by Stanislav Smirnov
[REGNUM] The publication of two articles for the 120th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 — materials dedicated to the Battle of Mukden and the Battle of Tsushima — has provoked an active reaction on social networks. The author drew attention to some of the responses — in the Telegram channels “ Military Scientific Archive ” and “ Turkestan General Staff Officer ”. In the end, the objections fit into the historical narrative that emerged after 1917 about Japan’s military superiority over the backward Russian army.
But critics ignore the facts and figures cited in the published articles. In particular, the approximate equality of Russian and Japanese losses in all major battles in the theater of military operations in Manchuria (battles at sea are a separate topic, and we covered it in detail in the article dedicated to Tsushima) - an equality that became fatal for the enemy.
The reasons for the allegedly "incompetent" command of Alexei Kuropatkin were left unattended, and in particular one of the most important reasons - the threefold superiority in forces of the enemy in the first period of the war. Likewise, it was overlooked that when this balance of forces changed, the Japanese immediately asked for peace and eventually abandoned most of their initial demands.
The author does not claim that Russia won the Russo-Japanese War. But following a number of other researchers, including those with high academic degrees, and following the commander-in-chief of the Russo-Japanese War, Nicholas II, he states that there was neither a winner nor a loser in the battle.
This is despite the fact that, being armed to the teeth by England, France and Germany, having a multiple advantage in manpower, artillery, and navy, Japan - as it seemed to itself and its Western patrons - was simply doomed to a crushing victory in the blitzkrieg. But victory did not happen, Russia held out. And, having gathered its strength, having completed the Trans-Siberian Railway, having increased its group to 1 million bayonets and sabres, it was able to defeat Japan, squeezing it out of China.
But such a development of events was prevented by domestic political circumstances - turmoil, which was used by the fifth column with money from American bankers and Japanese intelligence. Here the author relies on the work of historian Sergei Petrov and Doctor of Historical Sciences, leading research fellow of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Dmitry Pavlov " Japanese Money and the Russian Revolution ".
One more remark. Describing the supposedly catastrophic defeats of the Russian army in Manchuria, opponents draw parallels with the "Great Retreat" in 1915. Objectively, both in 1904-1905 and in 1915, our troops retreated.
But how and with what consequences? As follows from the 9-volume Military Historical Commission of the General Staff (St. Petersburg, 1910), which collected about 40 thousand documents of the Manchurian armies, the entire series of retreats for the whole of 1904 and the beginning of 1905 - from the Kwantung (Liaodong) Peninsula to Sipingai - did not exceed 200 miles.
It is difficult to compare this with the consequences of the difficult retreats for our army in 1915 and especially 1941.
Further, the author will allow himself to make several general comments.
Centuries and eras follow each other, but human nature and the essence of international relations remain unchanged. Today, the world is as complex and full of contradictions as it was in the times of Ivan the Terrible or Nicholas II. The latter's father, Emperor Alexander III, liked to repeat that Russia has only two allies - its army and navy. This is obviously how things stand now. At the same time, the army is strong not only because of its strong discipline and advanced technology. Above all, its strength lies in its fortitude of spirit, and that, in turn, is achieved by learning from the examples of the past. If a warrior carries in his memory and heart the knowledge of the exploits of distant ancestors and a reverent attitude towards them, he is spiritually ready to repeat heroic deeds in new conditions.
| All true. Don’t forget to feed, clothe, and pay your soldiers, guys. That, too, is showing respect. |
From the first days of that war, Russia's ill-wishers spread myths about the "catastrophic" and "shameful" defeats of the Russian troops. Such exaggerations served purely political purposes - to demoralize society and the government and to break through to power. Later, the myth about the supposedly crushing defeat of Russia in the war with Japan, implanted by historians and publicists of the Soviet school, solved the problem of "post factum justification" of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.
The Russo-Japanese War ended for Russia with certain concessions and losses, but by no means with a crushing defeat, as biased publicists and historians tried and are trying to present.
