|
2025-03-18 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
|
|
Invasion without a goal. How Ukraine realized step by step the failure at Kursk
|
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Andrey Khrustalev
[REGNUM] The Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces became one of the most controversial events of the last three years for the Ukrainians themselves. From the very beginning, the actions on the adjacent Russian territory took place under a veil of information fog.
There were different and often contradictory assessments of the goals of this offensive. The topic was hotly discussed by Ukrainian military and political scientists, but society never received a clear and precise answer to the question "why?" from them.
Although the invasion of the Kursk region really came as a big surprise to everyone. Unlike the failed summer counteroffensive of 2023, which was widely announced and everyone knew where and when to expect it.
As the Ukrainian TV channel Espreso noted at the time, “in reality, we learn most of the information about the course and reasons for the cross-border attack indirectly, thanks to Russian military personnel, videos and photographs from Ukrainian military personnel and foreign media, which either seek anonymous sources in government agencies or present expert opinions for their conclusions.”
The fighting began on the morning of August 6, 2024, when units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border near the city of Sudzha.
Ukrainian troops began advancing deep into the territory and within a few days controlled several hundred square kilometers. However, the authorities were in no hurry to report the results, given the sad experience of the previous "counteroffensive." The first official information appeared only a week later.
On August 12, Volodymyr Zelensky said that the goal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is to liberate the border area from the Russian army. Two weeks later, he said that Ukraine is not occupying Russia's Kursk region, and the operation in the region is only preventing the Russians from creating a buffer zone on Ukrainian territory.
And at a lower level, the goals were described quite differently. A series of publications appeared in the media hinting at historical claims to these lands and possible annexation of the territories.
"The Kursk region is historically connected with Ukraine and in the future it may become either a separate territory like the Kursk People's Republic or even part of Ukraine," the experts wrote in all seriousness. And social networks were massively disseminating various kinds of evidence that "a hundred years ago, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, Ukrainians living in the territory of today's Kursk and Belgorod regions actively supported the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR)."
In general, according to such statements, it was the Ukrainian ethnic territory of Slobozhanshchina, and the population had ancient Ukrainian roots, since the settlements were formed during the era of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. And the fact that the city of Sudzha and Belgorod were even the capitals of Soviet Ukraine for a short period only further emphasized the "Ukrainianness of these lands" in the eyes of the authors of theories calling for "re-evaluation of both the past and possible future of the borders between Ukraine and the Russian Federation."
The idea that Ukraine had turned from a victim into an aggressor, entering the territory of another country with weapons and violating international law (which it had constantly insisted on) was in plain sight. Nevertheless, a military commandant's office was created in the captured part of Kursk Oblast - its head was Major General Eduard Moskalov.
There was even an idea of opening Ukrainian classes in local schools from September 1. Deputy Minister of Education of Ukraine Mykhailo Vinnitsky said then that his department would probably have to draw up a plan to provide education for Kursk children, but this was later abandoned - in light of the same international law.
Meanwhile, the list of benefits Ukraine had put on display from the operation grew.
Here there was a rise in the morale of the population, and a demonstration to them and their "partners" of the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, capable not only of defense, but also of attack. The concept of creating an "exchange fund" was tested on the air. That is, if Ukraine could consolidate its positions, they could be exchanged for lands near Kharkov, Kherson or Donetsk.
There were also economic goals.
One of them was to exert influence on Russia by seizing Sudzha with its gas measuring station. This allowed control over the transportation of gas through the pipeline that supplies Russian natural gas to Europe via Ukraine.
The gas contract expired at the end of 2024, but gaining control of the plant brought the situation to an equation with many unknowns. Experts also spread the concept of seizing the Kurchatov NPP and potentially exchanging it for the Zaporizhzhya NPP.
The operation was supposed to force Russia to abandon its offensive in the Donetsk and Kharkov regions and switch to liberating its own territories.
But in the end, none of the plans worked.
The Ukrainian army got stuck, having captured only part of the planned territory. And gradually it became clear that it would not be possible to achieve even half of what was desired.
With the end of the offensive and the transition to positional battles, the operation in the Kursk region turned into a "suitcase without a handle" for Kyiv. Ukrainian forces were under constant fire, the army's advance stopped, and it became clear that there was simply no plan "B".
It was impossible to leave and withdraw the troops, and staying was extremely costly.
Accordingly, the question of why all this is necessary has loomed again on the airwaves - only in a different plane. As Roman Kostenko, Secretary of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, noted in August 2024, "this is a success in many aspects - both internationally and in our own, that we have seized the initiative; and in the moral and psychological sense, and a victory that we have not had for a long time. And the next goal is probably known only to our commander-in-chief and a few people involved in the Headquarters or the direct planning of this operation."
That is, the main victory is the proof of the genius of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. At the same time, the obvious failure increased the number of those who believed that the loss of territory in the Donetsk direction would hardly be compensated by the frozen resources in Sudzha.
