Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the rise to power of the armed opposition has undoubtedly become the main sensation of the year, leaving many other significant episodes in its shadow. This event has already shaken the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but it is likely that we are only hearing distant rumblings so far, and the main waves of this tsunami may follow later and spill out beyond the region.
The conquest of Damascus after a ten-day campaign by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allied forces led by Ahmad al-Sharaa (as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani is now known by his real name) could lead to a new awakening of the Middle East. The "Arab winter" could be replaced by a new "Arab spring". But for now, the Russian Federation is concerned with more pressing issues.
TWO MAIN QUESTIONS FOR RUSSIA
The issue of the presence of foreign, primarily Russian-speaking, jihadists in Syria will obviously require prompt intervention from the new authorities.
Most of the violence and extrajudicial killings, including against members of minorities, which have already sparked mass protests among Alawites, are linked to them. The same applies to attacks on religious sites of Alawites and Christians.
Obviously, these people did not come to Syria to watch Jolani destroy their dream of “Sharia rule and the spread of jihad,” but instead to implement his “Ikhwan” project, based on the work of the “Muslim Brotherhood”.
However, there is already a well-trodden path for such jihadists.
Jolani "expelled" his most radical supporters from Idlib towards Ukraine back in 2022-23. This concerns, for example, part of the "Ajnad al-Kavkaz" and "Albanian Jamaat" groups, which joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
This summer, the Kiev regime already expressed its readiness to take the most radical jihadist groups into its fold. At that time, Jolani apparently had his own plans for them. But now, after the end of military operations, it is obviously more profitable for him to get rid of them as soon as possible rather than keep them, and they can go not only to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also to Russia.
And this is one of the threats to Russia emanating from the “new Syria”.
The second factor that directly affects Moscow’s interests is the fate of Russian military bases.
As it became known after the direct line with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the country's leadership has not yet made a final decision on them, if we are talking about the long term. However, at present and probably in the coming months, their functioning will continue.
The new Syrian authorities, at least at this stage, also do not object to the preservation of Russian military facilities. This, in particular, was stated by Jolani in an interview with a British media outlet.
| At least at this stage — words to be concerned by. |
According to him, Syria and Russia have long-standing strategic relations that cannot be broken off overnight in a hurry, so the new Syrian authorities are in no hurry to demand the withdrawal of Russian bases, as some wish or imagine. To a clarifying question from a journalist whether this means that the Russians, with the right approach, can stay, he answered that in principle, yes, they can stay.
However, it is obvious that under any scenario Russia will no longer be able to use its military facilities in Syria in the same way as before.
"Since the start of the Syrian campaign, Syria, as a zone within the interests of the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces, has been fully used by Moscow to demonstrate a threat on NATO's southern flank. Now, even if we manage to reach an agreement on bases with the new Syrian authorities, no general will risk deploying Tu-95MS strategic missile carriers or MiG-31 high-speed interceptors with long-range missiles, given that the planes could be fired upon, allegedly by accident, by "certain cells" with small arms from commanding heights," Anton Mardasov, an analyst in the field of Middle East security, told Regnum.
According to him, there remains the possibility of using bases in Syria as a logistics hub to support Russian operations in Africa.
At the same time, as Mardasov notes, it will be quite difficult for Russia to strengthen ties with current Damascus, given that Moscow’s opponents, such as Ukraine and Poland, are rushing to establish cooperation with it, not to mention Britain, France and the United States.
Moscow will most likely continue to expand its activity in regions with crisis situations. However, given the limitations of economic resources and the ability to project power through, for example, reliance on the Navy, it will be possible to fully move to this only with the solution of problems in Ukraine, which will be able to provide Russia with a positive result and add weight in the international arena.
At the same time, as the analyst emphasized, Sudan or Libya, even with successful agreements, are too temporary options for official facilities, given the specifics of power in these countries, and are unlikely to be able to replace Russian bases in Syria.
TRIANGLE RUSSIA, IRAN, TÜRKIYE
Another open question at the end of the year: was Iran really so weakened and frightened by Israel’s actions that it did not intervene in the final, fleeting phase of the Syrian conflict, or did Tehran have other, much more pragmatic motives for “giving up the game”?
Perhaps the Iranian leadership has begun to rethink its role and real possibilities in Middle Eastern affairs. In the face of the threat of a social explosion due to the growth of internal contradictions, the baggage called the "Assad regime" has become an increasingly heavy burden for Iran.
On the horizon is January 20, 2025, and Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office, along with the tightening of sanctions pressure on the Islamic Republic and the closing of all loopholes for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to receive income from Iranian oil exports and the subsequent deprivation of the ability to finance the “Axis of Resistance.” This will lead to a sharp deterioration in the lives of most Iranians and an even greater increase in protest sentiment.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Iran wants to open a new page in relations with the United States. Moving away from financing and supporting its proxies to solving exclusively internal pressing problems could allow, if not to reduce Washington's pressure, then to minimize the prospects for introducing new restrictions.
