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| Science & Technology |
| Overweight medium German cat in the heavyweight category |
| 2025-01-11 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Text taken from a dzen.ru article by Yuri Pasholok An Unbiased Look at the German Medium Tank Pz.Kpfw.Panther Each tank-building power had its ups and downs, as well as its approach to what the optimal tank should look like. This view could change as the action progressed, with particularly strong metamorphoses occurring as a result of military operations. The greatest leap in this regard occurred during World War II, which forced an urgent revision of the view on what a tank on a modern battlefield should look like. At the same time, the battlefield itself gradually changed, since not only tanks but also means of combating them were rapidly developing. The result was that some countries found themselves in a dead end in the development of their tanks. Among the leading tank-building powers that found themselves in a dead-end situation by the end of World War II was Germany. This is not so obvious, especially against the backdrop of the praises that are usually sung to the German "menagerie". But if you look at the situation carefully, you can notice a general tendency that the Germans overloaded their tanks and deprived them of the opportunity to develop them further. One of the canonical examples is the Pz.Kpfw.Panther. It seems that the machine is one of the best in its class, but it is not for nothing that a number of people consider it a representative of the heavy class, not the middle one. Not to mention the fact that one of the most mass-produced German tanks, for some reason, did not have a good post-war fate. We will talk about this today. It must be said that the situation around medium tanks for the Germans was initially complicated. Suffice it to say that the program to create a replacement for the ZW (Pz.Kpfw.III) was launched in 1938, but by the summer of 1941 there were only two experimental models of the VK 20.01 (D) , which were an example of outright separatism. Suffice it to say that Daimler-Benz, having lost patience during the work on the ZW38 , went on principle and achieved permission from above to design the tank as the concern saw fit. As a result, the tank received a complex suspension with leaf springs, as well as a diesel engine. At the same time, the VK 20.01 (M), which was designed under the patronage of the 6th Department of the Armament Department (and personally under the hood of Heinrich Kniepkamp), was never completed even as an experimental chassis. The truth of life is that even if the conventional VK 20.01(D) had been accepted into service, nothing good would have awaited it. The fact is that the Germans managed to miss the amplitude of armored vehicle development, which, for example, the Pz.Kpfw.III managed to do. With it, as well as with the Pz.Kpfw.IV, the Germans got there in the mid-30s, which, for example, Soviet tank builders could not do. But we were able to get into the amplitude of development of the late 30s, having received the T-34 and KV. The Germans, however, were unable to create anything worthwhile during this period of time. As a result, promising new-generation tanks had minimal advantages over the same Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV produced in 1941. Moreover, their development prospects were no different from these tanks. Against this background, it is not surprising that in November 1941 the German command decided to completely restart work on new tanks. It must be said that it was the clean slate and complete revision of the medium tank concept that largely contributed to the success of the future Panther. The German military boldly overstepped the 30-ton limit, giving the tank the most powerful gun in its class, the most powerful engine in its class, and providing it with adequate armor protection from the frontal projection. If you look at the medium tanks that were designed in other countries in 1942 (and even in 1943), you can see that they were initially inferior to the VK 30.02 (M) . In fact, only in 1944 did new medium tanks appear that could fight the Pz.Kpfw.Panhter on equal terms. And at the front, they appeared, at best, in 1945. This must be acknowledged and no attempt to prove the opposite. The Germans were able to hit the target very well. It should also be acknowledged that under the leadership of Paul Wiebicke, a very technologically advanced tank was created, which turned out to be optimal for the German industry. This concerned, among other things, the hull production. The cost of the Pz.Kpfw.Panther without armament, optics and radio station was 117 thousand Reichsmarks, which was not much higher than the most advanced Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV in the same configuration (about 103 thousand Reichsmarks). And this is despite the fact that the "Panther" is noticeably larger and heavier. The Germans also managed to increase the production volume of these tanks to high figures. The peak of production was 380 tanks, then it began to decline, including under the influence of bombing of industrial enterprises. It is definitely not true to say that the Panther was a bad tank. It was not without reason that the Pz.Kpfw.Panther was used as a reference when creating the future Centurion, and our T-44 was also compared to the German vehicle. The Panther was caught up with in 1945, and the German medium tank was quite competitive with the heavy IS tanks. It was the encounter of the IS-85 with the Panthers during the attack on Lisyanka on February 19, 1944 that launched the IS modernization mechanism. In a word, this vehicle was dangerous, and most importantly, it was mass-produced. Towards the end of 1944, it was the most mass-produced German tank, and it retained its leadership until the end of the war. However, it was the "Panther", unlike the Pz.Kpfw.IV, that did not have a successful post-war life. And this despite the fact that in February 1945 there were more than 2,100 of these tanks, which is a quarter more than the Pz.Kpfw.IV. But the "four", which they tried to remove from production so many times, remained in service with a number of countries for several decades. But the "Panthers" only served with the French, and even then, out of desperation, since their own medium tank could not be produced. And this despite the fact that the French had connections with German industry, and spare parts. Agree, something is wrong here. To begin with, it is worth looking at the chassis of the