[LB] After spending a year and three months, the enemy reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnograd, controls more than 80% of Toretsk, is close to capturing Chasovy Yar, but has not managed to achieve a turning point in the war.
The front, contrary to the statements of both useful and harmful idiots, has not fallen in any area, the Defense Forces retain the ability to organize resistance.
by Viktor Kevlyuk
For almost three years of the great war, the aggressor has already forgotten about its strategic goals and feeds exclusively on tactical achievements, although from time to time it comes close to creating operational crises. For this, the Russians are paying a huge price, their army is deprived of the opportunity to accumulate reserves, and the command and staff are unable to bring their strategic offensive operation out of the deadlock. In other words: the group has concentrated all resources to achieve instant results that do not give either a decisive advantage or a decisive victory.
Kursk direction
On January 5, the Seversk Special Operations Group suddenly struck in the direction of Velikiy Soldatsky, from where the enemy was preparing to launch an attack on Sudzha along the P200 highway. The enemy military command had to prematurely (a day earlier) launch attacks along the entire line of contact, and the offensive from Velikiy Soldatsky failed, as the Russians lost the positions from which they were supposed to advance.
During January, the enemy managed to push back "Siversk" on the western flank to the Malaya Lochnia River, but did not break through further. Nothing burned out near Dar'ynoye and Novy Klin. On the eastern flank, the enemy advanced in the area of Makhnivka and Rus'ke Porechie, but in mid-January lost its positions. Makhnivka is ours, Rus'ke Porechie is a gray zone. OTUV "Siversk" is defending itself along water obstacles, imposing its will on the Russians - attack us across the rivers.
Near Dar'yinoye, Kurylivka, and Rus'ke Porechye, the enemy is forced to storm a defensive line built by itself. Built qualitatively, but abandoned in August 2024. The role of this direction is to tie up most of the aggressor's highly mobile forces: in January, regiments of three airborne divisions, two brigades, and a naval infantry regiment of the Black Sea, Pacific, and Caspian flotillas conducted combat operations here. This group suffered significant losses, which already at the end of January began to affect its combat capability, and at the beginning of February, they turned a large offensive into attacks in separate directions.
Example: the village of Kurylivka, which is being stormed by the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment of the Caspian Flotilla, which was transferred here from the Zaporizhia direction. It has to attack across the Psel River. For the most part, the Russians cannot cross the river, and those who manage to do so cannot reach the Ukrainian positions.
The regiment was considered one of the most combat-ready in the Kursk region, so its command cheerfully reported the capture of Kurylivka - and they believed it. But Kurylivka was not captured. The rest of the week the regiment went on attacks several times a day without any support and with minimal BC. The result was a full house in the regiment's medical post, piles of wounded on the battlefield, who were left without evacuation and medical care, a large number of dead, approximately 15 prisoners. The regiment lost almost a quarter of its personnel and is close to complete loss of combat capability.
If a miracle happens, the capture of Kurylivka will not lead to a breakthrough of the Ukrainian defense, because there are no reserves to develop the success. It is also worth mentioning the Koreans: the contingent of 3,500 people who participated in the fighting lost 65% in killed and wounded. On January 10, it was withdrawn from the fighting area. Cases of desertion of Koreans have been recorded, including the use of weapons against Russian soldiers. Conclusion from the assessment of the situation: the enemy will regroup by February 7–15 and only then will it continue the offensive.
The aggressor significantly expanded its bridgehead on the western bank of the Oskil River, captured the villages of Zapadne and Dvorichne, and reoccupied Novomlynsk. In December, units of two motorized rifle regiments were involved in the bridgehead, today up to half of the 6th combined arms army and the entire 69th division are here. Our Khortytsia Special Operations Command was defended here by two incomplete brigades of the Trotsky Brigade. This is the main reason why the enemy expanded the bridgehead, transferring additional forces and launching an offensive both to the west and to the south, towards Kupyansk.
Now the 6th Army headquarters has two options:
1) to force the Oskil, create a bridgehead on the west bank south of Kupyansk (in the Senkovo area) for a further offensive on Kupyansk simultaneously from the south and north and try to cut off part of the troops of the Khortitsa Special Operations Command, which are defending on the east bank of the Oskil;
2) to develop an offensive from the Dvorichnaya side in the direction of Velikiy Burluk (this is the task of the Sever Special Operations Command as of May 2024, which it successfully failed).
Now everything indicates that the enemy has chosen the first option: the 45th Engineer and Camouflage Brigade is being transferred to the Senkovo area. At the same time, the Russian infantry is trying to expand the advance to Oskol near Kolisnykovka. The Khortytsia Special Forces Division has a well-prepared defense area in Senkovo, there are enough troops, so it will not be an easy walk for the enemy. But he will try.
