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[Regnum] The Japanese command, having received the news of the death of Adm. Makarov, decided to begin the landing on the Liaodong Peninsula, the victory at Turenchen - the first test of strength in a clash with the European army - strengthened the belief in success.
The planned transportation of the 2nd army regiment General Yasukata Oku - from Hiroshima to Liaodong - demanded to use up to 80 transports. They followed in groups of 4-5 pennants under the cover of military vessels. On April 20 (May 3), 1904, the Japanese admiral again tried to block the exit from Port Arthur Bay with transports.
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This time, 10 steamers were used for the attack, but it was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the passage by sea took place. On April 23 (May 6), 1904, the Oku army began landing at Biziwo, approximately 60 km from Dalniy. The arrival of 33 transports with an assault force and the ships of the navy covering them to the shores of Liaodong had been noticed by observation posts the day before.
The Russian navy did nothing to stop the Japanese. For a long time Russian General Kuropatkin did not have accurate information about what happened, there was no information about the composition of the landing, and when the landing was confirmed, he considered it a demonstration until April 29 (May 12). By May 13, 3 divisions with artillery had already landed on the shore. This landing was supposed to ensure the taking under control of Dalny with its prepared port, safer, calm waters for navigation, and longer daylight hours. and when the landing was confirmed, he considered it a demonstration until April 29 (May 12).
The Japanese army was eager to fight. Her warriors dreamed of paying off for the forced renunciation of the conditions of the Shimonoseki peace. Oku was given the task of interrupting the railway connection between Port Arthur and Liaoyang, which he managed to do a few days later without much difficulty. On May 3 (16), his advance detachment of 16 battalions collided with three East Siberian rifle regiments, as a result of which they were forced to retreat to the gate to the Kwantung Peninsula - the Jin-chou isthmus. After that, turning its rear to the Manchurian army, the 2nd Army moved there.
The isthmus was located approximately 60 miles from Port Arthur and 20 from Dalny. Its width was three versts and two versts of shallows on each flank. At low tide, the shallows doubled - from four to eight versts. In front of the position, located on the dominant heights, lay the city of Jinzhou, surrounded by a wall of 3.5 versts. The positions were located at the top of slopes sloping to the north, which abruptly dropped off to the south. The valley over five versts in length was perfectly visible from the peaks, and only a city with a population of 25,000 was the only obstacle to shelling. Its fortifications were in the form of a square with four gates facing south, north, west and east.
The Russian fortifications on the isthmus, built in 1900, were not maintained in order and fell into disrepair. The powder magazines were flooded with water, the ditches were filled up, the ramparts collapsed.
This happened, despite the order of Kuropatkin, who visited them during a trip to the Far East, to keep the fortifications in order and make them permanent. The reason was the lack of funds. Even in 1903, instead of the necessary 19,000 rubles, only 5,000 were allocated for this purpose. Therefore, by the beginning of the war, there were abandoned trenches, several batteries, of which only two had dugouts covered with two rolls of poles with a small dusting of earth.
Admiral Makarov, who stopped here on his way to Port Arthur, also drew special attention to the need to strengthen the isthmus. Again, the fortifications on the isthmus were taken up only with the beginning of hostilities. It was not possible to complete the work by the time the Japanese troops landed.
Ten machine guns were also installed in the positions. Head of the Kwantung Fortified Region, General A.M.Stessel allocated for the defense of the isthmus and the city one 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment - 3,500 men under the command of the regiment. N.A. Tretyakova.
On May 12 (25), the Jinzhou positions were attacked by the Oku army - 35,000 men, 198 field guns, 48 machine guns supported by 3 gunboats that fired at the Russian positions from the side of the bay. The fortifications could not withstand the fire of the ship's guns. The positions were 3,800 people, 57 fortress guns and 10 machine guns. Behind them with a reserve of 13,700 people. was the head of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, General - L. A. V. von Fock. For some time the Russian defense was supported with fire from the gunboat "Bobr". It was a very significant support, because the fire of the Russian batteries was generally suppressed by 11 am. The Japanese were advancing regardless of the high losses. Numerical superiority - 23 to 1 in manpower and 2.5 to 1 in artillery - allowed Oku to go for it.
The situation was dire, but the Japanese attacks were repulsed with huge losses. They resumed the next day. Not receiving support from Stoessel, who had more than 40,000 men under his command, or from Fock, who was in the rear and called him a coward, Tretyakov was forced to retreat.