VK 20.01 (M), and then at what replaced it. You will see a number of interesting points, including those related to the dimensions. It seems that German engineers, including engine builders, relaxed. As a result, the average German tank turned out to be larger in size than any of its classmates. It so happened that the German tank had a very large internal volume, but part of this volume was air. It is even somehow surprising how this happened, especially after the relatively low Pz.Kpfw.III and Pz.Kpfw.IV. The main increase in height was provided by the Maybach HL 210/230 engine, which was too high due to the presence of air filters on top. The Germans did not even make a "step" that would have allowed them to slightly reduce the height of the fighting compartment, as well as the control compartment. And this would have saved weight. Then there are interesting questions about how German engineers were able to calculate the weight. According to the original assignment, the combat weight of the tank was to be 35 tons. This is the weight indicated in the performance characteristics of the VK 30.02 (M) in the spring of 1942, although there are doubts that this is so. Because later, as the tank was being refined, the armor protection of the front of the hull and turret was strengthened. As a result of all these changes, the combat weight of the Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D was 45 tons. Tell me, do you believe in miracles? I somehow doubt that +20 mm of the front of the hull and +20 mm of the front of the turret gave 10 tons. Someone clearly calculated something wrong. Meanwhile, a difference of 10 tons is very bad from the point of view of the chassis. The Germans essentially repeated the path of the KV, which, with a design weight of 40 tons, initially had a weight of 42.5 tons, then it reached 46, and at the peak of the load it reached 50 tons. This certainly did not make the KV any better. Here the Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D has also gone bad. On February 21, 1943, the first serial tanks were demonstrated to the Reich Minister of Armaments and Ammunition Albert Speer. A total of 13 Pz.Kpfw.Panther Ausf.D took part in it, 6 of which broke down. Another indicative moment was that tanks of this type were officially accepted in May 1943, although the factories began to hand them over in January. Then there was the Kursk Bulge, where the "Panthers" proved themselves to be a formidable weapon, but in those cases when they did not expose their sides and did not break down. According to Guderian's reports, the Pz.Kpfw.Panther acquired more or less decent reliability by the end of 1943. And then, with some nuances. One of the tank's key shortcomings was its engine. The Maybach HL 230 was not only too tall, but also not reliable enough. Putting 4 Solex carburetors in was a bad idea. The required level of reliability was never achieved. That's why the Maybach HL 234 engine was developed, which is closely associated with the E-50/E-75. In fact, this engine was more needed by the Panther, because it was not only more powerful, but also had direct fuel injection. Later, such a system was implemented on the Maybach HL 295 , which was developed for the French. There were also less significant problems. One way or another, the German tank had several insurmountable shortcomings. But that's not all. The serial Pz.Kpfw.Panther was, in a sense, an accident. The fact is that in early 1943, the Pz.Kpfw.Panther II appeared, which was supposed to have even thicker armor. But then it turned out that the Germans did not know how to calculate weight, and instead of 47 tons, it turned out to be more than 50. As a result, a very different tank appeared, partially unified with the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger III (VK 45.03). Then it became clear that the idea was so-so, so things did not go beyond the prototype. But history is indicative. It suddenly turned out that the reserves for developing the Pz.Kpfw.Panther design were exhausted at the start of serial production. In fact, this is a typical case for the new generation of German tanks. Not only were they overloaded, but they also had no reserves for development. Well, yes, there was the E-series (Pz.Kpfw.Panther II at this point said something like "well, well, well, I'll go to hell"), there were paper projects for installing a more powerful gun. But did they lead to something other than paper? That's just it. Not to mention that the Panther's turret was unbalanced, and something prevented the Germans from making a niche behind the turret (Ordnung, probably). And the German tank also turned out to be very blind. Only the commander could look around. In the end, what had to happen happened. Of course, one can dream about the Panzerwaffe-46, but the truth is that even in the most optimistic scenario, the Germans are getting a tank with more powerful weapons. At the same time, their opponents are not standing still and are already preparing to release new-generation medium tanks. They have already caught up with, and in some ways surpassed, the German tank. Rest assured, if the war had continued, the T-54 could have gone into production much faster. And a meeting with this tank did not bode well for the German machine. But if we return to the harsh reality, we will find a very "raw" tank in it, with a long-used development resource. Having tried German tanks (MNH specifically handed them over after the war), the British military spat for a long time. And there was reason for it. As a result, instead of a tank that, in theory, should have become the same terror of the battlefield as the Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E , we got a very controversial combat vehicle. Of course, it was very dangerous and had drunk a lot of blood, but at the same time it was overloaded and had far from outstanding reliability. This tank cannot be called very spacious either, and this is with an impressive volume of the fighting compartment. There were blunders in terms of providing visibility, therefore the "Panthers" were often cut off in the side. At the same time, the Germans were unable to make a fundamentally new tank to replace it. And after the war, the concept of a German medium tank had nothing to do with the "Panther". It was already a machine of a classic layout, and it turned out to be noticeably lower than the "Panther". Despite the fact that the early Soviet, American and British post-war tanks were a direct development of machines created as a response to the "Panther". |
| Posted by:badanov |