Deploying regular IRGC units and tens of thousands of Shiite militias to Syria to save Assad would be perceived by Israel and the US as a direct threat and would lead to their intervention in the conflict. And Iran does not need the inevitable new sanctions that would accompany it, given its already exorbitant costs.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that Tehran chose not to intervene in order not to worsen its own situation.
As Nikolai Sukhov, a leading research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and a professor at the Institute of Oriental and African Studies at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg, told Regnum, “the loss of Syria as an ally weakens Iran’s strategic position, especially its ability to support Hezbollah, in connection with which Tehran may increase investments in proxy groups in Lebanon and Iraq to compensate for the loss of influence in Syria. Or, on the contrary, it may focus resources on mitigating internal economic and social problems, thereby reducing the pressure of the Axis of Resistance on Israel and the United States.”
According to the orientalist, increased pressure from Israel and the US “is forcing Iran to adapt its foreign policy, and the scenario its leadership will choose will be shown in the near future.”
In this context, it is important for Moscow to understand whether Tehran is aiming to further expand its partnership with Russia, which should soon become “strategic” (tentatively, after February 2025, when the corresponding memorandum is planned to be signed). And whether Iran will abandon deepening ties with Russia in favor of normalizing relations with the United States and the West.
| The Great Satan? Not likely, so long as the Mad Mullahs are in charge. |
Events in Syria have shown that such a scenario is quite realistic.
In turn, Iran itself is showing similar concerns.
Tehran is concerned about the prospect of a quick end to the NWO and a deal between Moscow and Washington in which the Islamic Republic could become a bargaining chip.
The fall of the Assad regime has already generated a certain amount of mistrust on this issue. In Iran, there are behind-the-scenes opinions that Turkey and Russia could have agreed behind Tehran's back on the fate of the former Syrian regime.
"Iran, of course, is also offended by Ankara, but, in fact, only because it itself missed the opportunity to save the regime that it subsidized for so many years. In the new reality, Tehran will one way or another face a serious revision of its "Axis of Resistance", the capabilities of which have changed significantly. And in this regard, expanding ties with Turkey may be a completely viable option, especially since, contrary to idle talk, Turkish actions in the South Caucasus after the end of the Karabakh story are not as dangerous for Iran as Iranian ones are for the Turks," says Mardasov.
One way or another, Assad’s fall had a negative impact on the background of both Iranian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian interactions.
Although, indeed, if we talk about relations between Moscow and Ankara, there is now one less conflict point in Russian-Turkish relations, even though in Russia itself Turkey’s actions in supporting the armed opposition can be seen as another stab in the back.
Türkiye is trying to try on the laurel crown of the winner in the Syrian war, but it will itself face many new challenges.
It is obvious that Ankara will help Syria to carry out reforms, including constitutional and military ones, including the creation of a new army.
| I must have missed a step. How is it obvious? |
Turkey emphasizes the need to take into account the rights of all religious and ethnic minorities. Also, the new Syrian authorities will receive support in the fight against terrorism, hoping first of all to solve the problem of Kurdish groups from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The United States generally welcomes Turkey's increased role in Syrian affairs and is likely to be willing to compromise its support for the SDF. The same applies to its position on protecting ethnic and religious minorities. Now this is also a headache for Turkey.
Washington does not understand the true nature of HTS and does not trust Jolani, so they want to shift all responsibility to Turkey. And Washington will redirect the claims for failures both in the fight against ISIS terrorism and for violence against minorities to Ankara.
There is another weak link in Turkey’s consolidation of its role in Syria: it cannot fully control Jolani, who has always been inclined to play his own game and “screw” his former patrons. In Idlib, the Turks had much more leverage over HTS than they do now.
SYRIA AND THE NEW "ARAB SPRING"
The fall of the Assad regime demonstrated that the Islamic factor in the Middle East continues to play a role and is capable of serving as a basis for consolidation.
If it takes the form of “moderate Islamism” instead of “Salafi jihadism,” it can be accepted by the wider Sunni society, not just its religious part. In this case, the majority refuses to support and defend with arms the rule of secular autocrats. As happened in Syria.
Therefore, political Islam was written off too early. In this regard, we can expect an awakening of Islamic forces in other countries where the "Arab Spring" has passed into "autumn" and finally, it would seem, ended in a "long winter".
Moreover, in most countries affected by the events of the "Arab Spring", the reform processes have not been completed or, more precisely, have not even begun. And all those factors that forced the people to take to the streets in 2011 demanding the departure of the previous governments are still relevant.
