Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Stanislav Smirnov
[REGNUM] In 1907, the decadent poet Konstantin Balmont, who suddenly realized he was a revolutionary and went into European “relocation,” published the arch-radical “Songs of the Avenger ” in Paris. The most scandalous poem began like this: “Our king is Mukden, our king is Tsushima, our king is a bloody stain…”
The insults directed at Nicholas II escalated (the poet seemed not to suspect that he would be forgiven on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the House of Romanov) and ended with the promise of the scaffold.
One can argue whether the symbolist prophesied the massacre of the royal family in the Ipatiev House. But it is obvious that both the liberals who carried out the coup in February 1917 and the Bolsheviks who overthrew the liberals in October were united in their attitude towards the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.
And the battle of Mukden, and Tsushima, and all the previous and subsequent battles on the hills of Manchuria and at sea are nothing more than “a bloody stain, the stench of gunpowder and smoke, in which the mind is dark.”
To this day, there is a perception, “blessed” by Vladimir Lenin’s article “The Fall of Port Arthur,” of the war of 120 years ago as a series of failures. After all, in Ilyich’s opinion, the tsar’s “generals and commanders turned out to be mediocrities and nonentities.”
The Bolshevik leader also got his share of criticism from the ordinary soldiers of the Russian army: “The darkness, ignorance, illiteracy, and oppression of the peasant masses came forward with terrifying frankness when confronted with a progressive people (the Japanese. — Ed.) in a modern war, which just as necessarily requires high-quality human material as modern technology.”
This ideologically distorted optics still prevents us from understanding the real balance of power in the Far Eastern war, the course of the campaigns, and the heroism of Russian soldiers and sailors, which was evident in the first months of the war.
If earlier we looked at the details of the key episode of the war - the Battle of Mukden in February 1905, now we will pay attention to the initial stage of the war - the campaign of 1904.
THE WEST HELPED
In essence, the Russo-Japanese War was also a proxy war of Russia against the hegemonic power – the British Empire and the growing United States. Formally, the Anglo-Saxons maintained neutrality. But London and Washington feared our military and political strengthening in East Asia and the capture of Asian markets. It is not surprising that Theodore Roosevelt – the US President who opened the era of American globalism – openly “rooted” for Japan.
It is also not surprising that the British not only supplied the army of Emperor Meiji with the necessary amount of weapons, but also essentially created a modern Japanese fleet. All four squadron battleships and 11 destroyers were built in English shipyards. In addition to the British and Americans, France also participated in the production of cruisers.
By the beginning of the open clash with Russia, the Japanese army, including thanks to Western assistance, had a significant advantage in the future theater of military operations. An advantage more than sufficient to implement plans to “zero out” our presence in the Chinese northeast, in Manchuria, and to seize the ice-free Port Arthur built by Russia on the Liaodong (Kwantung) Peninsula leased from China.
If the Russian army group in the Far East by January 1, 1904 numbered only 98 thousand people (united into eight rifle brigades), and also dispersed over a vast area from Vladivostok to Port Arthur, then the Japanese invasion army had four field armies numbering 350 thousand people.
Serious Soviet military historians, writing on behalf of the party leadership and for the education of army and navy officers, also reported on this imbalance of power. For example, Major General Alexander Sorokin, author of the 1952 work “The Defense of Port Arthur. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905,” cites the figures mentioned above.
FLEXIBILITY OF ARMY LEADERSHIP
Just like the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, the Russo-Japanese War began with a treacherous attack, preceded by a political crisis and a negotiation process – behind its façade, the enemy was accumulating and deploying forces. The decision to start a war against Russia was made by Emperor Meiji after a meeting of the Privy Council on January 22 (February 4), 1904. The next day, two tasks were set – to invade Korea (where Japanese influence was weakening and Russian was growing) and to attack our ships in the Port Arthur roadstead.
On January 24 (February 6), units of Tamemoto Kuroki's 1st Japanese Army landed in Korea. Three days later, Rear Admiral Sotokichi Uryu's squadron, consisting of six cruisers (two armored and four armored deck) and two destroyers, blockaded the cruiser Varyag and gunboat Koreets, which were moored in the Korean port of Chemulpo. The sailors' feat, celebrated in the song, is worthy of a separate story, but for now we will only note that the unequal 50-minute battle ended with the greatest possible "loss" for the Japanese: the Russian sailors, as is well known, sank the Varyag and blew up the Koreets, leaving the enemy without a trophy.
But the rest of the Japanese plan seemed to go according to plan. Simultaneously with the attack on Chemulpo, on the night of January 26-27 (February 8-9), 1904, Japanese destroyers attacked Russian ships in the outer roadstead of Port Arthur.
By this time, the Japanese were deploying an occupation force in Korea. By early March, the armies were "concentrated," after which the enemy advanced to the Yalu River (Amnokkan), which separates Korea and Manchuria, and prepared to invade.
