by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] On May 6, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi announced a ceasefire between the Ansar Allah movement (Yemeni Houthis) and the United States.
The Omani Foreign Minister said the Sultanate had facilitated contacts and discussions on de-escalation prospects between the United States and relevant authorities in Sanaa. These efforts, the minister said, led to a ceasefire agreement between the two sides.
“In the future, neither side will attack the other, including American ships, in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, ensuring freedom of navigation and uninterrupted international commercial shipping,” Albusaidi concluded.
The Donald Trump administration confirmed the ceasefire had been reached.
If we lift the veil from Trump's loud statements, where he called the Houthis' agreement to a ceasefire a "capitulation," the agreement, in essence, became Washington's admission of its inability to achieve a quick victory in Yemen and achieve the objectives of the operation.
"SVO - two weeks to victory, Comrade!"
This time, the United States did not have a “small victorious war” that the White House could have credited as an asset.
Despite large-scale airstrikes that began in March 2025 (although the limited Operation Guardian of Prosperity itself has been underway since early 2024), the US military has failed to break Ansar Allah's resistance.
Efforts to prevent Houthi attacks on ships and to stop them from striking Israel have also been unsuccessful.
In the run-up to the deal, the Houthis have been shelling the Jewish state daily as part of their operation to support Gaza, most notably the successful launch of a ballistic missile that penetrated air defenses at Ben Gurion Airport on May 4.
By the way, Ansar Allah does not intend to stop attacks on Israel even after the ceasefire with the United States was signed: immediately after its announcement, Israeli air defense intercepted a drone.
The continuation of military actions by the American administration against the Houthis threatened to develop into a protracted and resource-intensive campaign.
Thus, the ceasefire, brokered by Oman, demonstrates the White House’s desire to avoid a repeat of the “forever wars” scenario from which Trump tried to withdraw the United States during his last presidential term by announcing the winding down of the Pentagon and allied operations in Afghanistan.
Of course, the American president can report that he has now achieved that the attacks on ships will cease. In fact, he has already rushed to do this.
But for most experts it is obvious that this result was not the result of the US military campaign, but rather the efforts of Oman and Iran to persuade Ansar Allah to refrain from its naval operations.
The Houthis, having retained their military potential, are capable of resuming the military campaign at any moment.
Thus, the ceasefire is intended only to mask the US strategic helplessness in the region.
It highlights the chaotic and thoughtless nature of the decisions of the new administration, which is pursuing unclear goals.
NO PLANNING, NO GOALS
According to The New York Times, in the first three weeks of the operation, the US spent $200 million in ammunition, destroying only a small part of Ansar Allah's military infrastructure.
The Houthis, using a network of underground tunnels built under former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which they strengthened and expanded, have preserved their missile arsenal and fleet of drones.
| Have they, indeed? |
This was despite the fact that the B-2s were using GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), the most powerful non-nuclear bombs in the US arsenal.
| Which did not destroy the tunnels? |
As a result, American commanders expressed concern about the depletion of stockpiles of heavy munitions, which are critical to deterring China.
Moreover, the continuation of the campaign against the Houthis played into Iran's hands, since the American arsenals of the most powerful weapons were, in essence, being emptied to no purpose.
And if negotiations between Tehran and Washington fail, they could be needed to intimidate the Islamic Republic.
The operation became an example of how expensive technologies alone, without lengthy preparation and clear planning, do not guarantee a quick resolution of a crisis.
Unlike Israel's actions against Hezbollah, the Americans and Israelis did not know exactly where Yemeni weapons were being stored or where the enemy's command posts were located.
| One wonders what the Israelis now know that they did not know before… |
| On the ground or listening via exploding pagers? |
Moreover, the Houthis, despite the American attacks, continued to take effective countermeasures.
Back in April–May 2024, seven American MQ-9 Reaper UAVs (each costing $30 million) were shot down over Yemen.
The Americans also lost two F/A-18 Super Hornet carrier fighters during emergency maneuvers of the aircraft carrier Dwight Eisenhower to repel missile attacks.
The losses highlighted the US Navy's vulnerability to asymmetric threats and called into question the effectiveness of its "war at a distance" strategy.
That is why the Trump administration began to seriously consider a ground operation as the only means of neutralizing the Houthis.
THE FAILED INVASION
In April 2025, reports emerged that the Trump administration was considering supporting a UAE-sponsored offensive by local militants to seize the port of Hodeida, a key weapons supply point.
Private American contractors have already held consultations with Yemeni militias, but plans for an invasion have had to be abandoned for a number of reasons.
First of all, this operation did not fit into Trump’s “peacekeeping initiatives” and, on the contrary, promised another “eternal war” instead of ending at least one.
In addition, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, which concluded a ceasefire with the Houthis back in 2022, categorically opposed such a scenario.
They had no intention of returning to confrontation or even providing their ports and airspace to the Americans for attacks on Yemen.
Trump's attempts to draw Egypt into his military campaign also ended in failure. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi rejected such proposals as unacceptable, calling a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip "the best way to stop the Houthis."
Even the deployment of a limited American contingent on the Socotra archipelago, proposed by the UAE, was not implemented due to fears of an escalation of the conflict.
Trump therefore chose not to bet on direct intervention in the Yemeni conflict, focusing on containing Tehran by other means and concluding a new “nuclear deal” with it.
It is clear that the strategy of intimidating Iran through the campaign in Yemen has not worked and, on the contrary, its completion may bring the agreement closer.
Moreover, ahead of his visit to the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, scheduled for May 16, Trump would like to appear as an envoy of peace, not war.
This is more in line with its original positioning and the expectations of its Arab Middle Eastern partners.
A TRUSTED BROKER
Oman, traditionally a neutral broker in the Middle East, played a key role in brokering the truce, focusing on achieving a specific goal: ending attacks on shipping in the Red Sea.
It is important to note that the negotiations did not include the issue of Houthi attacks on Israel. Thus, Omani diplomacy succeeded in de-escalating the maritime conflict by deliberately leaving the issue of support for Palestine outside the agreement.
As Gulf State Analytics expert Giorgio Cafiero explained : "Oman acted strictly within the mandate: to stop a threat to shipping that affected the global economy. The Houthis' policy towards Israel is a separate issue, linked to their ideology and regional alliances . "
This approach allowed Oman to maintain the trust of all parties by avoiding discussion of the Houthis' support for Gaza, a "red line" for them.
THE HOUTHIS AND THE "NUCLEAR DEAL"
It is obvious that the agreement is situational and does not resolve the underlying contradictions. Nevertheless, it can be considered as a first step towards a comprehensive settlement.
An end to attacks on ships should reduce tensions and create a platform for broader agreements, from a Gaza deal to resuming the stalled nuclear dialogue with Iran.
It is obvious that Oman, which has influence on the Houthis, and even more so their ally Iran, also exerted the necessary pressure on the leadership of Ansar Allah so that it agreed to accept this deal with the United States.
The agreement allowed Trump to emerge without losses from the difficult situation he had gotten himself into.
Oman now hopes that the US administration will be more accommodating and return to the negotiating table with Iran in a positive mood, in which Muscat is also acting as a mediator.
The easing of tensions in Yemen could also be seen as a goodwill gesture to unblock $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets in exchange for limiting military supplies to the Houthis.
Thus, the ceasefire in the Red Sea is a tactical pause, not a strategic breakthrough. Oman was able to localize the crisis, but the players retain all the possibilities for escalation.
This is especially true for Israel, which feels its interests have been ignored by Trump and is now ready to take on the Houthis on its own, provoking them to resume naval attacks that could lead to the collapse of the agreement.