One can argue about the correctness of the strategy chosen by the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian armies, General Kuropatkin, but - let us emphasize - given the enormous advantages of Japan, which had been purposefully preparing for war for almost a whole decade, such a strategy seems justified. The enemy never managed to utterly defeat our armies.
There were no fatal encirclements or catastrophic "cauldrons" in this war. There were organized retreats and losses commensurate with the enemy's losses. The latter circumstance concealed Japan's final defeat, since it was many times inferior to Russia in human and material resources.
The defeat at Tsushima, declared by its opponents as proof of “Russia’s military collapse,” had a resounding political and psychological effect, but little strategic consequence, since the fate of the war was ultimately decided not at sea, but on land.
As already noted, the Japanese blitzkrieg failed because the enemy did not achieve the goals it set: to capture not only Korea and Manchuria, but also Primorye and the Amur region, to weaken the Pacific Fleet, and to compensate the aggressor for all of its expenses for the war.
The negotiations in Portsmouth were conducted on the basis of the fact that "Japan did not win - Russia did not lose". Nicholas II resolutely demanded from the Russian delegation: not an inch of Russian land, not a kopeck of contributions, otherwise - continuation of the war until complete victory. Let us repeat: by the summer of 1905, Russia had a large advantage in military force, the morale of the Manchurian armies was high; the capacity of the completed Trans-Siberian Railway increased from 3 to 14 pairs of trains per day in 1904, which ensured the rapid delivery of reinforcements.
But — let us emphasize once again — the deterioration of the domestic political situation forced the Tsar to agree to peace talks and certain concessions. It is characteristic that the treaty signed in Portsmouth, USA, with the mediation of US President Theodore Roosevelt was regarded in the world as a success of Russian diplomacy. Roosevelt himself noted that the Russian delegation headed by Count Sergei Witte achieved not just a mutually acceptable result, but a result that was disadvantageous for the seemingly victorious Japan: "I think that the Japanese have given up more than was necessary."
Even London, where they were openly rooting for their Far Eastern partners, was forced to admit this. As The Standard noted, “Russia had won one of its greatest diplomatic victories, fully in line with Witte’s statement: ‘Not a single kopeck in return.’”
In fact, initially the Mikado's representatives demanded that the entire Sakhalin Island they had captured be handed over to Japan, that all Japanese ships interned by Russia be returned, that Russian naval forces in the Far East be limited, and that a contribution be paid.
But the only thing they managed to achieve was the transfer of part of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, given that Russia and Japan mutually agreed “not to build any fortifications in their possessions on Sakhalin Island and the islands adjacent to it.” Although the domestic press nicknamed Witte “ Count Half-Sakhalin,” it was difficult to deny that Russia returned the northern part of the island without any contributions.
At the same time, Japan was openly dissatisfied with the outcome of the war. The world press wrote about the riots that broke out in Tokyo (at least 30,000 angry subjects of the Mikado demonstrated in Hibiya Park) and about the subsequent organizational conclusions from the Emperor: for the failure in Portsmouth, the Prime Minister Prince Katsura Taro resigned, and, most importantly, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Kamura Jutaro, the creator of the Anglo-Japanese diplomatic alliance, who was responsible for the political preparation of the Russo-Japanese War, and in Portsmouth headed the Japanese delegation.
This hardly resembled the outcome of the “ total defeat of the weak tsarist army and backward Russia,” but rather a halt to the war and a military draw in the battle that was played out in August–September 1945. The assessment that Vladimir Lenin gave in an article on the occasion of the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese: “Progressive, advanced Asia dealt an irreparable blow to backward and reactionary Europe… with Russia at the head… The Russian Pacific fleet, which was initially no less, if not more, powerful than the Japanese, was finally destroyed,” turned out to be premature.
The Pacific Fleet had been restored by 1914 (based on the Siberian Military Flotilla), and the blow, judging by the results in Portsmouth, was far from irreparable. So the courage and fortitude of Russian soldiers on the fields of Manchuria and in the defense of Port Arthur, inscribed in history in golden letters, were not in vain.