Article

2007-08-01 Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Russia getting worried about security of Pak nukes or just yapping?

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Posted by 3dc 2007-08-01 01:08|| || Front Page|| [2 views ] Top

#1 We should all "worry."

Posted by Besoeker 2007-08-01 04:18|| 2007-08-01 04:18|| Front Page Top

#2 DOH!

Posted by newc">newc 2007-08-01 05:58|| 2007-08-01 05:58|| Front Page Top

#3 Decent article. It covers core issues about the security of Pakistan's arsenal:

What if extremists come to power in Pakistan who prefer nuclear jihad to sane policies? That is just as improbable. First, however hotly such people might call on others to carry out acts of suicide terrorism, they are in no hurry to set an example.

I'm not sure about this. Khomeini was fine with Iran being incinerated if Islam would emerge victorious. You can be sure Pakistan has more than a few hotheads like Khomeini running around.

Second, Pakistan has a powerful army drilled and organized along Western lines, which keeps the radical clergy in check and will never let fanatics make major policy decisions, especially nuclear ones-suffice it to recall the tough action at the Red Mosque.

This is the same army that is hopelessly in bed with the ISI so that does not lend anyone with a brain very much assurance.

Can the Pakistani authorities tolerate nukes smuggled out in secret or sold to other countries or non-state actors? That is hardly probable, with the danger it implies for Pakistan. The world's leading powers-terrorists' main targets-will surely launch an armed intervention if things take that turn.

Just as with Khan not being made available for interrogation by Western agencies, Pakistan has refused IAEA representatives any interviews with their other nuclear scientists. It's pretty safe to assume that Pakistan has not submitted specimens of its bomb grade nuclear materials for cataloging.

Lack of an isotopic fingerprint might embolden some extremists with the notion of plausible deniability. Current world leadership in no way exhibits the spine needed to let Pakistan know that any terrorist nuclear attack will result in their immediate immolation. Only this sort of unconditional retaliation can serve as the slightest deterrent to these rogue regimes.

Is there any chance of Pakistani nukes being stolen or accidentally blowing up? Here, the answer is not so clear-the world knows too little about the Pakistani arsenal's storage and maintenance. We have nothing but the reassurances repeatedly coming from the country's leaders.

Those "reassurances" simply are not enough. The only guaranteed solution is to confiscate Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Nothing less will eliminate the problem.

It is essential to rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons blowing up by accident or being tampered with demand. Otherwise, they will be suicidal weapons and targets for terrorists. The developed nuclear countries have always paid tremendous attention to safety, with sophisticated codes, safety interlocks, and so on, leaving no chance of using stolen weapons or obtaining fissionable substances from them. A unified comprehensive safety network leaves nothing to chance in manufacturing, transporting and stockpiling nuclear arms, to say nothing of decision-making on their use.

"One Point" safetywhereby accidentally triggering one part of the warhead's explosive lenses will not yield a full detonationis a methodology and technology that is probably well beyond the engineering capabilities of Pakistan's scientists. Political instability, doctrinal motivation for aggressive use, compromised arsenal security and inadequate fusing safety interlocks all converge to pose the threat of a perfect nuclear firestorm.

What's the situation in Pakistan? That is the crucial question as we assess its nuclear threat. It took the developed countries decades and huge amounts of money to get their safety system going. Such systems demand the latest technologies in many fields of science and production. Pakistan is not known, with any certainty, to possess such technologies.

As mentioned above, "inshalla" isn't an adequate substitute for One Point safety. An excerpt from SDA Vol. 4, NO. 2:

Hydronuclear and hydrodynamic testing

Nuclear weapons designers have been using hydrodynamic testing as well as full-scale testing for designing new weapons, which includes ensuring their safety. Since full-scale testing would be ended by a comprehensive test ban, some scientists claim that testing at some level, such as hydronuclear testing, is essential for determining the safety of nuclear weapons. In particular, such testing can be important for helping to determine what is called "one-point safety" or "single-point safety" of warheads in the absence of full-scale testing. One point safety means ensuring a nuclear explosion will not result if any point on the conventional explosive that surrounds the fissile material were accidentally detonated. The purpose of determining one-point safety is to help prevent accidental detonations of nuclear weapons. The United States has used nuclear tests extensively to determine one-point safety since 1955. During the 1958-1961 moratorium, Los Alamos put together a program for hydronuclear testing for studying one-point safety. The risks of a failure to determine one-point safety prior to putting a warhead into production have therefore been recognized for well over three decades.
[emphasis added]

Pakistan's highly-enriched-uranium weapons are rather simple to handle. So, if stolen, their uranium could be used in homemade explosive devices.

Without an isotopic fingerprint, there would be no way to attribute the source of the radiological material. The rogue nature of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal represents an intrinsic threat to global security and should be treated as such. It is vital to remember that rogue nations and tyrannies have no sovereign rights.

[snip]

The starting point lies where Pakistani interests coincide with those of the world-which means the technical safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal must be guaranteed.

Without IAEA compliance and a more determined effort to obliterate Islamic terrorist indoctrination within its borders there is no way that Pakistan can provide the least assurances to the global community. Long before any significant threat is allowed to materialize, it would be far better to declare Pakistan a failed state and give it the option of surrendering its nuclear arsenal or face total destruction at the hands of a coalition of free countries.

Posted by Zenster">Zenster 2007-08-01 13:47|| 2007-08-01 13:47|| Front Page Top

#4 well beyond the engineering capabilities of Pakistan's scientists.

Pakistan probably doesn't have scientists capable of actually designing nuclear weapons.

Note their so called tests in 98 - hurried emplacement in a tunnel and detonation. No real attempt to record data according to US intel sources.

These are not scientists. They are technicians - capable of following detailed Chinese instructions to assemble Chinese designed weapons.

Likewise for North Korea which only last year began building bicycles using imported Chinese technology.

MD Nalapat asks a good question: since neither Pakistan nor North Korea has ever built a tractor, a motorcycle or a high speed lathe, why do we all assume they can design nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles?

Posted by john frum 2007-08-01 15:23|| 2007-08-01 15:23|| Front Page Top

#5 Thank you for the confirmation, John Frum. This only serves to concrete my position that Pakistan must be given an ultimatum regarding further proliferation and abandonment of its nuclear weapons. They cannot be trusted with a fountain pen, much less atomic bombs.

Posted by Zenster">Zenster 2007-08-01 15:45|| 2007-08-01 15:45|| Front Page Top

#6 The downstream problem is that even if marginal countries like Pakistan don't use their nukes, they are so susceptible to regular overthrow that you never know who's going to end up with a couple of dozen A-bombs

Posted by Skunky Omins9743 2007-08-01 16:31|| 2007-08-01 16:31|| Front Page Top

#7 Marginal countries do not have the technical/scientific or industrial capacity to build these types of weapons.

This is a Chinese origin problem...

Posted by john frum 2007-08-01 17:52|| 2007-08-01 17:52|| Front Page Top

#8 Does anybody have an idea of what the lifetime of Chinese design nukes is?

Posted by James">James 2007-08-01 22:59|| http://idontknowbut.blogspot.com]">[http://idontknowbut.blogspot.com] 2007-08-01 22:59|| Front Page Top

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