If we recall how the Russians crossed the river near Liman six times in 2022, then by the end of February they will have one less engineering brigade. The situation is quite threatening for the Defense Forces. But it is not excluded that the Khortytsia Special Operations Command will wait for the enemy forces to concentrate (the 69th Division in full force, with reinforcements as possible), and then carry out a counterattack. General Drapaty was not appointed to command Khortytsia for no reason.
Let's take a separate look at the southern part of the Kupyansk direction - the village of Borova and the surrounding area. In these areas, the Defense Forces conducted several successful counterattacks and improved their positions near the village of Zagryzove.
The enemy is persistently attacking from the direction of Lozova in order to break through the Ukrainian defenses near Kopanky and Novoyehorivka. Events here are developing in a traditional Russian vein: the command of the 20th Army has loudly reported the capture of Novoyehorivka. The headquarters of the group on the theater of operations was delighted and gave the commander of the 20th Army the task of capturing Kopanky from the east and southeast. The general was saddened, because his army had been stuck in Kopanky since December, unsuccessfully advancing from Pershotravneve from the north, and since then the bypass of the Ukrainian defenses has been stalling at least from one side.
Now the occupiers are groping in the direction southeast of Novoyehorivka, which they do not really control. After the commander of the 3rd Army, the commanders of the 7th, 85th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades of the 3rd Army were removed from their posts for similar reports (about the capture of Bilogorivka and three other villages), the commander of the 20th is storming that Novoyehorivka at any cost, laying out the corpses of his soldiers without number on the agricultural lands of the village. The conclusion from the assessment of the situation: the enemy will break through to Borovaya and try to capture the village by the end of March.
KRAMATORSK AND TORETSK DIRECTIONS
It is advisable to look at these two directions together, because the enemy's goal is to occupy the entire Donetsk region, and here the road to Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk opens. The loss of positions at the refractory plant in Chasovye Yar meant the irreversible: the Defense Forces will leave the city, but when is an open question.
It should be recognized that the fighting for Chasiv Yar is in its final stages: the Russians are advancing slowly in the south and southwest, having suffered heavy losses in the battles for the plant. If our troops leave the city by the end of February, it will be a good tactical achievement. If not sooner.
The enemy grouping in the Kramatorsk direction is the 98th Airborne Division without the 217th Regiment (in Kursk), the 200th Brigade from the Murmansk Region, and a bunch of volunteer reconnaissance and assault brigades. The most famous is the 88th “Espanyola”, recruited from CSKA football fans. But all of them will not be enough, not only to advance quickly, but also to develop success when “Khortytsia” retreats from Chasovoye Yar.
Note that the situation may change dramatically if the Kramatorsk direction becomes a priority for the enemy command in the theater of operations. Even the actions in the Pokrovsky direction will be stopped, because there are much larger tasks here: we need to break through to Kostyantynivka, through it to Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, the belt of fortresses, the main hub of Ukrainian defense in the east of the country, and then storm it as well.
The withdrawal of the "Khortytsia" units from Klishchiivka and Andriivka to the western bank of the Seversky Donets - Donbas canal, the occupation of almost all of Toretsk allow the Russian command to seriously consider plans for an offensive on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk through Kostyantynivka from two directions at once - from Chasovy Yar and Toretsk.
Battles at Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. The enemy's next target is Kostyantynivka
The advance of the enemy's Central Front east of Myrnograd and Pokrovsk added a third direction to these two: by expanding the salient near Vozdvizhenka, the Central Front will be able to cut off the Ukrainian defenses in the Alexandropol area and attack Kramatorsk through Kostyantynivka from the Pokrovsk-Myrnograd direction. The enemy's plans are hindered by harsh front-line reality.
The Russians in the Torets and Kramatorsk directions simply lack the strength for such an operation. They also lack reserves. The only way to increase the group is to transfer troops from other directions. And there are not many there either. The commander of the Central Front, General Mordvichev, is currently preparing the Central Front and the East Front to begin the assault on Pokrovsk, but if the assault does not yield results in the first two weeks, the Pokrovsk direction will temporarily become secondary, and the Kramatorsk direction will be the main one, and the city will be assaulted from three directions. There will be no certainty on this issue until February 15–20. So far, the Tolstoyevsky forces are focused on expanding their advance eastward near Vozdvizhenka. Attacks on Alexandropol from the south, west, and east should be expected.
