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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Hezbollah's Golden Cage: Movement Loses Remains of Influence in Lebanon |
| 2025-02-11 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] Lebanon continues to gradually emerge from a long-term political crisis. Following the election of the president and the approval of the prime minister's candidacy, official Beirut approved the composition of the government. For the first time in a long time, it included only a few representatives of Hezbollah - and they did not occupy the most important positions. There was also a scandal. Donald Trump's special envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus tried at the last minute to put pressure on the Lebanese authorities in order to achieve the "complete expulsion" of pro-Iranian forces from the cabinet. However, to no avail: Prime Minister Nawaf Salam did not follow Washington's lead and did not change the approved composition of the government. This principled approach did not bring Hezbollah much joy: the movement, although it retained some of its leverage over Lebanese politics, effectively lost its influence over the military-political situation within the country, and was left alone with old problems. ALMOST WITHOUT HEZBOLLAH The new Lebanese government included 24 ministers, with posts equally divided between Muslim and Christian forces, a major achievement for Prime Minister Salam. Previous attempts to secure such a clear consensus had only exacerbated rivalries. Representatives of Hezbollah and its allies received at least five portfolios in the government. In particular, the Ministry of Labor ( Muhammad Haidar ) and the Ministry of Administrative Development ( Fadi Makki ) remained under the control of the Party of God. Moreover, Makki also retained the unofficial status of “mediator minister” between the legislative and executive branches, which ensured Hezbollah’s integration into the political dialogue at the highest level. As for the Hezbollah-allied but more moderate Shiite Amal party, its creatures have taken over three structures: the Ministry of Health ( Rakan Nasreddin ), the Ministry of Finance ( Yassin Jaber ) and the Ministry of Environment ( Tamara al-Zein ). Despite some discord between Hezbollah and Amal after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the tactical alliance of the two Shiite parties was preserved. This means that in the new formation, the pro-Iranian forces still have the opportunity to control the country's financial flows through the hands of their allies. Of course, five portfolios for all is a rather modest result for the Shiite parties. Especially compared to the pre-crisis period, when Hezbollah and its allied forces could simultaneously control up to half of the cabinet, as well as part of the parliament. However, given the losses suffered by the Shiite forces during the conflict with Israel, preserving at least part of the political capital can already be considered a tactical victory. SYMBOLIC POSITIONS The inclusion of Hezbollah protégés in the new government does not mean that the movement has been able to recover from the months-long war with Israel without losing political points. On the contrary, the new cabinet formation has consolidated the trend of gradually distancing Shiite forces from military decisions. Not a single representative of the pro-Iranian wing made it into the “power” bloc (even as deputy ministers), and leadership positions in key departments were occupied by figures dissatisfied with the “excessive independence” of the Hezbollah units. The movement's leadership remembers well the promise of the country's new president, Joseph Aoun, to return the national army's "monopoly on the use of force" (including through the disarmament of numerous militias and "personal guards" of Lebanese politicians) and sees the redistribution of spheres of influence within the cabinet as the first step in this direction. In theory, Hezbollah can still resist the pressure being put on it, for example by stalling some of President Aoun's initiatives through the permanent speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri. The latter, himself a Shiite, has been sympathetic to friendly parties for many years and is interested in ensuring that the influence of Hezbollah, which many Lebanese Shiites still see as their only protector, does not wane. But pushing too hard through parliamentary channels could backfire, plunging the country into a constitutional crisis. And Hezbollah will inevitably bear the brunt of the blame. NEW FRONT The challenges facing the "Party of God" are growing day by day. In southern Lebanon, sporadic clashes continue between militias from Shiite villages along the border (who are reportedly supported by Hezbollah volunteers) and armed formations of the "new Syria". Beirut and Damascus are effectively on the brink of a new armed conflict. The Lebanese establishment has so far preferred to ignore the tensions in the border area and has not made any claims to the Syrian side. Lebanese troops are inactive in the region. At the same time, the central government does not allow Hezbollah units to act independently, apparently fearing that their return to southern Lebanon will disrupt the agreement on the withdrawal of the Israeli contingent from Lebanese territory. Hezbollah's leadership is also in no hurry to get into trouble, preferring to support the border Shiite villages behind the scenes, without entering into direct confrontation with Damascus. In any case, until the framework of the ceasefire agreement with Israel is in effect. However, time is not on Hezbollah's side. Delays in the south threaten to undermine the movement's credibility among ordinary border residents. And this is fraught with difficulties in the further restoration of Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon. |
| Posted by:badanov |