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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia
Autumn campaign of the RF Armed Forces. Part one.
2024-09-25
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Text taken from the Telegram channel of @genshtab24.

Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics.

Part 2 is below.

[ColonelCassad] Many people wonder what to expect from the autumn campaign of the Russian Armed Forces. In the first part, we will analyze the situation in the vicinity of Gornyak. After the fall of Ukrainsk, the situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces here is not the best.

The central defense node here is, of course, Gornyak, which is also located on a hill. Of course, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will try to cling to it as long as possible, but there are several BUTs.

Let's analyze the main supply routes for the Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison in Gornyak and the surrounding villages:

1. The Selidovo-Tsukurino road (red arrow approximate advance of the Russian Armed Forces) according to information from both our and enemy sources has already come under the control of the Russian military. It is also worth noting that the Selidovo-Kurakhovo railway line passes through Tsukurino, which, in the current configuration of the front, also cannot be used for supplies.

2. The second road, Kurakhovo-Ostroe-Kurakhovka, also came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces yesterday (the red arrow points to the colony beyond Ostroe, which, according to both Ukrainian and our sources, was liberated by Russian troops) and cannot be used to supply the garrison in Gornyak.

3. There is also a third route, namely the Berestki-Ilyinka-Gornyak road, but most of this road is a dirt road, which even before the arrival of the muddy season has limited capacity, and with the arrival of full-fledged autumn in the DPR, it will not be suitable as the main artery for supplying the multi-thousand-strong garrison of Gornyak and the surrounding villages.

4. At the moment, of course, there is also the Berestki-Novoselidovka-Gornyak road, but it is no longer safe to use it due to the proximity of Russian forces in the Ukrainsk area, drones and remote mining.

5. Finally, the fifth supply option, namely Kurakhovo-Ilyinka-Gornyak, has both a problem with the road surface (see point 3), and the road across the Volchya River can simply be destroyed at any moment. According to objective control from the Ukrainian side, the dam locks have already been disabled. Probably, at the right moment, the road surface will also be disabled in order to block the supply channel.

6. The sixth option, let's say, "Krynochny", is supply via motorboats or across fields. Yes, it is certainly possible and, moreover, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will actively use it, but it is suitable for supplying a small group of troops (~up to a thousand people), without armored vehicles and artillery (even mortars), since each of the options (by water and by field) has serious limitations on the transported weight and volume. Therefore, in this case, problems will arise even with replenishing the ammunition for small arms.

WHY DID THIS HAPPEN?
First, these are certainly the competent actions of the Russian Armed Forces, which during the August offensive distributed all their forces, rather than trying to hammer in one direction. Yes, this certainly led to our forces leaving Selidovo (if they were there at all), but it allowed us to liberate Ukrainsk and the surrounding area.

Second, this is the unwillingness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to give up a hopeless pocket near Nevelskoye, concentrating their forces at Zhelanny Vtoroye and missing the offensive at Ukrainsk and Ostroye. The Ukrainian forces were so reluctant to either retreat or allow a cauldron to be created, abandoning their forces at Nevelskoye, that this led to the emergence of much more global problems in this direction.

CONCLUSIONS:
Due to the cut main supply roads, the Ukrainian Armed Forces already have supply problems in the Gornyak area, and as the Russian forces advance, the situation will become even more dramatic. Therefore, this direction can be called one of the most promising for "cleansing" in the autumn campaign. The Russian Armed Forces competently cut off the main supply roads of the Ukrainian group of forces. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were defending the pocket near Nevelskoye with all their might, which missed the more dangerous directions for them.

(c) "Orc from Mordor"

More from Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
Autumn campaign of the RF Armed Forces. Part two.
The second in order, but not in significance for the Russian Army is the Ugledar direction. Ugledar has long been a "bone in the throat" for our General Staff, because without it, it hampers any offensive operations in the district. Let's figure out why Ugledar was a real "fortress" for Ukraine.

First of all, its location. Ugledar is located at heights from which the entire district is visible for several kilometers, so any movements of the Russian Army in the district were known to the enemy in advance. In addition, the landscape itself adds complexity. These are mainly fields with small forest belts, in which it is difficult to hide both personnel and any equipment, so it was extremely problematic to bypass Ugledar.

The second reason is the legacy of the USSR. Ugledar consists mainly of multi-story buildings (except for a small area of ​​"dachas" to the southeast of the city), in addition, near the city there is a large number of various industrial buildings (mines, warehouses, production facilities), which the Armed Forces of Ukraine skillfully turned into virtually impregnable strongholds, which are also problematic to "bomb", our ancestors built to glory.

The third reason is that between Ugledar and Pavlovka there is a river, which restricts movement and does not allow "with force" to transfer equipment and personnel. Well, do not forget that bombing Ugledar is a thankless task, the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not pay attention to losses and continue to sit even in ruins.

Several attempts were made to storm Ugledar head-on, both at the beginning of the SVO and much later. But each time the RF Armed Forces suffered defeat in the battle for the "fortress". So what has changed now?

The main difference of the current situation is the classic tactics of the Russian Armed Forces to encircle the city "in pincers" and cut off the enemy's communications. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are currently using two roads to supply the garrison:

1. Bogoyavlenka-Ugledar (marked in blue from the west) is currently unsafe to use. According to various sources, it is 1 to 2 km from the forward positions of our troops. This allows using both FPV and classic methods of destruction, such as ATGMs and armored vehicles.

