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2024-08-02 Terror Networks
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Gaza deal handed over to Russia's former enemy in Syria
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] After the death of Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, the movement faced the question of who would coordinate its actions in the future. The vacant post was quickly filled by "Palestinian veteran" Khaled Mashal, who has about 40 years of membership in the group behind him. Of these, 20 were spent as head of the Politburo. Despite the fact that Mashal has so far headed this body with the prefix "acting", few doubt his retention in this post. Both Palestinian and Israeli sources call Mashal nothing less than "candidate number one" - despite the fact that a string of supporters and opponents of the deceased Haniyeh is reaching for the throne.
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MANY CONTENDERS
The head of the Politburo is approved by the Shura Council, which includes the most authoritative members of the movement. This usually does not take much time - the first candidate by default is the deputy head and his right hand.
However, this time the situation is complicated by the fact that the "backup" candidate for the post of head of the Politburo, Saleh Aruri, was killed by the Israelis at the beginning of the year | Oh dear. How unfortunate… |
and his place remained vacant until Haniyeh himself was killed. For this reason, the Council will most likely have to choose a successor from among the remaining figures.
In addition to Mashal, Hamas has at least two venerable candidates for the top job: Musa Abu Marzouq, Mashal's predecessor as head of the Politburo, and the group's chief negotiator, Khalil al-Haya. He once achieved a reset in relations with Syria and is now actively involved in the ceasefire talks in Gaza.
The list also includes some mid-level functionaries, notably Nizar Abu Ramadan and Zaher Jabareen. Both have fairly strong positions within the movement, but are unlikely to overtake the favorites.
At the same time, the “living symbol” of Hamas and one of the leaders of its military wing, Yahya Sinwar, despite his personal ambitions, prefers to stay in the shadows so as not to add excitement to the Israeli intelligence services when hunting for him.
At the same time, none of the candidates for the post, including Mashal, enjoys absolute approval. Each demonstrates a clear tilt toward either the military or political wing.
There is no one among the figures presented who is ready to continue the “Haniyeh line” in resolving the situation around Gaza – even the “diplomat” al-Haya is a supporter of a tougher approach to advancing the interests of Hamas, not to mention the conservative Sinwar and Jabareen.
Marzouk, although he appears to be quite reserved and pragmatic, is no longer perceived by some functionaries as a worthy “voice of Hamas” due to his advanced age.
However, against this background, Mashal’s business qualities are advantageously revealed: the ability to subtly sense the situation and promptly adjust the position – both his own and that of his subordinates.
CONTROVERSIAL CANDIDATE
Mashal is persistently positioned as a “compromise” figure who has no “sharp edges” in dialogue with the largest Hamas functionaries. Moreover, his political baggage includes several attempts to overcome the split with other Palestinian factions, in particular with Fatah, which controls the West Bank.
Fatah's warm attitude is also evidenced by the fact that its leader and current Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas expressed condolences over Haniyeh's death to Mashal, and not to any other high-ranking Hamas official.
Meanwhile, the future potential leader of the Politburo has managed to make many enemies during his long career, and most of them come from the "power bloc", of which Sinwar is the unofficial leader. There is also information about tension in the relations between Mashal and Marzouk, who represents the interests of part of the "political" wing.
The bet on Mashal's return to the chair of the Politburo chairman carries some risks for relations with external players - under him, Hamas could have problems with other participants and beneficiaries of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
During the Arab Spring, Mashal and his supporters took up arms against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, joining the anti-government forces, which resulted in them finding themselves on opposite sides of the barricades with Iran and Russia. This led to the expulsion of Hamas from Syria and a cooling of relations with Tehran. The movement has not yet been able to return relations to their previous level.
And although the parties managed to resolve a significant part of the contradictions in 2022, upon Mashal’s return, a certain coldness in relations between Hamas on the one hand and the “friendly three” (Iran, Syria, Lebanese Hezbollah) on the other will likely continue to be felt.
On the other hand, there are also external players who have a positive attitude towards this hypothetical appointee: Turkey and Qatar. Both countries see Mashal as a moderate figure who, unlike other candidates, is ready to balance within the framework of the given “rules of the game.”
The loyalty of Ankara and Doha is also important for Hamas because the main economic flows are routed through them, and the financial well-being of the group and the effectiveness of the “political office” largely depend on the willingness of Turkey and Qatar to “turn a blind eye” to dubious transactions.
China will be quite calm about Mashal's return. Beijing does not see personnel changes within Hamas as a threat to the previously signed "Declaration of Unity" of the Palestinian factions.
On the contrary, stable contacts between Mashal and Abbas could benefit the inter-Palestinian settlement process.
The potential head of the Politburo is also quite neutral towards Russia: despite his “anti-Assad” positions, he has attended negotiations in Moscow several times. And with the resolution of tensions between Hamas and Damascus in 2022, the potential divisive factor has disappeared from the agenda by itself.
As a result, with the death of Haniyeh, the course towards reconciling Palestinian political groups in a configuration favorable to Moscow and Beijing will probably not be reversed.
There are far more questions about the "peace plan" for Gaza: even being a pragmatist, Mashal is unlikely to accept the demands of the Israeli side now. Especially since such a step would be perceived by his numerous opponents as an unforgivable weakness and betrayal.
In light of this, negotiations on the release of detainees, as well as a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, will most likely remain in limbo.
However, Mashal is unlikely to demonstratively withdraw from the deal on his own initiative, so as not to accidentally spoil the diplomatic game for Qatar and other interested parties.
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Posted by badanov 2024-08-02 00:00||
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