[IsraelTimes] After Nasrallah vowed to retaliate for deaths of his operatives in Syria, Hamas, the braying voice of Islamic Resistance®, also hopes to establish a new formula vis-a-vis Israel in response to casualties in border festivities.
The firing of five rockets into Israeli territory from the Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with an iron fist by Hamaswith about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response ...
Strip late Friday came as little surprise, despite the period of relative calm between Israel and the Paleostinian enclave’s Hamas rulers.
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For at least two weeks, Hamas has been accusing Israel of violating understandings with the terror group brokered by Egyptian and international mediators, but the Hamas declarations have not been overly aggressive.
However,
by candlelight every wench is handsome...
immediately after it became known that two Paleostinians (among them a 17-year-old) were killed in festivities with Israeli troops Friday along the Gaza border, various terror organizations in the Strip threatened that a response would soon come ‐ and indeed it did.
Most of the rockets were fired at open areas, and one towards the outskirts of the southern city of Sderot, suggesting someone in Gaza was mainly seeking to send a message, not exact a price that could make the situation even worse.
The new-old formulation that the Paleostinian factions, led by Hamas, are trying to impose is clear: If there are fatalities at the weekly protests on the border, there will also be rockets.
The desire to establish such a dynamic is reminiscent of the situation with Hezbollah and Leb. Just as Hezbollah leader His Eminence Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah
...The satrap of the Medes and the Persians in Leb...
declared that an attack on the terror group’s operatives in Syria would be met with a response, Hamas too is seeking to produce a formula of its own ‐ aimed first and foremost at public opinion among Paleostinians both in and outside Gaza.
The terror group is trying to create a perception among Paleostinians that only it can protect the Paleostinians, just as Hezbollah and Nasrallah are trying to convince the Lebanese public that only Hezbollah can contend with Israel and create deterrence.
In actuality of course, the two situations are different. Militarily, Hamas is not Hezbollah, to put it mildly.
It must be noted, though, that things are still far from simple for the Lebanese Shiite terror organization. Hezbollah is going through a financial crisis entailing reductions and cutbacks, and faces an even bigger problem in the political context in which it now operates: All of Leb is currently focused on the country’s collapsing economy.
Over the past week, Lebanese official leaders (if there truly are any other than Nasrallah) convened several times to discuss ways to save the Lebanese economy. If at this point Leb again finds itself dragged into a war on Nasrallah’s account, that would damage Hezbollah’s image as the country’s protector and inflict a hit on Nasrallah’s own image.
Furthermore, such a military adventure could lead to a mass exodus. If just a few years ago hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of Syrians made their way to Leb because of the Syrian civil war, this migration could be be reversed in the next war with Israel, with Lebanese citizens fleeing to Syria.
Ultimately, the lack of casualties on the Israeli side from the Hezbollah anti-tank missile attack at the beginning of the week, and the feeling in Leb of accomplishment or at least temporary achievement in that Israel had been "successfully" targeted, allowed everyone to take their finger off the trigger.
Israel’s decision not to retaliate for the anti-tank fire or strike heavily at the Hezbollah cells scattered throughout the area derived from a clear desire to end the incident as quickly as possible.
It is obvious to both sides that there will be additional stages in this campaign ‐ but until then, Leb can return to economic matters and Israel can go back to the upcoming elections.
But with the Middle East being the Middle East, a decision not to respond up north, along with the enthusiasm with which Israel quickly ended the situation in the north, broadcasts a certain message of weakness in other areas. This causes actors such as Hamas to feel that the firing of a few rockets won’t be met with a response from Israel ‐ or, if so, a minor one.
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