2. Bogoyavlenka-Vodyanoye-Ugledar (marked in blue from the east). This road is essentially a country road in a field. It is less than 1 km from the forward positions of the Russian Armed Forces, which, coupled with the poor road surface, makes this road VERY dangerous.

Based on the above, all supplies for the Ugledar garrison (very battered due to constant shelling and the "pulling" of forces to Selidovo and Pokrovsk) hang on two roads, which are impossible to use safely. Yes, of course, it is possible to supply through the fields, but firstly, it is dangerous, drones and ATGMs have not been cancelled, and secondly, it is impossible to supply a huge enemy group in this way.

The Konstantinovka-Ugledar highway (red arrow from the east) is controlled by the Russian Armed Forces. Moreover, for us it is a real "artery" that will allow us to pull up armored vehicles to Ugledar, because without it the assault is impossible. BMPs and tanks will help both cover the infantry offensive and suppress the main firing points. Together with the liberation of the western outskirts of Pavlovka, the transition of the Ugledar dachas under our control and the offensive from the west, this time the Russian Armed Forces have every chance of driving the enemy out of Ugledar.

CONCLUSION:
The success of the Russian Armed Forces in the Ugledar direction is influenced by many factors, starting from the successful cutting of the enemy's supply channels, and the transition of the Konstantinovka-Ugledar transport artery (by the way, Konstantinovka is also under our control). The withdrawal of part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to Selidovo and Pokrovsk and the sending of select units of "hijackers" in their place, which do not have the same training as the 72nd OMBR, are also having an effect, which allowed the front to be pushed through in the Vodyanoye area.

Well, the imminent onset of thaw also plays a hand. In this case, the transfer of supplies to Ugledar across the fields will be completely impossible, and the garrison will need to be supplied with ammunition, provisions, and fuel. And if the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Ugledar are currently sitting "on a starvation diet," then, most likely, the trickle of supplies will soon stop altogether, leaving the enemy fighters with an empty ammunition, without food or fuel.

By the evening of September 24, the situation of the Ugledar garrison continued to systematically deteriorate.

The Ukrainian perspective, courtesy of korrespondent.net
The environment of Ugledar. The significance of the city.
Ugledar is of great strategic importance, it is located on a hill and at the junction of two fronts - the Eastern in the Donetsk region and the Southern in the Zaporizhzhya region.

There is a new problem area on the front, analysts call the situation around Ugledar in Donetsk Oblast critical. The Russian army is trying to encircle the city and at the same time destroying the settlement with artillery and KABs, analysts from the DeepState project reported on September 24. The defense against Russian troops in Ugledar is being held by servicemen of the 72nd separate mechanized brigade named after the Black Zaporozhians.

PROBLEMS IN DEFENSE
DeepState said that while “political discussions about restrictions and permits continue,” the occupiers “are simply destroying entire cities and villages with aerial bombs from planes that should have been destroyed, but there is nothing to destroy them with.”

The head of the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) Andrey Kovalenko noted that thanks to the use of KABs and aviation, the Russian army managed to advance to the flank of the Ukrainian troops defending Ugledar.

"Ugledar. Previously, this city was easy to defend, it is on high ground. But with the active arrival of KABs to the front, the enemy managed to destroy it and move to the flank. Unfortunately, KABs and aviation are the only thing that allows the enemy infantry to move," he wrote.

The 72nd Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which has been defending Vuhledar for two years, is exhausted and risks being surrounded, and there is no help or replacement for it, notes Forbes analyst David Ax.

"The Ukrainian armed forces are simultaneously advancing on Kursk and defending themselves in the east and south. They are greatly stretched. And the 14 new brigades that the army is forming are experiencing an acute shortage of modern equipment," the expert writes.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
Ugledar is of great strategic importance. It is located on a hill and at the junction of two fronts - the Eastern in Donetsk Oblast and the Southern in Zaporizhia Oblast.

18 km to the east of the city there are railway lines along which the Russian army can transport troops and equipment along the Donetsk-Volnovakha line and further south.

However, as long as Ugledar remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, their barrel artillery is capable of delivering targeted strikes on this important highway.

Russian troops have been trying to take Ugledar since the very beginning of their invasion of Ukraine.

In the fall of 2022, they managed to take the village of Pavlovka to the south, but all subsequent attempts to attack the city ended in failure. From February 2023 to June 2024, the Russian army carried out at least four major offensive operations there - unsuccessfully and with huge losses.

But now the slow advance of Russian troops in other areas of Donbass is beginning to have an effect, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend their stretching flanks.

After the fall of Novomikhaylovka in April, Russian units began to bypass Ugledar from the northeast. Feeling successful, they increased pressure from the south and southwest as well.

"The refusal to rotate the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade forced the leadership to introduce auxiliary reserves of the TRO forces, which were unable to cope with the enemy's onslaught," DeepState notes. "As luck would have it, the defense of the 58th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade in Prechistovka had also collapsed earlier. Due to the unplanned departure to "better lines," the enemy is enveloping the right flank of the Ugledar group."

Posted by:badanov

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