As autumn approached, the tone of statements describing the operation's objectives began to change.
On August 18, 2024, Zelensky stated in an evening address that the main objective of the operation in the Kursk region was to destroy as much Russian potential as possible and create a “buffer zone.”
On August 24, at a press conference in Kyiv, he noted that "everything is going according to plan," and the Ukrainian military prevented the occupation of the city of Sumy with a preemptive strike. And on October 21, citizens suddenly learned from the same source that "instead of a buffer zone on Ukrainian territory, which the Russians had planned, we created a buffer zone near our border on Russian territory."
The situation remained relatively stable throughout the autumn. But when in January 2025 the Russian army's offensive in Donbass and simultaneously in the Sudzha area had an obvious success, Kyiv could not counter it with anything. But Zelensky did not want to give up the "achieved success" either - this would refute everything said earlier, and he does not do this on principle.
By the end of February, units of the Russian Armed Forces approached the Sudzha-Sumy highway, through which supplies were supplied to the Ukrainian Armed Forces group in the Kursk region. As of March 9, according to The New York Times, the Ukrainians had lost 2/3 of the territory they had previously controlled. At the same time, all reports of a "cauldron" were actively denied.
Now the Ukrainian Armed Forces command (obviously, following instructions from Bankova) was trying to delay the retreat process, not giving the order to withdraw and exchanging the worsening situation for media bonuses.
After all, against the backdrop of the greatly deteriorated quality of communication with the US, Ukraine simply had to hold on to the territories until the start of the ceasefire talks. Otherwise, Kyiv would have lost one of its few trump cards. So, in the end, real information about the situation in the Kursk region was given, as usual, by foreign media.
On March 10, an article on Radio Liberty* devoted to the situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region was published with the headline "The beginning of the end? The Russian army is advancing in the Kursk region." It quoted Ukrainian Armed Forces serviceman Artem Karyakin as saying that "two months ago we already understood where this was all heading."
It was against this backdrop that Zelensky announced on March 14 that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had completed their operation in the Kursk region. He now called the withdrawal of Russian forces from Pokrovsk and Kharkov its main results. None of the country's military authorities dared to publicly admit the failure.
"The defense forces have redeployed to more advantageous defense lines in the Kursk region, " said Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov. And only the unbending MP Maryana Bezugla, who works as a lightning rod for the President's Office, clearly pointed out the "true culprits" of the failure.
"The retreat from Kursk region is not planned - this is another miscalculation, " she wrote on her Telegram channel. " People are not receiving any orders to leave, each unit leaves as best it can. This is barbarity on the part of Syrsky !"
And then the Russians' entry into Sumy Oblast looms - which, as we remember, was "prevented". Now the BBC* is publishing a report full of quotes from Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers: "horror film", "catastrophe", "collapse", "failure of the front". "The roads are littered with hundreds of destroyed cars, armored vehicles and ATVs. There are many wounded and dead."
However, there is another goal of this operation, which was also voiced by foreigners. According to The Washington Post, its task was to disrupt secret peace talks in August 2024. At that time, Ukraine and Russia intended to discuss efforts to partially cease fire and strikes on energy infrastructure, the publication reports, citing diplomats and officials.
A possible agreement would offer a reprieve for both countries, which had already ostensibly agreed to hold a summit in Doha, with only minor details remaining to be ironed out. Beyond that, some negotiators hoped they could reach a more comprehensive agreement to end the war.
The offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region disrupted all plans, making peace negotiations impossible.
The breakdown of peace talks has delayed the peace process — which Zelensky now insists on after his talks with Trump — by more than six months. And the question of how many lives the occupation of Russian lands has cost remains unanswered.
Even if the Russian army forces were pulled back from other directions and some populated areas remained under Ukrainian control, this was achieved at an incomparable cost of enormous efforts and lost lives of soldiers. Other goals of the operation turned out to be short-term.
Even morale was raised only for a short time, because the Ukrainian Armed Forces were unable to repeat such a breakthrough anywhere else, although they tried. And the definition of "adventure" for the ultimately failed invasion is more appropriate than any other.
|
Posted by badanov 2025-03-18 00:00||
||
Front Page|| [11139 views ]
Top
|
|
Posted by mossomo 2025-03-18 13:08||
2025-03-18 13:08||
Front Page
Top
|
|
05:11 NN2N1
04:50 NN2N1
04:24 Grom the Affective
04:14 Grom the Affective
04:09 Grom the Affective
03:49 Grom the Affective
03:40 Grom the Affective
02:50 Pancho Poodle8452
02:30 Grom the Affective
01:28 Grom the Affective
01:28 Grom the Affective
01:23 Grom the Affective
01:22 Grom the Affective
01:05 Frank G
00:57 Frank G
00:25 DooDahMan
00:18 Bobby
00:16 Skidmark
00:13 Bobby
00:12 Skidmark
00:05 Frank G
|
