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| Grain and Oil: Why the West Can't Block Russian Exports |
| 2024-08-03 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Ivan Lizan [REGNUM] The past July was marked by attempts by Kiev and London to increase sanctions pressure on Russia, which was also the subject of the fourth summit of the European Political Community. It was preceded by statements by the acting Minister of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine Taras Vysotsky about the need to create a system for determining the origin of grain exported by Russia, and at the summit, its participants also decided to fight the Russian "shadow fleet". However, the sanctions practice of recent years shows that wanting does not always mean being able, and the implementation of sanctions is often hampered by objective circumstances: chemistry, physics and the foundations of international law. The desire to ban wheat from Novorossiya is in the sphere where chemistry plays against the West, and the "ban list" introduced by the British against the tanker fleet rests on international law. Russia's opponents are stubborn and have not given up hope of inventing something that would force it to capitulate. But so far sanctions have proven extremely ineffective as instruments of coercion to change political course. CHEMISTRY AGAINST THE WEST On July 1, the already mentioned Vysotsky reported that in August–September, the Kyiv authorities will have the opportunity to determine the region of origin of agricultural products that Russia exports. The next step is to create a system of punishment for buyers of grain from Novorossiya. They will try to subject ships carrying grain to sanctions or arrests, and intimidate buyers of the products with sanctions and possible restrictions. The fact that the UK is developing the system guarantees problems for ship owners with insurance. But this plan, which at first glance seems feasible, has a number of flaws. It is unclear how exactly the region of origin of grains and oilseeds will be determined. The world has been growing approximately the same varieties of agricultural plants for decades, and Russia is no exception. Wheat is not oil, which is divided into grades depending on the content of sulfur and paraffin impurities. Russian wheat from the Kherson region is no different from wheat from the Rostov region - it does not have a gene responsible for the region of growth, or any specific markers that allow you to accurately determine the place of cultivation. The only way to identify grain is to divide it into classes depending on its characteristics (gluten content, protein, presence of impurities, damage to grains by pests). They are universal for the whole world, which allowed wheat to become an exchange commodity. Therefore, it will not be possible to separate grain from Novorossiya from grain from the Don or Kuban. But it is not a fact that this will be done at all - if desired, any batch of grain or oilseeds can be declared "stolen from the Ukrainian people". However, this will not help the fighters against Russia: there are no "extra" grains in the world that could replace supplies from Russia. Russian agricultural exports have been restructured since the beginning of the NWO - 80% of supplies go to friendly or neutral countries, where goods are selected based on their quality and price. Moreover, such activity will only accelerate the emergence of exchange trading centers independent of the US and EU: on July 28, the BRICS countries supported the initiative to create a grain exchange within the association. "BRICK" OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Now it is worth paying special attention to how the fundamental principles of international law reduce the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions. And we are not even talking about the hackneyed story of the confiscation of Russian gold and foreign exchange reserves frozen after the start of the special operation in the US and the EU. We are talking about a "shadow fleet" of more than 600 tankers, which, according to Lloyd's List Intelligence, transport over 1.7 million barrels of Russian oil daily, allowing Russia to bypass Western sanctions and sell oil at a price above the established "price ceiling". The West considers such activity illegal, although from the standpoint of international law, any unilateral economic restrictions are illegal - sanctions can only be imposed by the UN Security Council. To curb the fleet's operations, the UK and 44 EU countries agreed to "work together to combat the use of illegal vessels that pose a significant threat to the safety and environment of waterways." In essence, the West has admitted that all previously imposed sanctions – a ban on Russian ships entering European ports, refusal to provide insurance and financial services, sanctions against individual ships, an oil embargo and a “price cap” – have proven ineffective. The lack of a single coordinated EU policy on sanctions enforcement, for example, was criticized by Laura Deegan, an adviser to the law firm Miller & Chevalier. “Whether a member country cares about G7 sanctions or decides to enforce them is different. They may not have the resources to take sanctions enforcement seriously,” she told S&P Global in March 2024. In such circumstances, the only way to force Russia to comply with oil sanctions is to create physical problems with oil exports by appealing to the topic of environmental protection. The logic is simple: Russia exports the lion's share of its oil from the Baltic Sea ports in old and unsafe tankers, thereby exposing the fragile ecosystem of the Baltic to