The main lesson from the events in Syria is that all attempts to preserve the situation in one country or another and to do without deep transformations, even in the event of a military victory by one of the parties in an internal conflict, promise only a new collapse, social explosion or revolution.
In Syria, the Assad regime refused to engage in substantive dialogue with the opposition, labeling all of its opponents as terrorists, did not take into account the objective factors that caused the civil war in the country, and was intent on returning to the situation of 2011 without any significant changes to the state structure and the system of relations between the government and society.
The fall of the Assad regime also demonstrated that it is not enough to win the war to retain power; to do so, it is also necessary to win the peace.
It is necessary to carry out reforms, and not limit ourselves to demonstrative half-measures. It is necessary to conduct a dialogue with the real opposition, including the armed one, to be able to attract it to the side of the authorities, and not to replace the search for compromises with opponents by creating "tame oppositionists". It is also very important to be able to find the strength to share part of the power in time, so as not to lose everything.
Thus, according to Nikolai Sukhov, "the fall of the Assad regime and the rise to power of HTS underscore the importance of understanding the internal political dynamics and supporting local elites. Despite significant military and diplomatic assistance from Russia, Assad was unable to maintain control over the entire country in the long term. Russia must take into account that supporting authoritarian regimes without taking into account the interests of different ethnic and political groups, as well as without adequate and long-term, rather than one-time, intervention in the process of internal reconciliation, can lead to the collapse of the state."
In this regard, according to the orientalist, Russia’s intervention in the Syrian crisis, despite achieving short-term military goals, did not ensure long-term stability.
“In the future, Russia must be prepared to pay more attention to social, political and economic processes in the countries it supports, ensuring a comprehensive solution to problems, and not just military intervention,” Sukhov notes.
All the same problems that led to the fall of the Assad regime are, in one form or another, inherent in those states where it would seem that the "Arab Spring" was reversed. Be it Egypt or Tunisia. The only difference is the absence of an armed opposition.
But in addition to this, there is a threat of revolutionary changes in the states that are neighboring Syria and closely connected to it, which at the same time find themselves, to one degree or another, drawn into the conflict around Palestine, and the events in this country have a direct and negative impact on their internal political dynamics.
According to Sukhov, the threat of radicalization in Syria and instability in the south of that country will prompt Amman to strengthen security on its northern border, and “in Jordan’s domestic politics, one can predict the strengthening of the influence of local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, up to and including an attempt at a coup and seizure of power by Islamists.”
According to the orientalist, this will also affect Lebanon.
"The loss of support for the Assad regime weakens Hezbollah, which has already changed the Lebanese political dynamics, and forces hostile to Hezbollah are trying to minimize its role in the country's economic and social life, thereby reducing the population's support for the military-political course of this organization. At the same time, the Lebanese economic crisis could be aggravated by new migration flows from Syria and an increased threat of local interfaith conflicts," Sukhov said.
SYRIAN LESSONS
Summing up the events in Syria, it is important for Russia to work on its mistakes in order to avoid them in Africa and other regions of its military presence.
During the Syrian campaign, its initial goals - the fight against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra terrorists - were absolutely correct and understandable. But it soon became clear that the Russian Armed Forces in Syria would support Assad against all his opponents, including the moderate opposition, which, in order not to go beyond the initial objectives, was informally called "moderate terrorists."
This led to Assad, having achieved his goals in the civil war with the help of Russian weapons, becoming increasingly less receptive to signals from Moscow. The Russian side could not encourage the Syrian leadership to reform and properly influence decision-making. And most of the decisions made by Damascus were wrong.
Russia became the victor over ISIS in Syria, but it was unable to simultaneously become the country that put an end to the civil war, launched a full-fledged peace process, and began restoring the economy and returning refugees. To do this, it was necessary to act in defiance of Assad and force his regime to change, rather than follow his wishes.
Thus, by strengthening Assad and doing his job of clearing out any armed opposition, Moscow deprived itself of leverage over Damascus, which became less and less with each successful operation against the opposition.
Conversely, maintaining the situation of at least 2017, with a strong opposition and a process of reconciliation with Assad under Russian auspices, would strengthen Russia's position, turning it into a real guarantor of the implementation of agreements for both Assad and the opposition. And involving the opposition in the work of the government would allow it to begin to climb out of the quagmire of corruption into which the Syrian authorities have driven themselves.
Therefore, in Africa, we should also avoid Russia becoming simply a participant in a civil war instead of fighting terrorist groups, supporting one of the parties that has come to power in much the same way that the Tuaregs want to create their own state, in the same Mali.
In order to strengthen one's influence abroad, it is necessary to create a multi-layered presence, which should not be limited to supporting the government. And when destroying terrorists, it is necessary not to cleanse the armed opposition and rebels, but, on the contrary, to negotiate with them, turning them into one's own proxy forces and allies, and through them to influence the government, including introducing them into its composition.
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