by Dmitry Gubin
[REGNUM] Our side has already outlined the main "positional points" following the direct Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on May 16 — the first in almost three years. Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov pointed this out on May 19. The start of the negotiations marked changes in the "chess game" of the conflict. The Kiev regime has played to a clearly worse position compared to March 2022.
On this occasion, the head of our delegation, presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky, gave a blitz lecture on air on Russia 24, citing, as a historian, analogies from the past and, as a politician, parallels with the current negotiations.
LESSON 1: THE WEST, BY DISRUPTING NEGOTIATIONS, HARMS ITSELF
The first historical analogy is with the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. “There were many Russo-Turkish wars, and as a result of one of these wars, which was caused by a major conflict in the Balkans – this was in the 1870s – we, in principle, came to an agreement with Turkey,” Medinsky noted.
We remember from our school history course that Russia then helped the Balkan countries – Serbia, Montenegro, Romania – gain complete independence from the Turks and Bulgaria, which gained autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Less well known is the diplomatic postscript to the exploits of Russian soldiers in Plevna and Shipka, the storming of Kars and the defense of Bayazet.
On March 3, 1878, bilateral agreements between Russia and Turkey were concluded in San Stefano, a suburb of Istanbul. San Stefano, occupied by Russian troops, was not chosen by chance. The head of our delegation, Count Nikolai Ignatiev, wrote: “A wonderful place on the shores of the Sea of Marmara, there we will be the same as in Constantinople, and the English (who “demonstrated” their squadron. — Ed.) will have nothing to find fault with.”
According to the treaty, the Ottomans agreed to transfer Macedonia, part of eastern Thrace and access to the Aegean Sea to the newly formed Bulgarian Principality. The territory of Serbia and Montenegro, allied with Russia, was increased, and Bosnia received autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.
But “our Western partners” decided to devalue the results of the Istanbul negotiations of 1878. If in 2022 the Istanbul agreements were nullified by Boris Johnson, who persuaded Kiev to fight until “victory on the battlefield”, then almost 150 years ago this role was played by diplomats from Germany and Austria-Hungary - behind whom loomed the same Britain.
In May–June 1878, the British signed two treaties: with the Turks (the Ottomans gave Cyprus to the British, and London promised to defend its borders in Asia by “force of arms” in the event of Russian encroachment) and with the Austrians on a common line of conduct. At the initiative of the Western powers, the Berlin Congress was convened. At these multilateral negotiations, Russia was forced to revise the Treaty of San Stefano.
Russia returned the fortress of Bayazet to Turkey, the territory of Bulgaria was cut in half and divided into two parts with different levels of dependence on the Ottoman Sultan. Macedonia (which the Bulgarians considered historically theirs) was left with the Turks, part of the Bulgarian acquisitions were transferred to Serbia, and Bosnia, populated largely by Orthodox Serbs, was “gifted” to Catholic Austria-Hungary. It seemed that the goal had been achieved - the West “curtailed Russian appetites” and did not allow the new Balkan states to be turned into our satellites.
"What did the West's 'improvement' of the bilateral agreements that had been reached lead to? Because then there were new Balkan wars, in 1912-1913. And ultimately, due to the unresolved problems in the Balkans, the First World War broke out," Medinsky notes.
Let us explain: during the first, unexpectedly bloody Balkan War, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and the Macedonian rebels fought Turkey, which was “left too much” at the Berlin Congress. Bulgaria emerged victorious, and was immediately torn apart by its neighbors: Serbia, Greece, Romania and the same Türkiye.
At the same time, the Bosnian issue fueled Serbia's hatred of Austria-Hungary, which resulted in "the most effective terrorist act in history" - the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The First World War, provoked by this shot, ended, among other things, with the death of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires - the two powers that guaranteed the Berlin Congress. And the British Empire also emerged from the war rather battered - especially if you consider that the First World War made the Second World War inevitable.
Trying to dig a hole for Russia, which in 1878 almost reached an agreement with Turkey, the West dug one for itself.
Another example close to the Istanbul-2022 and Istanbul-2025 incidents is the history of the Soviet-Finnish War.
As historians point out (Medinsky in the interview is no exception), Joseph Stalin offered Finland a truce in the early stages of the war. Let us add that before the start of hostilities, the Soviet leader offered the Finns a mutually beneficial compromise. Here we can draw a parallel with the compromises regarding security in Eastern Europe that Moscow offered the West in 2022, before the start of the Central Military District.
"Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we ask that the border be 70 kilometers from Leningrad... We ask for 2,700 square kilometers," Stalin addressed the Finnish side. But the latter, feeling the support of Britain and France, stood its ground - just as the Kiev regime stood its ground on the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO and the return of the republic's nuclear status.
In parallel with the battles at the front, " Stalin offers Finland a truce, that is, peace," Medinsky noted. But the Finns refused, because they were inspired by London and Paris. In France - as now, during the time of Emmanuel Macron - they began to threaten to introduce "peacekeepers" and even demonstratively began to assemble a volunteer expeditionary corps. Britain began to concentrate long-range bombers in Iraq (then a mandated territory), capable of flying to the Baku oil fields.