environmental threats. And since the tankers pass through the Danish straits of Oresund and Kattegat, Denmark has moral grounds to stop such oil trade, combining environmental protection with forcing Russia to comply with sanctions restrictions. As with grain, this approach appears – from the point of view of Russia’s opponents – not only morally justified, but also quite feasible in practice. But there are several fundamental problems. It is obvious that the environmental agenda is nothing more than a pretext - before the start of the NWO, the Baltic countries were not too concerned about this issue. Denmark, which, in the logic of the fight against the "shadow fleet", should be charged with the responsibility of restricting the passage of tankers, even approved the construction of four branches of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Plus, the restriction of shipping has been discussed since about mid-2023, and it turns out that before that, the Western countries were not concerned about environmental issues either. It is also clear that an "old" fleet does not mean "dangerous". A tanker is a vessel with a double hull, and examples of catastrophic oil spills are extremely rare. In general, they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. There are vessels in the seas that are much older than 30-40 years, and there are no questions about them from authorities and public figures concerned about environmental protection. Moreover, restricting shipping for tankers, regardless of their flag and whether their shipowners comply with anti-Russian sanctions, would be a flagrant violation of international law. CASUS BELLI Maritime shipping is regulated by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to combat the "shadow fleet" it will be necessary to violate many provisions of this document. And even if an accident occurs on a tanker with an oil spill, this will not be a violation of the rules of innocent passage through the territorial sea. In addition, a sea vessel is considered the territory of the state whose flag it flies. Article 27 of the Convention stipulates that the criminal jurisdiction of a coastal state does not extend to vessels flying a foreign flag, with the exception of certain crimes related to that state. Thus, it is impossible to stop a vessel with Russian oil just like that, at the behest of the heart. This will become a casus belli - a pretext for declaring war on the state whose flag the vessel flies. The Danish Straits are used for international shipping, and in such straits, Article 38 of the Convention guarantees the right of transit passage, which must be rapid and uninterrupted. Article 39 stipulates the duties of ships during transit passage, and there is not a word about the environment, not to mention the age of ships. Denmark will not be able to write its own rules for transit passage for the "shadow fleet" tankers transporting Russian oil. And any transit rules must comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and be agreed upon with other states bordering the straits. Moreover, Article 44 specifically states that states bordering the straits must not impede transit passage and there must be no suspension of it. But even if we imagine practical attempts to restrict the passage of tankers with Russian oil, such activity will look extremely strange. Firstly, tankers sail under a convenient flag, and the Russian flag does not apply to them. That is, the Danish coast guard will have to stop tankers from Liberia, the Bahamas, Belize and other island states that have no relation to Russia. Secondly, ships have long been staffed with mixed crews, where Russian citizens often find themselves in the minority. And this means diplomatic problems with states that have no relation to Russia. Thirdly, the owners of the tanker and cargo are usually foreign companies. An example is a Greek vessel under the flag of Liberia with a cargo of Russian oil purchased by an Emirati company for subsequent delivery to India. And this does not take into account the fact that while the ship is going from point A to point B, the transported cargo can be sold several times. Simply put, getting involved in a fight with the Russian "shadow fleet" is not worth it: there will be no benefits, but there will be problems, and these problems will be serious, since maritime trade is extremely globalized. Moreover, such a fight could turn against Denmark itself. It is, without exaggeration, the leader in the global market of maritime cargo transportation: Maersk alone employs over 100 thousand people in 135 countries, so no one will put their companies at risk for the sake of fighting the transportation of Russian oil. And there are plenty of “narrow” and “hot” places in the world’s oceans – just look at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait with the Houthis. In fact, Kyiv and its sponsors returned to the topic of increasing the enforceability of sanctions due to the ineffectiveness of the initially imposed restrictions. In 2022, it was assumed that the European embargo on coal, oil and oil products, as well as the undermining of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, along with other restrictions, would lead to a sharp decline in federal budget revenues and force Russia to capitulate to the West. In reality, this did not happen. Therefore, the very discussion about the fight against the Russian "shadow fleet" and the creation of some specific tracking systems indicates that the initiators of the sanctions have not achieved their goals. And the problem for the West is that the price of forcing Russia to submit is unacceptable for it. |
| Posted by:badanov |