Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Israel and Yemen's Houthis (Ansar Allah) are stepping up their attacks, clashing at least three times in the past week.
The parties do not intend to stop there, which means the exchange of blows will continue.
But as the Gaza crisis (which triggered the conflict between the Houthis and Tel Aviv) approaches its two-year mark, the sides have fewer and fewer tools to create real tensions in the opponent's camp.
NEW TECHNOLOGIES
On August 22, the Houthis attacked the terminal of Ben Gurion International Airport, located in Tel Aviv.
The rebels said the strike was carried out by a Palestine-2 hypersonic missile, designed "specifically to deter Israel," and was meant to serve as a reminder that the movement was still at war with the Jewish state.
Israeli TV channels reported that the missile "fell apart in mid-air" and did not cause much damage to the airport infrastructure. However, the subsequent military investigation shifted the focus: Yemeni rebels launched a carrier with a cluster warhead toward Israel for the first time.
Moreover, an examination of the missile's flight path, as well as debris and fragments found at the site of the impact, led the military to the conclusion that an Iranian-made Khorramshahr ballistic missile was used to strike Ben-Gurion.
This came as a surprise to Tel Aviv, as the Khorramshahrs are considered a relatively new product of the Iranian military-industrial complex, and their mass production has not yet been established. Even during the 12-day war with Israel, Tehran used only three such warheads and has not previously been known to transfer such complex and expensive arsenals to its proxies.
Against this backdrop, Israeli alarmists recalled a recent interview with Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, who spoke of the deployment of “dozens of secret missile production facilities on the territory of third countries.”
The Houthis' acquisition of advanced Iranian missiles was seen as the first indirect sign of the veracity of these statements.
COUNTER MOVE
The Israelis' response was not long in coming.
Already on August 24, a group of IDF fighters entered Yemeni airspace from the Saudi Arabian side and struck the capital, which is under the control of the Houthis.
The targets of the raid were the presidential palace, the Asar and Khizaz power plants, and a fuel storage facility. There were also reports of an attack on a “military camp” located on the outskirts of the palace, where Iranian “engineer advisers” were allegedly stationed. However, these rumors were not subsequently confirmed objectively.
It is worth noting that the Israeli strikes are designed more for political than military effect.
Thus, the raid on the presidential palace was more symbolic in nature - in Tel Aviv they know very well that it is used by the Houthi leadership exclusively as a ceremonial building, and the movement's leadership does not live there permanently.
Fuel and energy facilities were attacked with the aim of increasing social tension in rebel-controlled territory.
Military facilities (barracks and air defense batteries) were not damaged during the air raid.
CRISIS OF IDEAS
Although the intensity of the exchange of blows between Israel and Yemen does not decrease, it is increasingly clear that the opponents have found themselves in an ideological impasse.
The Houthis are concerned about the fact that rocket launches from their territory are no longer perceived as a challenge to the Israeli authorities. The repelling of strikes from Yemen on land and at sea is taking place in the background, and not only the world but also the local press has practically stopped paying attention to the Yemeni actions.
With Israel stepping up its offensive in the Gaza Strip to take final control of the enclave, the Houthis need to up the ante again to draw away some of the enemy's forces and resources.
In this context, the launch of the Iranian Khorramshahr missile can be considered a kind of "touchstone". If Ansar Allah manages to convince Tel Aviv to establish mass production of advanced ballistics, it will have to constantly monitor the Yemeni direction, reducing attention to other areas of the "Axis of Resistance" activity.
Israel faces a similar "crisis of action."
Tel Aviv is unable to effectively contain the Houthis by carrying out symbolic airstrikes on energy and military infrastructure. Moreover, due to Yemen’s geographical remoteness, Israeli security forces have a very vague idea of the situation “on the ground” and are forced to strike “at the squares” in the hope of hitting one of the high-ranking rebels.
It is no wonder that even after almost two years of conflict in Gaza, the Houthi movement remains the leader in terms of the survival rate of its command staff among Iranian proxy groups.
SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY
Israel is still not ready to deploy a full-fledged strike force against Ansar Allah: Yemen is not included in the category of priority theaters of military operations and is inferior to Lebanon and Iraq in terms of potential risk.
Moreover, none of the countries neighboring Yemen is ready to take responsibility and “shelter” a punitive expedition by creating a transit base for the Israelis on its territory; there is a high risk of encountering not only retaliatory steps by the Houthis, but also retaliatory actions by Iran.
For this reason, Tel Aviv is looking for ways to shift responsibility for containing the Houthis to regional partners, especially those who already have established networks of influence in Yemen.
For example, a few days before the start of the latest wave of clashes between Israel and the Houthis, a delegation of Israeli officials headed by Minister of Strategic Planning Ron Dermer secretly arrived in the UAE.
In addition to discussing the situation in Gaza (the official purpose of the visit), the Israeli counterparts several times emphasized the need to stabilize the situation in the Red Sea – de facto, to contain the Houthis by force. And in this case, the large base of Yemeni loyalists on Abu Dhabi’s balance sheet could help temporarily distract Ansar Allah from the “Israeli front.”
Judging by the tone of the statements made by the Emirati authorities following the meeting about their commitment to a diplomatic settlement of the situation in the Red Sea, the Israelis never achieved their goals.
However, the UAE is not the only potential “helper” in pacifying the Houthis. Tel Aviv has a chance to reach an agreement with other major players, be it Saudi Arabia or Turkey. The only question is what dividends the Israelis will be ready to offer to hypothetical allies in exchange for a guaranteed escalation with Iran.
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