The retreat began at dusk, under the cover of the remaining volunteers. Panic could not be avoided in the darkness. Shouts of "Japanese cavalry!" The total losses of Siberian riflemen in the defense amounted to 450 people, while the regiment retreated, another 650 people were lost. (Tretyakov himself believed that the regiment had lost 1,500 riflemen and 75 officers) The losses of the Japanese reached 739 killed and 5,459 people. wounded. All positional artillery was abandoned. Some of the guns were blown up, locks were removed from almost all of them.
The Japanese army suffered unprecedented losses, but the victory allowed it to enter the Kwantung Peninsula. The enemy did not pursue the Russians, but the state of the retreating ruled out the possibility of defense at intermediate positions. The units mixed and fired at each other several times in the dark by mistake. The news of such a quick abandonment of Jinzhou was unexpected, and the order to evacuate Dalny that followed on the evening of May 13 (26) was sudden.
No one was going to defend the city, they resigned themselves to its inevitable loss. Unfortunately, it was not possible to organize the withdrawal correctly. Some of the breakwaters were blown up, the cranes were damaged, the gates from the dock were flooded, and some of the houses were set on fire. The damage was not significant, the Japanese were able to quickly repair them. The Japanese got the barracks and warehouses in Dalniy in excellent condition, the railway station and the telegraph office too.
The Japanese took possession of the city and port, where the 3rd Army of Gen. Maresuke Nogi, in the port of Takushan - the 4th army of the General Nozu Mitsura. The 1st, 2nd and 4th armies acted against the Russian forces in Manchuria, the 3rd army was instructed to take Port Arthur. Nogi had already taken it in 1894, and now the general was instructed to repeat this quick assault, and then strengthen the grouping of the main forces. The defense of the fortress began to play an important role in the fate of the war. Back on April 27 (May 10), Kuropatkin outlined his opinion on how it should be conducted:
"We must first gather our strength and only then go forward energetically. Decisive action cannot be taken before the fall. Port Arthur is well fortified and stocked for 16 months."
On May 14 (27), Admiral Vitgeft gathered the squadron flagships for a meeting. It was decided to stay in the harbor, waiting for the right moment to break through to Vladivostok. The question of determining such a moment remained open. However, the squadron commander received assurances that the army would soon help the fortress and remove the threat to the base.
The fall of Jinzhou and Dalniy caused the Governor to worry about the fate of Port Arthur and the fleet. Alekseev believed that the fortress would not last more than 2-3 months. On May 22 (June 4), he sent a telegram to Kuropatkin, instructing him to take the most decisive measures to divert enemy forces from Port Arthur. Kuropatkin's reluctance to take action was easily explainable.
Three Japanese armies: 1st - Kuroki, 2nd - Oku and 4th - Nozu - had up to 115,000 people in their ranks, while the Manchurian army - no more than 90,000. These forces were stretched across mountain positions for 140 versts and along the railway from Liaoyang to Vafandyan for 200 versts, there were no reserves. Moving forward could only lead to the separation of part of the army along the railway line another 150 versts from the Vafandyan station.
Kuropatkin did not have any reliable information about the enemy, the numerous cavalry - seven Cossack regiments - gave practically nothing, except for unverified rumors and conflicting reports. During the war, the Russian cavalry generally acted very ineffectively and practically did not bring any benefit. As a result of hesitation and regular disagreements between the governor and the army commander, they did not find an adequate answer to any of the threats that arose.
On May 24 (June 6), the governor Alekseev gave the order to Kuropatkin to immediately go on the offensive to the rescue of Port Arthur. The commander of the Manchurian army on the same day ordered the commander of the 1st Siberian Army Corps, General - L. Baron G.K. von Stackelberg to begin concentrating the corps in the area of the Wafangou station. It was supposed to be finished by May 28 (June 10). On May 25 (June 7),
Stackelberg received a lengthy instruction from the commander - the ultimate goal of his offensive was to capture the Jinzhou position. At the same time, Kuropatkin, being an opponent of active actions at this stage, made a palliative decision - the advancing corps was ordered to take care of reserves, to crowd out the weakest enemy forces, refraining from clashing with superior ones.
