Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
Russian military journalist Boris Rozhn discusses the latest in Syria.
[ColonelCassad] 1. On the eve of the talks between Putin and Erdogan in Sochi, the Russian Aerospace Forces intensified airstrikes in Idlib and northeastern Latakia (killing several dozen militants). Turkey responded by increasing its contingent in Idlib, deploying several mechanized companies to reinforce strongholds reinforcing the front line south of the M-4 highway (Jabal al-Zawiya area) and to the front along the M-5 highway.
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At that time, Assad was deploying units of the Tiger Forces and the 4th Panzer Division to the north, which had previously been sent south to suppress the rebellion of former militants in the province of Deraa (the rebellion was relatively peacefully suppressed with the assistance of Russian negotiators, who persuaded the militants to stop armed resistance to Damascus.
2. At the meeting between Putin and Erdogan, where the Idlib issue was discussed, there were no official statements on this matter. After negotiations, some Turkish officials began to state that the parties agreed to maintain the status quo in Idlib. At the same time, within the framework of the Moscow edition of the Sochi deal from March 2020, Turkey has still not fulfilled its obligation to unblock the M-4 highway for free travel between Latakia and Aleppo.
The same story was with the M-5 highway, which was taken away from Erdogan by force as a result of the SAA offensive in the winter of 2020 with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which resulted in a fleeting campaign against the Turkish army, which, like the Syrian army, also suffered serious losses in people and equipment (during the battles for Saraqib and as a result of the destruction of a mechanized company in Jabal al-Zawiya)
Since then, Despite the air strikes of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the front line in Idlib has not fundamentally changed in fact for 1.5 years. And in general, despite the fact that hostilities continue, we have not seen major operations in Syria for 1.5 years. Basically, the usual CTOs, attacks by the Russian Aerospace Forces, the fuss of the Kurds with the Turks in the north and the ISIS attacks.
Compared to the previous intensity of the war in Syria, it is almost routine (this is to the question of how the situation in Syria has changed after the start of the Russian operation, the 6th anniversary of which was recently celebrated).
3. Somewhat earlier, the negotiations between Putin and Erdogan, Turkish wishlist were voiced in pro-Turkish sources - Ankara allegedly would not mind surrendering Assad Jabal al-Zawiya, the M-4 highway (together with Arikha and Jisr al-Shugur) and another piece of Idlib in in exchange for the fact that the Russian Federation will close its eyes to another Turkish operation against the Kurds, so that the Turkish army could capture Kobani and a piece of the territory around Manbij, as well as Tal Rifat, actually connecting a piece with Afrin and Jarablus with an occupied piece of territory near Ras al-Ain ...
In general, the Turks probed the possibility of another deal at the expense of the Kurds, as was the case with Afrin and the operation in Rojava. In this regard, Turkey constantly insists that Russia and Turkey have a common interest in squeezing the American occupation contingent from northeastern Rojava and weakening the factor of Kurdish separatism, threatening Turkey and Syria. The Afghan story of the US flight from Kabul also transparently hints that with proper preparation, the US flight from the region can be accelerated (as Iran does in Iraq, constantly attacking American assets in this country with its proxies).
4. At the same time, Moscow is actively trying to seat Assad and Erdogan at the same table so that they agree on the normalization of relations (as is now happening in relations between Assad and the Jordanian king, who has resumed air traffic with Syria and simplifies the border regime).
But Erdogan does not want to give in, limiting himself to behind-the-scenes contacts with Assad through the special services, which periodically meet to discuss the current situation (the last such meeting was recently held in Baghdad). Erdogan also evades the Russian proposal to limit himself in Syrian affairs to the Adan Pact, that is, the opportunity agreed with Syria to officially act in the border zone against the Kurds, that is, to reduce the occupation zone to the borders of the Adan Pact. Turkey clearly does not want to do this, as it expects to bargain for the occupied territories for something more substantial.
5. After negotiations between Putin and Erdogan, there were reports that Turkey was allegedly withdrawing troops from Idlib. In fact, parts of the reinforcement were withdrawn to the north of the province and to Turkey, which were transferred to Idlib before the negotiations, the contingent that was already deployed there did not decrease at all, and given that not everyone is withdrawing, it rather even strengthened.
The Russian Aerospace Forces continued to strike south of the M-4 highway under the groans of the militants, which makes Turkey turn a blind eye to the fact that Russia is killing them. But Turkey has repeatedly shown that for her this public is a consumable and, if necessary, Ankara very easily turns a blind eye to the fact that Russia is killing dozens of Erdogan's minions. At official meetings, they still smile sweetly and shake hands.
6. Regarding a possible deal on M-4, Erdogan is unlikely to give it away for free, bargaining to the last for other benefits both in Syria and in Libya, where they write about an agreement to reduce the presence of PMCs of the Russian Federation and Turkey in this country (there were reports of the withdrawal of the Wagners from Al-Jufra and the departure of some part of the Sadat PMC from Libya, but so far more in words.
Erdogan and Putin), we can see a full-fledged military operation of the SAA with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces (and possibly Iranian proxies) south of the M-4 highway with access to this highway on a wide front with its subsequent unblocking. But this is only if there is an agreement.then the Turks will continue to sit in Idlib, and the Russian Aerospace Forces will continue to routinely roll the Giulani gang, along the way testing new weapons on them.
7. So far, from the hints that the operation is possible, we can note the transfer of Syrian troops (already mentioned 4th Armor Division, "Tiger Forces", additional NDF militias, 16th brigade, etc.), continuing air strikes of the Aerospace Forces RF in the area of the potential offensive zone, very high UAV activity (in addition, according to the Giulani militants, the other day an unknown kamikaze drone killed 4 militants), Lavrov's statements that "terrorism in Idlib must be destroyed once and for all" (at the meeting with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Lavrov once again stressed that "in some areas of Idlib, the terrorist threat is especially strong", "it is necessary to fulfill the agreements of Putin and Erdogan" and "divide moderate militants and terrorists from HTS," the statements of the Syrians, that it will take them 2 months to clear Idlib by military means (taking into account the presence of Turkey, a rather optimistic assessment, but the Syrians are now generally quite optimistic after Assad's visit to Moscow and the pacification of Deraa), etc.
Turkey is still busy strengthening its chain of strongholds, but it is worth remembering that in the case of the M-5 highway, they did not help at all, the SAA, when attacking, simply bypassed them and left them in the rear, after which, after months, the Turks gradually closed and withdrawn troops to the north.
By themselves, they are not an insurmountable obstacle, unless, of course, they are hollowed out purposefully, which Syria and the Russian Federation will try to avoid if it comes to an offensive. The trigger for the offensive can be the shelling of Khmeimim or drone raids on the Russian base, which will become a formal occasion. But again, if Moscow agreed to postpone the Idlib issue not in the medium term, then the operation south of M-4 will also be postponed.
From my subjective point of view, there is no question of whether the operation will take place in Idlib or not. The only question is when exactly it will be.
Sooner or later, it will be carried out. From my point of view, the sooner, the better, but it is quite clear that in the equation of relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey, there is not only Syria, therefore no one will beat the pots with Ankara for the sake of Idlib alone, at least for now.
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