by Robert Farley
France's decision to negotiate the sale of four Mistral-class Amphibious Transport Docks to Russia has been met with harsh criticism in the United States and among some NATO allies. Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili was particularly brutal, declaring of the sale, "It's not even appeasement of Russia. It's a reward for Russia."
There is no question that the acquisition of the four amphibious warships will substantially enhance Russia's power-projection capabilities. However, Russia is not the only state to have committed to the construction of large-deck amphibious warships. In fact, Moscow's purchase of the Mistrals comes in the context of a global "amphib" splurge. Big "amphibs" are trendy, and the Russians have simply decided to join the club.
Known as "gators" in the naval community, amphibious warships go by several different designations, depending on their specific characteristics and purpose. For example, the United States Navy operates LPDs (Landing Platform Dock), LHAs (Landing Helicopter Assault), LSDs (Dock Landing Ship) and LHDs (Landing Helicopter Dock). All, however, share a few important similarities. Amphibious warships usually carry a group of helicopters and have the capacity to quarter a significant number of troops. Almost all "amphibs" house the technical resources necessary to coordinate the deployment of troops onto land. The ultimate littoral command ship, "amphibs" have the dual capability to support operations on land and to maintain control of the sea.
Over the past 15 years, the number of amphibious warships in navies worldwide has expanded dramatically. Examples of new construction include the French Mistrals, the South Korean Dokdos, the Australian Canberras, the Dutch Rotterdams, the New Zealander Canterbury, the Japanese Osumis, and the Spanish Galicias. The Turkish navy has contracted for the construction of a new amphibious ship, intended for use in NATO peacekeeping efforts. Canada, India, Malaysia, and South Africa have all explored the possibility of acquiring "amphibs." The British navy and the United States Navy have also expanded their amphibious fleets through construction of HMS Ocean and the Bay class by the former and San Antonio class by the latter.
"Amphibs" play a couple of important roles for a navy. First, the air capability provides a cheap alternative to an aircraft carrier. The VSTOL-capable F-35B will serve to enhance this capability for those states involved in the project. More importantly, however, "amphibs" buy "a piece of the action," giving navies that deploy them an indigenous intervention capacity as well as the capability to participate without support in internationally sanctioned expeditionary operations.
Participation in multilateral expeditionary operations has become an important metric of international prestige and influence in the early 21st century. The ability of the United States Navy to support disaster relief efforts in Southeast Asia in 2005 and off Haiti in 2010 helped preserve and enhance American influence in both regions. Similarly, the presence of a large amphibious warship off Somalia has helped give the U.S. Navy a pre-eminent role in anti-piracy operations.
Through the presence of an amphibious warship, nations earn diplomatic credit for participation and have a chance to influence the course of relief operations. Given the challenges presented by piracy, refugees, and general maritime lawlessness in disaster relief operations, the ability to project order and power with an amphibious warship can significantly enhance a state's international image. And because such deployments provide valuable opportunities for operational training, they enhance a state's security as well.
Understood against this backdrop, Moscow's desire for the Mistrals becomes clearer: Like many other states today, Russia wants the capability to project power and influence far from its borders, as well as the prestige that goes along with being able to participate in multilateral expeditionary operations on its own terms. The large, modern Mistrals will give it the ability to do so.
Significantly, the decision to buy the ship from France, rather than build it domestically, represents Moscow's acknowledgment of the pathetic state of Russia's domestic shipbuilding industry. Under the agreement, some of the Mistrals will be built in France, and some will be licensed for construction in Russia. But the choice of a foreign design -- which spurred protest within Russia -- indicates Moscow's dissatisfaction with both post-Soviet naval architecture and with Russia's industrial capacity.
Although the Mistrals are often portrayed as posing an immediate threat to Russia's near abroad, the truth is that Moscow already has all the military and economic tools it needs to threaten its neighbors. Indeed, due to the political difficulty of transiting large warships through the Dardanelles, Russia is less likely to base the Mistrals in the Black Sea than in the Pacific and the Atlantic, where they could eventually form the centerpiece of a Russian naval task force in the Caribbean or off Somalia.
Rather, the Mistral purchase indicates that Russia remains committed to playing a significant, independent role in world maritime affairs. Like South Korea, New Zealand, Turkey and others, Russia sees value in the prestige and freedom of action that amphibious warships can provide. In an era where large-scale, high-intensity naval combat is no longer considered a serious possibility, "amphibs" have become the new "gold standard" of a modern, capable navy.
Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. 
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