- When will the Polish factor "shoot" in the Ukrainian theater of operations and how is this connected with the situation on the border with Belarus, Kaliningrad and the Baltic states?

- According to the data of the SVR, Poland has not abandoned its plans to occupy Western Ukraine and continues to actively build up its military capabilities by increasing the size of the army (the plans for increasing it increased to 400,000 people) and re-equipping with American weapons.
The build-up of Poland's military capabilities creates additional challenges for the Russian grouping in Kaliningrad and complicates the configuration of any conflict around the "Polish Corridor" in the event of a cessation of transit to Kaliningrad.

Poland in the current realities is a long-term threat to Russia, in the same sense in which the “Remediation regime” in Poland was a threat to the USSR from 1922 to 1939. In those years, the Polish General Staff directly pointed out that "the dismemberment of Russia lies at the heart of Polish policy in the East." Now the goals of Poland are exactly the same. The revival of the Eastern European hyena in the same role is another consequence of the criminal actions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which we will have to deal with in the coming years and decades.

Posted by badanov 2022-07-19 05:07|| || Front Page|| [5 views ] Top

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