POKROVSKY DIRECTION
The Center military unit is on the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnograd. It bypasses the agglomeration from the east and west, from Vozdvizhenka and Kotlyne. It is more successful from the west, from the east - like the dead are breathing, but oh well. Russian propaganda and Ukrainian useful idiots present the Pokrovsk operation as the future encirclement of the Defense Forces, although the enemy's real goal is more primitive - to consolidate and expand the zone of control to the west and east of Pokrovsk - Myrnograd in order to create a wide bridgehead for the further assault on the agglomeration. The assault will be head-on, because there is no time to maneuver forces and means for two-sided coverage, as well as other tactical innovations.
The defense forces have equipped a solid defense line here, saturated with troops. Those who have seen it say that it is quite good. There are no gaps for their favorite Russian tactics of infiltration by assault microgroups, so there will be long bloody battles for each position. The enemy is already making efforts to soften our defenses: bombing the outskirts of the city from the air, attacking quite massively with drones. For the assault, they are concentrating troops from three armies at once — the 41st, 2nd, and 51st, which previously attacked in the Pokrovsky, Novopavlovsk, and Hulyaipol directions. Since the fighting in the last two is ongoing, it will not be possible to form a strike group quickly. If the enemy command changes the priorities that we mentioned in the paragraph above, then the front here will hibernate for several months.
NOVOPAVLIVSKYI DIRECTION
The Khortytsia Special Forces Division is only defensively between the Vovcha and Sukhyi Yaly rivers, holding the village of Dachne on its eastern flank. The invaders have forced Sukhyi Yaly, but a quick offensive on the northern bank of the river is not possible. From the north, from the Vovcha side, the enemy has advanced to the village of Andriivka, the capture of which will open the door for an offensive on Konstantinopol. This will give the Russians a chance to cut off the Ukrainian units in the salient from Ulakli to Dachne.
The gloomy military genius (although, perhaps, not gloomy, but simply drunk) of the Russians transfers his units from there to Pokrovsk. The part that remains here is only relatively combat-ready due to losses and constant participation in battles for a month or more. The conclusion from the assessment of the situation: it is clear that the Ukrainian advance between Vovcha and Sukhye Yala will be eliminated sooner or later, somewhere between mid-February and mid-March. There is no point in expecting the enemy to advance further west here, because there will be no one to advance stupidly, everyone - to Pokrovsk or generally Kramatorsk. At the end of March, we should expect the Russians to reach the Mokry Yala River, after which there will be an operational pause somewhere until the beginning of summer.
HULYAIPIL DIRECTION
The enemy occupied Velika Novosilka and immediately slowed down the pace of advance to the west and northwest of the village. Russian propaganda tried to pass this village off as Stalingrad, but then limited itself to the definition of "an important logistics center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
While the “black Cossacks” held Vugledar, Velyka Novosilka supplied them. But after the loss of the Vugledar bridgehead for the Defense Forces, it is only the last large settlement in the south of the Donetsk region. Due to its loss, “Khortytsia” will move 9–15 km to the north-northwest, to the defense line of Komyshuvakha - Shevchenko (lower) - Dniproenergia, which is already happening.
The enemy will not be able to pursue the Ukrainian units, there are not enough ATVs for everyone, those of the personnel who survived are exhausted, and the rotation to the Pokrovsky direction has not been canceled. The conclusion from the assessment of the situation: no breakthroughs into Zaporizhia or Dnipropetrovsk regions, because there is nothing to do. The health of the enemy groups also does not allow the front of the Tavria Special Operations Command to be reduced and reach Zaporizhia.
Anyone who follows the course of the fighting should see that the troops of as many as three groups are operating in the direction: "Center", "East", and "South". The units are very mixed, their controllability and interaction were not the best before, and now they have only worsened.
So we can conclude that the capture of Velyka Novoselka is not part of some wise plan or subtle strategic design: the capture of this village means only the capture of another village.
Can the situation here worsen for the Defense Forces? Yes, it can. But the enemy must improve controllability, restore the combat capability of its troops and at least double their number, then the threat of the Tavria front in the Zaporizhia region will appear. But Putin has not yet agreed to mobilization, and without it there is nowhere to get the required amount of meat.
So, in February, we should expect the renewal of the enemy's offensive in the Kursk region, the expansion of the bridgehead near Dvorichnaya and fierce battles at Borova in the Kharkiv region, the withdrawal of the Defense Forces from Chasovy Yar and the beginning of battles on the approaches to Kramatorsk, the completion of the strike group near Pokrovskoe-Mirnograd and the assault on this agglomeration, the elimination of the Defense Forces' bridgehead between Vovcha and Sukhye Yala, the stabilization of the front line in the Novopavlivske direction, and positional battles on the Komyshuvakha-Shevchenko (lower)-Dneproenergiya line.
Far from the worst schedule for the Defense Forces, especially considering the Commander-in-Chief's promises to resume the practice of rotations and accumulation of reserves for the Defense Forces.