The Russian plan envisaged an initial concentration of troops in two detachments - the Southern and the Eastern. The first, numbering 22 thousand people, was tasked with defending Southern Manchuria. The second, with 20 thousand bayonets and sabres, was moving towards the Yalu River to block the Korean border. At the same time, part of the troops, up to 30 thousand fighters, occupied positions in the Vladivostok region and in the Ussuri region.
The further development of the campaign showed that, in unequal conditions, the Russian command, represented by the Emperor's Viceroy in the Far East, Admiral Yevgeny Alekseyev (whom Soviet historiography labeled a warmonger) and the commander of the Manchurian Army, General Aleksey Kuropatkin, demonstrated sobriety and flexibility.
The maneuvering of army units allowed them to escape from a crushing blow time after time. Throughout the 1904 campaign, our Manchurian army was never surrounded or suffered serious damage. On the contrary, the Japanese did not achieve a blitzkrieg.
WITH A CROSS FOR A BREAKTHROUGH
On the night of April 18 (May 1), 1904, the main forces of the 1st Japanese Army of General Kuroki, having a six-fold numerical superiority over our Eastern Detachment under the command of General Mikhail Zasulich, crossed the Yalu River. In the battle near the village of Tyurenchen, three Japanese divisions were opposed by only five Russian battalions.
However, the enemy failed to destroy the Eastern Detachment. The attempt to encircle was thwarted by a stubborn defense and, in particular, the dedication of the soldiers of the 11th East Siberian Rifle Regiment under the command of Colonel Vladimir Laiming, who stopped the advance of two divisions. "The heroes of the 11th Regiment, who covered their neighbors who were leaving the battle, showed the greatest heroism and tenacity," wrote the Soviet historian Sorokin.
In the Battle of Tyurencheng, 60 officers and 2,130 lower ranks were killed and wounded, while the Japanese lost 1,036 officers and soldiers.
The issue of losses is debatable, and we will dwell on it in more detail later. For now, we will note that most works on the history of the 1904-1905 war use predominantly Japanese data on the losses of their army.
There are no sufficient grounds to consider these data reliable, and the point of view that the Japanese deliberately underestimated both the number of their troops and the size of their losses in order to convince the world of the obvious superiority of their strategy, the art of their military leaders and the combat effectiveness of their army seems quite convincing.
Here and below, information is given about the losses of the parties, taken from a major study that was published by the military-historical commission of the General Staff of the Russian Army in 1910-1912 and which experts consider a reliable source.
The Battle of Yalu went down in history, among other things, thanks to an episode that, unlike the feat of the Varyag, was not publicized in Soviet times. At the most difficult moment of the battle, when the regimental commander was wounded and the Siberian soldiers almost wavered at some point, a 29-year-old regimental priest, Stefan Shcherbakovsky, a native of Odessa, came out in front of the soldiers. He blessed the soldiers with the cross and said, “Christ is risen!” and then, clutching the cross, rushed forward, toward the Japanese chains.
As Father Stefan himself said:
"I put on the epitrachelion, took the cross, blessed the soldiers and, singing "Christ is risen," went at the head of the riflemen of the standard company... Without the slightest hesitation, the glorious riflemen went to certain death, into the hellish fire, among the exploding shells... Some ran forward, some fell killed or wounded. I felt a strong blow to my arm and leg and fell backwards, losing consciousness."
Father Stefan was seriously wounded (he was carried off the field by soldiers) and miraculously survived. He became the fifth Orthodox priest in Russian history (and the first since the Crimean War) to be awarded the Order of St. George. In 1918, Father Stefan, who served in one of the parishes of Odessa, was arrested by the Cheka and shot.
LOSS OF SHIPS
Three days after the Battle of Tyurencheng, the vanguard of the Japanese army on 36 ships left the Korean port of Qingampo (Nampho) and on April 22 began landing in the south of Manchuria, in the area of the city of Biziwo, 150 kilometers north of Port Arthur.
In eight days, up to 200 transports were unloaded - divisions, rear services and services of the 3rd Army of General Yasukata Oku, numbering 60 thousand people.
From the sea, the landing was supported by a detachment of six Japanese battleships, four cruisers and 30 destroyers, called upon to block the exit of the Russian squadron from Port Arthur. And during this operation, the enemy again suffered significant losses. Two Japanese battleships, the Hatsuse and the Yashima, were blown up and sank by mines laid by the sailors of the minelayer Amur.
Overall, as the historian notes, “in a relatively short time, the Japanese fleet lost two first-class battleships, a cruiser and several other warships. This was tantamount to a major defeat.”
The next unpleasant surprise for the Japanese was the battle near the city of Jinzhou on May 13 (26).
After landing at Bitsiwo, General Oku's army rushed to Port Arthur. The few Russian screens retreated to a fortified position at the isthmus of the Kwantung Peninsula. Here, at the city of Qinzhou (Kinzhou), the Japanese army was confronted only by the 5th East Siberian Rifle Regiment under the command of Colonel Nikolai Tretyakov. Further on, the path to the fortress was blocked by the 4th Division of Siberian Riflemen under Major General Alexander Fok.