Stackelberg had practically no information about the enemy, the Russian troops acted blindly. The general himself, his staff officers and even the soldiers were fully confident that the enemy would not withstand the blow and would begin to retreat to the coast. Lack of maps and ignorance of the terrain led to one mistake after another.
“The ship set off,” said a French journalist walking with the hull, “and sailed without a compass and without a helmsman across an unknown sea. And by what sea!"
At first, the vanguard of the corps was a cavalry detachment under the command of Gen. A. V. Samsonov - pressed the enemy patrols. The state of the Russian cavalry was not brilliant - the horse train was tired of endless transitions and lack of food. Samsonov could not provide vigorous intelligence. Nevertheless, by May 25 (June 7), his Cossacks had entered into strong contact with the enemy. After that, the Japanese only constantly increased their pressure on the Russian covering parties.
On June 1 (14), near the village of Telisu, five kilometers from the Wafangou station, located 135 kilometers from Port Arthur and 225 kilometers from Liaoyang, Stackelberg, which initially had 26 battalions, 19 hundreds, 96 guns, met the Oku army - 48 battalions and 216 guns. The battle was fought on a front about 12 km away, the center of which was the railway. The initiative was wholly owned by the Japanese.
At first, they attacked in three columns, the fourth proceeded to a deep bypass of the Russian right flank. Immediately affected by the unpreparedness of the Russian infantry for the realities of modern firefighting. The officers led their soldiers into the attack, riding on horseback. To do it differently was considered unworthy of the honor of an officer. The losses of the command personnel, of course, were high, many privates were soon left without commanders, which affected the strength of the units.
There were precarious positions behind the attackers, which were difficult to hold. Russian troops did not have only a few days to strengthen them - only from May 27 to June 1, Art. Art. There were not enough trench tools and hoes, as well as working hands. Only half of the rifle trenches were prepared for standing shooting, the rest for kneeling.
It was impossible to dig in the rocky ground, at least not quickly. The batteries were located on the crests of heights, in shallow gun trenches. The slopes for the withdrawal of artillery, which were in open positions, were not prepared either. Shackled by the instructions of the commander, the troops entered the battle in parts against the superior forces of the enemy. The absolute superiority of the Japanese in mountain artillery immediately affected (in our positions there was only a 4 inch gun mountain battery of the border guards - the trophies of the war in China in 1901), which, moreover, was perfectly disguised.
The Russian batteries, which stood open, were immediately and literally bombarded with enemy shells. The Japanese fired exceptionally intense fire, while remaining invisible - the Russian artillerymen were forced, wasting time, to grope for the possible location of the enemy. In this duel, they were doomed. Our artillery fire was quickly suppressed as soon as the guns showed themselves.
The usual Japanese tactic in this war was defensive action. Artillery support for the advancing units usually ceased at a distance of about 1 km so that their own infantry would not suffer from "friendly fire". The Japanese paused until the shelling ceased, after which they met the attackers with energetic fire from their own artillery and infantry and launched a counterattack.
They did the same at Wafangou, when on the morning of June 2 (15), Stackelberg launched a counteroffensive against the Japanese center, which continued until the Japanese bypass was opened, threatening to cut it off from the railway. The information received from the cavalry patrols about the approaching enemy was ignored by the corps headquarters. Almost 4.5 hours elapsed between the cavalry's report of the detour and the dispatch of reinforcements.
In the meantime, having managed to fortify and dig trenches, the Japanese met unprepared attacks of the Russian infantry along the front with fire at prepared positions. After that, the enemy himself went on the offensive.
As a result, by the middle of the day, Stackelberg retreated, having lost 124 of. and 3,348 lower ranks killed and wounded against 1,163 for the Japanese. While retreating on the only slope, a gun was knocked out, blocking the way for others. 17 guns were left on the battlefield. The retreat was badly organized - in the dark, infantry units were mistakenly attacked by a Cossack patrol. The result was friendly gunfire and panic, which was not immediately dealt with. Fortunately, the enemy did not pursue.
According to the apt definition of a modern American historian, "while the Russians were arguing about a grand strategy, the Japanese methodically seized the initiative and, without hesitation, tirelessly pursued their strategic goals, and this was what turned out to be decisive in their victory."
And in Russia it was still relatively calm. The country was patiently awaiting news of its successes. Not all of them expected them with hope, but still the general situation still seemed calm. The strike movement, peasant unrest — all this was still ahead.
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