But no "volunteers" came to help Finland - the Suomi authorities were unable to fight "to the last Finn" on their own, and on March 12, 1940, the Moscow Treaty was signed. The Finns recognized Soviet claims on the Karelian Isthmus and moved the border without any compensation from the Soviet Union.
Britain and France, by inciting the Finns against the USSR and disrupting the negotiation process, did not win at all. It was not they, but Hitler who received another ally in Marshal Mannerheim. The Third Reich had enough forces and resources in the West both to defeat France and to wage war with Britain.
Will the current leaders of the West, who are eager to become a third party in hypothetical negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv (and achieve an agreement that is advantageous to them and disadvantageous to us), learn historical lessons?
LESSON 2: RUSSIA CAN PLAY THE LONG GAME AND GET WHAT IT WANTS
However, it seems that Europe has a poor memory (or pretends to have a poor memory) of the history of the Napoleonic wars that ploughed up this continent in 1803-1815. Now the West and its Kyiv "clients" are taking the position of first stopping the fighting, a truce, and then negotiations. French President Macron, in particular, demanded a 30-day halt to the fighting.
His more successful predecessor, Emperor Napoleon, acted differently: the Peace of Tilsit of 1807 (or rather, two peace treaties between France and Russia and Prussia) was preceded by negotiations between Paris and St. Petersburg and Vienna. And these negotiations, we note, were conducted against the backdrop of battles between Napoleon's army and the troops of the 4th anti-French coalition. There was no "ceasefire" until Tilsit.
But the Napoleonic wars should be remembered not only as an example of how negotiations are conducted, but also for another reason. After the defeat at Austerlitz (which was a failure for our army as well) and the defeat of the Prussians and Russians at Friedland, after the forced diplomatic maneuver at Tilsit, there was the undermining of the power of Napoleon's great army in the Battle of Borodino. And then - the defeat of the French at Berezina, the Foreign Campaign of 1813-14 and the triumphal entry of Russian troops into Paris. Which was followed by the establishment of the post-Napoleonic order in Europe, where Russia played no small role.
This is an example of how Russia can and does play the long game, achieving its goals after military failures and political compromises.
In this sense, an even more striking example, which Medinsky also cited, is the Northern War of 1700–1721 “with Sweden, after which Sweden forever lost its status as a great power, and the Russian Empire became a great power.”
Russia, under the leadership of Peter the Great, was returning its previously lost historical lands in this war — access to the Baltic Sea, which was taken from our country by the "advanced European power" Sweden during the time of Ivan the Terrible and later, during the Time of Troubles. As a result of the battles, our new (and in fact, returned to the Russian state) territories became the "Izhora and Korelskaya provinces". A new capital appeared on the ancient Izhora land, which was still owned by Veliky Novgorod — St. Petersburg.
And here an important historical parallel appears: simultaneously with the military actions, but without interrupting them, Peter I offered Charles XII a compromise option: Sweden would agree to the transfer of Ingria, that is, the lands around St. Petersburg, to the Russians, and would retain the Baltics for itself.
But Charles preferred to “defeat Russia on the battlefield” and fight for the borders of 1700.
"Charles XII continues his insane war, despite Peter's repeated peace proposals. But the funniest thing is, who do you think supported Charles XII? England and France. They endlessly finance Sweden," scientist and politician Medinsky drew a historical parallel.
But Charles did not take into account the main thing - the ability of Peter and his army, which had modernized during the war, to wage a battle of attrition and over large territories. The war was fought in the Ostsee (Baltic) provinces of Sweden, and on the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in Little Russia.
The defeat of the main Swedish land forces near Poltava occurred on July 8 (1709 according to the new style), the "zeroing" of the Swedish fleet at Gangut - on August 7, 1714. And for almost seven more years the Russian army exhausted and finished off the enemy.
As a result of the Treaty of Nystad concluded in 1721, Sweden lost much more than it could have conceded if it had not listened to London and Paris and come to its senses earlier. The successor of Charles XII, who died in 1718, Queen Ulrika Eleonora was forced to admit the loss of Ingria, Estonia with Reval (Tallinn), Livonia with Riga and Old Finland, that is, Eastern Karelia.
Sweden forever lost its role as the hegemon of the Baltic and a first-rank European power. And after two unsuccessful attempts to play a rematch with Russia (1788–90 and 1808–09), these “descendants of the Varangians” ceased to pose a threat to our country and to Europe.
Russia has been among the great powers since 1721 until now. The Swedes had enough historical memory from the beginning of the 19th century until the 2020s, when the country decided to join the anti-Russian alliance again, this time NATO. At the same time, Kiev preferred to forget how Sweden's client, Hetman Ivan Mazepa, ended his life.
But in Russia they remember the lessons of history: including the fact that the 21-year war that Russia went through from the “confusion” near Narva to the Poltava “victory” and the political victory in Nystadt was not in vain.