The battle on the isthmus, where the enemy had a tenfold numerical superiority, lasted until late at night, after which the defenders abandoned their positions.
THE ACQUITTED GENERAL
The losses of the Siberian riflemen amounted to 20 officers and 770 soldiers killed, 8 officers and 626 soldiers wounded, a total of 1,424 people.
The Japanese lost, according to their data, 33 officers and 716 soldiers killed, 100 officers and 3,355 soldiers wounded, a total of 4,204 people. The losses of the 5th Regiment, from which 37% of soldiers and 51% of officers dropped out, testified to tenacity and heroism, as noted by Soviet historians.
At this price, the enemy approached Port Arthur and was able to occupy the port city of Dalniy (Dalian), which Russian troops abandoned due to the threat of encirclement.
It should be noted that the battle at Qinzhou is assessed critically in Russian historiography. It is believed that General Fok was obliged to come to the aid of the 5th Siberian Rifle Regiment and defend the strategically important Kwantung Isthmus, the loss of which resulted in the surrender of the port of Dalniy. Subsequently, the Japanese used this to supply their troops. However, an objective analysis allows us to assess the situation differently.
Alexander Fok was not a "parquet" general - he had experience in the Russo-Turkish War and the Chinese campaign of 1900-1901. But "here and now" in the Kwantung Fortified Region, the enemy had a huge numerical superiority. It was defended mainly by two rifle divisions. The 7th Division of Lieutenant General of Engineering Troops Roman Kondratenko (the future hero of the defense of Port Arthur) was dispersed among the forts and fortifications of the Port Arthur fortress.
Phocas' 4th Division represented practically all available field troops. Its defeat would have accelerated the capture of Port Arthur, which the enemy was striving for at any cost.
By the way, General Fok was put on trial for his participation in the fortress's capitulation, but the court acquitted him of all charges. And later the military leader showed himself worthy during the defense of Port Arthur.
IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DEFEAT THE RUSSIAN TROOPS
The enemy, taking advantage of its superiority in manpower and equipment, meanwhile continued its assault on the Kwantung Peninsula. General Oku's army was joined by two more units that had landed from the sea. These were General Maresuke Nogi's 3rd Army, which had the goal of taking the fortress of Port Arthur, and Marshal Michitsura Nozu's 4th Army, which advanced north against our group near the city of Liaoyang.
The enemy landing force interrupted the connection between the Port Arthur garrison and our other units. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Alekseyev, demanded decisive action to unblock it.
The task was assigned to the 1st Siberian Corps of Lieutenant General Georgy Shtakelberg, consisting of the 1st and 9th Siberian Rifle Divisions and a brigade of the 35th Infantry Division (Morshansky and Zaraysky Regiments), reinforced by the Primorsky Dragoon Regiment. The battle unfolded south of the Vafangou station and proceeded with varying success.
The First Siberian Corps was confronted by the main forces of the 2nd Japanese Army of General Oku. Having numerical superiority, the Japanese launched a frontal offensive and simultaneously tried to envelop our positions, but they failed to defeat the Russian troops. Our losses in killed, wounded and captured amounted to 3,300 soldiers and officers, the enemy, according to Japanese data, lost 1,190 people.
"IF WE HAD A RAILROAD..."
Most historians agree that the forces assigned to strike Oku's army were insufficient. This can be agreed with, but the actions of the Manchurian army commander become understandable if we take into account the complexity of the situation. There was a huge advantage in infantry and artillery for the Japanese.
On the one hand, the enemy was supported by “our Western partners”, on the other hand, the Russian army faced logistical problems.
The theater of military operations was located 8 thousand miles away from the regions and provinces that supplied the army with manpower and supplies.
The communication routes were not developed, the Siberian route remained single-track, its carrying capacity at the beginning of the war did not exceed three pairs of trains per day, and for the rapid delivery of new divisions and the complements needed to replenish losses, no less than 14 pairs of trains were needed daily. Increasing the capacity of the road required enormous and coordinated efforts from the financial, railway and military departments.
And these efforts have been made in recent years: new sidings were built to allow oncoming trains to separate, repair depots, platforms, staff houses, locomotives were replaced with faster ones... It was not possible to do all this quickly.
General Kuropatkin wrote in his memoirs:
"If we had a railway prepared for the beginning of military operations for at least 6 military trains, we could have had not one 1st Siberian Corps at Vafangou, but three corps: 1st and 4th Siberian and 10th Army. The outcome of the battle would have been different, which would undoubtedly have affected the course of the entire campaign, because we could have taken the initiative in the actions."
But the army command had to proceed from the "current reality" - in it, our army was faced with circumstances of insurmountable force. Which Russian officers and soldiers nevertheless managed to overcome. But the most difficult trials were ahead - the siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Tsushima, which will require a separate story.
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