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| Hamas leader Sinwar's death prompts reshuffle in Egyptian intelligence | ||||||
| 2024-10-24 | ||||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] Recently, a high-profile resignation took place in the entourage of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. General Abbas Kamel, who had led the structure since 2018, has left his post as head of the General Intelligence Service (GIS; also known as the Mukhabarat). Kamel will reportedly take up the post of presidential adviser and general coordinator of the security services. At first glance, what happened looks like an honorary pension, especially since the general had previously repeatedly complained about his deteriorating health and asked to relieve him of some of the workload. The transfer to the pool of advisers was intended to satisfy this request. On the other hand, such a sudden change of mood in Cairo is connected with the intention to breathe new life into the negotiations on Gaza and expand its own influence on regional processes in the wake of the growing confrontation between Iran and Israel.
FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT Kamel has played a leading role in Cairo's political life almost without interruption since al-Sisi came to power in 2013. Before taking over the leadership of the ROC in 2018, he served in senior positions in military intelligence and also managed the presidential office. In addition, it was General Kamel who often acted as the "voice of Cairo", representing the country at summits and high-level international meetings. It was largely through his hands that Al-Sisi managed to assert his power after the overthrow of pan-Islamist President Mohamed Morsi.
Al-Tuhami, like Kamel, was part of President Al-Sisi’s “inner circle”, but was a supporter of a tough and uncompromising fight against internal and external enemies, which he clearly demonstrated during his year leading the SOR. Apparently, Al-Sisi saw this zeal as a direct threat to his own security (since he himself came to power under the slogan of fighting the "contra"), and therefore elevated a more flexible comrade. And, as time has shown, he was not mistaken in his choice. At the same time, Kamel has made several major miscalculations that have cost Cairo some of its regional influence. Until recently, the most painful defeat of the Egyptian Mukhabarat was the collapse of the “anti-Turkish club” – an informal association of states opposing Turkish expansion into the Middle East. The head of the SOR, as the main negotiator from Egypt, failed to turn to his advantage the efforts of Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and France to contain Ankara's influence. But "in return" Cairo received the activation of the conductors of Turkish interests in its zone of strategic influence (primarily in Libya). In this context, Kamel is still reminded of the failure of the "Military Council of Tribes" concept. Trying to rely on pro-Egyptian tribes in Libya, Cairo, despite its efforts, was never able to become the leading force in the conflict. Ankara retained the military advantage, while Moscow and Abu Dhabi ultimately gained more advantageous positions in the diplomatic space. PALESTINIANS ARE UNHAPPY With the outbreak of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, Kamel was appointed as Egypt's negotiator and was called upon to "conduct" interactions between Israel and Hamas. The appointment did not raise any questions: the general already had experience in resolving similar crisis situations. For example, in 2021, it was he who made a decisive contribution to the ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians. However, the negotiations reached a deadlock due to Tel Aviv's tough stance, and Cairo failed to achieve concessions on either the Philadelphia Corridor or the Netzarim axis. Attempts to work out a "package" agreement with Egypt's participation also failed. The last straw was the sudden death of Hamas Politburo chief Yahya Sinwar. He was killed by the Israelis in the Tel al-Sultan area, not far from the Egyptian border. Evil tongues were quick to claim that Sinwar was "sold" to Tel Aviv by the Egyptians in exchange for concessions on other sensitive issues. And this was allegedly done on Kamel's orders. However, both the nature of the clash and the subsequent problems with identifying the murdered head of the Politburo indicate that Sinwar was discovered by the Israelis by chance, and the involvement of the Mukhabarat in the liquidation process is unlikely.
"RASHAD'S PLAN" Kamel's successor as head of the Mukhabarat was Hassan Mahmoud Rashad, who had previously held the post of deputy head of the service. Due to the specifics of his position, very little is known about Rashad's past, but the Arab press is already calling him a "mirror" of his boss. This positioning is due to the fact that the new head of the SOR previously worked on maintaining dialogue with the “potential enemy” – he was responsible for resetting relations with Turkey and Iran. In this context, Rashad’s appointment as “negotiator No. 1” should be interpreted, among other things, as an attempt to “give a voice” to Ankara and Tehran in the Gaza negotiations without expanding the number of participants. Moreover, Egypt clearly expects to carefully influence the course of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation through its channels, keeping Tehran and Tel Aviv from large-scale clashes - but not too obviously, so as not to spoil relations with either of the interlocutors.
Then, instead of assurances of support for the previous course, the head of the Israeli General Security Service (Shabaq), Ronen Bar, received proposals from the Egyptians to move to a “creeping truce” – to seek the release of a couple of hostages for every few days of ceasefire. The "Rashad Plan" was met with extreme controversy by the Israelis: far-right politicians predictably spoke out against it and demanded not to follow Cairo's lead. However, the concept was supported by the military leadership, which saw in it a chance to end the protracted conflict. Washington also responded positively to Cairo's ideas. As for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he has not yet decided on a clear position and is torn between the "hawks" and the security forces. There is a high probability that in the end the Israeli leadership will still choose a "creeping truce" in order to maintain the appearance of negotiations with Hamas and not incur the wrath of the hostages' relatives. However, even in this case, the agreements are unlikely to survive for long. Tel Aviv is already using the first violations of the regime to declare it insolvent and to close it down.
Related: Abbas Kamel 10/17/2024 Egypt taps new spy chief Abbas Kamel 10/15/2024 Hostage deal talks likely off until after US elections — report Abbas Kamel 09/12/2024 Hamas says ready to implement ceasefire without new conditions | ||||||
| Posted by:badanov |
| #1 Later in November al-Sisi turns seventy. Long in the tooth, he apparently has no intention of retiring. Commonly, Egypt's military leaders either die in office or are assassinated. Al-Sisi apparently will not break the mold. |
| Posted by: One Eyed Schwarzeneggar9757 2024-10-24 07:42 |