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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
Iranian intelligence penetrates the holy of holies of Israel's nuclear program |
2025-03-07 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] The scandal with Israeli reservists who sold Iran some of the secrets of the legendary Iron Dome missile defense system had barely died down when a new spy story shook the country. This time, Iranian agents seriously raised the stakes by encroaching on Israel's "nuclear pearl." ![]() To gain access to the nuclear research center in Dimona (Southern District), a native Israeli was recruited, again with no obvious grievances against the authorities. And although Israeli intelligence agencies report that they were able to disrupt the enemy operation before the secret information leaked, there are still plenty of “blank spots” in the case. ENGINEER FROM BEER SHEVA The Israeli intelligence services spent only a month and a half searching for and capturing the “atomic mole” – in February 2025, Doron Bokobza, who worked as an engineer at Haifa Chemicals South, was arrested. The company, which specializes in the production of agricultural fertilizers and industrial chemicals, is located in the same area as the research center targeted by Iranian agents. Workers from both facilities often crossed paths in Dimona. The case materials, which became public a few days ago, noted that in December 2024, Bokobza himself approached an Iranian operative and offered his services. He justified his operational value by "having the necessary contacts" to penetrate the territory of the nuclear complex, and later backed up his words with "photographs of secret facilities." The motive that pushed the Israeli to cooperate with foreign intelligence is traditionally said to be the thirst for profit. The accused allegedly had serious financial problems (to which some media outlets added card debts, the existence of which was not mentioned in the case). At the same time, it is impossible to call him an opponent of the current government - he was almost not interested in the political life of the country and did not consider himself a "regular critic" of the authorities. By the time of his arrest, Bokobza had earned around a thousand dollars from espionage, a record sum among agents recruited by Iran over the past year. NUCLEAR PEARL The interest of Iranian intelligence services in the nuclear research center in Dimona is not accidental. Built in the Negev desert in 1958, the facility has a controversial reputation. Although Tel Aviv explains its work solely for scientific purposes, many are convinced that the complex is also used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. According to investigators, it is capable of producing, depending on the load, from 15 to 60 kg of weapons-grade material per year. This is equivalent (with an average nuclear warhead weight of 5 kg) to producing 3-12 nuclear weapons annually. Israel, committed to a policy of “double ambiguity,” neither confirms nor denies the military component of the complex’s operation, but clearly demonstrates its high value for the country. Thus, the late Israeli leader Shimon Peres (whose name the facility bears today) called the research center the country’s “nuclear pearl” and its main asset. It is not surprising that any encroachment on the center in Dimona is perceived by Tel Aviv as extremely painful. PAIN POINTS Penetration into the inner perimeter of the nuclear center in Dimona opens up wide opportunities for the Iranians. First of all, to obtain data on its real scale. Back in 1986, defector Mordechai Vanunu revealed to the press information about the existence of secret underground floors beneath the facility, but only in general terms. Israeli intelligence managed to steal it before the dossier was made public in full. Almost forty years later, information about the “forbidden part” of the complex is still fragmentary and contradictory, and it does not provide any insight into Israel’s “nuclear arsenal.” It is important for Iranian security forces to obtain up-to-date data on the nuclear center's defense systems. Especially since the information from the "Vanunu dossier" is seriously outdated, and attempts to "probe" the defense of the complex with their own proxies (for example, with the help of Hamas missile launches in 2014) have led to nothing. Having our own “eyes and ears” in the center would allow us to identify vulnerable spots and subsequently use them to guide missiles and drones. Tehran conducted a simulation of a strike on the center in Dimona back in 2021, as part of the strategic exercises "Great Prophet - 17", and in the context of the growing confrontation with Israel (when Tel Aviv threatens to strike, including on the nuclear infrastructure of its counterpart), the Iranian authorities are keeping the facility in their sights even more. Finally, Iranian intelligence services have a chance to paralyze the facility from the inside, using malware. Especially since the precedent was created long before that. In 2012, Israel, using a computer worm implanted in the control system of centrifuges at the low-enriched uranium plant in Netanz, was able to set Iran's nuclear program back several years. And although official Tel Aviv continues to deny participation in the operation, of all Tehran's adversaries at the time, it was the only one with sufficient technical capabilities to carry out an attack of this type. Tehran has a chance to pay Israel back in the same coin, especially since Iranian “combat viruses” have advanced greatly over the past decade and can reach where missiles and drones cannot. And although the possible damage from disrupting the operation of the Dimona facility is unlikely to be great, the psychological effect of the operation is much more important for Tehran. SIMPLE TRACE Although the “Bokobza case” was solved hot on the heels, it contains many oddities. For example, in the statements of the accused, which were widely circulated by the press, it is emphasized that he never visited the nuclear center, the data about which he was collecting. And he took the photos from open sources - and thus "profited from the gullibility of the enemy." However, this position contradicts the data of the Shabak: counterintelligence cites at least three instances of the transmission to an Iranian liaison of photographs of objects taken strictly in accordance with the technical specifications. The description of the first contact also seems illogical: allegedly Bokobza found an account in a messenger with an Iranian flag on the avatar and initiated interaction with the message: “I am Israeli and want to work with you.” The correspondence with the Iranian operative was conducted over an open channel and without allegories. When visiting objects, Bokobza often neglected secrecy and allegedly did everything to attract the attention of counterintelligence. Such crude work does not fit well with the agent's task: the Iranians hardly expected to take a well-guarded target "by storm". But to briefly throw the Israelis on a false trail, passing off another "disposable" agent as an important target - that's quite possible. It seems that Israeli detectives have gradually begun to understand this. A second "Israeli engineer" has appeared in the case, whose personal information has not yet been disclosed. Unlike the main defendant, he was a full-time employee of the nuclear center and could theoretically carry out Iranian intelligence tasks on the "inner perimeter." True, there is still no guarantee that the second trail will not also turn out to be a side track, and then Iran will have enough time to obtain the secrets of the “nuclear pearl”. Related: Dimona: 2025-03-03 Beersheba man indicted for giving Iran info on Israel’s nuclear program; police say the information was already public Dimona: 2025-02-14 Family says sign of life received for hostage Segev Kalfon Dimona: 2024-12-24 Israel Police, Shin Bet foil attempt to smuggle weapons over Egypt border using drone; 2 arrested |
Posted by:badanov |
#3 Countries get inspected when they show they can’t be trusted with the things. Israel has had nukes for about four decades, and never used them despite strong temptation. They’ve demonstrated they don’t need supervision. A long way to say what Frank G. said so efficiently. |
Posted by: trailing wife 2025-03-07 10:41 |
#2 Nothing |
Posted by: Frank G 2025-03-07 06:47 |
#1 Didn't we invade Iraq because nuclear inspectors weren't allowed in? Who inspects the Israeli nuclear stockpile? What should we do about this? |
Posted by: Jairong+Scourge+of+the+Gepids2435 2025-03-07 05:58 |